THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO AQUINO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Defendant-appellant herein was indicted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on an information which charged him with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, committed in the City of Manila on the 27th day of
March 1948. Upon arraignment on April 19, 1948, he pleaded not guilty, but
through representations made by counsel that appellant, who was a student, be
permitted to finish “the present semester of the school year before entering
Jail,” the hearing of his case was postponed to January 4, 1949.

On that date, the accused withdraw his former plea of not guilty and, soon
after the reading for the second time of the information filed against him,
entered a plea of guilty. In view thereof, and in answer to a question by the
court, the accused having stated that on March 27, 1948, he drove the motor
vehicle mentioned in the information, without license, with the recommendation
of the prosecution, and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (d) of
Section 67 of Act No. 3992, the court, on January 4, 1949, sentenced him to
imprisonment for one year, and to pay the costs.

On the same date of the judgment, and without objection of the fiscal, the
accused moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that in view of his
voluntary plea of guilty “a lighter indeterminate sentence” be given him. Said
petition for reconsideration was set for hearing on January 10, 1949, but, on
the same date, defendant filed a notice of appeal. The record shows that when
this case was before the lower court for the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration, the accused, either by himself or his lawyer, failed to appear
and the court, having lost jurisdiction to act, by reason of the appeal, on said
motion for reconsideration, denied the same on January 10, 1949.

In his brief the accused assails the correctness of the Judgment of the lower
court on the ground that the latter erred: (1) in not taking into consideration
“the sickly condition and appearance of the accused at the trial,” and in
imposing upon him “a rather heavy and excessive penalty not commensurate with
the offense committed;” (2) in “questioning the accused notwithstanding the fact
that he had pleaded guilty only to the charge or offense as alleged and set
forth in the information, which in effect compelled the accused to testify
against himself 5” and (3) in imposing an unusually heavy penalty on the accused
contrary to the usual and generally accepted practice in the courts on similar
offenses.

The brief of the accused contains a statement wherein he recites facts which
are not alleged in the information, and which We, for obvious reasons, cannot
consider reliable. As already stated, upon his withdrawal of the plea of not
guilty and his plea of guilty, no evidence was taken at the hearing of this case
in the lower court. His plea of guilty is an admission of all the allegations
and facts set forth in the information which reads:

“That on or about the 27th day of March, 1948, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being the driver and person in charge of civilian
Jeep bearing Plate No. 2783 with defective brakes, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully drive, operate and manage the same in a reckless, negligent and
imprudent manner westward along Legarda St., in said City, by then and there
giving the said vehicle a speed greater than was reasonable and proper under the
circumstance, and by not taking the necessary precautions to avoid damage to
property and accident to persons, causing as a consequence of his said
recklessness, imprudence and lack of precautions the said vehicle so driven,
operated and managed by him to hit, as in fact it hit, one Dimas Serrano who was
at the time boarding civilian Jeepney bearing Plate No. TPU-14383 parked in
front of House No, 613 Legarda, thereby inflicting upon the said Dimas Serrano
physical injuries, to wit: (1) Fracture, simple, pertrochanteric, femur, right
with varus deformity; (2) Wound lacerated, antero-medial ankle, left, which have
required and will require medical attendance for a period of from six to eight
months and which have incapacitated and will incapacitate him from performing
his customary labor for the same period of time.”

As may be seen, the latter part of the information which describes the nature
and seriousness of the physical injuries inflicted by appellant upon Dimas
Serrano, and which “required and will require medical attendance for a period of
from six to eight months and which have incapacitated and will incapacitate him
from performing his customary labor for the same period of time,” have
undoubtedly guided the court in imposing upon this appellant the penalty of one
year of imprisonment.

Appellant criticizes the lower court in questioning him as to whether or not
he had a license to drive a motor vehicle. But the accused having answered the
question voluntarily, he cannot now contend that he was compelled to testify
against himself. It is well settled that, in cases like the one before Us, the
trial judge has discretion to ascertain the true facts before rendering judgment
against an accused who has pleaded guilty. (Sec. 5, Rule 140, Rules of Court;
U.S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541; U.S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil. 426;
U.S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil. 91; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil.
305.)

Moreover, the court could not have taken judicial cognizance of the sickly
condition and appearance of the accused at the trial of this case, because, as
stated above, his plea of guilty dispensed with the necessity of taking any
evidence to substantiate the allegations of the information. Neither his alleged
sickly condition and appearance (Art. 13, par. 9, Rev. Penal Code), as
exemplified by a medical certificate Exhibit A annexed to the supplementary
petition for reconsideration of the judgment, can have any bearing on the
instant case as a mitigating circumstance. This accused is charged and convicted
of a violation of a special law (Act No. 3992, The Revised Motor Vehicle Law)
and the provisions of the Revised Penal Code are, pursuant to its Article 10,
not, therefore, applicable thereto.

Upon carefully viewing this case, We are of the opinion that if appellant was
really in such physical condition, as is described in said Exhibit A, he should
not have driven that civilian jeep “with defective brakes,” along Legarda street
of this City, and thus violated the provision of paragraph (d) of
Section 67 of Act No. 3992. This law, approved on December 3, 1932, after the
enactment of Act No. 3315 (The Revised Penal Code) which tools effect on the 1st
day of January 1932, has superseded the provisions of Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code in cases of offenses resulting from criminal negligence of the
offender while operating a motor vehicle; the purpose of the lawmaker being to
curb such violations by prescribing therefor a more severe penalty than that
provided by the Revised Penal Code for ordinary cases of reckless
imprudence.

Premised on all the foregoing, we, therefore, modify the judgment appealed
from in the sense that the penalty imposed upon this appellant shall consist of
an indeterminate penalty, ranging from six months and one day to one year and
six months of imprisonment. With costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Feria, J., no part.