G.R. No. L-14040. January 31, 1961
SEGUNDA PORNELLOSA AND JOSE ANGELES, PETITIONERS, VS. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION AND HERMINIO GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
An action to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of sale of
a residential lot in favor of the petitioners upon payment of the
purchase price of P1,505, to declare null and void a deed of sale of
the lot executed by the then Minister of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in favor of the respondent Herminio Guzman, to collect from
the defendants the sum of P1,000 as actual and P5,000 as moral damages,
and to secure other just and equitable relief, was brought by the
petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila (civil No. 8695).
After trial the Court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners
granting them the relief prayed for except the amount of moral damages
which was reduced to P2,000.00. The trial court dismissed the
defendant’s counterclaim. They appealed and the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment reversing that of the Court of First Instance and
dismissing the petitioners’ complaint (C.A.-G.R. No. 13901-R). Hence
this petition for certiorari to review the judgment rendered by the
Court of Appeals.
The facts as found by the appellate court are:
The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which
many families have settled through the consent of its owner. Each paid
a rental which, in all likelihood, was fixed proportionately to the
extent of the holding. There is no evidence whether or not an occupant
was given a formal contract for the specific portion he holds.
In May, 1941, the Santa Clara Estate was acquired by the Government
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 539, section 1 of which
recites thus:
“The President of the
Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest
therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same
into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under
such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or
occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves
and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.”
The administration and disposition of the land so acquired was
entrusted to an Office known as the Rural Progress Administration.[1] This Office was abolished later on and its functions were transferred to the Bureau of Lands.[2] Recently, such duties were given to the Land Tenure Administration.[3]
The evidence tends to show that on April 1, 1941 the plaintiffs
acquired by purchase the rights of occupation of the lot in question on
the strength of a document which reads as follows:
“Dapat Mabatid ng Madla:
“Akong si Vicenta San Jose,
may sapat na gulang, walang asawa (balo), na nakatira sa daang Galicia,
Sampalok, Maynila, ay pinatotohanan kong tinanggap ko ang halagang
ISANG DAAN AT LIMAN-PUNG PISO (P150.00) kay Gng. Segunda Pornellosa
bilang kabayaran sa aking bahay na nakatayo sa daang Galicia, bilang
502. Kaya’t isinasalin ko sa kanila ang boong kapangyarihan sa nasabing
bahay, ganon din ang karapatan na sila ang makikipag-unawaan sa
pamahalaan sa pagbili ng nasabing lupa.Sa katotohanan ay
aking inilagda ang aking pangalan sa kasunduang ito sa harap ng mga
saksi at ganon ang tatak ng aking hinlalaki, ngayon ika 1 ng Abril ng
1941.
Saksi:
Moises San Pedro”
(Exhibit A)
The vendor, Vicenta San Jose”, was an old tenant thereof. After the
purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs
were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the
lot which, as fenced, included two hundred (200) square meters. All the
amounts so paid were duly receipted as shown by Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G,
H, and I. Following these payments the plaintiffs sent a check in the
amount of P200.00 but it was not accepted. Thereafter the plaintiffs
found out that the lot, the right of occupancy of which they had
purchased from Vicenta San Jose, had been subdivided into two smaller
lots, Nos. 44 and 78, Block No. 12. Lot No. 44 had been sold to
Herminio Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint and, as a
result, the investigator, Atty. Vizconde, recommended that the lot
vacated by San Jose be restored to them.The evidence of the defendants is purely documentary. We do not deem it necessary to dwell thereon.
The appellate Court held:
Our discussion will be confined to the proposition of whether or not
the plaintiffs are entiled to purchase from the Government the lot
formerly held by San Jose, allegedly including about two hundred (200)
square meters. The plaintiffs believe they are, relying mainly on the
deed of sale executed by San Jose in their favor (Exh. A). In that
document, however, the area of the lot on which San Jose’s house stood
had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned.
Any receipt for the rentals paid by San Jose to the old management of
the Santa Clara Estate would have given us an idea of the extent of her
holding on the basis of the amount of the rent paid, but none was
presented. The plaintiffs presented a sketch, Exh. L-1, which allegedly
represents the lot they claim. But this piece of evidence is devoid of
persuasive value, considering that the old subdivision plan was not
offered.Significantly, the plaintiffs cannot show a
contract whereby the Rural Progress Administration has sold or promised
to sell them a lot of two hundred square meters. It is true that they
hold receipts (Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I) for payments made on
account of the purchase price of a lot but in none of them are the
number of the lot and its area stated. On the contrary, a note was
visible in all the said receipts, except two, which reads: “subject to
further re-adjustment”. The plaintiffs claim that a certain Moises San
Pedro, Sr. supervisor of collectors of the Sta. Clara Estate, made them
believe that the lot they had purchased was, more or less, of 200
square meters, as enclosed by a fence at the time San Jose vacated it.
They furthermore claim that San Pedro explained that the note “subject
to further re-adjustment” appearing in their receipt meant that their
lot would be increased or decreased should the proposed extension of
the adjoining street (the Lealtad St.) would eventually be carried out.
It suffices to say that it does not appear that San Pedro by his
position in the Government had power to sell any of the lots included
in the Santa Clara Estate. It is obvious that such power resides only
in the Chief of the Office in charge of the disposition of lands
acquired by the Government for resale to the needy. It would not be
amiss to state further that receipts of payment issued to other
purchasers of lots not adjoining any street invariably carries the
warning: “subject to further re-adjustment”.Pornellosa,
one of the plaintiffs, was given lot No. 78 and she would not agree.
She tried to convince us that lot No. 44 was given to a wrong party,
Herminio Guzman, who was not a bona fide occupant thereof. Guzman might not have been a bona fide
occupant, but the law does not bar him from acquiring the lot, at
least, as against the plaintiffs who have not satisfactorily
established their right thereto. The intention of the law in
authorizing the acquisition of the Santa Clara Estate was to give home
to the homeless. Jose B. Angeles, the husband of Segunda Pornellosa and
one of the plaintiffs here, presently resides with his family in a
house built on a lot included in the Santa Clara Estate and which had
been sold to him by the Government. The intention of the law, as stated
is to give home to the homeless, and let that be a reality if we are to
lend a contribution to the building of a strong and law-abiding
citizenry.Now for all the reasons stated above, we
believe that the plaintiffs failed to established their right to compel
the Director of Lands, now the Chairman of the Land Tenure
Administration, to execute a deed of sale conveying to them a
residential lot as they claim in this action.It appearing
that the functions of the Bureau of Lands in the administration of
lands acquired through purchase or expropriation by the government for
resale have passed to the Land Tenure Administration, the Director of
Lands, as one of the defendants here, is understood substituted by the
Chairman of the Land Tenure administration, and all the pleadings are
accordingly amended.
The finding of the
Court of Appeals that the petitioners have failed to prove that lot 44
is included in the lot formerly occupied by Vicenta San Jose, their
predecessor-in-interest, is binding upon this Court. A party claiming a
right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent
evidence. A plaintiff is duty bound to prove his allegations in the
complaint. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of that of his opponent.
In their amended
complaint, the petitioners allege that they and their predecessor
Vicenta San Jose, from whom they bought the residential lot in
litigation containing an area of 200 sq. m. more or less, had been for
many years in actual possession thereof, and that following the avowed
policy of the government to sell the lots acquired from the Santa Clara
Estate, of which the residential lot in litigation forms part, only to bona fide
occupants or tenants thereof, the defunct Rural Progress Administration
agreed to sell to them the said residential lot (pp. 1, 2-3, rec. on
app.). Reviewing the petitioners’ evidence, the Court of Appeals found
that in Exhibit A, the deed of sale executed by Vicenta San Jose in
favor of Pornellosa, “the area of the lot on which San Jose’s house
stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been
mentioned;” and that there is no showing of the extent of the alleged
vendor’s holding or interest. Besides, the petitioners have not
presented any document or evidence showing that the defunct Rural
Progress Administration had agreed to sell to them the residential lot
in litigation. Granting that the respondent Herminio Guzman is not
entitled to acquire by purchase the said residential lot, still that
fact does not relieve the petitioners from the duty of proving by
competent evidence the allegations of their complaint.
Moreover, the deed of sale (Exhibit A), allegedly executed by Vicenta
San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not
conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. While it is
valid and binding upon the parties with respect to the sale of the
house erected thereon, yet it is not sufficient to convey title or any
right to the residential lot in litigation. Acts and contracts which
have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a
public document.[1] The
petitioners having failed to prove their right to acquire lot 44 under
Commonwealth Act No. 539 cannot compel the respondent, the Land Tenure
Administration, to convey the lot to them.
The judgment under review is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
Paredes, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] Section 2, Commonwealth Act 539; Executive Order 191, dated 2 March 1939, 37 Off. Gaz., 705.
[2] Section 2, Executive Order 376, dated 28 November 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5330.
[3] Sections 3 and 28, Republic Act No. 1400.
[1] Article 1358(1), new Civil Code, article 1280(1) old Civil Code.