G.R. No. L-1131. May 31, 1947
JUAN JAMORA, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL BLANCO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, RESPONDENT.
PARAS, J.:
Jamora, seeking the annulment of the order of the respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Honorable Manuel Blanco, dated October 18, 1946,
which dismissed special proceeding No. 36 (Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Gorgonia Jamora Vda. de Mapa: Juan Jamora, petitioner), and set aside all the
proceedings theretofore accomplished therein.
The order complained of recites that the respondent Judge personally knew
that the estate of the deceased Gorgonia Jamora Vda. de Mapa had been settled
and distributed according to her will probated in the Court of First Instance of
Manila some fifteen years ago, and that the petitioner, then already appointed
administrator, when required to explain, stated that he instituted special
proceeding No. 36 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, because the records
of the testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila were
destroyed as a result of the war.
Petitioner’s main contention is that the respondent judge acted illegally in
basing the order of dismissal on his personal knowledge of alleged facts not
borne out by any evidence. While said respondent was perhaps somewhat hasty in
the matter, due undoubtedly to his reaction to the anomaly that confronted him,
we are not inclined to hold that the petitioner was thereby deprived of his day
in court. Indeed, lack of a formal hearing for the reception of necessary
evidence, is more than supplied by petitioner’s own admission in his petition
for certiorari (paragraphs 10, 11, 13) of the existence of the testate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila, of the destruction of the
records thereof, and of the absence of any petition for reconstitution. Such
admission also points to the belief that the petitioner; as alleged in the order
in question, really confirmed at the hearing held on October 15, 1946, what the
respondent judge personally knew. And this is the reason why the order in
question relies on the fact that—
“Dicho Sr. Jamora admitio ser ciertos los hechos expuestos en el parrafo
anterior, y explicando su proceder al instituir la presente actuacion especial
dijo que lo hizo porque con motivo de la guerra se ha destruido el expediente de
la testamentaria de su finada hermana, la referida Gorgonia Jamora viuda de
Mapa, obrante en el juzgado de primera instancia de Manila.”
Petitioner’s remedy is to file in the Court of First Instance of Manila the
proper petition for reconstitution of the records in the testate proceedings.
The circumstance that he is not in possession of documents sufficient for the
purpose, is not a valid excuse for his reluctance or omission to institute
reconstitution proceedings. He had no right to suppose that the records could
not be reconstituted, because other interested parties may be successful in the
task; and even if reconstitution should be impossible after proper proceedings,
it would be incumbent upon the court to order a new trial or permit the filing
of a new action.
The herein petition will therefore be, as the same is hereby, dismissed, and
it is so ordered with costs against the petitioner.
Pablo, Bengzon,
and Padilla, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
Petitioner alleges that he is the administrator of the estate of his deceased
sister Gorgonia Jamora Vda. de Mapa, in process of administration and
distribution in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo as special proceedings No.
36, besides being one of the heirs.
On September 11, 1945, after consulting Judge Gervasio Diaz of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, petitioner filed the petition initiating the
proceedings, and on September 12, 1945, Judge Gervasio Diaz ordered the petition
set for hearing at 8 o’clock a. m. on October 6, 1945, and the publication of
the order in the Ang Tigbatas, a newspaper edited in the city of Iloilo
and of general circulation, requiring all interested parties to appear and show
cause why the petition should not be granted.
The order was duly published. Nobody appeared to contest the petition. No
creditor filed any claim against the estate notwithstanding the lapse of six
months from the date of the publication of the notice.
In authorizing the filing of the petition and giving it due course, Judge
Gervasio Diaz had personal knowledge of the testate proceedings which was
pending in Manila, and was duly informed of the fact that the record was
destroyed and could not be reconstituted, and in said testate proceedings no
specific adjudication was made of a parcel of land, property of the deceased,
located in Negros Occidental.
Petitioner complains that more than a year after special proceedings No. 36
had been pending, without any motion, petition, or any pleading or incident
justifying it, respondent made a verbal order placing the case in the calendar
for October 15, 1946. On said day, respondent judge propounded a few questions
to petitioner. On October 18, 1946, respondent judge issued an order declaring
null and void the proceedings and set aside the court’s approval to a lease
contract between Roberto Jamora and petitioner, dated October 21, 1945, and
ordered that a copy of the order be sent to the register of deeds of Negros
Occidental for proper compliance with respect to lot No. 628 of Silay cadaster,
covered by original certificate of title No. 6676.
The order was based on respondent’s personal knowledge, acquired while he was
provincial fiscal of Iloilo in 1931, to the effect that in said year Gorgonia
Jamora died in Manila leaving a will which was legalized in the court of first
instance of said city, and that the fact was admitted by petitioner when he was
questioned on October 15, 1946.
Petitioner alleges that the order was null and void because (a) it was
not supported by any evidence on record and was issued by respondent judge
motu proprio, (b) the same is based on hearsay evidence of
respondent himself and on facts not falling within his judicial knowledge, and
(c) it makes the statement that the properties of the deceased were
distributed according to her will, which is not true.
Respondent answered by alleging: (a) that it is “almost of judicial
knowledge” that the deceased was a resident of Manila; (b) that she has
never been a resident of Iloilo; (c) that the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo is not the one competent; (d) that “it is known to everybody” that
since 1931 proceedings were initiated in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the distribution of the properties of the deceased according to her will,
and distribution was effected accordingly, and that the proper proceeding is to
reconstitute the record in Manila. The respondent judge also alleged that
petitioner acted in bad faith and made false allegations, and induced Judge
Conrado Barrios to give his approval to the lease contract which was set aside
by respondent.
Nowhere does it appear that any record or memorandum has been taken of the
hearing which took place on October 15, 1946.
We cannot give our approval to the procedure followed by respondent judge.
The bitter smack of arbitrariness in it is highly noticeable. More than a year
after the case was initiated and, apparently, in regular process, respondent
made an oral order to include it in the calendar of hearings for October 15,
1946. No reason at all has been given why no written order was issued. Except
petitioner, no one of the several interested parties, the heirs, appears to have
been notified of the hearing. No explanation has been given why the hearing was
concealed from said parties. The hearing was set on the judge’s own notion,
without any request from any interested party. No motion, petition, incident, or
proceeding called for a hearing. Because petitioner is the clerk of the court,
he could not fail to learn about the hearing. He was asked some questions, and
the whole hearing was reduced to said questioning. No stenographic notes were
taken. No record or memorandum of the hearing was shown. The omission has never
been explained.
On October 18, 1946, respondent issued the order annulling all the
proceedings in the case, and dismissing it with costs against petitioner,
without stating who is the creditor entitled to collect said costs. Although the
order mentioned admissions made by petitioner during his questioning, respondent
relied principally on facts of his own personal knowledge. The record is lacking
of any evidence upon said facts. Respondent avers that said facts are “almost of
judicial knowledge.” He ought to know that, while evidence can be dispensed with
to show facts of judicial knowledge, said facts are specifically mentioned in
the rules. There is no law authorizing the lower court to enlarge the scope of
facts of judicial knowledge. That power is reserved to the rule-making authority
of the Supreme Court and to the legislative functions of Congress.
Respondent’s personal knowledge of the facts in question does not make them
of judicial knowledge. The latter refers to undisputed facts which, by common
experience, are of universal knowledge among intelligent persons within a
country or community. It does not include personal knowledge of specific facts
about which individual judges may know or get information of. Respondent is
entitled to his opinion to presume that facts known or heard by him may be
elevated to the category of being “almost of judicial knowledge.” But what is
“almost” may not be included within the purview of the rule on judicial
knowledge. If respondent wanted the case to be disposed of upon facts of his
personal knowledge, the proper procedure for him to do was to take the witness
stand and allow another judge to take cognizance of the case. The order of
October 18, 1946, has been issued with abuse of judicial power, crowning a line
of anomalous actuations incompatible with justice and judicial dignity.
Respondent judge accuses petitioner of fraudulence, bad faith and perjured
testimony. If the accusations are based on fact, petitioner should be called
into account for them, but proper procedure should be followed, the one in
consonance with law and approved practice, and avoiding all irregularities. The
question whether special proceedings No. 36 of Iloilo should or should not be
dismissed is within jurisdiction of the lower court to decide, but the decision
should not be rendered through an arbitrary procedure or in disregard of the law
and the rules.
Petitioner complains of the intemperate language used by respondent judge in
his pleadings before this Court. Besides the fact that petitioner himself is not
free from all blame in this respect, we feel that the verbal outbursts of the
parties in this case are explainable as natural in view of the high tension of
feelings provoked by the controversy. Although the passion exhibited by both
parties may not be justified, it is hard to set fixed rules by which the emotive
manifestations of the parties may be disciplined or put under control.
We
conclude that the petition should be granted and the respondent’s order of
October 18, 1948, be set aside as null and void.