JOSE V. BONAFE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROBERTO ZURBANO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Some years back, petitioner, a policeman of Malilipot, Albay, was
suspended by respondent Mayor Marciano Bitara because of four criminal
cases filed against him in the Municipal Court of Tabaco, Albay, to wit:
assault upon an agent (another policeman) of a person in authority
with homicide; less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;
illegal possession of firearm; and alarm and scandal.

Before the cases could be tried on the merits, the prosecution moved for
their provisional dismissal on account of the desistance of the
offended parties who had been paid by petitioner. The motion was
granted by the court. Petitioner later sought a modification of the
provisional dismissal to an absolute dismissal, which was also granted
by the court.

Petitioner then filed with the Civil Service Commission a petition for
reinstatement and payment of the salaries he failed to receive during
his suspension, invoking the second paragraph of Section 16, Republic
Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, which provides:

“When a member of the police force or agency is accused in court
of any felony or violation of law x x x, the city mayor or municipal
mayor concerned, shall immediately suspend the accused from office
pending the final decision by the court, and in case of acquittal,
the accused shall be entitled to immediate reinstatement and the payment
of the entire salary he failed to receive during his suspension x x x.” (Italics supplied.)

The Civil Service Commission referred the matter to the Malilipot Mayor,
who replied with a firm expression of his refusal to reinstate
petitioner for the reason that there was actually no acquittal which
could be the basis of petitioner’s reinstate­ment with back salaries.
While the matter was pending in the Commission, petitioner filed an
action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Albay to compel
reinstatement and payment of back salaries. The court dismissed the
action. Hence this petition seeking reversal of the said decision.

The petition has no merit. The law predicates reinstatement with
entitlement to back salaries on “acquittal”. The dismissal of the
criminal cases filed against petitioner after he had paid the offended
parties, without trial on the merits, was not an acquittal.

“It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended
officer being ‘acquitted’ it means that after due hearing and
consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal
of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because
dismissal does not amount to acquittal. As aptly stated in People vs.
Salico, 84 Phil. 722, 732-733 [1949]:

‘Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant
is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt
is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on
the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates
the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of compe­tent
jurisdiction or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly
but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when,
after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant
moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground
that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an
acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution
fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is
not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be
again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is
elemental that in such case the defendant may again be prosecuted for
the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” (Malanyaon
vs. Lising, 106 SCRA 237 at 239.)

It is also noted that as regards the charge of assault upon an agent of a
person in authority with homicide, the case was before the municipal
court only for preliminary investigation. Certainly, the petitioner
could not have been acquitted therein.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. When he filed
with the court a quo the case subject of the instant petition, his
petition for reinstatement was pending in the Civil Service Commission,
as it still is.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.