G.R. No. L-19327. April 29, 1966
AMADO BELLA JARO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. HON. ELPIDIO VALENCIA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HON. JESUS NOLASCO, DIRECTOR OF HEALTH SERVICES, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.
DIZON, J.:
Case No. 440003) in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Secretary of Health and the Director of Health Services to (a) compel them to return him to his original station at Cateel, Davao as municipal health officer thereof and (b) to declare null and void Special Order No. 2 dated February 17, 1959 issued by the second respondent temporarily assigning
him as rural health physician of the Municipality of Padada, Davao.
After due trial the Court rendered judgment on March 25, 1961, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
“* * * * * * *.
“Since the questioned order is illegal, the petitioner is entitled to
be paid his back salaries from August 1, 1959, the date when payment of
petitioner’s salary was ordered withheld. The petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement of transportation expenses from Cateel, Davao to Manila
and return and for payment of his per diems during his stay in Manila
when he was summoned by respondents in connection with petitioner’s
transfer should be allowed, subject to auditing requirements.“Since there is no indication that the respondents were motivated by
bad faith in issuing the challenged order for, in fact, respondent
Nolasco appears to be against any move to transfer petitioner, there is
no justification for awarding damages and attorney’s fees to the
petitioner.“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
renders judgment declaring Special Order No. 2, dated February 17, 1959
(Exhibit ‘W-12’, also Exhibit ‘3’) issued by respondents null and void;
that the petitioner is entitled to the payment of his back salaries as
Municipal Health Officer of Cateel, Davao from August 1, 1959 and
transportation expenses and per diems in coming to Manila from Cateel,
Davao, subject to auditing requirements.“The counterclaim
of respondents is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit. This
proceeding is without pronouncement as to costs.”
In due time the respondents appealed (G. R. No. L-18352) raising purely questions of law.
Petitioner also appealed, the case having gone to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.RO No. 29352-R) because it raised the question of whether or not
the respondents had acted in bad faith in connection with the issuance
of the questioned Special Order No. 2 of the respondent Director of
Health Services, aside from the error allegedly committed by the trial
court in not awarding him moral damages and attorney’s fees. The Court
of Appeals, however, elevated the case to Us for final disposition in
conjunction with respondents’ appeal (G. R. No. L-18352) pursuant to
the provision of Section 17, paragraph 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended.
It appears that on August 30, 1963, in G. R. No.
L-18352 (respondents’ appeal), We reversed the lower Court’s decision
except with regard to the portion which dismissed the then respondents’
counterclaim, by holding that appellee’s (Jaro) transfer from Cateel to
Padada, Davao, was valid because his appointment was not for any
specific assignment or station but as a physician in the Municipal
Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals and that, as such he
could be transferred or assigned to any station where, in the opinion
of the Secretary of Health, his services may be utilized more
effectively.
The validity of the respondents’ order
effecting petitioner’s transfer to his new station having thus been
upheld, it is clear that respondents could not be held to have acted in
bad faith in ordering petitioner’ s transfer, in view of the lack of
sufficient evidence showing that, in connection therewith, they had
acted arbitrarily or inspired by purely personal motives.
Wherefore, the portion of the decision of the lower court covered by petitioner’s appeal is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.