PRISCILLA IMBING, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE BENJAMIN C. TIONGSON, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 5, MANILA, RESPONDENT.

Imbing versus Tiongson

The Case

This is an administrative case in which Priscilla Imbing charged Judge Benjamin C. Tiongson, then a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 5, Manila, with abandonment and non-support of their two children. The complaint grew out of a relationship that the Court found to be grossly immoral, and it matters for two reasons: it fixes the standard of moral conduct demanded of every member of the Judiciary, and it holds that a complainant's desistance does not strip the Supreme Court of its power to discipline an erring judge.

Procedural History

The complainant's letter, dated July 25, 1991 and addressed to former President Corazon C. Aquino, was endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which referred it to the Supreme Court. The Court required the respondent judge to comment, and he filed his comment denying the material allegations. The complainant then wrote a letter dated March 23, 1992 withdrawing her complaint. Notwithstanding the desistance, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for investigation, report, and recommendation. Because the complainant asked that her deposition be taken in Pagadian City for security reasons, the Court designated Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City to take it. When the deposition was called, the complainant confirmed her withdrawal and declined to give her deposition. The investigation report recommended a finding of grossly immoral conduct, dismissal from the service with prejudice to re-employment, and forfeiture of retirement benefits. The case was resolved by the Supreme Court in its administrative jurisdiction.

Facts

Priscilla Imbing alleged that on November 1, 1981 she was married to Benjamin C. Tiongson, then a city judge of Pagadian City, according to the rites, customs, and traditions of the Subanen tribe, solemnized by the tribal head, Lantay Imbing. They lived in Pagadian City and had two children, Anna Freya, born on September 19, 1982, and Benjamin, Junior, born on December 6, 1983. When the respondent was assigned to Manila, he brought the family along, but after a time he abandoned the complainant and the children for another woman, forcing them to return to Zamboanga del Sur without financial support.

In his comment, the respondent denied the marriage and denied paternity of Benjamin, Junior, but acknowledged paternity of Anna Freya. He claimed he had been sending one thousand pesos monthly for her support. He also asserted that the complainant was married to and had a child with another man at the time of the alleged marriage.

The Court examined the respondent's personal file and found that he had been married to Estrellita R. Tiongson on March 10, 1963, with no showing that the marriage was dissolved or annulled. The birth certificate of Anna Freya, which the respondent himself signed as informant, stated that the parents were married on November 1, 1981 in Lapuyan, with the explanation Subanen rites. The Court thus found that the marriage did take place, though it was invalid because the complainant is a Protestant and the respondent a Catholic, so the provision on marriages of Mohammedans and pagans did not apply.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross immorality warranting disciplinary action.
• Whether or not the complainant's desistance from prosecuting the administrative case warrants its dismissal.
• Whether or not the Court should resolve the filiation of Benjamin, Junior in this administrative proceeding.

Applicable Provisions

Article 78 of the Civil Code, the governing law at the time, provides:

Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.

The Court held that this provision could not validate the marriage between the complainant and the respondent because she is a Protestant and he is a Catholic.

Section 9, Rule 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987, governs the penalties for dismissal, and the Court applied it to the sanction imposed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent guilty of gross immorality. It stressed that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only in the performance of judicial duties but also in his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The respondent admitted that at the time of his affair with the complainant he knew she was married to and had a child with another man. The Court held that this arrant insensitivity and mockery of the moral norms of society betrayed a demeaning contempt of the societal standards of morality expected of members of the Judiciary.

On the second issue, the Court held that the complainant's desistance did not warrant dismissal. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may condone a detestable act, is to strip the Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary. The Court also found the circumstances of the withdrawal dubious, given the complainant's claim that the respondent had threatened to kill her if she pursued the case.

On the third issue, the Court declined to pass upon whether Benjamin, Junior is a child of the respondent, no evidence having been presented to sufficiently establish his true filiation. That is a matter to be determined in an appropriate proceeding in the proper forum.

Doctrine

A judge's personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach, for no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Gross immorality is a ground for dismissal from the service, and the dismissal carries cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government service. Once an administrative charge has been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate by the complainant's desistance, because what is involved is a matter of public interest and the Court's supervisory power over members of the Judiciary.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Benjamin C. Tiongson guilty of gross immorality, dismissed him from the service with the accessory penalties provided by law, and ordered him to cease and desist immediately from rendering any judgment or order or continuing any judicial action or proceeding.

Remember This

Memorize the line that there is no dichotomy of morality, and that a judge is judged by his private morals as well as his official conduct. Examiners use this case to test the standard of moral integrity required of judges and the rule that a complainant's desistance does not divest the Supreme Court of its disciplinary jurisdiction.