HOSPICIO NILO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALMARIO GATCHALIAN, RESPONDENTS.

Under Section 36(1) of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, a landowner may eject an agricultural lessee or tenant on
the ground that the owner shall personally cultivate the land himself.
On September 10, 1971, Republic Act No. 6389, in amending Republic Act
No. 3844, eliminated personal cultivation as a ground for the ejectment
of the tenant or leaseholder. The issue in these cases is whether or
not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to
cover cases that were filed during the effectivity of the repealed
provision.

G.R. NO. L-34586 – This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Court of Appeals’ decision ruling that Republic Act No. 6389 has
no retroactive effect.

Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at
Barrio San Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-76791 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the agricultural
share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65.

On February 22, 1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No.
1676 with the Court of Agrarian Relations electing the leasehold system.
On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian filed an ejectment suit against
petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36(1) of
Republic Act No. 3844 which provides:

“SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. –
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of
the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if
after due hearing it is shown that:

“(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the
immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will
convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory,
hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes x x
x.”

Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was
but an act of reprisal and retaliation because he elected the leasehold
system.

The two cases were heard jointly since they involved identical
landholding and parties. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that
there was a bona fide intention to cultivate the land
personally. The petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The
Court found no justification to unduly interfere with the desire of
Gatchalian to personally cultivate his own land.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
“personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural
lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389”. The latter law
which took effect on September 10, 1971 now provides:

“(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes x x x.”

The respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive application.

G.R. NO. L-36625 – This is an appeal raised by petitioner
Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court
of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint for the ejectment of his
tenant, respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation.
The landowner wants to personally cultivate the land owned by him
located in Pulilan, Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square meters.
Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned the constitutionality of Section 7
of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36(1) of Republic Act
No. 3844. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court on
the ground that the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
6389 falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.

The complaint in this case was filed by the petitioner with the Court of
Agrarian Relations. The petitioner asked for the ejectment of his
tenant Juan Castro. The latter in his answer alleged that the
petitioner was not the owner of the landholding in question and that
assuming the petitioner was the owner, he is nevertheless not qualified
and fit to personally cultivate said landholding as he spends most of
his time in mahjong sessions and in cockpits.

After the enactment of Republic No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, the
respondent moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint on the
ground that the new law eliminated personal cultivation by the landowner
as a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. The Court of
Agrarian Relations dismissed the complaint. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals alleging that: (1) the trial court erred in considering that
Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Sec. 36(1) of Republic Act
No. 3844 has a retroactive effect on all cases for ejectment of an
agricultural lessee from his landholding on the ground of personal
cultivation even if the said cases were filed long before the approval
of the said Act; and (2) the trial court erred in not considering that
Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 is unconstitutional, which point was
raised by appellant in his opposition to appellee’s motion to dismiss
the complaint and his motion for reconsideration of the order dated
December 17, 1971.

Since both cases involve the same issue of retroactivity, we shall resolve them together.

The issue of whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which
amended Section 36(1) of Republic Act No. 3844, repealing as a
consequence “personal cultivation” as a cause for dispossession, should
be given retroactive effect has spawned controversy. In Arambulo v. Conicon (CA-G.R. No. 46727-R, January 6, 1972) and Palpalatoc v. Pescador
(CA-G.R. No. SP-00089-R, February 22, 1972), the Court of Appeals held
that the deletion of personal cultivation as a cause for ejectment has
retroactive application affecting even those cases pending in courts.
The Arambulo case was elevated to the Supreme Court on
certiorari but was denied in a minute resolution “for lack of merit”
(G.R. No. L-34816, March 14, 1972).

In other cases, however, the Court of Appeals held that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect. In Lorenzo v. Lorenzo
(CA-G.R. No. 46842-R, September 4, 1971), the Court made a categorical
statement that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect. There
are other cases where the appellate court split into two camps.

In resolving the controversy, we first apply established rules of statutory construction.

Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code)
provides that: “Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein
otherwise provided.” According to this provision of law, in order that a
law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express
provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be
understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be
borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions with
no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application
to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that
the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless
the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).

As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced:

“The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a
retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there anything found therein
which indicates an intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is,
rather, by clear intendment, prospective.

“It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to
be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In
every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective
effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost without number.

“In the case of Reynold v. M’Arthur (2 Pet., 416, 434), it was said that –

“‘It is a principle which has always been held sacred in the
United States, that laws by which human action is to be regulated, look
forward not backward; and are never to be construed retrospectively,
unless the language of the Act shall render such construction
indispensable.’

“In the case of Leete v. St. Louis State Bank (115 Mo., 184), it was held that –

“‘In construing statutes in regard to whether their action is to
be prospective or retrospective, all the adjudicated cases and all the
text-writers with unbroken uniformity unite in declaring ‘that they are
to operate prospectively and not otherwise unless the intent
that they are to operate in such an unusual way, to wit,
retrospectively, is manifested on the face of the statute in a manner
altogether free from ambiguity.’

“The case of Berdan v. Van Riper (16 N.J.L., 7) holds that where a
statute is susceptible of construction as both prospective and
retrospective, the former construction will be adopted, but especially
if the retrospective operation will work injustice to anyone. x x x”
(de Montilla v. La Corporacion de PP. Agustinos; Ancajas v. Jakosalem,
24 Phil. 220).

The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543). Thus –

“A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute
operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the
express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the
lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more
strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act
retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and
imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the
intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court
will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said
so. x x x” (Farrel v. Pingree (1888), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer
v. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N. C., 495: United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U. S., 306;)

An earlier opinion to the same effect is In re Will of Riosa (39 Phil.
23). This is still the rule and it has stood the test of time (Asiatic
Petroleum Co. v. Llanes, 49 Phil. 466; De Mesa v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 53 Phil. 342; Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741; China Insurance
& Surety Co. v. Judge of 1st Inst. of Manila, 63 Phil. 320; La Paz
Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. v. Bordman and Iloilo Commercial
& Ice Co., 65 Phil. 401; The Manila Trading & Supply Co. v.
Santos, 66 Phil. 237; La Previsora Filipina v. Ledda, 66 Phil. 573;
Tolentino v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781; Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309;
Tamayo v. Manila Hotel Co., 101 Phil. 810; Valencia v. Hon. Jose T.
Surtida, 2 SCRA 622; Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA 682; Billiones v. Court of
Industrial Relations and Villardo v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14
SCRA 676; Lazaro v. Commissioner of Customs, 17 SCRA 36; Universal Corn
Products, Inc. v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 1048; Cebu Portland
Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 25 SCRA 789.

A restatement of the doctrine was made in the case of Espiritu v. Cipriano (55 SCRA 533.) Thus –

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“x x x Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature
has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the
obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is
equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a
retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such
intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment. x x x” (Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51,
286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28 F (2d) 30.)

The general rule therefore, is that statutes have no retroactive effect
unless otherwise provided therein (Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172). To exemplify this doctrine,
in Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408), we held that Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Act of 1959 has no retroactive effect. In Padasas v. Court of Appeals
(82 SCRA 250), we held that the Agricultural Land Reform Code or
Republic Act No. 3844 must be enforced prospectively and and not
retroactively and therefore, the rights created, granted, or recognized
therein such as the right of redemption accrued upon the enactment of
said legislation and may be exercised thereafter in appropriate cases.
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (87 SCRA 263) reiterated in Castro v. Court of Appeals (99 SCRA 722) and in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals (104 SCRA 619), we held that Presidential Decrees Nos. 27, 316, and 946 cannot be applied retroactively.

More important than resort to statutory construction in determining the
issue of retroactivity is the ascertainment of the objectives sought to
be realized by the Code of Agrarian Reforms.

In the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 6389, the applicable objectives are:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices;

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society.

It is the legislature which determines the policy objectives of reform legislation.

This Court would be thwarting and not promoting the objectives of
Congress if we rule against the small landowners in this case. The
national goal of having independent and self-reliant farmers tilling
their own small landholdings would not be achieved if persons who own
only two hectares or 6,941 square meters of land as in the instant cases
cannot be allowed to work their land themselves but must be compelled
to perpetuate a lessor-lessee relationship. The desire of Congress to
achieve a “dignified existence for the small farmers” is not served if
two families – one landowner and one tenant – must share the measly
produce from 6,941 square meters of land. Land reform and agrarian
reform were intended to equalize opportunities for land ownership, to
enable a diffusion and sharing of wealth and not a sharing of poverty or
a fragmentation of tenanted farms into non-economic sizes.

We are aware of the deliberations and debates in Congress on Republic Act No. 6389. We stated in Aisporna v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 481).

“That it was the intention of the legislature in amending
paragraph (1), sec. 36 of R.A. 3844 to deprive the landowner of the
right to eject his tenant on the ground that the former would personally
cultivate the land and also to abate cases brought by the landowner to
eject the tenant on the same ground which were still pending at the time
of the passage of the amendatory act, is clear and evident from the
deliberations and debate of Congress when Republic Act 6389 was being
deliberated, as published in the Senate Journal xxx.”

This Aisporna case is, however, notably distinct from the two
cases now before us. In Aisporna, the court ordered the petitioner
tenant ejected on the ground of personal cultivation by the landowner.
The court order became final and executory. One year after his
ejectment, Aisporna availed himself of his remedies under the law and
filed a case for reinstatement with damages alleging that the owner
failed to cultivate the land himself. The trial Court ruled in favor of
Aisporna. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision stating that during the pendency of the action for
reinstatement, the law was amended and personal cultivation as a ground
to eject a tenant was removed. The appellate court opined that with the
abolition of personal cultivation as a basis for ejectment, the
corollary proviso on reinstatement:

“x x x Provided further, That should the landholder not cultivate
the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have
the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any
loss incurred by him because of said dispossession.”

was also eliminated.

The issue in Aisporna was the right of the tenant to recover
his status vis-a-vis the landholding from whence he was ejected. To
sustain the appellate decision would have resulted in a plain case of
injustice to the tenant and a condonation of bad faith. Our
pronouncements on retroactivity dealt with this issue alone and to the
extent that the Aisporna decision may be interpreted as
covering factual situations similar to the two cases now before us, to
that extent we make it clear that it does not do so.

It is true that during the debates on the bill which was later enacted
into Republic Act No. 3844, there were statements on the floor that “the
owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure”
even in cases where the owner has not really succeeded yet in ejecting
the tenants (Senate Journal, Nos. 43 and 44, March 30 and 31, 1971, 2nd
Regular Session – 7th Congress). Nonetheless and inspite of these
remarks, Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act
No. 6389 retroactive and to cover ejectment cases on the ground of
personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts.

“x x x In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a
statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document,
it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning of
the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning
has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and
validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know
what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the
language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to
speak, is made up of two elements – an internal and an external one; it
originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the
latter may defeat the former. (59 C.J.S. 1017; Manila Jockey Club,
Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board, 107 Phil. 151).

In the case of Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board, supra.,
we held that legislative debates are expressive of the views and
motives of individual members and are not always safe guides and, hence,
may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what
construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body
that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members
thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who
did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other (Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, 499-501; Ramos vs. Alvarez, 97 Phil. 844).

There have been cases in the past where we adhered to this doctrine.
Thus, we held that individual statements made by Senators on the floor
of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (Casco
Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347; Resins, Inc. v. Auditor
General, 25 SCRA 754). Accordingly, they are not controlling in the
interpretation of the law in question (Phil. Assn. of Government
Retirees, Inc. v. GSIS, 14 SCRA 610). Some statements may be deemed to
be a mere personal opinion of the legislator (Mayon Motors, Inc. vs.
Acting Com. of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 918).

The interpretation of statutes is for the courts. And the courts are
not necessarily bound by one legislator’s opinion, expressed in
Congressional debates, concerning the application of existing laws (Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank of the Phils. 102 Phil. 477).

The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic
Act No. 6389 is a social legislation and passed under the police power
of the State, it should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
tenants.

We agree with the petitioner-tenant that the law in question is social
legislation. But social justice is not for tenants alone. The disputed
land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in
L-34586 is slightly bigger, about two (2) hectares. A person with only
one or two hectares of land to his name is equally deserving of social
justice.

A majority of the landowners affected by the repeal of “personal
cultivation” as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant own small
landholdings. The records of Senate Bill No. 478 which eventually
became Republic Act No. 6389 reveal that the repeal has affected an
estimated 75% of landowners in the country who own tenanted lands of
less than 3 hectares, 40% of those who own 5 hectares or less and 96% of
landowners who own an area of less than 10 hectares each.

Many of these landowners who filed actions for ejectment on this ground
are retirees who have opted to leave the stresses and strains of city
life and to return to their home towns to personally cultivate their
small landholdings. They are teachers, clerks, nurses, and other
hardworking and frugal people who in a lifetime of sacrifice gathered
their pitiful little savings and purchased small farms to supplement the
inadequate pensions from the Government Service Insurance System or the
Social Security System. The owners of the lots in these cases had the bona fide
intention to personally cultivate their lands as proven and found by
the trial courts. To hold that they can no longer eject their tenants
because of Republic Act No. 6389 would deprive them of their right to
enjoy their property which they had already asserted before the statute
was passed. Precisely, the legislators, in providing “personal
cultivation” as a ground to eject tenants intended to encourage and
attract the landowners to go to their respective provinces and till
their own lands. Unfortunately, the ground of “personal cultivation”
was abused and used as a pretext to eject the tenants and this led to
the amendatory law.

This unfortunate consequence should not work an injustice upon those small landowners proven to have the bona fide intention to personally cultivate their lands. In Gonzales v. GSIS (107 SCRA 492), we held that:

“It should also be borne in mind that Republic Act No. 3844, then
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, is a social legislation
whose implementation has been made more imperative by Section 6, Article
11 of the 1973 Constitution. It is designed to promote economic and
social stability. It must be interpreted liberally to give full force
and effect to its clear intent. This liberality in interpretation,
however, should not accrue solely in favor of actual tillers of the
land, the tenant-farmers, but should extend to landowners as well,
especially those owning “small landholdings”, by which is meant
landholdings of 24 hectares and less than 24 hectares. These landowners
constitute part of the economic middle class which the Government is
trying to build. They deserve as much consideration as the tenants
themselves in order not to create an economic dislocation, were tenants
solely favored but this particular group of landowners impoverished.”
(See “Whereas”, clauses of LOI No. 143).

In Cabatan v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA 323), we similarly held that:

“x x x the reliance by the tenants-lessees on “social justice” as a
reason to support the continuance of an unjust and inequitable rental
rate is not only improper but would countenance and perpetuate an
injustice against the landholder-lessor. This, the constitutional
precept of “social justice” was never meant to do.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“Social justice as thus defined and in its true meaning is not
meant to countenance, much less perpetuate, an injustice against any
group – not even as against landholders. For the landholders as a
component unit or element in our agro-industrial society are entitled to
‘equal justice under law’ which our courts are, above everything else,
under mandate of the Constitution to dispense fairly, without fear nor
favor.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“x x x A cursory study of the long line of decisions on social
justice will readily reveal, however, that the concept has been fleshed
out – the principle, conceptualized – as Justice Laurel enjoined in the
celebrated case of Calalang vs. Williams – not thru mistaken sympathy
for or misplaced antipathy against any group – whether labor or capital,
landlord or tenant – but even-handedly and fairly, thru the observance
of the principle of ‘equal justice under law,’ for all and each and
every element of the body politic.” (Eg. Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.
726 (1940) cited, supra; Guido vs. Rural Progress
Administration, 47 O.G. 1848, (1949) 84 Phil. 847, a reconciliation
between conflicting claims of social justice and protection to property
and rights; Militona Estate Inc. vs. De Guzman, et al., No. L-11912
(1959), 105 Phil. 1296 (unreported).)

In Dequito v. Llamas, (66 SCRA 504) we ruled that the
petitioner-tenant ought to know that if he has rights to protection as a
tenant, the landowner has also rights under the law. The protective
mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to hoodwink
courts of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea of
helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner.

Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength from later developments.

Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property
ownership is impressed with a social function. This means that the
owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself
but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6
of Article II that in the promotion of social justice, the State “shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.”

The Constitution also ensures that the worker shall have a just and
living wage which should assure for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life
(Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs.
Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).

In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the constitutionality
of Presidential Decree No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of
tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the
ownership of the land they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294). We noted the imperative need for such a decree in Chavez v. Zobel (55
SCRA 26). We held in the latter case that “on this vital policy
question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a
radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was
apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. x x xThere is
no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the
law of the land according to the present Constitution.”

Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of the tenant
from the bondage of the soil, transfers to him the ownership of the
land he tills, and provides instruments and mechanisms therefor, has
recognized personal cultivation as a ground for retention and,
therefore, exemption from the land transfer decree. Personal
cultivation cannot be effected unless the tenant gives up the land to
the owner.

Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:

“In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than
seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will
now cultivate it.”

The redistribution of land, restructuring of property ownership,
democratization of political power, and implementation of social justice
do not require that a landowner should be deprived of everything he
owns and that even small parcels as in these two cases now before us may
not be worked by the owner himself. The evil sought to be remedied by
agrarian reform is the ancient anachronism where one person owns the
land while another works on it. The evil is not present in cases of
personal cultivation by the owner.

Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict requirements. In
addition to proof of ownership and the required notices to the tenant,
the bona-fide intention to cultivate must be proved to the satisfaction
of the court. And as earlier stated, the tenant is protected in case
the owner fails to cultivate the land within one year or to work the
land himself for three years.

The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to
landowners who do not own other agricultural lands containing an
aggregate of more than seven hectares or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes where they derive
adequate income to support themselves and their families. (Letter of
Instruction No. 472 dated October 21, 1976).

To support his petition, Fortunato Castro in L-36625 asserts that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 is unconstitutional.

The amended provision reads:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests
on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.”

There appears to be nothing unconstitutional in the above provision. If
Mr. Castro is challenging agrarian reform itself, then his challenge is
puerile if not hopeless. We ruled in Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations
(22 SCRA 792) that the Agricultural Land Reform Code is valid and
justified. In Paulo v. Court of Appeals (54 SCRA 253) we ruled:

“x x x Land Reform, which is now transforming the rural existence
of the farmers, has become more imperative in view of the provisions of
the New Constitution. Thus Section 6, Article II thereof directs that
‘The State shall promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare
and security of all the people,’ and for the attainment of this end,
directs that ‘the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
ownership and profits.’ Section 5, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions provides that the implementation of declared agrarian
reforms’ shall be given priority. There is no question that the massive
overhaul of the system of land ownership by the transfer to the tenants
of the ownership of the land they till and the grant to them of the
instruments and mechanisms to increase their land’s productivity will
decisively improve the people’s livelihood and promote political and
social stability.”

And, of course, Section 12 of Article XIV specifically mandates that
“the State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and
achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.” At any rate, there
is no need to pass upon the constitutional issue for the purpose of
resolving the narrow question of retroactivity of the questioned
provision.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NO. L-34586 is denied for lack of merit
and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. In
G.R. No. L-36625, the questioned order of the lower court is set aside
and the case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for
trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Acting C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., in the result.

Aquino, J., no part.

Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., on official leave.