G.R. No. L-22581. May 21, 1969
THE COMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN GO TIENG AND SZE SAU CHIEN, (ALIAS BENITA SY PA), HUSBAND AND WIFE, PERSONALLY, AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN GO KIM…
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals vacating the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
in its Civil Case No. 47845 (Juan Go Tieng et al. vs.
Emilio L. Galang, etc.) and remanding the same for
further proceedings.
The antecedent facts are set forth in the appealed decision as
follows:
“From the record of the case we gather that on the strength of
a falsified certificate of
birth, whereby it was made to appear that petitioner Juan Go Tieng was an illegitimate son of one Virginia Tomas, a
Filipino citizen, with a certain
Chinaman by the name of Go Tin, said petitioner was able to obtain an order
from the Bureau of Immigration on June 29, 1960, cancelling
his registration in the Philippines as an alien (Exhibit A, Original Record,
p. 40), and on June 30, 1960, the
issuance in his favor of Identification Certificate No. 11916 (Exhibit B, Orig.
Record, p. 41), both of which declared him
to be a
Filipino citizen by birth.
By virtue of her supposed marriage to Juan Go Tieng,
the other petitioner herein, Sze Sau
Chien, also succeeded in securing from the same
Bureau an order dated September 8, 1960,
cancelling her registration as an alien in the
Philippines (Exhibit C, Orig. Record, pp. 42-43), and the issuance in her favor
on the same date of Identification Certificate No. 12888 (Exhibit D, Orig.
Record, p. 44), both of which also declared her to be a Filipino citizen by
reason of her alleged marriage to said Juan Go Tieng.
However, on July 21, 1961, after the falsity of the birth
certificate of Juan Go Tiang had been discovered,
respondent Commissioner of Immigration issued two orders, one revoking the
order dated June 29, 1960, which declared Juan Go Tieng
a Filipino citizen by birth, cancelling his
Identification Certificate No. 11916 and revalidating his ARC and IRC, and the
other likewise revoking the order dated September 8, 1960, which declared Sze Sau Chien
a Filipino citizen by marriage, cancelling her
Identification Certificate No. 12888, revalidating her
ACR and requiring her to leave the country within five days from notice
considering that her stay herein was authorized as a temporary visitor and the period
of her stay had already expired (Exhs. F & G,
Orig. Record, pp. 48-49).
Meanwhile, petitioners Go
Kim Chong and Go Siong
Lim, claiming to be the children of Juan Go Tieng,
arrived in the Philippines on July 15, 1961, aboard of PAL plane from Hongkong and sought admission into the country as Filipino
citizens, but they were ordered excluded and returned to the country from
whence they came, on the ground that their alleged father is not a Filipino
citizen (Exh. H, Orig. Record, p. 50).”
On July 25, 1961 a deportation proceeding under Section 37(a) in
relation to Section 45(f) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, was instituted against Juan Go Tieng for
having knowingly made false statements and representations in connection with
his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
and the certificate of registration of Sze Sau Chien. The deportation case was assigned to the Law
and Investigation Division of the Bureau of immigration for hearing and recommendation. Before it could be heard, however, Juan Go Tieng, Sze Sau
Chien, Go Kim Chong and Go Siong Lim filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for prohibition and mandamus against the Commissioner of
Immigration. They prayed the court to
restrain him from carrying out his order requiring Sze
Sau Chien, Go Kim Chong and Go Siong Lim to depart
from the Philippines and from confiscating their cash bonds; to restrain the
Law and Investigation Division of the Bureau of Immigration from hearing the
deportation case filed against Juan Go Tieng; and to
declare all of them citizens of the Philippines.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision dated February 8, 1962, dismissing the
petition. It found that “there
is no complete evidence on
record upon which petitioner Juan Go Tieng relies
(for) his claim to be a Filipino citizen”; that Sze Sau Chien could not claim
Filipino citizenship by marriage; and that as a consequence their minor
children could not claim to be Filipinos by birth. Upon receipt of a copy of the decision on February 14, 1962 counsel for
petitioners below (respondents here) immediately filed a notice of appeal to
the Supreme Court. However, on March 1, 1962 counsel withdrew their
appearance with the conformity of their clients; and the next day, March 2,
said petitioners themselves withdrew their appeal.
The following March 12 another set of lawyers entered their appearance in
the trial court and filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial on the following
grounds: (1) that they had discovered
new evidence regarding Go Tieng’s parentage; (2) that
former counsel had committed a mistake in admitting Go Tieng’s
certificate of birth without presenting him to testify regarding the
circumstances of his parentage; and (3) that the decision was contrary to the
facts of the case. The Commissioner of
Immigration opposed the motion, alleging in effect that the decision had become
final and executory, and that said motion did not
contain any valid grounds for reopening the case. By way of rejoinder petitioners below prayed
that their motion be considered as a petition for relief from judgment. On September
24, 1962 the trial court issued an order to the effect that while
the motion for reconsideration and new trial had no legal basis as such, it
might be considered as a petition
for relief from judgment. Accordingly,
the decision dated February 8, 1962
was set aside and the case was
reopened exclusively for the reception of the testimony of Juan Go Tieng. The hearing
was held, and on September 27, 1962,
holding that there was no valid reason to disturb its original findings, the
trial court reaffirmed its previous decision.
Thereupon petitioners below appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On January 16, 1964
the appellate court rendered the following judgment:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby vacated, and let
this case be returned to the court of origin for that court to conduct further
proceedings on the matter of the citizenship of Juan Go Tieng,
and thereafter, the trial court is instructed to render another decision as the
evidence presented may justify. Meanwhile,
action on the petition of Sau Sze
Chien, Go Kim Chong and Go Siong Lim is held in abeyance until final determination by
the trial court of the citizenship of “Juan Go Tieng,
without any special pronouncement as to costs.”
His motion for
reconsideration having subsequently been denied, the Commissioner of
Immigration elevated the case on the instant petition for review, assigning several
errors in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
It is first alleged that when herein private respondents filed their
motion for reconsideration and new trial in the court a quo its
decision had already become final, and that if the motion be considered as a petition for relief from
judgment the grounds relied upon were not valid for that purpose. Petitioner then contends that private
respondents should have exhausted the administrative remedies available to them
before coming to Court, by allowing the deportation proceeding to continue and
then appealing to the Secretary of Justice from the decision, if adverse, of
the Commissioner of Immigration.
Finally, petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in entertaining the
appeal of private respondents and in remanding the case for further
proceedings.
We first take up the issue posed in the second and third of the
foregoing recapitulation of errors. It
should be noted that the basic petition in the Court of First Instance was for
prohibition and mandamus (1) to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from
carrying out his order for then petitioners (respondents here) Sze Sau Chien,
Go Kim Chong and Go Siong
Lim to depart from the Philippines; (2) to stop the hearing of the deportation
proceeding against Juan Go Tieng; and (3) to declare
all the petitioners (respondents here) Filipino citizens.
To begin with, it should be stated that as far as the records of
the Bureau of Immigration are concerned respondent Juan Go Tieng is
a Chinese citizen, the order of the Commissioner of Immigration dated June 29,
1960 cancelling his alien certificate of registration
and declaring him a Filipino citizen having been revoked in the subsequent
order of July 21, 1961. The only basis
of the first order was the falsified certificate of birth of Juan Go Tieng and hence the second order was necessary and logical
upon the discovery of the falsification.
After Go Tieng was thus reverted to his former
status as an alien in the records of the Bureau of Immigration, the
Commissioner, on July 25, 1961,
instituted the deportation proceeding against him for having used a falsified
certificate of birth in obtaining the order of June 29, 1960. It
was to secure a judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship and to utilize
such declaration to stop the investigation which was to be conducted in
connection with the deportation proceeding that Go Tieng
went to Court on a petition for prohibition and mandamus.
We do not see that prohibition and mandamus are proper vehicles
for such purpose. The first is a remedy
against proceedings that are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
second is a recourse to compel the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty – again when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Commissioner of Immigration neither
exceeded his authority nor abused his discretion
in instituting a deportation proceeding against Go Tieng
and ordering the corresponding investigation.
It was a proceeding sanctioned by Section 37(a) in relation to Section
45 of the Immigration Act of 1940. The
question of Go Tieng’s Filipino citizenship was and
should have been addressed in the first instance to the Commissioner, and his
authority to hear the evidence and pass upon the said question to enable him to decide whether or not Go Tieng should be deported cannot be preempted by the courts
in a suit for prohibition. In other
words, is pointed out by the Solicitor General, the suit was premature, no
hearing having yet been conducted and no conclusion reached concerning the
deportability of Go Tieng. Orderly procedure requires that the matter be
threshed out where the law assigns it in the first place.
As matters now stand, despite the two chances given to
petitioners below to establish the basis alleged by them for the suit for
prohibition in the Court of First Instance, they have failed to do so.
“After having reviewed at length the entire evidence adduced by both
sides,” said the Court of Appeals in its decision, “we find the same
quite deficient to warrant a sound and judicious pronouncement that Juan Go Tieng is or is not
a Filipino citizen.” If for this reason alone the denial by the trial
court of the basic petition should have been affirmed, since after all the burden of making out their case rested upon
the said petitioners.
With respect to Sze Sau
Chien, it appears that she came to the Philippines on
April 16, 1960 as a temporary
visitor, and was permitted to enter and stay for a period of only one
month. To guarantee that she would leave
upon the expiration of the permit, Juan Go Tieng put
up a cash bond of P1,000. The evidence referred to by the Commissioner
of Immigration in the instant petition shows
that in her application for a passport visa as a non-immigrant she
stated she was married to a certain Co Cheng Guan, a resident of Rangoon, and
that she had no close relative in the Philippines. The clear implication, of course, is that she
is not the wife at all of Juan Go Cheng.
But assuming that she is, the fact of the marriage alone, even conceding
the possibility that her husband may be able to establish his Filipino
citizenship after he is heard in the deportation proceeding, would not make her
automatically a Filipino citizen. This
is the doctrine already settled by this Court in a number of decisions. The citizenship of an alien woman who marries
a Filipino husband must be determined in an appropriate proceeding by a showing
that she “might herself be naturalized” as a Filipino citizen.+ Consequently, the order of the Commissioner of immigration
for Sze Sau Chien to depart, the period of her authorized stay having
long expired, cannot be said to be in excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse
of discretion. The same conclusion holds
true with respect to the two minor children, allegedly of her marriage to Go Tieng.
Apropos is the decision of this Court in the case of Sy Ha vs. Galang, April 27, 1963
7 SCRA 797), from which we quote:
“It should be borne in mind this is a petition for mandamus to
compel respondent to recognize the validity of an order of Associate
Commissioner Felix Talabis which declared petitioners
citizens of the Philippines and to restore their identification certificates
as such citizens after respondent commissioner had exercised his authority to
re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence then extent in his office as submitted
in the administrative investigation, and yet the court a quo had acted on the
matter without giving said respondent an opportunity to examine and evaluate
the evidence on which it predicated its amended decision. We consider this action unfair and improvident
for it is tantamount to
overruling the decision of respondent on evidence which he himself did not have
occasion to consider. It is like over?ruling
him on a matter which was never submitted to him for consideration.
“Another point we should consider here is the nature of the
proceeding before us. It should be
recalled that this is a petition for mandamus which will only lie to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty – not a discretionary duty, for, as it
was aptly held, mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
of a public officer where the law imposed upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act, because it
is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.”
In view of what has been set forth above we deem it
unnecessary to pass upon the procedural questions raised by petitioner herein,
namely, whether or not the original decision of the trial court dated February 8, 1962 had become final and unappealable; whether or not the motion for reconsideration
and new trial dated March 12, 1962, was correctly considered as a petition for
relief from judgment; and whether or not such petition was granted on justifiable
grounds.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside,
and that of the Court of First Instance dismissing the basic petition is
affirmed, with costs.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
+ Sec. 15 Commonwealth Act No.
473; Cua vs. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521; Lee Suan Ay, et al., vs.
Galang, et al., 106 Phil. 706; San Tuan vs. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Pek Young vs. Commissioner of Immigration; L-20784,
Dec. 27, 1963; Tan Siok Sy vs.
Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Lao Chay vs. Galang,
L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964; Austria vs.
Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee vs. Galang,
L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965; Lee Giok
Ha et al. vs. Galang et al., L-21332, March
18, 1966; Co Pek et al. vs. Vivo L-21775, Dec.
17, 1966; Lo Beng Ha Ong vs.
Republic, L-24503, Sept. 28, 1968.