IGNACIO MESINA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of
the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the
registration case pending before the same court covering the property
described therein be given due course and that defendants be ordered to
pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s;
action is already barred by the statute of limitations. The reasons
advanced are: the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of
registration or issuance of patent over the property was issued
“sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout”, while the transfer
certificate of title covering the same was issued 6h September 16,
1953. The present action which calls for the cancellation of said
decree and title has, therefore, been filed after the lapse of more
than four years, which cannot be done, because the title has already
become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained this
motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259,
with improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that
he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly,
peacefully and against the whole world and up to the present time he is
the only one who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at
present the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same
court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No.
N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands,
without exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that
defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as a consequence of
which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the register
of deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through fraud,
deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged
to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands has no authority nor
jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land because it is the
private property of plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff prays that
said decree and title be cancelled.

Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141), provides:

“(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interests have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceeding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.”

In the case of Susi vs.
Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926
(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 241), the
possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts—an application therefor being
sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Thus, the
following is what this Court said on the matter:

“It
clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely and
publicly, personally and through, his predecessors, since the year
1880, that is, for about forty-five years. * * * When on August 15,
1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi
had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account
that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold
it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to
possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is
beyond the reach of memory. * * * In favor of Valentin Susi, there is,
moreover the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (6) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired,
by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47
of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.” (Italics supplied)

Such is the situation in which plaintiff claims to be in his complaint.
He alleges that he is the owner in fee simple of the lot in question,
with the improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija,
and that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly,
openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to the
present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof.
He further claims that said lot is at present the subject of a
registration proceeding pending in the same court, known as
Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238. If by
legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have
acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had
ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property
and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of
title covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of
defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued
through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

Considering
that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s action is already barred by the
statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory
that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground
of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,^[1]
which theory does not apply here because the property involved is
allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public
domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing
the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove
his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to deny the
motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable,
rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., reserves his vote.

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^[1] Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil., 259; 45 Off. Gaz., 3819; See also G. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Quirino Bolanos, 95 Phil., 106; Aguilar, et al. vs. Caoagdan, et al., 105 Phil., 661; 56 Off. Gaz. (28) 4546; Henderson vs. Garrido, et al., G. R. No. L-4913, December 28, 1951.