THE HEIRS OF THE LATE FLORENTINA NUGUID VDA. DE HABERER, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO MARTINEZ, BALDOMERO MANALO, FAUSTINO BAGALAWIS, FEDERICO STA. TERESA, ANGELIT…

The Court grants the petition for review by way of appeal from
the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 dismissing the appeal of the
late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer in CA-G.R. No. 53680-90-R and ordering all pleadings filed in
said cases after the death of said appellant stricken off the records, for having
been issued with grave error of law if not with grave abuse of discretion and
remands the case for proper proceedings and deter­mination of the appeal on the
merits.

This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the late Florentina Nuguid vda. de Haberer as the duly registered owner filed in 1964 and 1965
eleven (11) complaints for recovery of possession of the parcel of land
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal issued in her name, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleging that
private respondents had surreptitiously entered the land and built their houses
thereon.

The lower court, after trial on the merits, rendered a
consolidated decision, dated May 26,
1971, dismissing all the complaints.  On motion of the late Florentina Nuguid vda. de Haberer
the cases were reopened and retried on grounds of newly discovered
evidence.  On September 15, 1972, the lower court issued an
order reviving its decision of May 26,
1971.  The decision was thus
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In the Court of Appeals, the cases were erroneously dismissed
once before, on the ground that the appeal was allegedly filed out of
time.  The issue was brought to this
Court in Cases Nos. L-39366 and L-39620-29, en­titled “Florentina
Nuguid vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez,
et al.”^[1]
On January 29, 1975, this Court rendered its judgment setting aside the
appellate court’s dismissal of the appeal and ordering the reinstatement of the
same for proper disposition on the merits, having found “that con­trary to
respondent court’s erroneous premises and computation, petitioner duly and
timely perfected her appeal within the reglementary
period and in compliance with the material data rule requiring that the Record
on Appeal state such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on
time.”

The cases were remanded to the Court of Appeals where appellant
was required to file printed brief within forty-five days from her receipt of
notice.  Three days before the period was
to expire, or on June 18, 1975,
appellant’s counsel requested for an extension of time within which to file
appellant’s brief.  Respondent court in a
resolution dated June 23, 1975 granted the request and gave appellant a 90-day
extension (with warning of no further extension) from receipt on June 27, 1975
or up to September 25, 1975 within which to file the appellant’s printed
brief.  On June 23, 1975, private respondent opposed the extension by
filing a “Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Extension of Time to File
Brief.” Appellant was directed by respondent court to comment on the said
opposition and appellant’s counsel complied by submitting its comments on July 15, 1975.

In the meantime, appellant Florentina
Nuguid vda. de Haberer had died on May 26, 1975.  Appellant’s counsel Attorneys Bausa, Ampil and Suarez
accordingly gave respondent court notice of the death of their client in their
motion of June 28, 1975 and asked for the suspension of the running of the
period within which to file the appellant’s brief pending the appointment of an
executor of the estate left by their client in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-2026) where a petition for the
probate of the alleged will of the deceased had been filed by another lawyer, Atty.
Sergio Amante. 
Respondents in turn contended that the lawyers of the deceased had”
no longer any legal standing and her attorneys could no longer act for and in
her behalf for the reason that their client-attorney relationship had been
automatically terminated or severed” and asked that the appeal be
dismissed “for failure to prosecute.”^[2]

Since their motion of June 28, 1975 remained unacted
upon and the original extension granted by the respondent court for the
deceased appellant to file her printed brief was about to expire, her counsel
filed on September 18, 1975 a manifestation and/or motion asking either for an
extension of sixty (60) days and/or resolution suspending the running of the
period within which to submit appellant’s printed brief.  Still, respondent court remained silent.

Not certain whether their services would still be retained by the
heirs of the deceased, counsel for the late Florentina
Nuguid vda. de Haberer reiterated their request in a motion dated November
14, 1975 either for an extension of time to file appellant’s brief or for the
issuance of a resolution suspending the running of the period for filing the
same, pending the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of
the deceased appellant.

Finally, acting on counsel’s motion of November 14, 1975, respondent court denied the
request for extension and at the same time dismissed the appeal, ruling in its
resolution dated November 24, 1975
as follows:

“Upon consideration of the manifestation and/or for another
extension to file appellant’s brief dated November 14, 1975, filed by counsel
for the appellant on the grounds therein stated, and considering that appellant
has already been given a total of one hundred ninety-five (195) days within
which to file brief, the Court Resolved to deny the motion for another
extension to file brief and to dismiss the appeal.”

Counsel for the deceased appellant forthwith filed their urgent
motion for reconsideration of December 8, 1975 explaining their predicament
that the requests for extension/suspension of period to file brief was due to
the uncertainty that their services may no longer be retained by the heirs or
legal representatives of their deceased client but they felt obligated to
preserve the right of such heirs/successors to continue the appeal pur­suant to
Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court, pending the settlement of the
question of who among them should be the executor of the deceased’s estate and
presented therewith, for admission, the printed “brief for the appellant”
the printing of which they had deferred “for professional ethical
considerations,” pending respondent court’s action on their request for
suspension of the period.  They further
submitted therewith copies of 2 separate orders of September 3, 1975 and August
26, 1975 issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations and the Court of First
Instance both at Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, respectively, wherein the deceased Florentina Nuguid vda. de Haberer
was party-defendant, granting the deceased’s counsel’s prayer to hold in
abeyance further proceedings therein pending the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the deceased.

Respondent court, however, denied reconsideration, per its Resolu­tion
of January 15, 1976 citing
the general principle that “litigants have no right to assume that such
extensions will be granted as a matter of course.” But respondent court
erred in applying this general principle and summarily denying reconsideration
and denying admission of the appel­lant’s brief conditioned upon the administrator
of the deceased’s estate making his appearance upon his appointment and being
granted leave to file his supplemental brief/memorandum,^[3]
in view of the intervening event of appellant’s death and the interposition of
the equally established prin­ciple that the relation of attorney and client is
terminated by the death of the client, as acknowledged by respondent court
itself as well as res­pondents.  In the
absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized re­presentatives of his
deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or
authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the
court of the client’s death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the
deceased’s rights in the case.

This is what the deceased’s counsel did in the case at bar.  They properly informed respondent court of
the death of the appellant and sought suspension of the proceedings and of the
period for filing appellant’s brief pending the
appointment of the executor of the deceased’s estate in the proper probate
proceedings filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City.  Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court^[4]
sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death of any of the
parties.  Under the Rule, it is the court
that is called upon, after notice of a party’s death and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of
the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant.  Since no administrator of the estate of the
deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending
determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, the motion of the deceased’s counsel for the suspension of the running of
the period within which to file appellant’s brief was well-taken.  More, under the Rule, it should have set a
period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative
or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the opposing party
to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased at the
cost of the deceased’s estate, and such representative shall then
“immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased.”

Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and
requiring the appearance of the legal representative of the deceased and
instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be substituted in
the pending appeal.  Thus, it has been
held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued
by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of
the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such
substi­tution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without such
legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are
null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of
the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment
would be binding.^[5]

Respondent court therefore erred in ruling that since upon the
demise of the party-appellant, the attorney-client relationship between her and
her counsels “was automatically severed and terminated,” whatever
pleadings filed by said counsel with it after the death of said appellant
“are mere scraps of paper.”^[6]
If at all, due to said death on May 25, 1975 and severance of the
attorney-client relationship, further proceedings and specifically the running
of the original 45-day period for filing the appellant’s brief should be
legally deemed as having been automatically suspended, until the proper
substitution of the deceased appellant by her executor or administrator or her
heirs shall have been effected within the time set by respondent court pursuant
to the cited Rule.

Respondent court likewise gravely erred in dismissing the appeal
on “(its) belief that the supervening death of the appellant Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer rendered the
continuance of the appeal unnecessary” on the basis of a totally
inapplicable citation of a ruling in Velasco vs. Rosenberg, 29 Phil. 212, 214
that “If pending appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for
the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal will be dismissed.”
Manifestly, the appellant’s death in no way impedes that the deceased’s appeal
to recover the parcel of land re­gistered in her name be continued and
determined for the benefit of her estate and heirs.

Prescinding from the foregoing, justice
and equity dictate under the circumstances of the case at bar that the rules,
while necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice,
should not be applied with the rigidity and inflexibility of respondent court’s
resolutions.^[7]
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant is to
be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his com­plaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities.^[8]
A liberal, rather than a strict and in­flexible adherence to the Rules, is
justified not only because appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs)
should be given every opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial
injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse parties principally,
since they are in actual possession of the disputed land.^[9]
The better and certainly the more prudent course of action in every judicial
proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose
of a case on technicalities,^[10]
especially where no substantial prejudice is caused to the adverse party.^[11]

The dismissal of an appeal based on the appellant’s failure to
file brief is based on a power granted to respondent Court of Appeals and not
on a specific and mandatory duty imposed upon it by the Rules.^[12]
Since the power or authority is not mandatory but merely directory, the
exercise thereof requires a great deal of circumspection, considering all the
attendant circumstances.^[13]
The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does
not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically.^[14]
Rather, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss
appellant’s appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.^[15]

Paraphrasing what the Court stressed in the leading case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals,^[16] a reading of the appellant’s brief
discloses that petitioners-appellants have a prima facie meritorious
case which should be properly determined on the merits and “the element of
rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to cover the
matter,”^[17]
for to dismiss the appeal would not serve the ends of justice.

A final note:  On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted
with their Manifestation the written authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by
instituted heirs and/or legal representatives
of the testate estate of the
deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
granting said counsels full authority to file and prosecute the case and any
other in­cidental cases for and in their behalf,^[18]
which was duly noted in the Court’s Resolution of March 26, 1976. 
Such manifestation and authority may be deemed the formal substitution
of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact they appear as petitioners in the
title of the case at bar.  Hence, the
proper determination of the pending appeal may now proceed, as herein directed.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and respondent
court’s re­solutions of November 24,
1975 and January 15, 1976
are set aside.  The appellant’s brief
filed with respondent court in the pending appeal in CA­-G.R.
Nos. 53680-90-R is ordered admitted and the cases are remanded to respondent
Court of Appeals for further proceedings and proper determination of the appeal
on the merits.  With
costs against private respondents.

The Court has noted that upon recommendation of the Solicitor
General in Adm. Case No. 2148 entitled “Francisco Ortigas,
Jr., et at. vs. Atty. Felipe C. Navarro” that
counsel for respondents Felipe C. Navarro be disbarred for “gross
misconduct and/or malpractice,” he has been sus­pended from the practice
of law during the pendency of said proceedings.  The Court, however, directs that copy of this
decision be served on said counsel for the sole purpose of apprising private
respondents through him of the promulgation of this judgment and to require
respondents (1) to inform the Court of their new counsel, if any, and to direct
him to enter his appearance or (2) if they have no new or other counsel, to
inform the Court of their respective addresses for purposes of service of the
Court’s processes, within ten (10) days
from notice hereof.

Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro**, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

* Fifth Division composed of
Andres Reyes, ponente, Godofredo
P. Ramos and Samuel F. Reyes, JJ.

^[1]
62 SCRA 162.

^[2]
Respondents’ comment, Rollo,
at page 60.

^[3]
Appellant’s brief at page 2, Rollo, page 46.

^[4]
Section 17, Rule 3 reads, to wit:

“Death of
party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be
granted.  If the legal representative fails to appear within such said time,
the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest
of the deceased.  The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may
be recovered as costs.  The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.”

^[5]
Ordoveza vs.
Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 (1936); Obut
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 546.

^[6]
Court of Appeals Resolution of January 15, 1976, Rollo, at page 51.

^[7]
Obut vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 546 (1976); Cucio vs.
Court of Appeals, May 24, 1974, 57 SCRA 64; Limon vs.
Candido, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
1166; Barrido vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 59
SCRA 168; Monticines, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 53 SCRA 14.

^[8]
Pongasi,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 71 SCRA
614 (1976).

^[9]
Vide Sollorano, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 62 SCRA 478.

^[10]
Obut vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., supra.

^[11]
Maqui vs.
Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 368.

^[12]
Section 1, Rule 50, Rules of Court.

^[13]
Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Philippine Milling Co., Inc., et al., 26 SCRA 712; Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 144.

^[14]
Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, supra.

^[15]
Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Philippine Milling Co., Inc., supra; see also Gregorio vs. Court
of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120.

^[16]
53 SCRA 228, 236.

^[17]
Carillo vs. Allied Workers
Association, 24 SCRA 566.

^[18]
Rollo, at pages 95-97.

** Justice Pacifico P. de Castro was designated to sit with the First
Division vice Justice Ramon C. Fernandez who is on official leave.