EPIFANIA CUENCA Y MENDOZA,PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, RESPONDENT AND APPELEE.

Epifania Cuenca y Mendoza, is appealing from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (in Spec. Proc. No. 3379), denying her petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Sometime in 1955, appellant was charged with the
crime of theft in the Municipal Court of Manila (in Crim. Case No. D-46759),
with 3 others, under the following information:

“The undersigned accuses Epifania Cuenca y Mendoza, Alfredo Coronel y
Sarmiento, Remigio Lachica y Basilan, and Ariston Cuevas y Baldueza, of the
crime of theft, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 21st day of July, 1955, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away two (2) packages of one pound each of
Cafe Puro coffee, valued at P5.20, belonging to Cesar Ascoña, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P5.20 Philippine
currency.

“* * * that the said accused Epifania Cuenca y Mendoza and Ariston Cuevas y
Baldueza are habitual delinquents according to Art. 62, Sec. 5(a) [of the
Revised Penal Code], they having been previously convicted several times of the
crime of theft by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent Courts, as
follows:

EPIFANIA CUENCA Y MENDOZA

*            *            *            *            *           
*            *

“Contrary to law.”

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. The case was then tried and,
after trial, the Municipal Court of Manila, on August 29, 1955, rendered a
decision which, in part, reads:

“The Court finds the accused Epifania Cuenca y Mendoza * * * guilty as
charged in the information. Epifania Cuenca y Mendoza is sentenced to suffer two
(2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, plus the additional
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, for being a habitual
delinquent and costs, * * *.”

Pursuant to a commitment order of the Municipal Court of Manila, appellant
commenced to serve her sentence on the same date, at the Correctional
Institution for Women.

On April 12, 1960, after having served 5 years, 7 months and 12 days
(including good conduct time allowances) of her sentence, she filed the present
petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Spec. Proc. No. 3379) with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal alleging, among others, that the allegations of
habitual delinquency in the information (in Crim. Case No. D-46759) are
insufficient, as they do not contain an averment of the date of commission of
and the imposition of an additional penalty for habitual delinquency based on
such insufficient allegation, even granting that she entered a plea of guilty,
is null and void; and that even granting that said allegations regarding
habitual delinquency are sufficient, the penalty imposed by the trial
(municipal) judge is excessive, considering that said allegations only show that
she should have been imposed an additional penalty for a fourth conviction, in
accordance with the decision in People vs. Kaw Liong, 57 Phil.,
839.

After hearing the petition on the merits, the court, on August 5, 1960,
dismissed the same, in a decision which in part reads;

“The Court finds no merit on the first issue raised by the petitioner. It is
true that habitual delinquency requires that the second crime was committed
after the first conviction, the third, after the second, the fourth, after the
third, and so on (People vs. Santiago, 55 Phil., 266) and hence, the
date of commission is an indispensable allegation. The Court, however, believes
that the face of the information shows a sufficient allegation of the dates of
commission. The information runs, thus

‘* * *; that the said accused Epifania Cuenca y Mendoza and Ariston Cuevas y
Baldueza are habitual delinquents according to Art. 62, Sec. 5(a), they having
previously been convicted several times of the crime of theft by virtue of final
judgment rendered by competent courts, as follows:

EPIFANIA CUENCA Y MENDOZA

“It must be observed that the first column is denominated ‘DATE’ without
mentioning whether it is the date of the commission or not, The Court believes
that, considering that the rest of the allegations are substantially complete,
said designation may be reasonably presumed to refer to the date of commission,
because the above preliminary paragraph before the tabulation, clearly stated
‘habitual delinquents’ and, therefore, whatever may appear in the tabulation
must be deemed to cover only those necessary to constitute a sufficient
allegation of the habitual delinquency, one of which is the date of
commission.

“The Court is of the opinion that petitioners second contention is untenable.
It is a well-settled rule of law that the writ of habeas corpus is not
a writ of error and hence, the question of the sufficiency or lack of evidence
adduced in a case cannot be Inquired into, as long as the Court which decided
the case had jurisdiction over the same.

“There is merit however in the third contention of petitioner, namely, that
the penalty of habitual delinquency is excessive. The penalty imposed by the
trial Court for habitual delinquency is 12 years of prision mayor, or
otherwise stated, prision mayor In its maximum period, which, under
Article 62, par. 5(c) of the Revised Penal Code is imposable only upon a
fifth or additional conviction. As previously pointed out, the trial court
can impose the penalty for habitual delinquency only insofar as the allegations
of the information warrant, regardless of whatever extraneous evidence may be
presented. The information in the aforementioned criminal case, can permit the
imposition of said penalty on a fourth, not fifth conviction. As shown by the
above tabulation, the convictions for the first and second crimes fall on the
same date and, therefore, should be regarded as only the first convictions; the
same is true with the third and fourth convictions, which should then be
considered only as the second conviction (People vs. kaw liong, 57
Phil., 839) Thus the fifth crime results in the third conviction and the crime
petitioner is now serving sentence should be regarded as only the fourth
conviction, for purposes of the habitual delinquency law, the imposable penalty,
of which, is that falling under Article 62, par. 5(b), which is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, the range of which is from 6 years
and 1 day to 10 years. The trial (municipal) court, therefore, had jurisdiction
to Impose the penalty in question only up to 10 years and, consequently, cannot
have jurisdiction to impose a 12-years penalty. Petitioner further contends that
considering the triviality of the amount involved and the age of the accused,
the trial (municipal) court should have imposed prision mayor in its
minimum period, which is 6 years and 1 day. This latter contention, the Court
cannot uphold. As repeatedly stated, the writ of habeas corpus is not a
writ of error nor a writ for the purpose of review. In the case at bar, the
(municipal) court has jurisdiction to impose an additional penalty to the extent
of 10 years, and up to that extent, the validity of the judgment can not be
inquired upon in a habeas corpus case. As held in Cruz vs.
Director of Prisons (17 Phil. 269), said writ can be availed of to release a
prisoner under a sentence imposed in excess of the power of the court, if he had
served so much of the sentence as was and could be lawfully imposed, because
said sentence was void only as to such excess.

“It appearing, therefore, that the petitioner has not yet served the sentence
that could be lawfully imposed, which is ten years, she is still restrained of
her liberty under a valid process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
wherefore, a writ of habeas corpus will not lie to secure her
release.”

From this decision, appellant instituted the present appeal, with the
following assignment of errors:

(1) The trial court erred in not finding that appellant has been illegally
declared (by the Municipal Court, in Crim. Case No. D-46759) a habitual
delinquent.

(2)The trial court erred in not finding that the additional
penalty of 12 years imprisonment (imposed by said Municipal Court) for habitual
delinquency is null and void, as having been imposed with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.

(3)The trial court erred in declaring that habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy in the case of the appellant.

(4)The trial court erred in not ordering the immediate release of the
appellant.

The appeal is devoid of any merit. This Court has repeatedly held that a writ
of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, or a writ for the purpose of
review. (Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 27 Phil., 378; Pomeroy
vs. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil., 50 ; 57 Off. Gaz., [40] 7150).^[1] In the Pomeroy case, we stated that:

“With reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule
is that the writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error.
Hence, the writ will not lie to correct mere mistakes of fact or of law which do
not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions,
if the court has jurisdiction over the crime and over the person of the
defendant.”

The first assigned error is grounded on the alleged insufficiency of the
allegations of the Information (in Crim. Case No. D-46759, Municipal Court of
Manila) and the lack of evidence to sustain the charge of habitual delinquency.
But these alleged defects in the information, even if true—which are not, as
explained and found in the decision appealed from—are mere errors of fact or
law, which do not nullify the proceedings taken by said court in the exercise of
its functions, considering that it had jurisdiction over the offense charged
(theft), and the person of appellant. The second error, on the other hand,
attacks the Municipal Court’s appreciation of the number of appellant’s previous
convictions for theft. Again, this is merely an error of judgment by said court,
which did not in any way affect its jurisdiction, or could nullify its
proceedings, but was correctible only by a seasonal appeal.

In the Felipe case, supra, we pointed out:

“But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy provided for the
correction of such errors.Courts cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings,
review the record in a criminal case after a judgment of conviction has been
rendered, and the defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence
imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found by the trial court were in
accordance with the evidence disclosed by the record, or in order to pass upon
the correctness of the conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts
thus found. Under the statute, a commitment in due form based on a final
judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal case is conclusive
of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it appears that
the court which pronounced the judgment was without or exceeded its jurisdiction
in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of law or of fact, which did not have the
effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause and the
person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in the
form and manner prescribed by law.”

Reliance is placed on our ruling in the cases of Cruz vs. Director
of Prisons (17 Phil. 269) and Caluag vs. Pecson, (82 Phil. 8), but
these cases are not in point, for they involved penalties not provided by law
and, therefore, beyond the power or jurisdiction of the trial court to impose.
Thus, in the Pomeroy case, supra, we said:

“While this Court has ruled that an excessive sentence or penalty imposed by
final judgment may be corrected by habeas corpus, the cases where such
ruling was applied involved penalties that could not be imposed under any
circumstances for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted; (subsidiary
imprisonment for violation of special acts, in Cruz vs. Director of
Prisons,17 Phil., 269; imprisonment for contempt by refusal to execute a
conveyance instead of having the conveyance executed as provided by Sec. 10 of
Rule 39, in Caluag vs. Pecson, 82 Phil. 8).* * *”

In the case at bar, the Municipal Court of Manila had, undoubtedly, the
jurisdiction to impose on appellant the additional penalty for habitual
delinquency, as provided by Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code.^[2] What is here questioned is only
the correctness of the exercise of that jurisdiction.

In the decision appealed from, the trial judge declared that the Municipal
Court of Manila had jurisdiction to impose on appellant an additional penalty of
10 years only, and not 12 years. He arrived at said conclusion after examining the
information (in Crim. Case No. D-46759), and finding appellant had only 4
convictions for theft and, pursuant to Article 62(5) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, is liable only for a maximum additional penalty of 10 years, for habitual
delinquency. While the reasoning may be correct, yet the conclusion of the court
a quo is wrong. The mistake committed by the sentencing court in the
appreciation of the facts and in the application of the law thereto, did not
divest it of its jurisdiction, and such error was beyond the power of the trial
judge in the present case to correct, because as we have pointed out in the
Felipe case, supra, “mere errors of law or fact, which did not
have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause
and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on
appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law.”

Wherefore, with the above modification, the judgment of the court a
quo appealed from, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner-appellant. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ.,
Concur.

---

^[1] See also Talabon vs. Prov.
Warden, 78 Phil. 599; Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271;
Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 140; Trono Felipe
vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Jayme, 24
Phil. 90; McMicking vs. Schields, 41 Phil. 971.

^[2] People vs. Acha, 68 Phil.
664,666.