ANGEL ALBANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, RESPONDENT.

This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua
Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. 
In a letter dated June 20, 1962
addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the Japanese
occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino,
and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte.  After which came the accusation
that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized,
respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a
result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer.  This notwithstanding, it was claimed that
respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney’s fees.  It was
then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when respondent
presented in exhibit a document
showing that they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case promised to pay
her a contingent fee of 33-1/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land
or damages.  A copy of such document was
attached to the letter.  The more serious
charge was that the signature therein appearing, purportedly that of the
complainant, and the writing after the name of his mother were not made by
them.  It was further stated that the
Honorable Delfin B. Flores, then Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, submitted the
document in question to the National Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
referred to as NBI) together with samples of his genuine signature.  A copy of the finding of the NBI was
attached, the conclusion being that the questioned signature “is NOT in the hand of the
person whose sample signatures were received.”

Complainant stated that being a poor man, he could hardly pay for
the services of a lawyer to assist him in the disbarment proceedings.  He added the information that respondent
Coloma “is a very
influential woman in the province of Ilocos Norte” as she was
then a member of the provincial board. 
The prayer was for the “kind and generous help regarding this
matter in order that Atty. Perpetua Coloma may be
made to stand before the bar of justice and disbarred from the practice of her
profession as a lawyer.”

In a resolution
dated July 20, 1962, this
Court required respondent Perpetua Coloma to answer
the complaint.  The answer came on September 4, 1962.   There was a specific denial of the allegation that the complainant, was
“a victim of injustice,” respondent alleging that the same was
“untrue, unfounded and imaginary.” While admitting that her services
were contracted by complainant and his mother and their co-plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4147, she stated that there was a contingent fee of one-third (1/3) of
whatever land and damages could be obtained for the plaintiffs.  She denied that she did nothing to expedite
the hearing and termination of such civil case as the record would show that
she filed “more than twenty (20) papers and pleadings, went to trial for several days and with the
assistance of her sister, Atty. Oliva D. Coloma,
obtained a favorable judgment
in the Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs and
filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals a thirty-five (35) page brief,
finished after careful, conscientious and exhaustive study and preparation.” She attached a
copy of the favorable decision rendered by Judge Simeon Ramos of November 10,
1948;^[1]
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 13, 1950,
confirming the above favorable decision, which was penned by the then Justice
Gutierrez David;^[2]
and the dismissal of a petition for certiorari to review such decision in the
resolution of this Court of January 10, 1951.^[3]
Then came a reference to a decision by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 10563-R, the complainant as one of the
plaintiffs having appealed from an order of the lower court, sustaining her
lien upon the judgment as well as “her share of one-third (1/3) of the
lands adjudicated” which according to the lower court however would
require that the proper action be filed. 
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals penned by Justice Sanchez, now a member of this Court, an evaluation of
her services was made thus: “Appellee served as
plaintiffs’ counsel for a period of about seven years.  The record shows that she was diligent
in her work.  That she had rendered
valuable services cannot be doubted.  In
fact, the final decision favorable to plaintiffs is almost wholly the result of
her efforts.  Literally, she gambled on
the success or failure of the
litigation.  She was a member of
the Bar since 1940.  Gauged by the familiar rule that an
attorney shall be entitled to have reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the, professional standing of the attorney,
* * *, we feel, as did the trial court, that appellee
is entitled to one-third of all the
lands and damages recoverable by plaintiffs under the judgment of the Court
below.”

She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served “faithfully, efficiently, continuously
and to the best of her knowledge
and capacity.” Her dismissal then, according to her, “was made without cause and
without, the consent of herein respondent and only on June 18, 1951, when the
undersigned had already won the case for them in the Court of First Instance
and in the Court of Appeals.” In view of the failure of the new lawyers
retained to be at times avail­able in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and as pleadings
by opposing counsel mere still sent to her and out of loyalty to her former
clients she continued “to render professional legal services to complainant and his mother.”
Then came the allegation “that after the case was
won in the trial court and in
the Court of Appeals, complainant and his co-plaintiffs stopped seeing the
undersigned and even dis­owned their contract with her in the trial of [her]
petition to record attorney’s lien which
was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.”
Copies of the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
submitted together with the answer.^[4]
She characterized as “false and unjust”
the averment of complainant
“that the latter and his mother did not sign Annex ‘A’ because they really
signed the instrument in the presence of attesting witnesses who testified to
and confirmed the signing of the same, which fact (of signing) was found and
confirmed by the trial court after and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, * *
*.”

Then came the denial of the allegation
of complainant that due to the seriousness of the charge, Judge Delfin B. Flores submitted the alleged falsified document to the NBI for examination,
the truth being that it was
complainant who did so.  She likewise “specifically denies the authenticity
and veracity of the alleged findings of the National Bureau of Investigation on Annex ‘A’ because the
signatures therein are genuine and have been found to be so by the trial and
appellate courts after hearing the testimony of the instrumental witnesses and
comparing the signatures in Annex ‘A’ with signatures admitted to be genuine by
the complainant as well as upon the affirmation of complainant’s sister and as
co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4147.” She then referred to a rule which she considered well-settled
in this jurisdiction that a question of whether or not a given document is genuine falls
within the general knowledge and competence of a judge who may inquire into its authenticity, the
testimony of instrumental witnesses sufficing, without the court being bound
even by real experts.  Nor could she
agree that the complainant was a poor man and could hardly afford the services
of a lawyer
because thru her efforts, he and his co-plaintiffs were richer “by about
P100,000.00 (P85,000.00 in realty and P15,000.00 in cash as damages) by winning
Civil Case No. 4147 for them notwithstanding, which ingratitude had been her
reward.  Respondent also denied the
insinuation that she was using her influence as a board member.  She stated that from 1944 to 1951, when she rendered
her services for complainant, she was in private life, not having been elected
to the provincial board until 1959.

She concluded by saying that “during her practice of law for
more than twenty (20) years /she/ has strictly adhered to the ethics of the
profession and has always been
guided by the principles of justice, fairness and respect for individual rights
and that as a
public official, /she/ has never used her influence to corrupt public servants or
ordinary citizens, and all the people of Ilocos Norte
well-know that complainant has no sense of justice, no integrity to preserve,
no honor to treasure and no future to build. 
On the other hand, the people of said province have faithfully supported
/her/ in her aspirations, first as councilor and then as board member with overwhelming majorities.  Said support speaks of vindication and means
full faith and credit to /her/ integrity, ability and honesty.” She
further submitted as affirmative defenses, the cause of action being barred by
(1) prior judgment and (2) by the statute of limitations.  She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
against her.

The matter was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated
September 7, 1962.  On September 12,
1967, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General was sub­mitted.  He asked “that this case be
dismissed.” We grant such a plea.

In his report, the Solicitor General noted that in the investigation
conducted on his behalf by the provincial fiscal of Ilocos
Norte, “only the complainant appeared.”^[5]
No evi­dence was introduced by him other than the NBI report on the alleged
falsified signatures.  He manifested that
all his evidence could be found in the
records of Civil Case No. 414, of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.^[6] Respondent, on her part, according to the
Solicitor General, “merely
file a manifestation to the effect that the contract for attorney fees in
question had already been declared genuine and authentic by the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, the Court, of Appeals, and
this Honorable Court, in their respective decisions, copies of which were
attached to her answer; that said contract was signed by petitioner and the
instrumental witnesses thereto in her presence; and that she was submitting the
case on the annexes to her answer and the transcript of the trial of the
proceedings on the recording of her attorney lien in Civil Case No. 4147 * *
*.”^[7]

The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of respondent as
counsel for the complainant and his mother were concerned reveal the
utmost diligence and conscientiousness on her part.  What she said in her answer was sustained in
all respects.

The express finding was then made by the Solicitor General that
the question of the genuineness and due execution to pay respondent her
attorney’s fees “had already been litigated by the parties in the course of the proceedings for the
recording and enforcement of the
attorney’s lien of respondent in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte; that the plaintiffs in said case (one of whom is the complainant in this case) denied the, genuineness and
due execution of said agreement Exh. ‘A’; that they had full opportunity to present
evidence in support of their said contention; that hearing,
the trial court found said document to be genuine (pp. 43-48,
rec.); and that on appeal to the Court of Appeal said court likewise found said
document genuine * * *.”^[8]

On this point an extended excerpt from the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the opinion being, penned as noted by Justice Sanchez, was
quoted.  Thus:

“1.  Exhibit A, the
written contract of professional services, shows that appellee,
as plaintiffs’ attorney, is entitled to one-third of all the lands and damages which may be
awarded plaintiffs; otherwise, if the case is lost, then appellee
is not entitled to compensation.

“That Exhibit A was duly executed is a proven fact.  A witness to that document, namely, Sergio
Manuel, testified that the cross after the name of Delfina
Aquino was placed by her and that the signature of
Angel Albano, one of the plaintiffs, is the genuine
signature of the said Angel Albano.  It is true that on the witness stand Delfina Aquino denied that she
placed a cross after the typewritten words ‘Delfina Aquino‘ in Exhibit A, and that Angel Albano
likewise denied his signature therein. 
Suffice it to say that this negative
testimony will not prevail over the positive testimony of appellee
and her witness aforesaid.  People vs. Bueno, 41 Phil., 447, 452; People vs. Ferrer,
44 O.G., No. 1, pp. 112, 115.

“Further, appellee’s evidence on
this point is not limited merely to Exhibit A. 
The record shows that previous thereto, there was a verbal agreement
regarding said attorney’s fees.  On this
point, appellee finds corroboration in the testimony
of Rosario Lagasca, a blood relation of plaintiffs,
and Silvina Guillermo.

“Plaintiffs’ evidence that in 1944 appellee
undertook to take up the case of plaintiffs for a stipulated contingent fee of
P2,000.00 does not merit serious consideration.  It does not seem probable that appellee would take the case on a win-or-lose basis, i.e.,
for the sum of P2,000.00 in case the litigation is won and nothing in case of
loss, because at that time P2,000.00 was worth only a few gantas of
rice.  No lawyer in his right mind would
accept such a
miserable fee.

“The following testimony of Felicidad
Albano, one of the plaintiffs, given in an obviously
unguarded moment, stripped plaintiffs naked of the pretense that there was no
such contract for one, third share as fees:

‘Q – Did you not authorize your brother, Angel Albano,
or your mother, to give one-third (1/3) of all the properties and damages?

 A – We authorized them.’ Tr., p. 8, Galapon.

“The court below, therefore, is correct in declaring that, after weighing and considering the
evidence of both parties, Exhibit A is genuine.  (pp. 61-62, rec.)”^[9]

The Solicitor General thus concluded that the finding of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and of the Court of Appeals that the
questioned document “is genuine, is now res
iudicata and bars complainant Angel Albano (one the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 4147) from raising said question anew in these
disbarment proceedings.  As repeatedly
held, the fundamental principle of res judicata applies
to all cases and proceedings in whatever form they may be (Brillantes vs. Castro, L-9223, June 30, 1956, 99 Phil. 497; 50 C.J.S. 31, 267), and a party can
not escape the bar if a judgment against him in a new suit on the same cause of action by varying
the form of his action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case (Wensel v. Surigao Consolidated
Mining, Inc., 57 O. G. 6958; Vda. de Padilla
vs. Paterno, G. R.
No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961; 50 C.J.S. 98).”^[10]

It was noted further that there was no oral testimony as to
the alleged falsification, except the report of the NBI, lacking in persuasive force in
that it failed to state the
reason or basis for its conclusion. 
The observation of the Solicitor General here made is both pertinent and rele­vant: “The
mere conclusion in the aforesaid NBI report that the signature of complainant
Angel Albano on the document Exh.
A was not written in the same
hand that wrote the genuine specimens of his signature, without any reason or
reasons supporting it, is, therefore, of little or no value in evidence, and
consequently, it: cannot support the present charge of falsification against
respondent, apart from the fact that, as already stated, it is inadmissible on
the ground of estoppel by judgment.”^[11]
On the reasonableness of the contingent fee collected by respondent, the Solicitor General
adopted the same view found in the decision of the Court of Appeals, already referred to being part
of respondent’s answer, that such indeed was the case.

The
Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone
guilty of bad faith in this
case “it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who,
after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried
to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter’s contingent
attorney’s fees by dismissing her as their
counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity
and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees,
* * *.”^[12]

He was of the opinion then
that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial cases could not
be considered binding “it is safe
to conclude, from a review of the evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence
before us in this case, that respondent may be exonerated herein.”^[13]
With such a conclusion of the
Solicitor General, this Court, to repeat, is in full agreement.

 Counsel, any counsel, is
worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services.  With his capital consisting solely of his
brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment
of his fees.  It is indeed ironic if
after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he
represents, he himself would not get his due. 
Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid.  It views with disapproval any and every
effort of those benefited by counsel’s services to deprive, him of his
hard-earned honorarium.  Such an attitude
deserves condemnation.

There is this additional point to consider.  As Cardozo aptly
observed:  “Reputation /in the legal
profession/ is a plant of tender growth, and its
bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.”^[14]
This Court, certainly is not averse to having such a
risk minimized.  Where, as in this case,
the good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless
disregard of the, truth, an action prompted by base ingratitude, the severest
censure is called for.

Certainly,
this is not to say that if a case were presented showing nonfeasance or malfeasance
on the part of a lawyer, appropriate disciplinary action would not be
taken.  This is not such a case however.  Respondent, as has been so clearly shown, was
in no wise culpable; there is no occasion for the corrective power of this
Court coming into play.

WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine Bar, is hereby
dismissed.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex 1, Answer.

^[2]
Annex 2, Answer.

^[3]
Annex 4, Answer.

^[4]
Annexes 5 and 6, Answer.

^[5]
Report and Recommendation, p. 4.

^[6]
Report and Recommendation, p. 4.

^[7]
Report and Recommendation, p. 4.

^[8]
Ibid, p. 10.

^[9]
Albano v. Ramos, 1955 (CA-G.R. No. 10563-R).

^[10]
Ibid, p. 12.

^[11]
Ibid, pp. 14-15.

^[12]
Ibid, pp. 17-18.

^[13]
Ibid, p. 18.

^[14]
New York ex
rel, Karlin v.
Culkin (1928) 162 N.E. 487, 492.