MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MRR., RESPONDENTS.

Sometime on February 10, 1950, the Court of Industrial Relations
rendered a decision in Case No. 270-V, holding, among others, that the
petitioner MRR should pay 25% additional compensation for night work
performed from 6:00 p.m. , to 6:00 a.m. , the next day. On June 8, 1960 , more
than ten (10) years after the rendition of said decision, respondent
Union filed a motion, praying that petitioner be required to pay the
night differential pay of the Gate Crossing Keepers from February 1,
1950 to October 31, 1950 , who were among the class of laborers found
to be entitled to such night work pay. The motion was opposed by
petitioner, alleging that the same was a violation of the Order of the
CIR dated March 19, 1956 , requiring a simultaneous audit in cases of
computations submitted by the Court Examiner, conformably to the
accepted procedure of the respondent CIR on the matter. On August 12,
I960, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner of the Court to compute the
night work differentials on the Gate Crossing Keepers and to submit a,
report. On November 1, 1960, the Chief Examiner submitted a report
covering a period from February 1, 1960 to October 11, 1960, amounting
to P6,938.63, which was objected to by petitioner on the ground that
decisions and awards of the courts, including the CIR, cannot be
enforced by mere motion, after the lapse of five years but by a new
action or proceeding. This objection was anchored on the decision of
this Court in “National Development Company vs. Juan Aralar, et al.,
108 Phil., 1068, promulgated July 26, 1960 . An opposition was
interposed by the Union , contending that the cited case was not
applicable and the ground relied upon should have been raised earlier,
that is, after the promulgation of CIR order dated March 19, 1956 . The
respondent CIR judgment, the pertinent portions of which read—

“The two reports of examiner (one is dated May 20,
1957 and the other is dated November 7, 1960), were compared and the
Court found that Francisco Sarmiento, Joaquin Austria, Vicente
Sarmiento, Laureano Arceo, Delfin Mauricio, Luis Castillo and Manuel
Ariena are in the later report but are not included in the former
report. However, while they have not been paid any night work
differential before, this Court, believes that the denial to them the
payment of the present claim would be merely a technical matter to
which this Court Is not bound. It is established that their claim are
legitimate and in accordance with the decision of February 10, 1950 .
The night work differentials of these people were not immediately
executed because of the poor financial position of the company. Hence,
sometime in September, 1956, the parties entered into a negotiation
wherein the outstanding1 obligations of the company under the
above-entitled case may even be paid on monthly installment. If the
company were to invoke the live year period, it could have raised that
matter in the negotiation in 1956. But, since it had been agreed to pay
the claimants of their night work differentials by monthly installment
such technicality of filing a new case to execute the award at this
stage would be farfetched.

In view thereof, the objection of respondent to the report of examiner dated November 7, 1960 is hereby overruled.

*        *        *        *        *        *        *

WHEREFORE, the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of
this Court and/or the Accounting Unit of this Court, is hereby directed
to withdraw from the deposit in connection with the above-entitled
case, the amount of P5,342.75 in favor of the Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa MRE, for payment to the workers concerned of their night
work differential from February 1, 1950 to October 31, 1950, subject to
rules, and regulations. The President and Treasurer of said Union, as
well as the union’s counsel are hereby directed to render an accounting
of the said amount of P5,342.75 within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the treasury warrant, otherwise they shall be held in contempt.”

On March 10, 1961 , the petitioner, thru the corporate counsel, presented a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CIR., en banc, denied on April 12, 1961 .

The case is now before Us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
interposed by the petitioner. The question is centered on one count, to
wit: whether in the light of the doctrine laid down in the Aralar ease,
the claims of the Gate Crossing Keepers have already prescribed.
Respondent Union insists on the inapplicability of the ruling in the
said case; and submits that the prescriptive period has been arrested,
in view of the arrangement made between the MRR and the Union in 1956,
in the matter of payment of the petitioner’s obligations, even on
monthly installments.

One of the arguments adduced by petitioners to justify its refusal
to grant the claim is that the Gate Crossing Keepers were not included
in the judgment. Apart from the fact that the decision in Case No.
270-V of February 10, 1950, is clear, the said Gate Crossing Keepers,
having been workers of the said company, before and subsequent to the
judgment, and were similarly situated as the original petitioners, the
benefits of the said judgment are extended to them. Workers involved in
a dispute include other workers, unionists or not, who are presumed
interested in the outcome of the demands or strike, one way or the
other (Price Stabilization Corp. vs. PRISCO Workers’ Union, 102 Phil.,
515, Nov. 29, 1957).

This Court, in the Aralar case has ruled that—

“* * * Under the amendment, if a final judgment or
award of the CI.R is to be enforced by writ of execution or any other
remedy provided by law in the same way that orders and judgments, pf
Courts of First Instance are enforced, then the legal provisions to the
effect that decisions may be enforced only within five years from the
date of entry are applicable to decisions or awards of the Industrial
Court. Consequently, it is necessary to make distinctions if the award
made in 1948 has never been executed as regards all the petitioners,
then the present petition should and must be denied. A now action or
proceeding would be necessary to enforce the award. However, if the
1948 award has heretofore been executed or enforced as to some or all
of the petitioners from the date of the last enforcement up to-the date
of the present petition, not more than five years have elapsed, then
the present petition may be granted as to those petitioners not covered
by the prohibition of Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.”

It appears from the record, however, that in view of the poor
financial position of the company at the time of execution of the
February 10, 1950 decision, the trial court issued an order dated
January 26, 1956 , stating among others, the following—

“However, not a centavo of the said amount has been
paid by respondent company: It also failed to pay the employees the
compensation for night work that they have earned ‘during the period
beginning October 1, 1950 and thereafter. According to the
manifestation of the respondent on April 26, 1955 , and the
counter-manifestation of petitioner union dated April 28, 1955 , the
latter agreed to defer or suspend until January 1, 1956 the enforcement
of their demand for payment of 25% additional compensation for night
work.”

Since the object of the motion in question was merely the issuance
of an alias writ of execution of a judgment which had been the object
of various periodical executions, within the 5 years from the date of
entry of the said judgment, which were not enforced because of the poor
financial condition of the company, and due to the agreement of the
parties with the approval of the trial court, as shown in the above
quoted portion of the Order, to defer or suspend1 until January 1,
1956, the enforcement of the employees’ demand, and because the
deferment or suspension was granted for the benefit of the
company-obligor, and since the latter by asking such deferment or
suspension had waived its right to enforce the judgment within the
prescribed period, the counting of the said period should commence to
run after January 1, 1956, the expiration of the period of deferment or
suspension agreed upon.

“Where judgments are for money only and are wholly
unpaid, and execution has been previously withheld in the interest of
the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has
no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more that
five years after the judgments arc entered”. (Application of Molnar,
Belinsky, et al. vs. Long Is. Amusement Corp., 1 N.Y.S. 2d 866).

“In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although
there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there
should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the
taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas,
by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may
be issued without scire facias.” (23 C.J. 378).

The filing of the motion for alias writ of execution on June 8,
1960 , is well within the period. The rule in the Alarar case,
heretofore quoted has not been infringed.

Conformably with all the foregone appeal is hereby dismissed, and
the Order sought to be reviewed, is affirmed. With costs against herein
petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador , Concepcion , Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.