THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELOY MAGSI, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is a mandatory review of a death sentence.

Information dated January
10, 1968 filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second
Judicial District, charged:

“That on or about the 14th day of January, 1968 in the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, namely ELOY MAGSI, JUAN PONCE y BILLON, alias
JOHNNY, PERFECTO ARCE alias PEPING, conspiring and confederating with their
fellow accused GERARDO FLORES alias GERRY, OPRING OLAZO, DORO DOE and PETER DOE, the latter four being still
at large, and mutually helping one another with intent to kill and with
treachery, while the said accused were armed with carbine, pistols and
revolvers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enter the house where JESUS GALLARDO and his family live and once inside the said house, attack,
assault and shoot one JESUS GALLARDO,
inflicting upon the said offended
party JESUS GALLARDO multiple gunshot wounds on the different
parts of his body which caused the instantaneous death of the said JESUS GALLARDO.

“That the following aggravat­ing circumstances were attendant
in the commission of the offense: (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) use of a
motor vehicle; (3) the offense was
committed in the dwelling place of the offended party; and (4) that the offense
was committed by a band.

“CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 248 in relation to
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

xx      xx         xx  
(p. 2, rec.).

“Doro Doe,” subsequently identified as Teodoro del Rosario, was arraigned
on October 19, 1970 and an
unqualified plea of guilt was entered. The next day, October 20, 1970, the court rendered its
judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds TEODORO DEL ROSARIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER as charged in the informa­tion
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH x x” (pp. 4-5,
rec.).

In his brief, defendant-appellant assailed the aforesaid decision
and alleged that:

“I.     The Trial Court erred in imposing upon the
accused the DEATH penalty on a plea of GUILTY
without ascertaining that the accused fully understood the charges against him
and the char­acter of the penalty
that may be imposed upon him notwithstanding his plea of guilty.

“II.    The Trial Court erred in not making inquiry
as to the extent of the force applied by Eloy Magsi and his companions upon the accused Teodoro
del Rosario, when they ordered him to kill Jesus Gallardo.

“III.    The Trial Court erred in appointing as
attorney de officio
for the accused a lawyer who is the ‘compadre‘ of the person killed by said accused and who,
because of the special relationship with the deceased, reluctantly discharged
his duties as attorney de officio, after the Court had denied his
repeated petition to be relieved of his appointment as such” (p. 46, rec.).

The Solicitor General recommended the affirmation of the
decision, and refuted the allegations of the defendant-appellant, but said
recommendation is negated by the facts that actually transpired during the
proceedings.

Records show that soon after defendant-appellant was apprehended
on August 20, 1970, his
arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La
Union, presided over by Judge Lino Añover.

Altogether, this case was actually set and rescheduled for six
(6) times, first of which was on August
1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty.
Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was
re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused’s desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty.
Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was
favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September
8, 1970, for failure
of the de officio and de parte
counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set
for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador
Cariaso de officio counsel for the
accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte
nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty.
Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment
purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea
of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out
of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi
and the other co-accused. Hearing conducted that day showed, to wit:

“Court – It seems that nobody wants
to defend you. They probably think that you are guilty.

“Del
Rosario – I have not yet talked personally to the
lawyer, x x“

(p. 4, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1970).

“Court to Interpreter – Will you
call Atty. Rivera? xx xx Atty.
Rivera, do not be afraid to assist the accused. xx xx (To the accused): This is for arraignment only.
Do not expect Atty. Cariaso to come here and be your
law­yer nor the top bracket lawyers of Manila.

“Del
Rosario – I want to enter the plea
of guilty xx x” (pp. 5-6, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1970).

“Court
– xx     xx All right, arraign the
accused. (Interpreter Mariano Lete reads the
information before accused Teodoro del
Rosario).

“Interpreter Lete
—

The accused prays that
before he pleads, he be given a chance to say something in court.

“Court — Can your lawyer not say
that for you?

“Atty. Rivera — Your Honor, he
wants to manifest to the Court
what I have already manifested regarding the mitigating cir­cumstance and the
extent of his participation (pp. 10-11, t.
s.n., Sept. 9, 1970).

Accused’s allegation of duress prompted
Atty. Rivera to move for the re-setting of the case for the study and
presentation of possible mitigating circumstances. The case was accordingly re-set for September 14, 1970. On the fourth hearing date, the
presentation of mitigating circumstances was not held as scheduled, but de
officio counsel Atty. Cariaso’s explanation
regarding his close ties with the deceased and his family was heard, and his
motion to be relieved as counsel by reason thereof, and be replaced by one who
can attend to the defense of the accused with candor, was denied by the court. However, per the note presented to the Court by
Atty. Cariaso presumably from Atty. Baterina, de parte counsel for the accused, the contents of
which sought the re-setting of the case for the first week of October, the case
was again re-set for October 6, 1970. The Court motu
proprio changed
accused’s plea of guilty to not guilty. At the fifth hearing, Atty. Cariaso,
who appeared in court only after a warrant for his arrest was issued, informed
the Court that those interested in the conviction of the accused opposed his
appearance as de officio counsel, and at the same time, also turned
over another note, the contents of which asked for another resetting. The Court
denied the motion of Atty. Cariaso to withdraw as counsel, but re-set the case
for October 19, 1970.

At the outset of the
sixth hearing held on October 19, 1970, Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused was ready to
enter an unqualified plea of guilty. Hearing conducted that day
showed, to wit:

“Court – Witnesses for the prosecu­tion?

“Atty. Cariaso – Before we proceed, may I inform the Court that I
have just been conferring with the accused and he wants to be re-arraigned
because the order of this Court the last time is that his plea of guilty be dis­regarded
and a plea of not guilty was entered. Now he says he wants to be
re-arraigned and I believe he will not offer any qualifying circumstance.

“Court
– Let me see the record. Now he wants
to be re-arraigned?

(Court issued an order.)

“Court to accused – Your attorney
informed the court that you are willing to be re-arraigned and that this time
you will enter an unqualified plea of
guilty, is that true?

“Del
Rosario – I admit.

“Court – All right, re-arraign the
accused.

“Interpreter Lete
– After reading the information, the accused Del Rosario pleaded guilty x x x” (pp. 31?33, t.s.n., October 19, 1970).

Based on accused’s plea of guilty
without any evidence for the prosecution on any of the alleged aggravating circumstances nor accused’s
evidence on duress, the Court rendered its decision the next day, October 20, 1970.

Of the six hearing dates held relative to the case, accused at
two instances entered a qualified plea of guilty.

Recorded proceedings at the first instance on September 9, 1970
reproduced previously, showed that de officio counsel
Atty. Rivera and accused were hardly afforded by the Court any opportunity to
discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the
Court’s proddings rather than from accused’s spontaneous volition.

At the second instance, the Court knew that accused’s
prior plea of guilty was qualified by alleged duress employed on him by the
other accused. It behooved the Court to allow the accused an opportunity to
present evidence on the alleged duress, as well as discover for itself the
reasons for accused’s change of mind regarding his plea.

But more importantly, the Court could have complied, as it failed
to do so the first time, with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the
accused of the seriousness of the charges, the meaning of the qualifying and
modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be imposed on him
despite the plea of guilty, as well as
received prosecution’s evidence on the alleged aggravating circumstances
attendant to the commission of the offense charged. But these considera­tions
notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from
the prosecution nor from the defense, after Atty. Cariaso’s
manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the accused whether he
confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the case.

WE have consistently enjoined strict and substan­tial adherence
to Our rulings in eases where defendants are charged
with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma appoint­ment of de officio
counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting
of hearing by the court for alleged
reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of
the penalty, are not sufficient compliance with Our
injunctions.

On the appointment of
reluctant de officio counsels, We have commented in the case of People vs. Valera (43 SCRA 207-211), thus:

“In the absence of an explana­tion why Atty. Ansaldo Jr. asked to be released as counsel de officio
as soon as he was appointed by the trial court; why he failed to appear for the
trial on July 2, 1968 when the court ordered his arrest and on July 3, 1968
when the Court had to appoint another (the third) counsel de officio
and that when Ansaldo appeared on July 16, 1968 he
informed the Court that his client,
upon his advice wished to change his previous plea of not guilty to one of
guilty, this Court is forced to conclude that counsel was not disposed to
discharge his duties as counsel de officio and it was naive for
the court to have proceeded to re-arraign the accused with a counsel of such
disposition and expect that the rights of the accused would be amply protected.
x x x“

In the case of People vs. Simeon (47 SCRA 141, 142), We brought to fore the court’s
obligation to the accused, and We said:

“The court a quo cannot plead ignorance of the injunction
directed towards trial judges to exercise the patience and circumspection in
explaining the meaning of the accusation and the full import of the plea of
guilty to the accused, who should
likewise be granted all the chances to acquaint his counsel de officio
with his version of the incident and to conduct his own investigation at the
locale of the crime as much as practicable, more than just examining the records of
the case. This Court in numer­ous cases
as early as October 29, 1906 in
U.S. vs. Talbanos (6 Phil. 541, 543) enunciated that
‘while there is no law requiring it, yet in every case under the plea of guilty
where the penalty may be death, it is advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of
culpability of the defendant.’ This was reiterated over a year later on
December 21, 1907 in U.S. vs. Rota, et al. (9 Phil. 426, 431) wherein this
Court added that ‘in all cases, and especially in cases where the punishment to
be inflicted is severe, the Court should be sure that the defendant fully
understands the nature of the charges preferred against him and the character
of the punishment to be imposed before sentenc­ing him. x x
x“

Focusing attention on the trial court’s duties to the accused, We
have again said in People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244):

“WE enunciated times with­out number in Our injunctions
addressed to the trial courts
that they should exercise solicitous
care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital
offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of
the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the
meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper
thing to do in capital cases is to take tes­timony, to assure the court that
the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty
(People vs. Villafuerte, supra; People vs. Alamada, L-34594-5, July 13, 1973; People vs. Busa, L-32047, June 25, 1973; People vs. Silvestre,
L-27821, June 22, 1973; People vs. Simeon, L-33730, Sept. 28, 1972; People vs. Espiña, L-33028, June 20, 1972; People vs. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 760; U.S. vs. Jamad,
37 Phil. 305).”

WE continued to stress lengthily the same injunctions in the case
of People vs. Baluyut (L-32752-3, Jan. 31, 1977, 75
SCRA 153-55):

“To start with, the court a quo did not even
ascertain for itself whether the accused com­pletely understood the precise
nature of the charge and the meaning of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having attended the commis­sion
of the crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have mis­understood the
nature and gravity of the charge to which they were pleading guilty. The trial
court did not conduct a dialogue with the accused on their educational
attainment, especially considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures
on the statements they gave to the Malolos Police
Force (Exhs. A, B and C) tends to show that they have
very little or scanty education. Moreover, from the transcript, We have noted that after the
arraignment, trial was held on three dates and on each day the accused were
assisted by three different counsel de officio. In the hearing of
October 7, 197O — the day the decision under review was rendered — ­the
counsel de officio who assisted the accused was de­signated by
the trial court only after the case was called for trial, i.e., after the accused had informed the trial court
that they did not have a lawyer. Under these circum­stances, it is not
unreasonable to assume that said counsel de officio proceeded to
trial without first fully investigat­ing the facts of the case and that his
interview with the accused, even if it lasted for twenty (20) minutes as the
record insinuates, was not, and could not have been sufficient to enable him to
acquire a fairly good grasp, much less a comprehensive knowledge, of the
relevant facts of the case. Incidentally, under the Rules of this Court, whenever
an attorney de officio is
employed or assigned by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he
shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his
defense before proceeding further in the case, which shall not be less than two
(2) days in case of trial (Sec. 5, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court). The
record, incidentally, does not show the existence of a ‘good cause’ to justify
the trial court in shortening the trial fixed by the Rules.

xx                                             xx                                             xx

“WE deeply lament this attitude of the court a quo. Be that as it may, however, We only
hope that hereafter trial courts would strictly comply with the rigid stan­dard
set in the following cases of Apduhan, Arpa and Solacito, all of which
have invariably, consistently and firmly established and stressed the duty of
trial courts before accepting the plea of
guilty of an accused to a capital offense. xx   xx“

In the recent case of People vs. Regular (L-38674, Sept. 30,
1981, 108 SCRA 23, 32-33), the injunction is reiterated:

“At the outset, it must be stated that the plea of guilty by the two accused were improvidently laid.
During the arraignment, the trial judge did not adhere strictly to the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan (24
SCRA 798) where We postulated the guideline in cases
where there is a plea of guilty by the accused. In the instant case under
review, We observe that the trial judge failed to
explain fully to the two accused the meaning and the far-reaching effect of
their plea. It was not explained to them the meaning of the term ‘treachery,’
an aggravating circumstance which qualified the crime to murder and frustrated
murder respec­tively. Neither did the judge explain the terms ‘evident pre­meditation’
and ‘recidivism,’ both aggravating circumstances alleged in the information
which had legal significance and consequences not ordinarily understandable to
a layman.

“The trial judge asked the appellants whether they were aware
that the court had no other alternative except to impose the capital punishment
on them without explaining why it had to be so. In People vs. Solacito (L-29209, August 25, 1969, 29 SCRA
61), We had the occasion to say that, ‘(j)udges
are duty-bound to be extra soli­citous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty, he understands fully the mean­ing of his plea and the import of
an inevitable conviction.

xx                                             xx                                             xx”

“The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be
effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused” (People vs, Simeon, 47 SCRA 141).

The conduct of the court a quo taken in the light of the foregoing decisions clearly
established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the herein
accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT CONVICTING ACCUSED TEODORO DEL
ROSARIO IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
CASE IS HEREBY REMANDED TO THE COURT A QUO FOR RE-ARRAIGNMENT AND
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. NO COSTS.

Teehankee, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Abad
Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, C.J.,, on official
leave.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

Guerrero and Vasquez, JJ., no part.