G.R. No. L-49044. October 12, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPLLEE, VS. LAO WAN SING ALIAS CO TIOK ALIAS WASING, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The records disclose the following antecedents:
In an Information, dated July 10, 1957, Lao Wan Sing alias Go Tiok alias Wasing was charged
with the crime of Arson in Criminal Case No. 964 of the then Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Branch II, reading as follows:
“That on or about the 17th day of June, 1956, in the evening,
in the poblacion of Kalibo,
Province of Aklan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire
to a certain building owned by Lourdes L. Motus,
knowing it to be occupied at the time by many persons, thereby exposing human
lives to great danger and causÂing complete destruction of said building and
other buildings and proÂperties to the damage and prejudice of their owners and
other persons who have interests on said buildings and properties in the amount
set opposite their names, to wit:
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That the crime was committed with the following attendant
aggravating circumstances:
1. That the crime was committed during nighttime; and
2. That the crime was committed on the occasion of
conflagration.”
On July 31, 1959,
judgment was rendered by then Judge Ramon L. Avancena
finding appellant guilty of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the various persons
who suffered losses in the fire. From the said original Decision, Lao Wan Sing appealed
to this Court in G. R. No. L-16379.
On May 5, 1965, during the pendency of
the appeal, appelÂlant, through Atty. Ceferino de los Santos, filed the first Motion for New Trial[1]
on the ground of recantation by two prosecution witnesses, particularly,
Guillermo VIDAL and Jose NARCE, who executed their Affidavits of retraction on
February 18, 1965 and April 8, 1965, respectively (Exhibits “1” and
“6”). Action on said Motion was deferred “until the case is
taken up on the merits”.[2]
On December 17, 1966,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Jesus G. Barrera, rendered judgment in the
appealed case[3],
affirming in all respects the Decision of the Trial Court.
On January 30, 1967,
appellant, through Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, filed a printed Motion for
Reconsideration or New Trial[4],
which was denied by this Court on May
24, 1967.[5]
On June 6, 1967,
appellant’s Petition for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration or New
Trial, presented by Atty. Vicente E. del Rosario, having been granted,
appellant filed said Second Motion on June
27, 1967.
In a Resolution, dated August 18, 1972, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Calixto Zaldivar,
granted new trial and set aside the Decision of the lower Court dated July 31,
1959, as well as this Court’s Decision of December 17, 1966 and its Resolution
denying reconsideration dated May 24, 1967. In that Resolution this Court
“considered it necessary to ascertain the truthfulness of the recantation
made by witnesses Narce and Vidal of their
testimonies given at the trial” stating that “if the recantation of
witnesses Vidal and Narce are true, there is no more
credibility and positive identification of appellant x x
x with the advertence that this resolution should not
be construed as reflecting any opinion on the value and force of new evidence
that may be presented x x x“.[6]
PurÂsuant to said Resolution, the records were remanded to the lower Court for
new trial.
The lower Court, then presided by Judge Dominador
L. Quiroz, limited its authority pursuant to this Court’s Resolution:
“x x x
only to determine the truthfulness of the recantation made by Guillermo Vidal
and Jose Narce and render judgment in accordance
therewith, such that this Court cannot disturb the findings of other facts not
related thereto which had been found by this Court in the decision dated July
31, 1959 that was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and neither has this Court to
make a finding on those facts.”
This was reiterated by defense counsel, Atty. Ceferino
de los Santos, in a Manifestation before the commencement
of the new trial when he said “x x x the Supreme Court has limited the scope of authority on
the trial of this Court to determine solely upon the veracity, truthfulness and
sincerity of the recantation of evidence, so that it is indispensable on the
part of the accused to produce the two recantation witnesses.”[7]
At the new trial, presided by Judge Dominador
L. Quiroz and ultimately by Judge Amelia K. del Rosario, the following
testified for the defense: NARCE, VIDAL, Ambrosio Medel “broÂther-in-law and witness to signature and thumbmark and who inÂterpreted the affidavit in the
language known to the affiant (Narce)”, and
Atty. Vicente S. Ocol, Clerk of Court of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City before whom NARCE swore
to his Affidavit. Three other witnesses were presented to prove failure to
serve the subpoena on NARCE originally, although ultimately the latter was
found and testified. The rebuttal witnesses for the prosecution were Dr.
Gregorio Mirto, Coronacion Peñaflor, Lourdes Motus and Dr. Iluminado Motus. The prosecution
attempted to have NBI Agents Nos. 37 and 45, who had conducted the
investigation in this case, subpoenaed but was informed that the former had
died while the latter had already retired and was an invalid.[8]
On June 18, 1977,
after new trial, the lower Court, then presided by Judge Amelia K. del Rosario,
rendered judgment convicting appellant anew. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been established
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Lao
Wan Sing alias Go Tiok alias Wasing,
guilty of the crime of arson punishaÂble under par. 1, Art. 321 of the Revised
Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstance of having committed the
crime on the occasion of a conflagration as provided for by Art. 14, par. 7 of
the said Code, sentences the said accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Jose G. Quimpo
in the sum of P16,000.00, Kalibo Rural Bank in the
sum of P3,677.56, Isidra Laserna
Mirto in the sum of P15,000.00, Natividad
Laserna Abanilla in the sum
of P6,000.00, Lourdes Laserna Motus
in the sum of P2,661.24, Modesto Laserna Baltazar in the sum of P4,900.00 and Fortunato
Quimpo in the sum of P6,000.00, to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
From the aforesaid judgment, appellant interposed this appeal.
After the filing of Briefs including a Supplemental Brief by appellant, this
Court considered the case submitted for decision on July 23, 1979.[9]
On September 28, 1979, appellant, through Atty. Ceferino de los Santos, filed
another Motion for New Trial[10]
(the 4th, if we include the Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for New Trial
dated January 30, 1967) on the ground of “new and material evidence
recently discovered” consisting of an Affidavit of Atty. Apolonia Francisco, one of the private prosecutors during
the original trial, who stated therein that she had coached prosecution
witnesses, Jose Narce and Guillermo I. Vidal, in
accordance with an outline given to her by the spouses, Dr. & Mrs. Iluminado Motus.[11]
The Affidavit was sworn to before Asst. Fiscal Esmeraldo
R. Acorda of Quezon
City. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the
new trial prayed for. This Court deferred action until the decision on the
merits.
In this appeal, appellant alleges:
“I
The Lower Court
erred in not finding that there are facts and cirÂcumstances showing that Vidal
and Narce, the prosecution witnesses, had testified
falsely in the first trial as shown by their fabricated testimony as suggested
by those having great influence over them and also for valuable consideration.
II
The Lower Court
erred in applyÂing the doctrine laid down in the case of People versus Saliling, No. L-27974, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427, in the case at bar to
determine the credibility of, and the weight of evidence testified to, by the
reÂcanting witnesses in the new trial.
III
The Lower Court erred in not finding the testimonies of Narce and Vidal in the new trial more credible than those
of Dr. Gregorio Mirto and Dr. Iluminado
Motus, let alone that of Coronacion
Penaflor who had been already declared unreliable and
not rehabilated (sic) in the Resolution of this Court
dated August 18, 1972, and not eliminating their testimonies in the first
trial.
IV
The Lower Court
erred in giving credit or weight to the evidence preÂsented by the prosecution
during the new trial, the instant case having been prosecuted under the
direction and control of the private prosecutor instead of the Fiscal.
V
The Lower Court
erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.”
The factual findings made by this Court in its Decision of December 17, 1966 follow:
“The records show that Rizal Street is the business
section of Kalibo, Aklan Province.
It runs from north to south. On the north, it opens into 19
Martirez Street, which
intersects it perpendicularly. Along the northern side of 19
Martirez Street, is the Kalibo Plaza.
“At around 5:40 o’clock
in the afternoon of June 17, 1956,
a fire broke out at what is known as Juana’s Store located on the western side
of Rizal Street.
The fire spread northward, engulfing the next store, the Novelty Store and the Masing’s Store and, finally, the Municipal Building of Kalibo, which occupied the western corner of 19 Martirez and Rizal Streets. The
fire also spread to two doors to the south, until it reached the Ang Tong Suy Store, which was
also engulfed, and then stopped.
“When this fire at the eastern side of Rizal
Street was already dying, and the roof of the Municipal Building of Kalibo had already collapsed, black smoke was seen coming
from the direction of the kitchen of the New Plaza Bazar,
owned by herein appellant, and located on the eastern side of Rizal Street across the municipal building. Said kitchen of
appellant was located on the ground floor of the Abanilla Building,
which was also partly occupied by the Kalibo Rural
Bank. This second fire spread eastward and southward, and then jumped to the
houses on the western side of Rizal
street, razing to the ground several houses,
burning, practically, the entire business section of Kalibo“.
It should also be mentioned that opposite the municipal building
across Rizal Street
stood the Laserna
Building, which belonged to the Laserna sisters.[12]
One of the sisters, Lourdes, who is
married to Iluminado Motus,
an optometrist, resided in a portion of the upper storey of that building and
operated a drug store on the ground floor.[13]
The other Laserna sister is married to Dr. Gregorio Mirto and they own the Mirto Building.
Between the Laserna
Building and the Mirto Building
stands the Abanilla
Building. These three structures
are immediately adjacent to one another and had interconnecting doors and
access to and from the Laserna Drug Store, the dining
room and kitchen of appellant.
The store owned by appellant known as the New Plaza Bazaar is
located in the Laserna
Building on the eastern corner of Rizal and 19 Martirez
Street and is adjacent to the Laserna
Drug Store.[14]
The rear of the New Plaza Bazaar is connected to its dining room and thence to
the kitchen. There are doors and corridors leading from the Laserna
Drug Store to said dining room and kitchen. Appellant’s kitchen is actually
located in the rear of the Abanilla
Building from where there is also
acÂcess to appellant’s kitchen. Presumably, the “kitchen” is a
restaurant as it adjoins other “kitchens” towards the south belonging
to other individuals.
The case for the prosecution during the original trial centered
on the testimonies of Jose NARCE, Guillermo VIDAL, Coronacion
Peñaflor and Dr. Iluminado Motus.
In respect of Coronacion Peñaflor’s testimony, referring in particular to appellant’s
identification, this Court’s finding in the Resolution of August 18, 1972, was:
“x x x We find that the testimony of Coronacion
Peñaflor cannot be taken as positive identification
of the appellant, because she never stated that she saw appellant in the
kitchen, but that she only heard a voice which she recognized to be that of
appelÂlant.”[15]
That testimony was to this effect:
“Coronacion Peñaflor stated that on the day of the
fire, she was a cook at Chin Guan store adjacent to that of appellant. While
evacuating some goods from said store to a clump of bananas some 25 meters
away, she heard some one from appellant’s kitchen, saying ‘o-o-oh’ and
recognized the voice to be that of appellant. She then noticed fire and smoke
in appellant’s kitchen. She immediately ran outside and shouted ‘Wasing (appellant) again burned his kitchen’. Looking to
the left, she saw flames leaping from appellant’s kitchen door. She then ran to
the place where she had left her personal belongings.[16]
The gist of the testimony of NARCE, then 22 years old, single, a
houseboy, who reached only Grade I, during the origiÂnal trial was that he
knows only how to write his name; that at the time of the fire, he was a
houseboy of Blanding and Amading Kimpo;
that when he heard the bells ringing, he went out to the street and saw the
fire at Juana’s store. Having been a houseboy of the Motuses
for three years, he proceeded to the drugstore of his former employers to help
evacuate the medicines and other things. He recognized appellant who was
dressed in white shirt and pants also going back and forth evacuating his
things. On his third trip from the second floor, NARCE saw appellant pick up
the lighted kerosene lamp from a table near the stairs and thereafter bring the
lamp to the dining room adjoining. The witness followed appellant to the dining
room and while he was about two armslengths from him
(appellant), the latter removed the glass funnel of the lamp, increased the
flame and placed said lamp on one of the shelves where there were boxes of
shoes. When the accused left, NARCE transferred the lamp to a table and took
some shoes and merchandise to the plaza. When he returned, he passed by the
kitchen door intendÂing to hide some shoes for himself when he saw appellant
holding a can of petroleum with one side raised and afterwards lighting a match
and placing it on a pile of wood. Black smoke then rose and red flames
followed. Fearful of what he saw, NARCE ran away and went to the bodega of one
Garcia where he used to sleep. Two days later or on the following Tuesday,
NARCE told Dr. and Mrs. Iluminado Motus
at the house of Mrs. Motus‘ mother about appellant’s
having set fire to his kitchen.[17]
In NARCE’s Affidavit of Retraction
executed on April 8, 1965, sworn to before Vicente S. Ocol,
Clerk of Court of Quezon City, he stated that the
“facts” he had testified to were not true and that he had testified
under pressure from the Motuses who promised to give
him work, and that “in conscience, I have to right the wrong I have done
and do justice to the innocent”.[18]
During the new trial, NARCE, then 35 years old, testified that
after he heard the bells warning of the fire, he went to the plaza and stood at
the bandstand and saw the fire at Juana’s store; that flames were flying all
around; that fire was seen from the kitchen of Abanilla;
that when he went down from the bandstand he met Dr. and Mrs. Motus whom he helped gather mediÂcines. NARCE emphasized
that he did not go to the drugstore. He also declared that during the original
trial he testified upon the prodding of the Motuses
and upon promise of a job and that he would be given P200.00 if they win the
case; that he, VIDAL, and Coronacion Peñaflor were coached by Atty. Apolonia
Francisco at the Motus residence; and that when he
executed the Affidavit of retraction he was working on and off in Pasay City and lived with one Ambrocio
Medel.[19]
As to how he happened to execute said Affidavit, he tesÂtified
that he met the accused accidentally in Quiapo who
told him “as if you kill me when you testify in the trial in Kalibo, I did not do anything in connection with that
fire” and that if NARCE sympathized with him, the former should help
because he would be staying for 30 years in jail and might die there. Appellant
further told him that VIDAL had already executed an affidavit, and because of
that NARCE felt “bolstered”. NARCE did not have a permanent job at
that time.[20] NARCE’s AffiÂdavit was thereafter prepared at the house of
Atty. de los Santos
in Quezon City[21]
and he swore to the same before the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. The contents of the
Affidavit were translated to NARCE by Ambrosio Medel, a driver, and with whom he was living.[22] Medel was also jobless at the time.
Coming now to VIDAL. This Court in its Decision in L-16379
synthesized his testimony during the original trial when he was then 20 years
old, married, a laborer, thus:
“Guillermo Vidal testified that while the fire on the western
side of Rizal Street
was raging, he helped the family of Dr. and Mrs. Gregorio Mirto
(another fire victim) evacuate their personal belongings from their house,
which was near the appellant’s store. After most of the Mirto’s
perÂsonal belongings had been evacuated, they told him to help in the
evacuation of the effects of the Laserna Drugstore,
which was next door to appellant’s store. As he approached the kitchen of
appellant to go to the Laserna Drugstore, he saw
appelÂlant, in white trousers and shirt, bending over a pile of firewood in his
kitchen. Suddenly, flame and smoke rose from the firewood. Due to fear, he
turned back and ran to the plaza. He there found the Mirtos
attending to their children and belongings, but he did not tell them or anybody
else of the incident he saw in appelÂlant’s kitchen. Because he got wet by the
rain that fell on the night of the fire, he contracted fever which lasted for
about 5 days. While recoÂvering from the fever, his father visited him, and it
was to him that he told that the fire which destroyed several houses of Kalibo came from the kitchen of appellant and was set by
the latter. His father then advised him not to tell anybody about it, to avoid
involvement in its conseÂquences. Notwithstanding his father’s advice, however,
he told Mrs. Mirto about the aforesaid incident at
appelÂlant’s kitchen, when he saw her one day weeping and lamenting on the loss
of her house.[23]
In his Affidavit of retraction executed on February 18, 1965, and
sworn to before Gregorio L. Lira, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, he stated that his testimony during the original trial that he saw
appellant as the one inÂside the kitchen setting fire to a pile of firewood and
papers in his kitchen, was a mere guess and that he testified the way he did
upon the urgings of the Motuses and the Mirtos, who were among the victims in the Kalibo fire, and whom he could not refuse due to the many
favors they had showered on him; and that in the conflicting emotions between
gratitude and peace of mind he “had to ease and clear my conscience and to
do jusÂtice to the innocent”.[24]
At the new trial, VIDAL, then 36 years old, married, alÂready a
public school teacher in elementary education, declared that the second fire
started from the Abanilla kitchen which he had seen
from the window of the second storey of the Mirto
residence. He declared that he did not go to the drugstore of the Motuses nor was he instructed by Dr. Mirto
to help the Motuses although he helped in saving Mirto properties. He allegedly pinpointed appellant upon
the urgings of his benefactors, the Motuses, who gave
him a job after enduring hardship in his former employment after his stint with
the Mirtos.[25]
On how he happened to execute his Affidavit, he stated that while
he was on vacation in Batan, Aklan,
as he was then residing in Ampatuan, Cotabato, he met the accused accidentally in Kalibo, Aklan. The accused told
him that “because you have testified in the trial and now I will be
sentenced for 30 years imprisonment and probably I will die there”. As his
conscience was disturbed he told the accused that he would retract. He then
went to Iloilo City
where he met the accused at the Happy Landing Hotel on February 17 where he
showed the draft of the statement that he had prepared to Atty. Ceferino de los Santos.
The latter made a slight correction and thereafter they proceedÂed to the Court
of First Instance at Iloilo City
where the AfÂfidavit was typewritten and he subscribed to the same before the
Clerk of Court of said Court.[26]
As heretofore stated, the function of the lower Court during the
new trial, with which defense counsel was in conÂformity, was to determine the
veracity of the recantation of evidence by NARCE and VIDAL. We affirm the lower
Court’s findÂing in this regard when it said:
“After painstakingly going over the voluminous record, the
testimonies of Vidal and Narce both during the
original trial and during the new trial on the participation of the accused,
the circumstances under which they were given, especially the cirÂcumstances
behind the execution of the affidavits of retraction, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the testimonies of Guillermo Vidal and Jose Narce
during the original trial are true, while those given during the new trial are
afterthoughts to save the accused, thus complying with the purpose of the new
trial, that is to ascertain the truthfulness of the recantation of these witÂnesses.”[27]
As between NARCE’s two versions, one
given at the original trial and the other at the new trial, that given at the
original trial deserves more credence. As noted by the lower Court:
“The Court had gone over his lengthy testimony during the
original trial. He was able to testify on deÂtail about the lay-out of the
premises of the drugstore of Mrs. Motus and of the
premises occupied by the acÂcused and the actuations of the acÂcused. An
illiterate man like him, if merely coached to tell a lie, could not possibly
testify on those details and acquit himself during the very detailed and
meticulous cross-examination.
“The fact that the witness, on cross-examination mentioned
four times on having seen the accused get the lighted lamp near the stairs in
the drugstore of Mrs. Motus when the matter was not
directly the subject of inquiry cannot be taken by the court as having answered
as an autoÂmaton. He was asked on how many times he went up and down the stairs
and if the witness answered in addition that the third time he went down he saw
the accused, it was to clarify the point that it was on that particular going
down that he saw the accused.”[28]
NARCE’s allegation during the new trial
that he merely stood at the bandstand of the plaza when the fire was raging
cannot be believed. Even appellant admitted that he saw NARCE at the scene of
the fire running and dropping a pair of Besa shoes in
the process[29],
thereby negating NARCE’s contention that he did not
go to the drugstore of the Motuses at all.
As to NARCE’s execution of his
Affidavit of retraction, we quote with approval the lower Court’s assessment
thereof:
“Narce testified that the acÂcused,
upon meeting him in Quiapo, said: ‘You are here,
Jose. I have been looking for you for a long time’. This speaks of efforts of
the accused to locate the witnesses to get their retraction as an ultimate
remedy for an acquittal.
“Narce had no permanent job when he
met the accused in Manila. He went
there in 1958 to look for work. In fact he told the accused that he was trying
his luck in Manila where he might
find a job.
“The financial situation of Jose Narce
at the time he met the accused makes the Court suspect that he was an easy prey
to an offer of remuneration in consideration for executing an affidavit of
retraction.”[30]
As rebuttal witnesses during the new trial, both Dr. Motus and Mrs. Lourdes Motus
emphatically denied that NARCE had tesÂtified originally upon their proddings and upon promise of a job at the Park View Hotel.
As they respectively testified, at the time, that hotel had not yet been
constructed. And if he was employed thereafter it was more likely to help him
with a job and because they needed helpers. The Motuses
learned of what appellant had done when NARCE himself disclosed it to them a
few days after the fire. The Motuses merely told him
to relate what he had seen.[31]
VIDAL’s original testimony is likewise
more credible. As the Trial Court had aptly pointed out:
“Again, like Jose Narce, the
testimony of Guillermo Vidal during the original trial was vivid and detailed
and the witness was able to withstand the very lengthy and meticulous
cross-examination which only one who is telling the truth can withstand.”[32]
At the new trial, VIDAL declared the he testified for the
prosecution because he was indebted both to the Motuses
and to the Mirtos, who had sent him to school[33],
and that he left the Mirtos because of their
insistence that he should testify. This was rebutted by Dr. Gregorio Mirto, however, who stated that VIDAL left their place and
transferred to the Magnolia Kiosk upon their own suggestion because they could
no longer cope with expenses due to their losses in the fire.[34]
As this Court has held, retraction of witnesses at a new trial
made after a judgment of conviction as in this case is to be taken warily and
to be rejected where rebutted by other witnesses.[35]
Besides, even assuming that NARCE and VIDAL owed the MoÂtuses and the Mirtos a debt of
gratitude, it does not necessarily follow that to repay them, they would
testify falsely aÂgainst appellant and charge him with a crime as serious as
Arson.
VIDAL’s pretense that he prepared the
draft of his own Affidavit of retraction is negated by the fact that during the
new trial, he even requested the help of an interpreter so he could speak in
“Hiligaynon” because his diction and
expression in English was poor. And yet the Affidavit was in good English. As
the Trial Court had observed:
“It is likewise not believable that the witness who admits he
is short of English and diction would take the trouble of drafting Exhibit 1
knowing that he was to meet Atty. de los Santos,
the counsel of the accused, who could more easily draft the statement as to
accurately contain what he wanted to be contained.
“The Court has reason to suspect that the witness so testified
to impress the Court of his sincerity and of the originality of Exhibit
1.”[36]
VIDAL also denied having received any money from appelÂlant in Iloilo
City so he could meet with Atty. Ceferino de los Santos
thereat. The fact remains, however, that he had to stay overnight at the Happy
Landing Hotel in order to be able to meet with said counsel and thereafter had
to go back to Cotabato. As the Trial Court opined,
“it could not believe that the accused could have allowed the witness who
was to do him a favor to undertake the expenses in Iloilo.”
The defense also stresses that the delay of NARCE and VIDAL in
immediately informing other people that appellant had set fire to his own
kitchen proves that their testimony is unworthy of belief. The delay has been
satisfactorily explained, however. Both were seized by fear when they saw what
appellant had done. VIDAL was also afraid of physical harm on his person.
Besides, the evidence shows that NARCE had disclosed to the Motuses
two days after the fire what he had witnessed, while VIDAL had also done to the
same to his father first and then to Dr. Mirto.
That Dr. Motus did not reveal the
information furnished him by NARCE and VIDAL to the PC and the Municipal
Council, of which he was a member, was also explained by him in that he feared
reprisals against the witnesses besides the fact that they might succumb to
pressure, specially considering that investigation was conducted at the bandstand
at the public plaza. The Motuses, instead, preferred
to solicit the aid of the NBI at Iloilo.
In fact, they brought Jose Narce to the NBI in Iloilo
as early as July, 1956, or the month following the fire. NARCE’s
affidavit was taken by the NBI and signed before NBI agents. It is to be noted
also that the Motuses and the Mirtos
adhered to their testimonies during the original trial and did not lose
interest in the case despite the lapse of 23 years from the date of the
occurrence of the fire and the dates of their subsequent testimonies at the new
trial, not to speak of their requests for early resolution in this case.[37]
They would have had no motive to impute the serious crime of Arson to appellant
unless they had been informed by NARCE and VIDAL, respectively. The NBI and the
Fiscal conducted their own respective investigations, which also accounts for
the delay in the filing of the criminal charge.
In their testimonies during the new trial, NARCE and VIDAL also
declared that the second fire started at the Abanilla
building implying that it did not start from appellant’s kitchen. That kitchen,
however, is just on the first floor of the Abanilla
building. Coronacion Peñaflor
also testified at the original trial and confirmed at the new trial that she saw
a sudden burst of fire followed by heavy dark smoke inside the kitchen of the
New Plaza Bazar. True, this Court discounted her
testimony in the Resolution dated August
18, 1972, supra; however, what was rejected was her
identification of appellant and not the rest of her testimony.
The defense also intimates that the Abanilla
fire could have been caused by flames flying from the Masing
store across the street which could have reached the powder and chemicals kept
by Abanilla who was a manufacturer of fireworks and
firecrackers. The evidence does not disclose, however, any explosion which
would surely have occurred if that were the case.
The defense contention that the active prosecution of the case
was done by the private prosecutor and, therefore, the evidence presented
cannot be given weight or credit is not deserving of any serious consideration.
While the private prosecutor actively conducted the trial, an Assistant Fiscal
was always present and the proceedings were under his direction and control.
In the Supplemental Memorandum filed on December 6, 1982,
appellant, through another counsel, Atty. Gil Venerando
R. Racho, additionally contends that respondent trial
Court erred in failing to make in its Decision findings of fact other than
findings on truthfulness of the recantation considering that the former
judgment was set aside and, therefore, the theory is advanced that the Decision
under review should be declared null and void.[38]
As already explained, it was this Court that had limited the scope of authority
of the lower Court at the new trial to ascertaining the truthfulness of the
recantation made. This was confirmed by Atty. Ceferino
de los Santos
in his manifestation before the lower Court prior to the new trial, and
reiterated by Atty. Felix V. Macalalag, who appeared
as collaÂborating counsel, that “the Supreme Court sent back the records
to this Court to determine better whether the recantation should be given
faith”.[39]
Appellant’s brief also admits that “the only issue raised before the Court
of origin of the new trial is whether the recantation made by Vidal and Narce of their testimonies given at the trial are
true”.[40]
Further, there is absolutely no basis to the allegation of the
defense in its Supplemental Memorandum that appellant has been denied due
process of law by the Court a quo because of “absence of
evidence on record to support its findings”. Basically, the issue is one
of credibility as between the conÂtradictory testimonies of NARCE and VIDAL
during the original trial and at the new trial, and our own conclusions support
those of the lower Court.
Appellant’s additional argument is that the lower Court erred in
applying the doctrine in People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA
427 (1976), reading:
“x x x It
would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken
before courts of jusÂtice simply because the witnesses who had given them later
on change their mind for one reason or another, for such a rule would make
solemn trials a mockery and place the invesÂtigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. Affidavits of retraction can be easily secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses uÂsually for a monetary consideration. Recanted
testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it
may later be repudiated. So courts are wary or relucÂtant to allow a new trial
based on retracted testimony.”
Even assuming it to be inapplicable, actually, the ruling in said
case was not the only basis of the Trial Court for reÂjecting the recanted
testimonies. That Court made a careful comparison between the original and
retracted testimonies, the circumstances under which they were given, as well
as the moÂtives behind the changes in testimony. Thereby, the Court a quo
correctly applied the criteria laid down in People vs. Ubina,
et al., 97 Phil. 526, as follows:
“x x x The
rule should be that a testimony solemnly given in court should not be lightly
set aside and that before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subseÂquent one be carefully compared, the circumstances under which each given
carefully scrutinized, the reasons or motives for the change carefully
scrutinized — in other words, all the expedients devised by man to determine
the credibility of witnesses should be utilized to determine which of the
contradictory testimonies reÂpresents the truth.”[41]
Lastly, the Motion for New Trial[42]
based on the AffiÂdavit of Atty. Apolonia Francisco
must be denied. As pointed out by the lower Court, if Atty. Francisco conferred
with the witnesses before they were presented, that was but natural. In fact,
the Motuses admitted that Atty. Francisco met with
NARCE, VIDAL, and Coronacion Peñaflor,
but merely to elicit from them what they knew and not to coach them nor to
coerce them to testify against appellant. The Motuses
and Dr. Mirto all denied having coached NARCE and
VIDAL, respectively, as the latter two alleged during the new trial. In the
words of Dr. Motus, they did not coach NARCE because
“he knows better what he had seen and on what he will testify”.[43] Coronacion Peñaflor likewise
denied having been coached by either the MoÂtuses,
the Mirtos or Atty. Francisco. She admitted that
Atty. Francisco had convened NARCE, VIDAL and herself and asked them whether
they had knowledge of the case, and when they replied in the affirmative, she
just told them to tell the truth when they testify in Court.[44]
And on cross examination, she declared that she had also given a sworn
statement to the NBI, the PC, and the Municipal Council[45],
thereby negating the defense contention that she was merely “coached”
on how to tesÂtify during the original trial.
As to the non-presentation by the prosecution of Atty. Francisco
as a rebuttal witness, it manifested that it was due to her senility as she was
then around 80 years of age.[46]
Although the defense stoutly denies such condition, it is to be noted that
neither did it present her as its own witness to affirm the contents of her
Affidavit.
All told, other than their own self-serving claim, we have found
no evidence to support the assertions of NARCE and VIDAL that during the
original trial they had falsely testified against appellant out of extraneous
considerations such as graÂtitude, or because they were coached to testify in a
particular way. Our findings are that their testimonies during the origiÂnal
trial represent the truth.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto. The Motion for New Trial filed by the
defense on September 28, 1979
is hereby denied.
Costs against accused-appellant, Lao Wan Sin @ Co Tiok, @ Wasing.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, and
Relova, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, and Escolin,
JJ., were designated to sit in the First Division vice Associate Justices
Claudio Teehankee, Chairman, and Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr. who are on official leave, pursuant to Special Order No. 251, dated
September 23, 1983.
[1]
pp. 108-120, Rollo, L-16379.
[2]
p. 121, ibid.
[3]
G.R. No. L-16379, 18 SCRA 1076 (1966).
[4]
p.148, Rollo, L-16379.
[5]
p. 177, ibid.
[6]
Resolution, p. 208, Rollo of G.R. No. L-16379.
[7] T.s.n., October
24, 1973, pp. 5-6.
[8] T.s.n., April 25,
1975, pp. 566-567.
[9]
p. 90, Rollo.
[10]
p. 91, ibid.
[11]
p. 98, ibid.
[12] T.s.n., July 9,
1958, p. 93; July 10, 1958,
pp. 23-24.
[13] T.s.n., id., pp. 27-28.
[14] T.s.n., July 9,
1958, pp. 93 and 101.
[15]
p. 207, Rollo of G. R. No. L-16379.
[16]
Decision, G.R. No. L-16379, 18 SCRA 1079-1080.
[17] T.s.n., December
18, 1958, pp. 221-239, Vol. I; December 19, 1958, pp. 545-623; December 20, 1958, pp. 277-322, Vol. II.
[18]
Exhibit “6-A”, p. 1725-1726, Original Record, Vol. III.
[19] T.s.n., October 1,
1974, pp. 320-364.
[20] T.s.n., October 3,
1974, p. 102.
[21] T.s.n., ibid., p. 108.
[22] T.s.n., ibid., p. 113.
[23] Decision,
G.R. No. L-16379, 18 SCRA 1079.
[24]
p. 120, Rollo, G.R. L-16379.
[25] T.s.n., January
21, 1974, pp. 403-455.
[26] T.s.n., January
23, 1974, pp. 472-485.
[27]
Decision, pp. 29-30, Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[28]
Decision, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[29] T.s.n., February
26, 1959, p. 632, Vol. I.
[30]
pp. 145-146, Appellant’s Brief.
[31] T.s.n., April 25,
1975, pp. 569-621.
[32]
Decision, p. 26, Rollo, p. 33.
[33] T.s.n., January
21, 1974, pp. 421-422, T.s.n., January 23, 1973, p. 468.
[34] T.s.n., April 23,
1975, pp. 186-187.
[35]
People vs. Castelo, et al., 11 SCRA 193
(1964).
[36]
p. 153, Appellant’s Brief.
[37]
pp. 140; 144, Rollo and in L-16379, p. 197.
[38]
Temporary Rollo, G.R. No. L-49044.
[39] T.s.n., October
24, 1973, pp. 5-17.
[40]
pp. 4-5, Appellant’s Brief.
[41]
People vs. Ubiña, et al., 97 Phil. 526 (1955).
[42]
p. 91, Rollo.
[43] T.s.n., April 25,
1975, p. 597.
[44] T.s.n., April 25,
1975, pp. 531-535.
[45] T.s.n., ibid., p. 536.
[46]
p. 117, Appellant’s Brief.