JOSE MATIENZO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MARTIN SERVIDAD, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Under review is the
judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Naga City, in CAR Case No. 920-CS-64, entitled
“Jose Matienzo vs. Martin Servidad”, dismissing plaintiff’s action
for Reinstatement, Reliquidation and Damages. 
This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals on September
20, 1967, the
principal issue being one of law, particularly, the interpretation of the
contracts between the parties.

The controversy stemmed from the following
uncontroverted facts:

Defendant Martin Servidad is the owner of a sixteen hectare agricultural land situated at Barrio
Binahian, Sipocot, Camarines Sur.  On April
16, 1961, he and plaintiff Jose Matienzo executed a private
instrument^[1]
handwritten in the dialect of the locality
by Feliza Servidad, wife of defendant Martin Servidad^[2], and translated into English as follows:

“I Jose Matienzo, Elenita Robles, we husband and wife were
instituted head-overseer in the land of Martin and Feliza de Servidad
who will take care of their plants. 
Whoever resides in our land will have to obey the head-overseer as we have then authorized to supervise the
landholding.  Like borrowing loans needed if there is no letter from the
Head-overseer to us we will not accommodate. 
So that whatever need you have you must inform the Head-overseer as the
latter is the one to inform us.

The conditions for clearing the land are these:  With respect to all your plants we will
share no percentage for the land. 
But you will have to plant coconut in our land.  We will not pay as this is our
conditions.  You are free to clear and
plant the land as long as you wish.  We
must help one another for our betterment. 
Let us not do anything prejudicial to others.  Let’s do the best as it is better.

To show our conformity to the terms given by Martin and Feliza de
Servidad, we signed in the presence of two witnesses this date.” (Italics
supplied)

Witnesses:

1.     
Jose Matienzo

2.     
Paulino Ponayo

3.     
S. Ralles

The area entrusted to
plaintiff was seven hectares, on a portion of which he constructed his house.

On January 1, 1963, the
parties entered into another agreement concerning the conditions of copra
making and upland planting for the year 1963.^[3] This was again handwritten in the local
dialect by Feliza Servidad.^[4] The English translation of the agreement
reads:

“Condition
in Copra Making and Upland

Planting This Year 1963

Binahian, Sipocot, Camarines Sur

“I, JOSE MATIENZO and ELENITA ROBLES, husband and wife, are
hereby made caretakers of the land of Martin Servidad and Feliza de
Servidad, and when we arrived on their land all plants are productive.

The condition given to us in copra making is one third, but before
we begin copra making, we are to clean the plantation and everytime we make
copra we separate nuts for seedling.  We
are given one male carabao (castrated). 
The condition for upland planting is this:  all those that we are to plant no share
will be taken for the land, but we are
also to plant coconut, coffee, abaca, and the owner shall not pay the
same.  Before I signed this I have read
the same.  In truth we agree to the
condition given to me, and I signed this 1st day of January, 1963 before two
witnesses.  In the year 1964 new
agreement will be made.  (Italics ours)

SGD. Jose Matienzo Elenita
Robles

Sgd. Pedro Moreno – Vice Barrio Lieut.

Sgd. Jose Bacho

Jose Matienzo Elenita Robles”

Plaintiff planted bananas, bancocan, coffee, coconuts,
breadfruits, abaca and some auxiliary crops.  He also looked after the coffee and abaca
plants of defendant, as well as the latter’s goats entrusted to his care.  For clearing the coconut plantation, he was
paid per coconut tree he cleared.  For
his labor in making copra, he was paid 1/3 of the copra he made.  Other persons who made copra therein were
also correspondingly paid.

On January 30, 1964,
defendant wrote plaintiff telling him not to “interfere with the
plants” as they had no agreement yet for that year, and that being the
landowner, he should be the one to decide in accordance with the “tenancy
law”^[5].  On
March 4, 1964, defendant sent another letter to plaintiff prohibiting him from
planting and clearing the land for the same reason^[6]. 
Plaintiff sought the assistance of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel in
Naga City.  Efforts to settle the case
amicably failed, as a consequence of which, plaintiff brought an action against
defendant in the Court of Agrarian Relations of Naga City praying that
defendant be held guilty of illegal ejectment; that in view of the
strained relationship with defendant, he
was waiving his right to
reinstatement provided he be paid reasonable compensation for his improvements;
and that defendant be ordered to pay him actual and moral damages.

The case was heard by
Judge Valeriano A. del Valle, then by Judge Agustin Frivaldo, and terminated by
Commissioner Benjamin G. Fernandez, who was appointed by the Court to hear the
case on January 20, 1966, with the consent of the parties^[7]. 
Based on the Commis­sioner’s Report, which was adopted in toto by the Court, a
judgment was rendered on May 17, 1966 dismissing the suit for lack of
merit.  Plaintiff moved for reconsi­deration,
but this was denied.  In its judgment,
the Court a quo specifically
made a finding that plaintiff had expressly waived his right to reinstatement
“on account of his strained relationship with defendant.”

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which Court, however,
as hereinabove stated, certified the case to us on the theory that “where
the issue is the construction or interpretation of contracts, or where all the
facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the conclusion drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
reviewable by the Supreme Court”.^[8]

Plaintiff has assigned
the following errors:

I

“The lower Court erred in hold­ing that appellant is merely an
over­seer of appellee over the landholding in question.

II

The Court a quo committed a grave error in considering exhibits
‘2’, ‘C’, & ‘C-1’ as contracts that established merely an overseer re­lationship
between the appellant and appellee; in this regard the Court a quo deviated
from the es­tablished procedures in determining the nature of a contract.

III

The Court a quo committed a grave error in authorizing the
ejectment of appellant.

IV

The Court failed to observe the requirements of Sections 10 &
11, Rule 33 of the New Rules of Court.”

The sole issue for
determination is whether under the parties’ agreements, plaintiff was
instituted as an overseer or as a tenant by defendant.

To start with, a few basic principles on the interpretation of
contracts should be reiterated.  When
there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, its literal
meaning shall control.^[9]
Article 1372 of the New Civil Code further provides that however general the
terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things
that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties in­tended to agree^[10]. 
Therefore, a meaning other than that expressed or an interpretation
which would alter its strict and literal significance should not be given to
it.^[11] Moreover, the entirety of the contract must be
taken into consideration to ascertain the meaning of its provisions^[12].

It is clear from Exhibit
C that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant, not a tenant.  It was likewise expressly stipulated therein
that “the con­ditions for clearing the land are these:  With respect to all your plants we will share
no percentage for the land.” And again, “all those (coconuts) that we
are to plant no share will be taken for the land”^[13] The basic element of sharing in agricultural
tenancy, therefore, is absent.  The
one-third share plaintiff received from copra-making constituted payments for
the processing of copra.  These are
evidenced by re­ceipts^[14]. 
Plaintiff also got paid for clearing the coconuts as shown by Exhibits 7
and 7-A^[15].

A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199
as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate
household, culti­vates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter’s consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price
certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.  From the above
definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no
tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties.  What transpired was that plaintiff was made
overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he
was to supervise applications for loans from those residing therein; he was
allowed to build his house thereon and to plant specified plants without being compensated; he was free to clear and plant
the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and
defendant; and he was not obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share the
produce with, the latter.

Although Exhibit 6 states that plaintiff and his wife were made
“caretakers” of the land, there is a definite provision in both
Exhibits C and 6 that de­fendant would not share in the produce of plaintiff’s
plants.  Because of this aspect, the
ruling in Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88 (1966), which holds that a
“caretaker of an agricultural land is also considered cultivator of the
land”, finds no applicability.

Besides, even if we were to rule that plaintiff is a tenant, the
whole exercise would become academic since he has waived his right to
reinstatement.

With respect to the fourth assignment of error, plaintiff
asserts, for the first time, that the trial Court committed grave error in
failing to notify the parties of the filing of the Commissioner’s Report, and
in not giving them ten days to object thereto pursuant to Section 10, Rule 33
of the Rules of Court.  He also claims
that the Court failed to set the Report for hearing in accordance with Section
11 of the same Rule.  Be that as it may,
well established is the rule that issues not raised in the trial Court can not
be raised for the first time on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the
Petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exhibit “C” & “C-1”, Folder of Exhibits.

^[2]
Pp. 10-11, t.s.n., Oct. 24, 1964.

^[3]
Exhibit “6”, Folder of Exhibits.

^[4]
p. 167, t.s.n., January 19, 1966.

^[5]
Exhibit “A”, “A-1”, Folder of Exhibits.

^[6]
Exhibit “B”, “B-1”, ibid.

^[7]
Pp. 141-142, Folder No. 1, CAR Record.

^[8]
Cunanan vs. Lazatin, 74
Phil. 719; Ng Young vs. Villa, 93 Phil. 21.

^[9]
Art. 1370, New Civil Code; Cebu Portland Cement Co., vs. Dumon, 61 SCRA
218 (1974).

^[10]
Rep. vs. Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974).

^[11]
City of Manila vs. Rizal Park Co., 53 Phil. 515 (1929).

^[12]
Ruiz vs. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 (1970).

^[13]
Exhibit “6”.

^[14]
Exhibits “3”, “3-A”
to “3-C”, “4”, “4-A” to “4-D”,
“5”, “5-A” to “5-C”, Folder of Exhibits.

^[15]
Ibid.