JESUS GALANO, BASILIO FLORES, SOLTICIO PLAZA, ISIDRO SAN JOSE, PATRICIO ANASTACIO, RODOLFO DE LAS ARMAS, AMADO REGIS, PEDRO CRUZ, FEDERICO MANUEL, EULOGIO MAKIRAMDAM, APOLONIO A…

Galano versus Roxas

The Case

This is a petition filed by Chief of Police Jesus Galano and twenty-three co-petitioners, all members of the police department of San Mateo, Rizal, against Mayor Nemesio Roxas of the same municipality. Although the petitioners themselves denominated their pleading as one for mandamus, the Supreme Court treated it for what it really was: a petition for quo warranto, praying in effect that the respondent mayor be ordered to comply with the directive of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate them and to pay their back salaries. The case matters because it teaches two enduring lessons: that the persons who replaced the petitioners are indispensable parties in any action that would unseat them, and that a quo warranto or mandamus action touching title to public office must be brought within one year from ouster, a period that administrative remedies do not interrupt.

Procedural History

The controversy began before administrative bodies. The petitioners wrote separate letters to the Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission in January 1968, impugning their supposed courtesy resignations. The Civil Service Commission referred the matter to the Police Commission, whose Hearing Officer conducted hearings and recommended that the resignations be declared null and void, that the petitioners be reinstated, and that they be paid their salaries for the period they were unduly deprived of their positions. The Police Commission en banc approved this recommendation, and the Commissioner of Civil Service indorsed it to the respondent mayor, directing immediate compliance. The mayor moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Instead of complying, he indorsed the matter to the President of the Philippines for information and guidance, and no further action was taken by that office. Because the mayor refused to comply, the petitioners filed this petition directly with the Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the petition, and it is that dismissal which we now study.

Facts

In the local elections of 1967, Nemesio Roxas was elected mayor of San Mateo, Rizal, and he assumed office on the first day of January 1968. Shortly thereafter, between January 2 and 6, 1968, twenty-four resignations were filed with his office, signed by Chief of Police Jesus Galano and his twenty-three co-petitioners, all members of the municipal police department. Together with the resignations were their respective applications for terminal leave. The mayor accepted the resignations, and on varying dates between January 31 and June 30, 1968, the municipal treasurer paid the corresponding leave benefits, which the petitioners duly received. With the police force badly depleted, only eight policemen remained, and two municipal councilors had to perform traffic and patrol duties. The mayor then appointed replacements to the vacated positions.

On January 12, 1968, the petitioners addressed separate letters to the Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission, complaining that the mayor had threatened them into filing what they called courtesy resignations, and praying that these be declared null and void and that the appointments of their replacements be disapproved. The mayor's position was that the resignations were voluntary, that he could not have coerced armed and civil service eligible policemen, and that the mass resignations were a concerted move to embarrass his administration. He refused to reinstate them unless ordered by a competent court.

The Police Commission's Hearing Officer found the petitioners' version substantiated and recommended reinstatement with back salaries, and the Commissioner of Civil Service directed immediate compliance. The mayor sought reconsideration, failed, and referred the matter to the President, where it languished. On November 20, 1969, the petitioners filed this petition with the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition may be resolved without the persons who replaced the petitioners in their positions being impleaded as parties.
• Whether or not the petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting title to public office was filed within the one-year period from the petitioners' ouster.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific statutory provision; it rests on the settled jurisprudence on quo warranto and mandamus affecting public office. The governing rule, as stated by the Court, is this:

the unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position.

This rule bears directly on the case because the petitioners were separated from the service between January 2 and 6, 1968, and filed their petition only on November 20, 1969.

On the necessity of impleading the replacements, the Court relied on this principle:

They are indispensable parties to these proceedings and their absence is fatal to the authority of this Court to act, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.

This principle bears on the case because granting the petition would necessarily unseat the replacements, who were never given their day in court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition could not be decided without giving the replacements an opportunity to be heard. The petitioners in effect asked the Court to sanction the disapproval of the appointments of those who had taken their places, and their removal would be a necessary consequence of declaring the resignations void. Whether the matter of the disapproval of those appointments is treated independently or as a corollary of the ruling on the resignations, the replacements have a vital interest in the outcome. They are therefore indispensable parties, and their absence is fatal to the authority of the Court to act.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition was filed too late. The petitioners themselves alleged that they were separated from the service through the ruse of accepting their courtesy resignations between January 2 and 6, 1968, and the record showed that they were aware of the supposed illegality of their ouster as early as January 10, 1968, the date of their separate letters to the Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission. The one-year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. After that period lapses, the remedy of the aggrieved party lies exclusively with administrative authorities. The Court quoted its own earlier ruling:

While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period.

Because the petitioners filed only on November 20, 1969, they were beyond the help of the courts. Having resolved the case on these two grounds, the Court found no need to pass on the factual question of whether the resignations were coerced.

Doctrine

First, a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting title to public office must be filed within one year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. This period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. After it lapses, the aggrieved party's remedy lies exclusively with administrative authorities.

Second, the persons who have been appointed to and are occupying the positions in controversy are indispensable parties in any action that would result in their removal. Their absence is fatal to the exercise of judicial power, because no one may be deprived of a public office without an opportunity to be heard.

Third, the choice of remedy is the petitioner's, but it carries a price: one who opts to pursue administrative remedies instead of going to court at once must still file the judicial action within the reglementary period, since administrative remedies neither are a prerequisite to nor bar quo warranto proceedings.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, without costs, and the motion to declare petitioner Galano in contempt of court was denied for lack of merit.

Remember This

Memorize the one-year rule: a quo warranto or mandamus action touching title to public office must be filed within one year from ouster, and administrative remedies do not interrupt that period. Examiners use this case to test the indispensable-party requirement and the fatal effect of filing beyond the one-year period.