IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF DEXTEL L. CATAP AND MINORS CATHY LYN CATAP GALANG, CAYSE LYN CATAP GALANG, EDRALINE CATAP MANICAG, ROSARIO G. CATAP AND ULPIANO B. …

Catap versus Catap

The Case

This is the story of Catap versus Catap — spouses Ulpiano Catap and Rosario Guio-Catap against their own grandchildren, or more precisely, against the legal consequences of seeking to adopt them. The spouses filed a petition for adoption of four grandchildren: Dexter, Edraline, and the twins Cathy Lyn and Cayse Lyn. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The case matters because it is the Court's clearest statement that the welfare of the child does not automatically mean adoption by whoever can give the child more — and that the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable, absent abandonment, insanity, or hopeless intemperance.

Procedural History

The spouses filed their Petition for Adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch Fifty-Six. After trial, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition on October 12, 1999, for failure of the petitioners to substantiate that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to adopt. The spouses appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning three errors: the dismissal itself, the failure to appreciate the preponderance of evidence including the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the finding of an ulterior motive in the adoption. The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court.

Facts

On September 29, 1998, Ulpiano Catap, sixty-nine years old, and Rosario Guio-Catap, sixty-four years old, married since September 24, 1952, filed a petition to adopt four of their grandchildren: Dexter, eighteen; Edraline, fourteen; and the twins Cathy Lyn and Cayse Lyn, eight years old. They had eleven children, two of whom had died. All nine living children consented, including the two residing in the United States. Dexter and Edraline gave their written consent. The natural parents of Cathy Lyn, Cayse Lyn, and Edraline also consented.

At trial, the spouses presented proof of publication and notice of hearing, real properties covered by transfer certificates of title, a cash deposit of 240,718 pesos and 63 centavos, and an annual income of approximately 200,000 pesos. They alleged they had no criminal record and were physically and mentally fit. The Department of Social Welfare and Development officer who prepared the Adoption Home Study Report and the Adoption Child Study Report recommended that the petition be granted for the minors' best welfare and interest.

Despite this, the trial court dismissed the petition. It noted that the spouses' claim of income and fitness rested on bare testimony, without an income tax return, medical or mental certificate, or clearances. It found the age gap too wide, and it noted that the spouses' children in the United States had filed a petition to extend immigrant status to the spouses, suggesting an ulterior motive. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that no compelling need to grant the adoption had been shown. It found no evidence that the natural parents were unfit or unsuitable, and it found that the natural mother of Dexter had not given valid written consent.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the petition for adoption for failure to prove the qualifications and lack of disqualifications of the adopting spouses.
• Whether or not the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the demonstrated love and capability of the grandparents sufficed to overcome the parental authority of the natural parents.
• Whether or not the adoption of Dexter Catap could proceed without the written consent of his natural mother.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9 of Republic Act Number 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

This provision governs whose written consent is indispensable to a valid decree of adoption, and it is the provision the Court found violated as to Dexter.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did not err. While the spouses amply demonstrated willingness, capability, love, and devotion, these were insufficient to defeat the parental authority vested by law in the natural parents. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Santos Senior versus Court of Appeals:

Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.

Only upon the parents' death, absence, or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Here, no evidence established the unsuitability or unfitness of the biological parents. The Court acknowledged that the natural parents consented for financial reasons — the fathers were tricycle drivers and one mother a dealer of Tupperware — but held that inadequacy of income alone does not make a parent unfit. It is enough that the natural parents earn a decent living and support their children according to their means. The advanced age of the spouses was also a proper consideration.

On the second issue, the Court held that the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the bond of love did not suffice. The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents. The Court also noted the alleged ulterior motive — that the spouses would petition the minors as immigrants once they became American citizens — as a circumstance supporting the trial court's finding.

On the third issue, the Court held that the adoption of Dexter could not proceed. The trial court had denied admission of the document purporting to be the written consent of Dexter's natural mother, Bernadette Catap, because it was not duly signed by her. The Court held that the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption, and that the requirement may be dispensed with only if the parent has abandoned the child, or is insane or hopelessly intemperate. No abandonment was alleged in the petition. Dexter's testimony that his mother lived in Cutcut, Angeles City, seldom communicated with him, did not take care of him, did not visit him, and did not send him to school did not amount to abandonment. The Court stressed that while adoption statutes are construed liberally to promote the welfare of children, when the law is clear and no other choice is given, its full mandate must be obeyed.

Doctrine

First, parental authority belongs to the natural parents, and substitute parental authority may be exercised by a grandparent only upon the parent's death, absence, or unsuitability. Second, inadequacy of income alone does not render a parent unfit or unsuitable; it is enough that the natural parents earn a decent living and support their children according to their means. Third, under Section 9 of Republic Act Number 8552, the written consent of the biological parent is indispensable to the validity of an adoption, and it may be dispensed with only upon proof of abandonment, insanity, or hopeless intemperance. Fourth, the welfare of the child is determined holistically, considering physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social, and spiritual needs, not material comfort alone.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the October 12, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch Fifty-Six, dismissing the petition for adoption.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the written consent of the biological parent is indispensable to a valid adoption, and only abandonment, insanity, or hopeless intemperance excuses it. Examiners use this case to test the limits of the best-interest-of-the-child principle and the requisites of consent under the Domestic Adoption Act.