G.R. No. L-27079. August 31, 1977
MANILA CORDAGE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANILA CORDAGE WORKERS UNION, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
These are petitions to review the decision dated May 4, 1966[1]
and the resolution dated October 19,
1966[2]
of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) in Case No. 2728-ULP entitled “Manila Cordage
Workers Union, complainant, vs. Manila Cordage Company and Manco
Labor Union, respondents”.
The dispositive part of the decision
reads:
“FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds substantial
evidence to sustain the charge of unfair labor practice against respondent
Manila Cordage Company in violation of Section 4(a), paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of
the Industrial Peace Act, and against respondent Manco
Labor Union in violation of Section 4(b), paragraphs 1 and 2 of the same Act
and, therefore, orders both respondents, their officials or agents:
1. To cease and desist
from restraining and coercing complainants in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875;
2. To cease and desist
from further committing the unfair labor practice complained of; and
3. To reinstate
complainants Silvino Rabago,
Natalio Nisperos and
Ricardo Trajano to their former positions and with
all the rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto and to pay jointly
and severally their back wages from the time of their respective dismissals on
January 27, 1961, February 3, 1961, and May 2, 1961 up to the date of their actual
reinstatements, minus their earnings elsewhere, if any.
To facilitate the payment of back wages due the complainants, the
Chief of the Examining Division of this Court and/or his duly authorized
assistant is hereby directed to examine the payrolls, daily time records and
other pertinent documents relative to complainants’ services with respondent
company and to submit the corresponding report and computation for further disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines,
May 4, 1966.
AMANDO C. BUGAYONG
Associate Judge”.[3]
The resolution dated October
19, 1966 denied the two (2) separate motions filed by Manila
Cordage Company and Manco Labor Union for the
reconsideration of the decision dated May
4, 1966.
On February 1, 1967
the petitioner Manco Labor Union filed the following
Motion in G.R. No. L-27080 (Manco Labor Union [NLU]
vs. Manila Cordage Workers Union,
et al.):
“MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THIS CASE WITH
G.R. NO. L-27079 AND TO ADOPT THE PETITION THEREIN AS THE PETITION IN THIS CASE
Comes now the petitioner Manco Labor
Union (NLU), by the undersigned attorney, and to this Honorable Court,
respectfully states:
That in Case No. 2728-ULP of the Court of Industrial Relations,
entitled “Manila Cordage Company and Manco Labor
Union (NLU), respondents”, said Court rendered its Decision and Resolution
on May 4, 1966 and October 19, 1966, respectively, against the respondents;
That the Manila Cordage Company had appealed said Decision and
Resolution in Case No. 2728-ULP before this Honorable Court by certiorari
and in the resolution of this Court dated January 23, 1967, in G.R. No. L-27079 (Manila
Cordage Company vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al.), the same was
given due course by this Court;
That since the issues to be brought by the herein petitioner in
this case are similar to the issues raised in the petition for certiorari
in G.R. No. L-27079, in order to avoid a multiplicity of cases, it is desirable
that the present case be consolidated with the said case;
That in order to avoid repetitions and a voluminous record, herein petitioner
is adopting the petition for review filed in G.R. No. L-27079 as its own in the
present case, and by reference,
is made a part hereof;
That this motion is timely because copy of the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in this
case was received on January 6, 1967, notice
of appeal and a petition for extension for 15 days was filed with this
Court on January 16, 1967, which was granted, and today is the last day for the
filing of our petition for review in this case.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
1. That the present case be consolidated with
G.R. No. L-27079, entitled “Manila Cordage Company vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and Manila Cordage Workers
Union;
2. That herein petitioner be allowed to adopt the
petition for review in G.R. No. L-27079 as its own, and by reference made a
part hereof;
3. That upon notice in accordance with the Rules
of this Court, herein petitioner will deposit the amount of P80.40 in payment
of costs.
4. That in case this motion will be denied, that
herein petitioner be given five (5) days from notice to file its own petition
for review.
Manila, January 31, 1967.
EULOGIO R. LERUM
Attorney for
Petitioner
Manco
Labor Union (NLU)
3199
Magsaysay Blvd., Manila”
The Court issued on February
15, 1967 the following resolution:
” ‘Considering the motion of attorney for
petitioner in L-27080 (Manco Labor Union [NLU] vs.
Manila Cordage Workers Union, et al.) praying (a) that this case be
consolidated with L-27079 (Manila Cordage Company vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al.); (b) that petitioner be allowed to adopt
the petition for review in aforesaid case L-27079 as its own, and by reference
made a part thereof; (c) that upon notice in accordance with the Rules of
Court, petitioner will deposit the amount of P80.40 for costs; and (d) in case
the motion is denied, petitioner be given five days from notice to file its own
peÂtition for review, THE COURT RESOLVED to grant the first three prayers of
the motion, provided that docket and other fees are paid.’
Very truly yours,
BIENVENIDO
EJERCITO
Clerk of Court”
On October 24, 1967
the petitioner Manco Labor Union submitted the
following motion:
“MOTION TO ADOPT THE BRIEF OF
PETITIONER MANILA CORDAGE CO.
Comes now the petitioner Manco Labor
Union (NLU), by the undersigned attorney, and to this Honorable Court,
respectfully moves that in view of the fact that said Union
could not afford the printing of its brief due to poor finances, that it be
allowed to adopt as its own, the brief of the Manila Cordage Co.
That in addition to the arguments contained in said brief, this
petitioner would like to emphasize the following:
1. That complainants in
the Court below, namely, Silvino Rabago,
Natalio Nisperos and Ricardo
Trajano, by resigning from the Manco
Labor Union (NLU), violated the provision of the collective bargaining
agreement then in force, which reads as follows:
‘IV MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP
Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are already
members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this
AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of the UNION
for the duration of this
AGREEMENT’ (Exhibits ‘5-B’ and ‘6-B’ Company).
Having violated said agreement, these complainants are liable to dismissal
in the same manner as strikers who violate a no-strike clause in a contract
could be dismissed although said contract is silent regarding the penalty for
breach thereof.
Hence, the Manco Labor Union (NLU) should
not be the one penalized for its effort to secure compliance with the terms of
its contract with petitioning company.
2. That said agreement
could not be susceptible of any other interpretation except that violation
thereof would result in dismissal because as found out by the Court below, the
said provision was explained to the members before and after the same was
signed.
3. Petitioner Manco Labor Union (NLU) could not be held guilty of
discriminating against Rabago, Nisperos
and Trajano because of their union activities. The record shows that beÂsides these three,
Vicente Untalan, Ruperto Balsamo and 40 others resigned. In the case of Untalan
and Balsamo, after the Manila Cordage Co. had
dismissed them on request of the petitioning Union, this
Union was also the one who asked for their reinstatement
when they withdrew their resignation from the union. In the case of the other 40 members who
resigned (Exhs. ‘A’, ‘A-1’ to ‘A-49’) when they
withdrew their resignations, the Manco Labor Union
did not do anything to them, although it had full knowledge that they have
joined the rival union.
WHEREFORE, considering that Silvino Rabago, Natalio Nisperos and Ricardo Trajano had
violated the Collective BargainÂing Agreement whereas the action of the petitioner was done in good faith in what it
believes to be its right under said contract, we respectfully pray of this
Honorable Court that the decision appealed from be set aside and case No.
2728-ULP of the Court of Industrial Relations be ordered dismissed.
Manila, October 24, 1967.
EULOGIO R. LERUM
Attorney for the
Petitioner
3199
Magsaysay Blvd., Manila“
The petitioner, Manila Cordage Company, is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The petitioner, Manco Labor Union, is a
legitimate labor organization.
The respondent, Manila Cordage Workers Union, is also a
legitimate labor organization. Said resÂpondent
union is composed of employees of the petiÂtioner company.
Sometime in 1957, the Manila Cordage Company and the Manco Labor Union, then acting as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the former’s employees, entered
into a collective bargaining agreement which contained, among others, the
following stipulations:
“WHEREAS, the parties hereto decided to enter into an
agreement relating to the terms and conditions of employment, with reference to
those members to whom the provisions of this agreement applies.”
x x x
“Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are
already members of the UNION at the time of the signing
of this AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of the UNION
for the duration of this AGREEMENT.”[4]
The foregoing stipulations were also
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Manila
Cordage Company and the Manco Labor Union in 1959.
When the collective bargaining agreements were entered into, the
employees, Silvino Rabago,
Ricardo Trajano and Natalio
Nisperos were already members of Manco
Labor Union.
Shortly after 1959, some employees of Manila Cordage Company
formed the Manila Cordage Workers Union.
The usual campaign for membership of the new union took place. Some employees who were members of the Manco Labor Union resigned from said union and joined the
Manila Cordage Workers Union. At the
instance of the Manco Labor Union, the Manila Cordage
Company dismissed those who resigned from the Manco
Labor Union, among them, Silvino Rabago,
Vicente Untalan, Ruperto Balsamo, Natalio Nisperos, Ricardo Trajano, Roque Ruby and Salvador de Leon. It is alÂleged that the Manco
Labor Union held meetings wherein the members were informed that under the
above-quoted stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement, continued
membership in the Manco Labor Union was a condition
precedent to employment in the Manila Cordage Company. As a consequence, some of those who resigned
from the Manco Labor Union withdrew their
resignations and were re-employed by the Manila Cordage Company.
At the behest of the Manila Cordage Workers Union, an acting
prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a complaint dated March 28, 1961 for unfair labor
practice against Manila Cordage Company and the Manco
Labor Union in behalf of the Manila Cordage Workers Union and its members
namely, Silvino Rabago,
Vicente Untalan, Ruperto Balsamo and Natalio Nisperos. The complaint
was docketed as Case No. 2728-ULP of the Court of Industrial Relations.[5]
The acting prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed
an amended complaint in Case No. 2728-ULP dated July 14, 1961 adding as complainants Ricardo TraÂjano and Salvador de Leon.[6]
It was alleged in the amended complaint that the Manco Labor Union, through its President, for no other
valid cause except for the resignation of some of its members and the active
campaign of the Manila Cordage Workers Union in recruiting members, knowingly
and unlawfully influenced and connived with officers of the Manila Cordage
Company in the dismissal of Silvino Rabago, Vicente Untalan, Ruperto Balsamo, Natalio Nisperos, Ricardo Trajano and Salvador de Leon, who had resigned from the Manco Labor Union and joined the Manila Cordage Workers
Union.
The Manco Labor Union averred in its
answer that the complainants were dismissed on the basis of an existing
collective bargaining contract between said union and the Manila Cordage
Company.[7]
The Manila Cordage Company alleged that said company had entered
into a valid collective bargaining contract with the Manco
Labor Union, a bona fide legitimate labor organization, then
recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees of
the respondent company; that one of the conditions of employment provided in
said collective bargaining agreement is the maintenance-of-membership clause requiring
all members of the Manco Labor Union to remain as
such members thereof during the life of the contract; that the Manco Labor Union demanded of the Manila Cordage Company
the dismissal of the individual complainants from employment for the reason
that said complainants had failed to continue and maintain their membership in
the union; that acting in good faith and in pursuance of its obligations under
the said contract, respondent company had to terminate the employment of said
complainants, otherwise the Manila Cordage Company would be charged with
contractual breach and confronted with the Manco
Labor Union’s reprisal.[8]
After trial the respondent Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision dated May 4, 1966 ordering the petitioner, Manila Cordage Company,
and the Manco Labor Union “To reinstate
complainants Silvino Rabago,
Natalio Nisperos and
Ricardo Trajano to their former positions and with
all the rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto and to pay jointly
and severally their back wages from the time of their respective dismissals on
January 27, 1961, February 3, 1961, and May 2, 1961 up to the date of their
actual reinstateÂments, minus their earnings elsewhere, if any.”[9]
The motions for reconsideration of the Manila CorÂdage Company
and the Manco Labor Union were denied by the Court of Industrial Relations in a
resolution en banc dated October
19, 1966.[10]
However, the Presiding Judge voted for the modification of the decision dated May 4, 1966 by eliminating therefrom the award of back wages. He concurred in the reinstatement of
complainants Nisperos, Trajano
and Rabago.[11]
The petitioner Manila Cordage Company assigns the following
errors:
“I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, UNDER THE
‘MAINTENANCE-OF-MEMBERSHIP’ CLAUSE IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER (‘COMPANY’) AND MANCO LABOR UNION (‘MANCO’), EMPLOYEES
OF THE COMPANY WHO ARE ALREADY MEMBERS OF MANCO WHEN SAID AGREEMENT TOOK EFFECT
WERE REQUIRED TO REMAIN SUCH MEMBERS AS A CONDITION OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT IN
THE COMPANY.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT INDIVIDUALS, WHOSE
EMPLOYMENT HAS CEASED DUE TO ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND WHO HAVE NOT
SOUGHT OTHER SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT AND REGULAR EMPLOYMENT, CEASE TO BE
‘EMPLOYEES’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 2(d) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 875, AS
AMENDED, AND HENCE, ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION AND RELIEF UNDER THIS ACT.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT INDIVIDUALS DISMISSED
PURSUANT TO A UNION SECURITY CLAUSE ARE NOT ENTITLED TO BACK WAGES, WHEN THEIR
EMPLOYER EFFECTED THEIR DISMISSAL IN GOOD FAITH AND IN AN HONEST BELIEF THAT
THE CLAUSE AUTHORIZED SUCH DISMISSAL.
IV
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.”[12]
Anent the first error assigned, the petitioner avers:
“It should be emphasized strongly that this is virtually a
case of first impression in this jurisdiction.
We are not aware of any decision of this Tribunal squarely determinative
of the principal issue in this petition.
For this reason, it should be appropriate to consider American
jurisprudence which is the source of most of our laws on labor relations. (Flores vs. San Pedro, L-8580, September 30,
1957.)
Decisions of American federal and state courts as well as the
comments of recognized American treatise writers uniformly define a
maintenance-of-membership provision as one which requires all employees who are
already members of the union at the time the provision takes effect to remain
such members during the life thereof as a condition of continued
employment. (NLRB vs. Eaton Mfg. Co. [6th Cir. 1949] 175 F2d 292, 16 Lab Cas
75, 761; Markham & Callow vs. International Woodworkers, 175 P2d 727, 170
Or 517 [1943]; Walter vs. State, 38 So2d 609, 34 AlaApp
268 [1949]; Colonial Press vs. Ellis, 74 NE2d 1, 321 Mass 495; Rothenberg on
Labor Relations, 49-50; Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law 448;
Prentice-Hall, Labor Course, Par. 12, 204, also at 914; 3 CCH Labor Law
Reporter [Labor Relations], Par. 4520.)[13]
It is not necessary to consider American jurisprudence. The issue of whether or not the so-called
“maintenance-of-membership” clause requires all employees who were
already members of the Manco Labor Union at the time
the said clause took effect to remain members of the union during the life of
the collective bargaining agreement as a condition of continued employment may
be resolved under the constiÂtution and
relevant Philippine jurisprudence.
It is a fact that the complainants were employees of the Manila
Cordage Company and members of the Manco Labor Union
when the following stipulation was included in the collective bargaining
agreement:
“IV MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP
Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are already members of the UNION
at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of
the UNION for the duration of this AGREEMENT” (Exhibits ‘5-B’ and ‘6-B’-Company).[14]
The foregoing stipulation, however, does
not clearly state that maintenance of membership in the Manco
Labor Union is a condition of continuous employment in the Manila Labor Cordage Company.
In consonance with the ruling in Confederated Sons of Labor vs. Anakan Lumber Co., et al., 107 Phil. 915, in order that the
Manila Cordage Company may be deemed bound to dismiss employees who do not
maintain their membership in the Manco Labor Union,
the stipulation to this effect must be so clear as to leave no room for doubt thereon. An undertaking of this nature is so harsh
that it must be strictly construed and doubts must be resolved against the
existence of the right to dismiss.
Apparently aware of the deficiency of the
maintenance-of-membership clause, the petitioner urges that the same should be
construed together with the “Whereas” provision of the contract which
reads:
“WHEREAS, the parties hereto have decided to enter into an
agreement relating to the terms and conditions of employment and reference to
those employees to whom the provisions of this AGREEMENT apply.” (Exhibits
‘5-A’ and ‘?-A’-Company)[15]
Anent this point, the Court of Industrial Relations through Judge
Amando Bugayong ruled:
“But whether read disjunctively or
conjunctively, these two provisions would not justify the interpretation which
respondent company would want to attribute to the same. For said ‘Whereas’ proviso neither refers to
tenure or duration of employment which is the dispute in the case at bar but
only to terms and conditions of employment such as working hours, wages, other
benefits and privileges clearly specified therein. We need not stretch our imagination too far
to know the difference between or duration of employment from terms and
conditions of employment. Besides, even
on the assumption that ‘terms and conditions of employment’ covers continuity
or period of employment, the ambiguity of the provision should not adversely
affect complainants. Hence, even with
the conjunctive interpretation, these two provisions can not supplant the
omission of said maintenance of membership clause, let alone cure the defect of
the same. This is especially so if the
rule which states that in case of inconsistency a particular provision like the
disputed ‘maintenance of membership’ clause prevails over or controls a general
provision, such as the ‘WHEREAS’ proviso, invoked by respondents, is to be
applied to the interpretation of this doubtful provision (Rule 130(4), Section
10, New Rules of Court).”[16]
To construe the stipulations above-quoted as imposing as a
condition to continued employment in the Manila Cordage Company the maintenance
of membership in the Manco Labor Union is to violate
the natural and constitutional right of the laborer to organize freely.[17]
Such interpretation would be inconsistent with the constitutional mandate that
the State shall afford protection to labor.[18]
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations correctly found that
the disputed “maintenance-of-membership” clause in question did not
give the Manila Cordage Company the right to dismiss the complainants just
because they resigned as members of the Manco Labor
Union.
There is a showing that the dismissed complainants sought other
substantially equivalent and regular employment. They failed to find any.
The contention of the petitioners that they acted in good faith
in dismissing the complainants and, therefore, should not be held liable to pay
their back wages has no merit. The
dismissal of the complainants by the petitioners was precipitate and done with
undue haste. Considering that the
so-called “maintenance of membership” clause did not clearly give the
petitioners the right to dismiss the complainants if said complainants did not
maintain their membership in the Manco Labor Union,
the petitioners should have raised the issue before the Court of Industrial
Relations in a petition for permission to dismiss the complainants.
However, considering the circumstances and equity of the case,
the petitioners should be held liable to pay the back wages of the complainants
for a period of two years only from the date they were respectively dismissed.[19]
The reinstatement order of respondent Court of Industrial
Relations of complainants Silvino Rabago,
Natalio Nisperos and
Ricardo Trajano to their former positions and with
all the rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto is correct (supra,
p. 2). Such reinstatement now is of
course subject to said complainants still being within the required physical
and age requirements, but any physical or medical examination to which they may
be subjected is to be given them as old reinstated workers, but not
as a precondition to their reinstatement.
Our ruling in Davao Free Workers Front vs.
CIR, 60 SCRA 408, 425, is fully applicable mutatis mutandis in the case
at bar, as follows:
“x x x The
filing and pendency of an unfair labor practice case
as in the case at bar presuppose a continuing employer-employee relationship
and when the case is decided in favor of the workers, this relationship is in
law deemed to have continued uninterruptedly notwithstanding their unlawful dismissal
or the lawful strike and stoppage of work, and hence, seniority and other
privileges are preserved in their favor.
To require them to undergo a physical or medical examination as a
precondition of reinstatement or return to work simply because of the long pendency of their case which is due to no fault of theirs
would not only defeat the purpose of the law and the constitutional and
statutory mandates to protect labor but would work to their unfair prejudice as
aggrieved parties and give an undue advantage to employers as the offenders who
have the means and resources to
wage attrition and withstand the bane of protracted litigation.
“Hence, the aggrieved workers may be subjected to periodic
physical or medical examination as old reinstated workers, but not as a
precondition to their reÂinstatement or return to work with the important conÂsequence
that if they are found to be ill or suffering from some disability, they would
be entitled to all the benefits that the laws and company practices provide by
way of compensation, medical care, disability benefits and gratuities, etc. to
employees and workers.”
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
with the sole modification that the backwages which
both the petitioners are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the
complainants Silvino Rabago,
Natalio Nisperos and
Ricardo Trajano are hereby fixed at the equivalent of
two years pay without deÂduction or qualification computed on the basis of
their wages at the time of their respective dismissals on January 27, 1961,
February 3, 1961 and May 2, 1961.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex K petition, Rollo, p. 86
[2]
Annex R petition, Rollo, p. 143
[3]
Annex K, Rollo, p. 101
[4]
Petition, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 12-13
[5]
Annex A of petition, Rollo, pp. 30-33
[6] Annex
D of petition, Rollo, pp. 39-42
[7]
Annex B, Rollo, pp. 34-35
[8]
Annex E, Rollo, pp. 43-46
[9] Rollo, p. 101
[10] Rollo, p. 143
[11] Rollo, pp. 144-146
[12]
Petitioner’s brief, pp. 1-2, Rollo, p. 166
[13]
Petitioner’s brief, pp. 8-9, Rollo, p. 166
[14]
Annex K, p. 7, Rollo, p. 92
[15] Idem,
Rollo, p. 92
[16] Idem,
Rollo, p. 93
[17]
Article III, Sec. 1(6), 1935 Constitution
[18]
Article XIV, Section 6, 1935 Constitution
[19]
Cf. Feati Univ. Faculty Club vs. Feati Univ.,
58 SCRA 395, 418 (1974).