PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DOLORES COQUIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

From an incident which occurred on July 1, 1957, one David C. Naval
filed with the Municipal Court of the City of Naga a complaint for
grave oral defamation against the herein defendant-appellee, Dolores
Coquia. Thereafter and by virtue of that complaint, the same court
ordered her arrest. On July 22, 1957, however, the same court forwarded
the records of the case to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
for the continuance of the proceedings since the accused had renounced
her right to the second stage of preliminary investigation. In turn, on
August 2, 1957, the last mentioned court endorsed the case to the
Office of the City Attorney for reinformation. For some unexplained
reasons, the case was left completely unacted on by the City Fiscal’s
office until January 26, 1959 when the City Fiscal filed with the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur the corresponding information for
grave oral defamation against the accused, appellee herein.

The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription
which was opposed by the prosecution. Ruling on the motion, the court a quo
sustained the movant and dismissed the case. A motion for
reconsideration therefor having been denied, the City Attorney,
represented by the Solicitor General’s Office, appealed to this Court.

The Solicitor General concedes that the delay in the filing of the
information for this case had been unduly long. Quite subtly even, the
concession extends to an admission that prescription had indeed set in.
It was expressed, however, that the instant appeal was never the less
interposed so that a ruling may be secured as to the precise period
when a criminal proceeding should be considered as having been
“unjustifiably stopped to mark the resumption of the running of the
period of prescription” pursuant to the provisions of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, hereunder quoted:

“Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.—
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted; or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. “The term of
prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.”

We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant a resolution
of the issue raised. It is sufficient to indicate and conformably to
the doctrine expressed in the case of People vs. Juan del Rosario, 110
Phil., 476, December 29, 1960, the prescriptive period for the case at
bar was never interrupted. In the said case, We declared that—

“Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light
offenses prescribe in two months. Article 91 of the same Code provides
that ‘the period of prescription shall commence’ to run from the day on
which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.’ The
complaint or information referred to in the above provisions which
interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, as ruled in the case
of People vs. Tayco (73 Phil., 509), accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal’s Office * * *.”

It should be recalled that the proper court in the present
litigation was the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The record
of this case clearly show that no formal complaint or information as
contemplated by the aforementioned Article 91 of the Penal Code was
ever filed therein within the reglementary period. As a matter of fact,
the said formal complaint or information was filed only after the lapse
of more than one year. Considering that under the Code, the
prescriptive period for grave oral defamation is six months (Art. 90,
Revised Penal Code), the only conclusion deducible is that the same has
prescribed.

Applying the principle laid down in the aforecited case of People vs. Del Rosario, supra, We cannot speak of the resumption of the prescriptive period since it has never been interrupted.

Wherefore, the appeal taken by the Government is hereby dismissed
and the order dismissing the information is hereby affirmed in full.
Costs de oficio.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. Barrera Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.