G.R. No. L-19760. April 30, 1964
MARCELO VILLAVIZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE TOMAS PANGANIBAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
City, in its Case No. 2088-NE-60, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Quirino Capalad to pay the petitioners as follows:
1. Jose Aguilar 2. Agapito Neuda 3. Sixto Malamlat 4. Rafael Alamon 5. Petronilo Aguilar 6. Eulogio Samaniego 7. Castor Rufino The following respondents are hereby ordered to vacate their respective
landholdings in favor of the petitioners, subject to the provisions of
pars. 3 and 4, Sec. 22 R.A. No. 1199, as amended, the indemnity in the
aforestated paragraphs, supra, shall be paid by respondent Quirino
Capalad:
1. Alejo Pramel 1. Jose Aguilar 2. Severino Padilla 2. Agapito Neuda 3. Domingo Villaviza 3. Rafael Alamon 4. Marcelo Villaviza 4. Petronilo Aguilar 5. Cirilo Ramos 5. Eulogio Samaniego 6. Ciriaco Pizaro 6. Castor Rufino 7. Cesario Villaviza 7. Sixto Malarulat Ben Morelos Juan Morelos SO ORDERED.”
The lower court found that the above-named respondents (petitioners
below) were tenants since 1944 in a riceland situated in Aliaga, Nueva
Ecija, and owned by Domingo Fajardo. Fajardo gave out the land for
lease (civil lease) to the petitioner, Quirino Capalad, starting with
the crop year 1955-56. The said lessee, in June, 1955, plowed the land
by machinery, and installed, as his tenants, his above-named
co-petitioners in this Court, so that when the respondents went back to
their respective landholdings to prepare them for planting they found
the land already cultivated. The respondents-tenants demanded their
re-instatement, but every time they did, which they did yearly until
the present suit was filed, Quirino Capalad promised, but never
fulfilled, to reinstate them for the agricultural year following said
demands.
As grounds for the petition for review, the petitioners claim grave
abuse of discretion by the Agrarian Court and a lack of substantive
evidence to support its findings.
The above claim is wild and reckless and definitely without merit,
since the decision itself contains the recitals of the testimonies of
the witnesses upon which the court based its findings, and the
petitioners do not question the existence and adequacy of these
testimonies. That the court believed the evidence for the respondents,
rather than those for the petitioners is the tenancy court’s
prerogative, and, as a reviewing court, the Supreme Court will not
weigh anew the evidence all that this Court is called upon to do,
insofar as the evidence is concerned, is to find out if the conclusion
of the lower court is supported by substantive evidence; and the
present case is, as hereinbefore explained.
A tenant’s right
to be respected in his tenure under Republic Act 1199, as amended, is
an obligation of the landholder created by law and an action for
violation thereof prescribes in ten years under No. 2 of Article 1144
of the Civil Code. The respondents were ousted from their landholdings
in June, 1955, and they filed the present action on 31 March 1960;
therefore, the period of limitation had not expired.
The tenancy court found that the ejected tenants-respondents have
engaged in gainful occupations since their illegal ejectment and had
delayed the filing of the case, and for these reasons the court made an
award for damages against Quirino Capalad equivalent to only two
harvests based on the landholder’s share for the crop year 1954-1955.
The premises for the award are erroneous. Under section 27(1) of
Republic Act 1199, as amended, a tenant’s earnings may not be deducted
from the damages because the said section positively provides that the
tenant’s freedom to earn elsewhere is to be added (“in addition”) to
his right to damages in case of illegal ejectment (Lustre, et al. vs.
CAR, et al., L-19654, March 21, 1964). Nor can it be said that the
respondents-tenants are guilty of laches for having unnecessarily
delayed the filing of the case, because the delay was attributed to
Capalad’s promises to reinstate them.
The amount of the
award to each respondent should not, however, be disturbed because the
respondents non- appeal from the decision indicates their satisfaction
therewith and a waiver of any amounts other than those indicated in the
decision (David vs. de la Cruz, et al., 103 Phil., 380; Dy, et al. vs. Kuizon, L-16654, 30 Nov. 1961).
For the foregoing considerations, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.