HEIRS OF ANASTACIO FAUNILLAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CHRISTINE MUGA-ABAD, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, MOALBOAL, CEBU, HON. LEOPOLDO T. CAÑETE, PRESIDING JUDGE RTC, BR.60, BARILI, CEBU…

Heirs of Anastacio Faunillan versus Muga-Abad

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the Heirs of Anastacio Faunillan, joined by the Heirs of Sotero Faunillan and the Heirs of Feliciana Bontigao, against the spouses Bernard and Glenda Kessler. The petitioners sued for ejectment with damages, claiming that the respondents entered their registered agricultural land by force, intimidation, stealth, and strategy, built a house on it, and cut twenty fruit-bearing coconut trees. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the single, narrow question that governs every forcible entry action: prior physical possession. The Court reminds us that ownership, title, and even the correctness of a Torrens certificate are beside the point in a summary ejectment suit.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed their complaint for ejectment with damages before the Municipal Trial Court of Moalboal, Cebu, after the Barangay Captain issued a certification to file action. The case was eventually heard by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal, Cebu, which, on May 11, 2009, dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action for forcible entry. The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, of Barili, Cebu. On January 7, 2010, that court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the issue of prior possession was put to naught by its own findings in a related injunction case between the same parties. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2010. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Facts

The petitioners claim to be the registered owners of an agricultural lot in Balabagon, Moalboal, Cebu, known as Lot 7452, covered by a certificate of title issued in 1981, with an area of about 23,715 square meters. They say that they and their predecessors had possessed the land openly and adversely for more than forty years, that the lot was marked by monuments after the 1978 cadastral survey, and that the late Anastacio Faunillan built a stone embankment and planted a row of coconut trees to mark the boundary with the adjacent Lot 7379, then owned by Fernando Buhat.

The respondents bought Lot 7379 from the spouses Fernando Buhat and Leonarda Beriarmente by a deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1993. On June 15, 1994, according to the petitioners, the respondents entered Lot 7452 by force, intimidation, stealth, and strategy, built a house there, and cut twenty fruit-bearing coconut trees. The respondents answered that their house stood inside their own Lot 7379, and that they had complied with all legal requirements before building. They added that a related injunction case was pending between the parties, and that the real dispute was one of boundary, not dispossession.

At trial, the respondents leaned on several relocation surveys and on the report of a court-designated commission, which concluded that Lot 7379 did not encroach on Lot 7452. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court gave weight to that report and dismissed the complaint. The Regional Trial Court affirmed, and the petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners sufficiently alleged and proved the requisites of forcible entry, particularly their prior physical possession of the disputed portion.
• Whether or not the petitioners' evidence of ownership, consisting of their certificate of title, sketch plan, lot description, and photographs, may be given evidentiary weight in an ejectment action.
• Whether or not the lower courts erred in failing to resolve the bottom-line issue of who had prior material and physical possession.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court governs forcible entry and provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -- Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

This provision supplies the three indispensable requisites of the action, and the Court measures the petitioners' complaint against it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners did allege the requisites in their complaint, but failed to substantiate them. From Section 1 of Rule 70, the Court drew three indispensable requisites: first, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession; second, they must assert deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and third, the action must be filed within one year from the deprivation. These requisites must appear on the face of the complaint to confer jurisdiction. Here, the petitioners alleged prior possession through monuments, a stone embankment, and a row of coconut trees, but offered no positive evidence that these structures or trees ever existed. Absent such proof, their claim of exclusive possession deserved no credence, and they failed to make out a clear case for ejectment.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners' evidence of ownership could not be given evidentiary weight. Quoting settled doctrine, the Court explained:

Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

The Court stressed that the only question in ejectment is who is entitled to possession de facto, meaning physical possession, as distinguished from possession de jure, meaning legal possession in the civil law sense. A party who proves prior possession may recover even against the owner himself, because the action proceeds independently of any claim of ownership.

On the third issue, the Court held that the lower courts committed no reversible error. The petitioners' arguments dwelt on ownership, indefeasible title, and the technical description of the respondents' title, all of which are immaterial to the original action. Since the petitioners bore the onus of proving their case by preponderance of evidence and failed to do so, the dismissal stood.

Doctrine

A forcible entry action under Section 1 of Rule 70 requires three indispensable requisites, all appearing on the face of the complaint: prior physical possession by the plaintiff, deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and filing within one year from the deprivation. The sole issue in ejectment is possession de facto, not ownership or title; evidence of ownership is inadmissible except to clarify the nature of possession. A plaintiff who proves prior physical possession may recover it even from the owner, for the action proceeds independently of any claim of ownership.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the decisions of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, as well as the order denying reconsideration, were affirmed. The respondents won.

Remember This

Memorize the line: in ejectment, only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. Examiners use this case to test whether a candidate will be distracted by a Torrens title and forget that a forcible entry complaint rises or falls on proof of possession de facto.