CASTOR AGUILAR, PETITIONER, VS. ERNESTO TAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

The primary object of the petitions in these two cases for certiorari
is to reverse and/or nullify the June 16, 1964 decision and September 21, 1964
resolution of the Court of Appeals, it ap­pearing that said decision and
resolution would have the effect of depriving Castor Aguilar of his alleged
right to operate the porterage service at the Manila
International Airport and vesting if in
respondent Ernesto Tan.^[1]

The cases have their roots in Civil Case No. 2190-P of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, entitled “Ernesto
Tan, Plaintiff, versus Urbano B. Caldoza,
et al., Defendants, Celso Gazzingan,
Intervenor“, for mandamus to compel
defend­ants to allow plaintiff to resume porterage
service at the Manila International
Airport.  The judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal of March
31, 1964 dismissed plaintiff’s mandamus suit and dissolved
the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore issued.  Ernesto Tan took steps to appeal to the Court
of Appeals.

Meanwhile, plaintiff Ernesto Tan, in a motion before the court of
first instance, sought to stop enforcement of the decision and to maintain the
status quo under the dissolved injunction. 
The court, on April 27, 1964,
ruled out the motion.  On April 29, 1964, the court rejected
the motion for reconsideration and directed Tan and/or his agents, workers or
laborers “to refrain or cease from operating the porterage
service in the Manila International
Airport immediately.”

Parenthetically, Castor Aguilar (petitioner herein in L-23600)
was afterwards placed in the operation of the porterage
service.

Ernesto Tan then went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.^[2]

On June 16, 1964, without first giving due course to the petition
and without as much as giving notice of Tan’s petition to herein petitioners,
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, viz:  “WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby granted, with orders for respondent court to give due course to
petitioner’s appeal from its adverse decision dated March 31, 1964; desist from
carrying out its order of April 7, 1964;^[3]
and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, or Aguilar or any other party acting in his stead, to desist
from interfering or molesting petitioner [Ernesto Tan] who is hereby understood
to have remained all the time as concessionaire of the Manila International
Airport, with the costs against respondents, except respondent court.”

By way of follow-up to the foregoing judgment, Ernesto Tan moved
in the Court of Appeals for a directive to be issued against the judge of first
instance and herein petitioners to comply with the terms thereof.  Simultaneously, Tan filed a similar motion in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying for an
order to direct the Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (Director)
to comply with the decision of the Court of Appeals.^[4]

Aguilar and the Director, for their part, moved to set aside the June 16, 1964 appellate court’s
decision, the former on June 20, 1964,
and the latter on June 22, 1964.  Their common ground is lack of jurisdiction
over their persons as they had no notice of Tan’s petition.

On June 27, 1964,
the Court of Appeals promulgated the following resolution:

“The petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari,
prohibition and mandatory injunction filed by Ernesto Tan in the
above-captioned case being an offshoot or concomitant to Civil Case No. 2190-P
pending in respondent Court of First Instance, this Court of Appeals, in aid of
its jurisdiction, was in a position to pass upon the said petition ex parte – as it did.

However, considering the importance of the case and to enable the
respondents to be heard, upon motion they are hereby ordered to answer the
petition within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of this order.  Upon petitioner’s filing a bond of P1,000.00,
respondent court is hereby ordered to suspend further proceedings in Civil Case
No. 2190-P.

In the interim, this Court’s decision promulgated June 16, 1964, is being held in
abeyance.”

Pursuant to the foregoing resolution, summons were served on
Aguilar on July 1, 1964 and
the Director on July 2, 1964.

The Director and Aguilar, instead of filing their respective
answers, went to this Court on an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction (“Vicente C. Rivera,
Jr., in his capacity as Director of Civil Aviation, Petitioner, versus Ernesto
Tan and the Court of Appeals, Respond­ents”, L-23164; “Castor Aguilar,
Petitioner, versus Ernesto Tan and the Court of Appeals, Respondents”,
L-23165).  Both petitions sought to annul
the June 16, 1964 decision
of the Court of Appeals and also its June
27, 1964 resolution.

This Court, in a minute resolution of July 13, 1964 issued in both cases (L-23164 and
L-23165), resolved to dismiss the two petitions for being premature since
petitioners “may appeal after the resolution by the Court of
Appeals.”

Back to the Court of Appeals, Aguilar and the Director there
filed their respective answers to Tan’s petition.

Issues having been joined and following oral arguments on the
merits, the Court of Appeals, on September 21, 1964, issued an extended
resolution, the dispositive part of which reads:  “After pronouncing that our decision
promulgated June 16, 1964, was sim­ply intended to be held in abeyance, the
same stands with the ins­tant resolution incorporated therein as part
hereof.”

Hence, this appeal by certiorari.  As prayed for, we issued a cease-and-desist
order on November 7, 1964
in L-23600 (Castor Aguilar, Petitioner, versus Ernesto Tan and the Court of
Appeals, Respondents).

1.       Petitioners assail
the June 16, 1964 decision
of the Court of Appeals.  Petitioners’
claim is that at the time that decision was rendered, the court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over their persons. 
They submit that the decision was void for lack of due process.

Beyond question is the fact that the June 16, 1964 decision was rendered by the Court
of Appeals without giving notice to herein petitioners of Tan’s petition
therein and without giving them an opportunity to be heard.  Had the proceedings stopped there,
unquestionably, that decision would have to be stricken down as null and
void.  But petitioners complained.  They separately moved to set aside that
decision.  They stressed lack of due
process.  The Court of Appeals listened
to their plea.  Thus, on June 27, 1964, the appellate court
resolved to hold in abeyance its June
16, 1964 decision, and ordered respondents (petitioners herein) to
file their answers thereto.  Summonses
were served upon the Director and Aguilar. 
Thereafter, they filed their res­pective answers.  The case was heard before the appellate court
on the merits.  The parties argued orally
their respective causes thereat.

There is then reason to say that the situation here presented
comes within the coverage of the rule that “[w]hat the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard.”^[5] We have
said that where a party was given a chance to be heard with respect to his
motion for reconsideration there is sufficient compliance with the requirements
of due process.^[6]
Such is the case here.

Considering then that the decision of June 16, 1964 was suspended, that meanwhile
herein petitioners were given a chance to traverse the averments of the
petition, have had full opportunity to speak and explain, and did actually
speak and explain their side of the case, we feel that the fundamental safeguards
of due process were not denied petitioners. 
Where previously there was error, subsequently such error was
corrected.  Originally victims of hasty
justice, petitioners were subsequently given fair treatment.  The vice existed; but it was cured.

2.       Now to the core of
the case.  The judgment of the trial
court dissolved the preliminary injunctive writ which gave respondent Tan the
right to operate the porterage service.  The appellate court’s directive is that such
judgment should not be enforced.  It is
the Court of Appeals’ view that Tan’s appeal from the adverse decision
“suspended all proceedings to oust him until such appeal shall have been
finally disposed of by the appellate court.”

The rule that an appeal does not stay execution of the judgment decreeing
the dissolution of a preliminary injunction has a history in this country which
dates back to 1902.  That was the ruling
of this Court in Watson & Co., Limited vs.
Enri­quez (November 13, 1902), 1 Phil. 480, 481-482, closely followed on
November 22 of the same year by Sitia Teco vs. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497, 499.^[7]

3.       Whether or not there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in enjoining
the lower court from enforcing its decision dissolving the injunctive writ is
the next problem we are to grapple with.

Deeply ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that the writs
of certiorari and prohibition are granted “to keep an inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.”^[8]
As we have said in Albert vs. Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 965, “the office of the writ of certiorari
has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and
cannot legally be used for any other purpose.”^[9]

Let us now look into the reasons of the appellate court for
granting the writs.

The resolution of September
21, 1964, which was issued after hearing both parties, confirmed
the conclusion reached in the June 16,
1964 decision that the writs prayed for should be granted, thus:

“Considering the attendant circumstances, in view of the
appeal filed by petitioners from the trial court’s decision arid in view of the
further circumstance that petitioner has, for the last three years, been the
incumbent server of the arrastre service in said
international airport, it would seem the better part of judgment to preserve
that status in view of the appeal they have interposed from the trial court’s
decision.  Obviously, to rule otherwise,
that is by allowing respondent arrastre group to take
over, would be tantamount to disturbing the present order of status quo
and evidently pre-judge the case.”^[10]

The most that can be inferred from the foregoing resolution is
that in dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the trial
judge could have erroneously sized up the situation.  Intimation of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse of discretion, there is none. 
Not every error a court commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction may
be correctible by certiorari. 
Errors of judgment may be reviewed only by appeal.^[11]

That the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Tan’s bid for status quo
pending appeal, may readily be shown from a reading of his order of April 27,
1964, thus –

“As to the petition for preliminary injunction, we can not see
our way clear in granting the same in view of our findings that the plaintiff
has not acquired any right under the bidding of November 28, 1960, which has been set aside by the Executive
Secretary by authority of the President. 
In our decision, we stated:

‘We have carefully weighed the reasons of Undersecretary Contreras,
the Auditor General and the Executive Secretary in setting aside the bidding of
November 28, 1960, and we are not prepared to hold, as we find no sufficient
and valid reason therefor, that said officers in
setting aside the bidding, acted arbitrarily or with abuse of discretion.  As a matter of fact, the record fails to show
that the aforesaid officials had exceeded their authority in disapproving
and/or setting at naught the bidding.  It
is our sense that in so doing they were merely guided by their sound judgment
and honest opinion.  They acted with fairness
and justice to protect public interest.’

We are loath to make an order modifying the decision heretofore
rendered, or restoring or granting the injunction prayed for during the pendency of the appeal.”^[12]

More emphatic is the trial judge’s statement in his order of April 29, 1964 denying Tan’s second
motion aimed at eliminating the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, as
follows:

“After a careful consideration of said motion for
reconsideration and the opposition thereto, it is our conviction that the
plaintiff has no more legal right to continue operating the porterage
service nor has he shown any special reason satisfactory to the court to
reconsider its decision dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
dated August 29, 1961.”^[13]

An order dissolving a writ of preliminary injunction issued
before decision, we must say, stands on a footing different from that decreed in the decision
itself.  In the former, the possibility
of irreparable injury which could visit petitioner pending hearing would be a
potent deterrent against dissolution. 
The court at that time did not yet have a full grasp of the
situation.  But after the facts are known
and the decision is rendered, a strong presumption of the correctness and
validity of the judge’s directive arises.^[14]
So that when the court in its decision orders dissolution of the preliminary
injunction, weighty reasons must be advanced to overturn such order.  Because discretion exercised by the trial
court should normally be upheld.  That court
is at home, so to speak, with the record of the proceedings.

We, accordingly, rule that there was no abuse of discre­tion on the part of the trial court which
would call for the exercise of the supervisory powers of the Court Petitioner,
Appeals.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals of June 16, 1964 and its resolution of September 21, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 33943-R, entitled “Ernesto Tan,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Judge Angel Mojica,
etc., et al., Respondents”, are hereby reversed, and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued in L-23600 is hereby made permanent.

Costs against respondent Ernesto Tan.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., did not take part.

^[1]
CA-G.R. No. 33943-R, entitled “Ernesto
Tan, Petitioner, versus Hon. Judge Angel Mojica
etc., et al., Respondents.”

^[2]
CA-G.R. No. 33943-R mentioned in footnote 1.

^[3]
Should be April 29, 1964.

^[4]
Rollo of L-23631, p. 46.

^[5]
De Borja vs. Tan, 93
Phil, 167, 171, emphasis supplied; Embate vs. Penolio, 93 Phil. 782, 785.

^[6]
De Borja vs. Tan, supra; Llanto vs. Dimaporo,
L-21905, March 31, 1966, 16
SCRA 599, 603-604.

^[7]
See also:  Dimaunahan vs. Aranas, 74
Phil. 455, 459-460.

^[8]
Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 915, citing
case.

^[9]
Citing Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil.
245, 271.

^[10]
Rollo of L-23600, p. 62; Rollo of L-23631, p. 59.

^[11]
Palma vs. Q. & S., Inc.,
L-20366, May 19, 1966, 17
SCRA 97, 100.

^[12]
Rollo of L-23631, p. 26.

^[13]
Rollo of L-23631, p. 27.

^[14]
Virginian Railway Company vs. U.S., 71 L. ed. 463, 471.