G.R. No. L-22608. June 30, 1969
MACKAY RADIO & TELEGRAPH CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. JOHN W. RICH, RESPONDENT.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals of
January 29, 1964 and from
its resolution of March 3, 1965
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as gathered from the findings of the Court of Appeals,
follow:
Petitioner Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., Inc., (hereinafter
referred to as Mackay) is an American corporation, engaged in the business of
world-wide wireless and radio communications, with a branch office in Manila. Sometime in April, 1952, in Tokyo,
Mackay engaged the services of respondent John W. Rich (hereinafter referred to
as Rich), an American citizen and a resident of San
Francisco, California. A few months later, Mackay assigned Rich to
its Manila office as commercial supervisor. Rich arrived in Manila
on July 7, 1952. On October 21, 1952, a contract of employment
was executed between Mackay and Rich, providing that the employment was for a
three-year period from May 1, 1952 to April 30, 1955, at a salary of U.S. $400
a month; that “upon the satisfactory completion of the term of service x x x, the Company will grant to
the Employee a furlough of three months on full pay with free passage” to
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. After
having satisfactorily completed the terms of the contract in May 1955, Rich
went on furlough to the United States
with the cost of his transportation to San Francisco,
round trip, paid for by Mackay.
While on furlough, Rich was made to report to Mackay’s
main offices in New York and he
was sent to the New Orleans branch
on company business. This work of Rich,
at a time when he was supposed to be on vacation, lasted for 21 days. In New York,
Rich’s new assignment was taken up, and in due time he was again sent to Manila,
arriving in the latter place for his second assignment on October 5, 1955.
The second tour of duty of Rich in Manila
lasted only until February 15, 1956. On February
16, 1956, Rich boarded the SS Tungus for Hongkong, and after staying in Hongkong
for a few days he took the SS President Cleveland for San
Francisco where he arrived in March 1956. Rich paid for his transportation from Manila
to San Francisco because Mackay
refused to so pay.
In June or July, 1957, Rich returned to Manila. He came this time on his own as a temporary
visitor. Shortly afterwards, Rich
obtained employment with the local office of the RCA Communications, married a
Filipino woman, and became a permanent Philippine resident. It was then that Rich pursued his claim
against Mackay for breach of contract of employment. His claims having been denied by Mackay, Rich
brought suit against Mackay before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for damages arising from wrongful dismissal from
employment. After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court renders judgment in
favor of plaintiff and sentences the defendant to pay unto the former the sum
of P15,000.00, representing the balance of salary up to October 5, 1958; the
sum of P1,438.00, as reimbursement of transportation fare from Manila to San
Francisco; the sum of P560 as salary for extra services for 21 days; the sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and
the sum of P5,000 for and as attorney’s fees, together with interest at the
legal rate from November 24, 1959, until fully paid, and the costs of the
suit.”
Defendant Mackay appealed from the above-mentioned decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal to the Court of
Appeals. On January 29, 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision modifying the judgment of the lower court by eliminating the award
of exemplary damages and reducing the award of moral damages from P10,000 to P5,000, and providing that the award for moral
damages and attorney’s fees should bear no interest. In all other respects the judgment of the
lower court was affirmed.
Hence, the present appeal before this Court.
Appellant Mackay now contends that the Court of Appeals erred:[1]
1.
In not holding that after the
termination of Rich’s contract of employment, exhibit A,
on April 30, 1955,
without having executed a new contract, his employment from October 5, 1955 to February 15, 1956 was on a
month-to-month basis.
2.
In finding that Rich was dismissed
by Mackay on February 15, 1956 before the expiration of the alleged 3-year contract
of employment and that Rich is entitled to actual damages of P15,000.00 which
is approximately 60% of the balance of his unpaid salary of P25,333.34; and
further erred in not deducting the earnings received by Rich during the
unexpired period of his alleged 3-year contract of employment from February 16,
1956 to October 5, 1958 in the amount of P20,966.66 from his claim of
P25,333.34 to mitigate his damages.1-a
3.
In not finding that the award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 is
excessive, unreasonable and disproportionate to the main claim.
4.
In finding that Rich is entitled
to moral damages without proof of bad faith or fraud on the part of petitioner.
1. Appellant Mackay
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that after the
termination of Rich’s contract of employment on April 30, 1955 his employment
from October 5, 1955 to February 15, 1956 was “on a month to month
basis”, no new contract of employment having been executed. Mackay argues that clause 8 of the original
contract of employment (Exhibit A), which provides that
“8. It is further mutually agreed between the
parties hereto that upon the satisfactory completion of the term of service
specified in Clause 1 of this Agreement, the Company will grant to the Employee
a furlough of three months on full pay, with free passage to the place referred
to in Clause 7 above, and free passage from such place to the station of the
company to which he may be assigned upon a renewal of this agreement between
the parties hereto being executed” (Brief for the Petitioner, p. 53).
should govern
the relationship of the parties, it being stated in said clause that “a
renewal of this agreement between the parties hereto being executed”. It is admitted in the instant case that no
written contract of renewal of employment was executed.
Appellee Rich, on the other hand,
argues that the matter regarding his re-employment for a 3-year period is a
factual question, and the Court of Appeals had found that his re-employment was
for a 3-year period; and the finding of the Court of Appeals is conclusive upon
this Court.
What is to be considered, therefore, is whether the question
raised is one of fact or of law. In
Joaquin vs. Navarro,[2]
this Court laid down a guide in determining whether a question is of fact or of
law, thus:
“When the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of
which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed
thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all
the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of
law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.”
The decision of the Court of Appeals, appealed from, shows that
the issue regarding the period of re-employment was resolved on the basis of
evidence not purely documentary, because appellee’s
evidence on the matter was both documentary and testimonial. Neither was the issue decided on the basis of
an agreement of facts, because there was no such agreement. We find that the Court of Appeals made a
thorough examination of the evidence of both parties before arriving at
findings and conclusions, as follows:[3]
“The appellee’s statement that he
was sent back to Manila for another
3 years finds confirmation from the appellant’s own officers. Upon the other hand, the appellant did not
produce any evidence that the second contract was month-to-month, nor did the
appellant deny the appellee’s statement that he was
asked to come back for another three years.
The appellant does not question the authenticity of Exhs.
F, G, H, I and J.
In short, the appellant relies on the absence of a written
contract. But even in its
own documentary evidence, Exh. 16, sent by
its New York to the Manila
office, reference is made to the appellee’s period of
employment as ‘HIS CONTRACT TERM OF THREE YEARS’.
“It seems that every one always considered the re-employment
as for another 3 years and the failure to put the contract in writing hardly
affected its duration. In fact, no fault
should be attributed to the appellee, for even with
regard to the first tour of duty which began on May 1, 1952, the written contract for it, Exh. A, was executed only on October 21, 1952, or more than 5 months later. To our minds, it is conclusive that the
appellant rehired or reemployed the appellee for
another period of 3 years. This contract
commenced on October 5, 1955,
the day the appellee arrived in Manila
for the second assignment and the day he started drawing his salary for this
second assignment.”
The foregoing conclusions of the Court of Appeals, based as they
are upon its findings of facts, cannot be reviewed by this Court.[4]
Applicable to the issue at bar is the statement of this Court in
Lim vs. Calaguas,[5]
to wit:
“That query necessarily invites calibration of the whole ‘evidence’
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation.
Consequently, the question must be deemed factual, for the Appeals’
Court to solve.”
In Corbin on Contracts,[6]
We read that the question regarding the term of service in service contracts is
“one of factual interpretation, and very frequently it is a jury
question.”
At any rate, the case is now before this Court, and upon
examination of the record and of the issue therein raised We
find that the Court of Appeals correctly held that appellee
Rich was reemployed by appellant Mackay under the same terms and conditions as
in the original contract of employment.
In Horton vs. Wollner, 71 Ala.
452, cited in Abbot on Facts, 5th ed., 1937, p. 651, We
read:
“The weight of authority holds that an employee originally
hired for a definite term, who continues to render the same services after the
expiration of such term without explicitly entering into a new agreement, is
prima facie presumed to be serving under a new contract having the same terms
and conditions as the original one.”
Again, in Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, pp. 689-690, We read:
“When parties have made a contract of employment for a
definite period of the expiration of that period the employment is often
continued without making any new agreement about it. From this conduct, especially if the original
contract was for one year’s service, an inference will usually be made that
the parties intend a renewal of the contract for a second similar period; such
is said to be the ‘presumption,’ rebuttable in
character. Even though the parties
expressly agree upon a different salary, the presumption will be indulged as to
the extension of time.” (Citing Associated Newspapers v. Phillips, 294 F
845; Williams vs. Schalk Chemical Co., 53 P 2d 1015,
11 Cal. App. 2d 396; Fletcher v. Crichton, 164 So. 411, 183 La. 551; Allen v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 91 N.E. 887, 205 Mass. 569; Adams v. Fitzpatrick,
26 N.E. 143, 125 N.Y. 124; Magnolia Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Davidson,
38 S.W. 2d 634; Virginia Canners Exchange v. Scheidt,
119 S.E. 56, 137 Va. 452; Conrad v. Ellison-Harvey Co., 91 S.E. 763, 120 Va.
458, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 1171; Kellog
v. Citizens Co. of Pittsburg, 69 N.W. 362, 94 Wis. 554; and Steward Dry Goods
Co. v. Hutchison, 198 S.W. 17, 177 Ky. 757, L.R.A. 1918 C, 704.)
In 56 CJS p. 83, We
read:
“As a general rule, where one enters into the service of
another for a definite period, and continues in the employment after the expiration
of that period, without any new contract, the presumption is that the
employment is continued on the terms of the original contract.”
We find in the record that the presumption of renewal of the
contract of employment of Rich, for the same 3-year period, has not been
rebutted. On the contrary, as the Court
of Appeals said, Rich’s statement that he was sent back to Manila
for another 3 years found confirmation from Mackay’s
own officers. For instance: a Vice-President of Mackay, after reviewing
the concessions given to Rich for his second assignment to Manila, reported to
Executive Vice-President Henderson that:
“He [Rich] appeared very pleased with these decisions, and he
returned to Manila for a further
3-year period.” (Exhibit H-1)
And in Henderson’s
second letter to Rich, Exhibit J, he stated that:
“x x x [Mackay]
would have provided you with a return passage to San Francisco at the end of
your second three-year term, just as we did at the end of the term of
your first three-year tour of duty x x x.” (Exh.
J-2)
Even Mackay itself understood the contract to be for 3 years, as
the New York cable (Exh. 16) stated that:
“x x x Pls note as Rich is leaving Manila without completing his contract
term of three years his transportation back to the States will be at his own
expense.”
The foregoing evidence certainly
militates against, and overcomes, appellant Mackay’s
contention that the second employment of Rich was on a month-to-month basis
because there was no written contract of renewal of employment for another
3-year service.
2. We now come to the
question of whether, or not, the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in finding that Rich was dismissed by
Mackay before the expiration of the 3-year period of the second employment; (b)
in declaring that Rich is entitled to actual damages of P15,000 which is
approximately 60% of the balance of his unpaid salary of P25,333.34; and (c) in
not deducting the earnings of Rich, in other employments during the unexpired
portion of the term of the contract, in the amount of P20,966.66.
We find in the record conflicting evidence on the question of
whether Rich was dismissed from, or Rich did abandon, his job. In spite of appellant Mackay’s
own evidence which shows that it had discharged Rich from his job, said
appellant asserts that Rich abandoned his job.
Regarding this question, the Court of Appeals made the following
findings:
“. . . . . [Like] the trial court we also ‘cannot but note the
contradictory and irreconcilable positions adopted by defendant in this
regard’. In the face of documents coming
from the appellant itself, we find, as the lower court found, that the appellee did not abandon his employment but was dismissed
by the appellant. This dismissal is a
breach of the 3-year contract of employment.”[7]
The question, therefore, is another question of fact, and the
finding of the Court of Appeals on this matter is conclusive on this Court.
“The question had of whether an employee was in fact discharged
or had voluntarily quit or resigned is ordinarily a question of fact for the
jury.” (56 CJS p. 461)
“In employee’s action against employer for wrongful discharge,
evidence that he did not leave employment of his own accord held to present
jury question and to make jury’s finding in favor of plaintiff thereon
conclusive on appeal.” (D. Buchanan & Son v. Ewell,
139 S.E. 483)
“In action for wrongful discharge of employee, whether
employee voluntarily quit his employment was for jury.” (Sinclair Refining Co. v. McCullom, et al., 24 NE 2d 784).
“In action by employee for breach of contract of employment,
evidence as to whether plaintiff voluntarily quit or was discharged held
sufficient for jury.” (Crosby v. Bradley, 140 SE 702)
We now determine whether, or not, the award of damages made by
the Court of Appeals to appellee Rich is
correct. It is the settled rule in this
jurisdiction that in an action for breach of contract for employment where the
employee is wrongfully discharged the employee is entitled to recover damages
to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to him by the terms of the
contract.[8]
It has been shown that appellee Rich was reemployed
for a period of three years from October
5, 1955, so that the period of his employment would last until October 4, 1958. It having been shown, also, that Rich was
wrongfully discharged from his employment, and the discharge took effect on February 16, 1956, it follows that
the period from February 16, 1956
to October 4, 1958
constitutes the remaining period of the contract of employment. It has been computed that, based on the
salary of $400.00 a month (or P800.00), the total salary that Rich would have
earned during the unexpired period of his employment if he was not wrongfully
discharged was P25,333.34. It was proved by appellant Mackay that
during the period from February 16,
1956 to October 4, 1958,
Rich was able to find work and received compensation amounting to P20,966.66, as follows:
(1) As training automotive salesman
with
Crown Auto Sales at Palo
Alto, at $300 a
month, for two
Months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . P1,200.00
(2) Automotive salesman in same
company for one month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 600.00
(3) Earnings from Wilson
Sporting
Goods
at $400 a month from
September
1956 to January 1957
(5
months) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 4,000.00
(4) As Far Eastern Sales Representative
of RCA Communications,
Manila,
from July 1, 1957 to
October 5, 1958 (15 months &
5
days at P1,000 a month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 15,166.66
TOTAL . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . P20,966.66
The Court of Appeals, however, did not
deduct what Rich had earned in other employments, during the unexpired period
of his employment with Mackay, from the amount that he would have earned had he
not been wrongfully discharged by Mackay and had worked till the end of the
period stipulated in the contract for employment. Instead, the Court of Appeals awarded to Rich
the sum of P15,000 as actual damages, representing
about 60% of what he would have earned during the unexpired period of his
contract of employment with Mackay. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the award made by the trial court in this respect,
based on the decisions in the cases of Garcia Palomar vs. Hotel de France Co.,
42 Phil. 660, and the case of Sotelo vs. Behn Meyer & Co. 57 Phil. 775.
It is now claimed by appellant Mackay that the Court of Appeals
erred in not deducting the compensation earned by Rich during the period of
the unexpired term of the contract from the amount which he would have earned
during the same period if he had not been wrongfully discharged. In other words, it is the contention of
Mackay that the Court of Appeals erred in giving a downright award of P15,000 to Rich.
We find merit in the contention of appellant Mackay.
The ruling in the cases of Garcia Palomar vs. Hotel de France
Co., supra, and Sotelo vs. Behn
Meyer & Co., supra, can not be applied in the present case. In those two cases, the complaints for
damages for breach of contracts of employment were filed before the lapse of
the agreed period of employment. In Garcia
Palomar, the contract had more than 20 months to run when the case was
submitted; and in Sotelo, the unexpired term
of the contract was 33 months when the case was brought to court. In the latter case, this Court awarded
plaintiff “about 60 per centum of the amount which he would have earned
under his contract with defendant if he had been permitted to serve as its
salesman for the entire term,” because the Court took into account the
probability that the discharged employee would be able to earn money in another
employment during the period which was still to run after the breach.
In the case now before Us, however, the action for damages for
breach of the contract of employment was filed after the lapse of the
agreed period of employment, and, therefore, there is no reason to take into
consideration what the employee might earn during the period after discharge
until expiration of the agreed period, because the evidence shows what the discharged
employee had actually earned during the period from the date of his
discharge to the date of the expiration of the contract of employment.
In the case of Coleman vs. Hotel de France,[9]
this Court, in deciding in favor of the plaintiff who sued for damages for
breach of a contract of employment, held:
“Holding as we do that the defendant corporation without just
cause or excuse discharged the plaintiff in flagrant violation of its contract
of employment with her, we agree with the trial judge that plaintiff is
entitled to recover not merely compensation for services rendered before the
breach of the contract by her employer, but the full amount which she might
have earned under the contract less such compensation as she actually
obtained or might have obtained in some other employment during the term of the
contract which had not yet expired at the date of the breach, the burden of
proof as to the amount by which the prima
facie damage may thus be reduced being upon the defendant. (Aldaz
vs. Gay, 7 Phil. Rep. 268).[10]
The doctrine laid down in the above-cited case, regarding the
amount of damages recoverable in suit for breach of contract of employment and
the deductions therefrom, had been applied in the
case of Knust vs. Morse.[11]
In the case of Potenciano vs. Estefani,[12]
which is a tenancy case, the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the
landowner to deliver to the tenant 81.2 cavans of palay, or their current market value, for damages suffered
by the latter as a consequence of his illegal ejectment
from the land he was working on as a tenant.
On appeal, this Court ruled:
“….Since there is evidence to show that during his ejectment the tenant was able to cultivate the ricelands of Regino Cano and
Paula Arce containing an area of almost two hectares
and that during the two agricultural years of 1951 and 1952 he received a share
of at least 8 cavans of palay
for each year, or a total of 16 cavans, it is the
sense of this Tribunal that this earning should be deducted from the cavans of palay awarded to him in
the decision appealed from.”
In labor cases, this Court has invariably ruled that the amount
earned by an employee during the period when he was laid off, or from the time
of his discharge to the time of his reinstatement, is deductible from the back
wages that are paid to the employee. Thus, in Philippine Air Lines Inc. vs. Philippine Air Lines Employees
Association, No. L-15544, July
26, 1960, this Court said:
“In the past, we have had occasion to rule upon the question
of deducting from the back wages accruing to an employee due for reinstatement
any amount that he may have received in the meantime. On the principle that one should not be
allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another, we almost invariably
granted the deduction.”[13]
In the instant case, therefore, the amounts actually earned by appellee Rich during the unexpired period of his employment
contract with Mackay should be deducted from what he could have earned from
Mackay had Mackay not discharged him.
The amount of P1,800.00 received by Rich as
allowances from Crown Auto Sales at Palo Alto
is deductible because he actually earned said amount, even if it is claimed
that said amount was given to him as allowances. Also deductible are the earnings from Wilson
Sporting Goods in the amount of P4,000, and from the
RCA Communications, Manila, in the
amount of P15,166.70.
Regarding the sum of P1,438.00 which
Rich claims to be reimbursed for his transportation expenses in returning to San
Francisco after he was discharged from his employment
by Mackay, the lower court correctly granted the reimbursement. As a matter of fact, Mackay does not question
that award in the present appeal.
However, Rich asserts that he had to spend an equal amount for
transportation from San Francisco
to Manila in order to get an
employment from the RCA. Rich maintains
that this sum of P1,438.00 which he spent in coming
back to Manila to get an employment
should be charged against Mackay, because these expenses were incurred in order
to get an employment which resulted in reducing the damages to be paid by Mackay. We find merit in this claim of Rich. Under Article 2203 of the Civil Code, the
party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family to minimize the damage resulting from the act or omission of
another. In the instant case, We consider it reasonable that whatever measure the
discharged employee had taken to minimize the damage he suffered should be at
the cost of the person liable to pay the damage, being an indirect consequence
of the act of the latter, and an integral part of the injury caused.[14]
We believe that it is but just that an employee wrongfully discharged by his
employer should be entitled to recover from his employer the necessary and
reasonable expenses incurred by him in seeking or in obtaining other employment.[15]
Consequently, the amount of P1,438.00
which appellee Rich spent in coming back to the
Philippines to get a job at the RCA should be credited to him, and this amount
should be taken from the sum of P20,966.66 which is deductible from the sum of
P25,333.34 which Rich would have earned till October 4, 1958 if he was not
wrongfully discharged by Mackay. In
other words, the deductible amount should be reduced to P19,528.66.
3. Appellant Mackay also
contends that the award for attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000
is excessive. We have examined the
record carefully, to assess the legal services of counsel for the appellee, and bearing in mind the guidelines in the award
of attorney’s fees laid down in the case of Delgado vs. De la Rama,[16]
We find that the award made by the Court of Appeals of P5,000
for attorney’s fees is reasonable.
4. Petitioner also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral damages because there is no
evidence that appellant acted in bad faith.
Appellant Mackay is presumed to be a debtor in bad faith. In Lemoine vs. Alkan,[17]
this Court said that when an employee is wrongfully discharged, the employer
should be considered, in relation to the injured employee, a debtor in bad
faith. In Garcia Palomar vs. Hotel de
France Co.[18]
this Court said:
“Commenting upon Article 1586 of the Civil Code, the
well-known author Manresa says that the obligation to
indemnify is implicit in the prohibition to dismiss without cause; and in this
connection he says that in strictness the employer who is proved to have dismissed
his employee capriciously or unjustifiably should be considered a debtor in bad
faith….”
The Court of Appeals gave reasons for granting moral damages, as
follows:
“With our finding that the appellee
was in fact dismissed by the appellant, what remains to be resolved is whether
the awards are justified under the circumstances. The appellee
because of the nature of his work belonged to exclusive clubs and moved in
select business circles. He had a good
name in the community and this good name no doubt suffered from his
unjustified dismissal. No doubt also,
this dismissal caused mental anguish and suffering such that when he arrived in
San Francisco he was hospitalized. Further contributing to and increasing the appellee’s suffering is the appellant’s changing stand from
dismissal then to that of abandonment. While it was bad enough that the appellee was dismissed without justification, to be blamed
later for abandonment compounds the breach.
It shows a clear attempt on the part of the appellant to evade liability
at all cost which we cannot countenance.
We also note that while the appellee had
simply requested to use part of his accrued leave, the appellant, because of
what can be called a distorted cable of its then Manila
manager, cabled back releasing him without ado.
The appellee was not even afforded the simple
courtesy of being asked for an explanation nor a
softening letter explaining his termination.
To our minds, the behavior of the appellant amounts to bad faith
entitling the appellee to moral damages (Article
2220, Civil Code). We feel, however,
that an award of P5,000 moral damages is reasonable
and sufficient.”
We agree with the Court of Appeals in the award of P5,000 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be modified,
such that petitioner-appellant Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., Inc. is ordered to pay respondent-appellee
John W. Rich the following:
1.
The balance of the salary
amounting to P25,333.34
which appellee could have
earned for the unexpired
portion of the contract,
less P19,528.66, or .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P5,804.68
2.
Reimbursement for transportation
fare from Manila
to San Francisco . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 1,438.00
3.
Salary for extra services
for 21 days . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 560.00
4. Moral damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 5,000.00
5. Attorney’s fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 5,000.00
TOTAL
. . . . . . . . . . . . P17,802.68
All the amounts awarded, except those for
moral damages and attorney’s fees, shall bear interest at the legal rate from November 24, 1959, until fully
paid. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro, J., took no part.
Dizon, J., on leave.
[1]
As paraphrased from the assignment of errors, pp. 1 and 2, petitioner’s brief.
1-a
This is, in fact, the first error assigned, but for sequence purposes in our
discussion We place this as the second.
[2] 93 Phil. 257.
[3] Quoted from decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 6 and 7 of
Appendix A of petitioner-appellant’s brief.
[4] Macapinlac, et
al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 86 Phil. 359.
[5] 83 Phil. 796, 799.
[6]
Vol. 3, p. 686.
[7]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 12-13, Appendix A of
petitioner-appellant’s brief.
[8] Aldaz vs. Gay, 7 Phil. 268; Hicks vs. Manila
Hotel Co., 28 Phil. 325; Coleman vs. Hotel de France Co., 29 Phil. 323; Lemoine vs. Alkan, 33
Phil. 162; Knust vs. Morse, 41 Phil. 184; Potenciano vs. Stefani, 97
Phil. 978; Philippine Air Lines Inc. vs. Philippine Airlines Employment
Association, L-15544, July 26, 1960.
[9] 29 Phil. 323.
[10]
Underscoring supplied.
[11] 41 Phil. 184.
[12]
G. R. No. L-7690, July 27, 1955;
99 Phil. 97.
[13] Citing cases of Macleod & Co. vs. Progressive Federation
of Labor, G. R. No. L-7881, May 31, 1955; Mindanao Lumber Co. vs. Mindanao Federation of Labor,
G. R. No. L-10170, April 25, 1957; etc.
[14] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 547,
citing 1 Von Tuhr, Obligaciones,
p. 80.
[15]
84 A.L.R., p. 171, and cases cited therein.
[16] 43 Phil. 419.
[17] 33 Phil. 162, 167.
[18] 42 Phil. 660, 671.