CHARLES L. YANG, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, BOARD OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, AND BENJAMIN M. LIMSON, RESPONDENTS.

In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Charles L. Yang seeks
reversal of a Court of Appeals resolution^[1]
promulgated on March 8, 1978
denying his petition to enjoin enforcement of public respondents’ order
suspending him from the practice of his profession as electrical engineer.

The case arose out of an administrative complaint for
unprofessional conduct lodged against Yang by Benjamin Limson
before the Board of Electrical Engineering.^[2]
After due hearing, the Board declared Yang guilty as charged and imposed on him
the penalty of suspension from the practice of the electrical engineering
profession for a period of two (2) years.^[3]

Yang appealed to the Professional Regulation Commission.  The Commission however upheld the Board’s
decision and required Yang to surrender to it his certificate of registration
as electrical engineer for safekeeping for the duration of his suspension.^[4]

His plea for reconsideration having been denied by the
Commission, Yang went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
to challenge the Commission’s decision. 
But the Court dismissed his petition for review for lack of cause of
action.  The Court ruled that on account
of his failure to appeal the decision of the Professional Regulation Commission
to the Civil Service Commission before going to court for relief in accordance
with Presidential Decree No. 839, Yang failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, a fatal omission.^[5]

Yang then appealed to the Court of Appeals.  There he prayed for reversal of the decisions
of the Board of Electrical Engineering and the Professional Regulation
Commission, on the ground that (a) the finding of unprofessional conduct
against him was contrary to the evidence and applicable law; and (b) the
penalty imposed on him (two years suspension) was grossly excessive and
arbitrary under the facts.

On January 20, 1978,
while his appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Yang received a letter
from the Executive Director of the Board of Electrical Engineering^[6]
ordering him to surrender his certificate of registration within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof and to desist from practice as a professional electrical
engineer.  This prompted him to file
before the Appellate Court a verified petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.^[7]
On January 30, 1978, the
Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for; but after
hearing, the Court, by Resolution dated March
8, 1978, set the restraining order aside and denied the petition
for injunction.  Yang’s motion for
reconsideration proved futile.  Hence,
his present appeal to this Court.

According to said Resolution of March 8, 1978, the function of deciding appeals in
administrative cases involving professionals had been transferred from the
Office of the President to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in
virtue of Letter of Implementation No. 47, issued by President Marcos on August 18, 1976.  And since Yang did not appeal the decision of
the Professional Regulation Commission to the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, thus legally
disabling himself to take any proper recourse to the courts.

Yang contends, however, that reliance by the Court of Appeals on
LOI No. 47 is erroneous.  He argues that
Presidential Decree No. 223^[8]
creating the Professional Regulation Commission and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations do not provide for any appeal from the Commission’s decision to any
superior administrative body, said decision being pronounced “final x x x within thirty days from
receipt thereof” by the parties. 
Hence, according to him, from the decision of the Professional
Regulation Commission, there is no further mode of redress except through the
courts.

The Professional Regulation Commission has expressed concurrence
with Yang’s position.^[9]
Their position is well-taken.

Letter of Implementation No. 47 was issued avowedly to implement
Presidential Decree No. 830, which restructured the Office of the President of
the Philippines.  It transferred to the heads of departments
certain “functions now being undertaken by the Office of the
President.”^[10]
Particularly, it transferred to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
the function of “(a)pproval of rules and
regulations promulgated by the Professional Regulation Commission and decision
on appeals on administrative cases involving professionals.^[11]

That function, however (of deciding appeals in administrative
cases involving professionals), no longer pertained to the Office of the
President as of the time of the issuance of said Letter of Implementation No.
47, August 18, 1976, or of the decree it was designed to implement, PD 830,
effective on November 27, 1975.  For as
early as 1973, when the Professional Regulation Commission was created by PD
223, the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission (in
virtue of an express grant of power by the Decree) already provided that any
party aggrieved by the decision of any professional board (e.g., Board of
Electrical Engineers) “may appeal** within thirty days from receipt
thereof to the Commission whose decision shall be final,”^[12]
and that decisions of the Commission “shall be final** within thirty days
from receipt thereof” (by the parties).^[13]
Under PD 1, a regulatory agency like the Professional Regulation Commission,
having statutorily conferred authority, among others, to “adjudicate
contested cases,” was declared to be “subject to the administrative
supervision of the department under which it is placed, but its “decisions
** in the exercise of its rule-making and adjudicatory powers ** (were not)
subject to review by the department head unless otherwise stated specifically by the law establishing it.”^[14]
And appeals “from decisions of (such) regulatory agencies shall be to the
courts of justice, unless otherwise specifically provided by law.”^[15]

Thus, at the time of the promulgation of LOI 47, the Office of
the President had not the authority or function to resolve appeals from
decisions of the Professional Regulation Commission; the latter’s decisions
were final, and appeals therefrom could be taken only
to the courts of justice, absent any provision of law specifically providing
otherwise.  The provision of LOI 47
purporting to transfer to the Civil Service Commission the function then
“being undertaken by the Office of the President” was clearly founded
on a mistaken assumption, such function no longer pertaining to the Office of
the President.  Moreover, PD 839, which
LOI 47 was admittedly designed to implement, contains no provision specifically
granting to the Civil Service Commission or to the Office of the President, the
power of review in appeals from decisions of the Professional Regulation
Commission or any of the professional boards under its supervision.  Hence, LOI 47 could not have transferred, and
did not transfer, from the Office of the President to the Civil Service
Commission, the power of review lodged in the “courts of justice”
over judgments of the Professional Regulation Commission, or explicitly grant
that power to the Civil Service Commission.

It was no doubt upon these legal premises that, as the public
respondents point out, even after promulgation of LOI 47, the Office of the
President has been declaring itself without jurisdiction, and declining to take
cognizance, of appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission.^[16]

That PD 839 placed the Professional Regulation Commission under
the administrative supervision of the Civil Service Commission is of no
moment.  For, as PD 1 states, supra,
the placing of a regulatory agency like the Professional Regulation Commission,
having statutorily conferred authority, among others, to “adjudicate
contested cases,” under the administrative supervision of a department did
not have the effect of making its “decisions ** in the exercise of its
rule-making and adjudicatory powers ** subject to review by the department head
unless otherwise stated specifically by the law establishing it.”

This proposition is entirely consistent with corresponding
provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987.^[17]

SEC. 38 * * *

(2)    Administrative
Supervision ? (a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the
administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and
regulatory agencies or agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to
the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance
with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such actions
as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including
rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and
to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them * *.

* * *

(b)  
Such authority shall not, however, extend to:

* * *

(3)  
the power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions of
regulatory agencies in the exercise of their regulatory or quasi-judicial
functions; * *

(c) 
Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law
governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word ‘supervision’ shall
encompass administrative supervision as defined in this paragraph.

It was therefore error on the part of the respondent Court to
decline to act on Yang’s case on the ground of want of jurisdiction.  As the law now stands, the Civil Service Commission
has no power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decision of the
Professional Regulation Commission or the professional boards under it, and in
accordance with PD 1, supra, appeals “from (its) decisions ** shall
be to the courts of justice, unless otherwise specifically provided by
law.” This was in fact the state of the law when Yang commenced
proceedings in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
for the review of the adverse decision of the Professional Regulation
Commission, and when he appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already
stated, affirmed the Trial Court’s order dismissing his appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

The law has since been changed, however, at least in the matter
of the particular court to which appeals from the Commission should be
taken.  On August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 became effective and in its Section 29,
conferred on the Court of Appeals “exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions
except those falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.  **.” In virtue of BP 129, appeals from the Professional
Regulations Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated March 8, 1978 and that of April 11, 1978, denying reconsideration
of the former are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. 
The case is hereby REMANDED to said Court which shall take cognizance of
the petitioner’s appeal from the adverse decision of the Professional
Regulation Commission dated November 18, 1976, proceed with it in due course,
and resolve the same on the merits.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.

^[1]
By the Third Division, composed of Justices Reyes, L.B. (ponente)
Busran and Alampay, in
CA-G.R. No. 62280-R.

^[2]
Docketed as Administrative Case No. 170.

^[3]
B.E.E. Decision dated June 29, 1976;
Rollo, pp. 35-40.

^[4]
PRC Decision dated November 18, 1976;
Rollo, pp. 43-45.

^[5]
CFI Order dated May 19, 1977
penned by Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan; Rollo, pp. 47-59.

^[6]
Petition, Annex, “F”, Rollo, p. 60.

^[7]
Petition, Annex “G”; Rollo, pp.
62-70.

^[8]
Promulgated on June 22, 1973.

^[9]
Public respondent’s Comment, Rollo, pp.
112-116.

^[10]
Emphasis supplied.

^[11]
Par. 1(a), emphasis supplied.

^[12]
Sec. 35.

^[13]
Id.

^[14]
Par. 2, Art. II, Chapt. IV, Part II, Integrated
Reorganization Plan as adopted under P.D. No. 1.

^[15]
Par. 5, Id.

^[16]
Comment, pp. 117-120, express reference being made, for instance, to (1) PRC
Case No.  A-10:  Fernando Besabe v.
Emiliano Javate (Annex 1,
Comment), and (2) OP Case No. 0448-PRC Case No. A-15:  Dominador Fernandez
v. Soon Too Eng (Annex 2).

^[17]
83 OG No. 38, pp. 36-37, Sept. 21,
1987.