REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, AND ELISA BERNABE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on
certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of Respondent Court of
Appeals^[1] dated February 5, 1975 in
CA-G.R. No. 50076-R, entitled “EMILIO BERNABE SR., et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES“, affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC
Cadastral Record No. 1097, which dismissed petitioner Republic’s petition for
review of the decrees of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered
on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of the private Respondents herein,
the lots applied for by them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated March
19, 1975 denying herein Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as
follows:

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No.
19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.

On July 6,
1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural
land for disposition under the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).

On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of
First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under Republic Act 931, as
amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a portion of Lot No. 622 — Lot Nos.
792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 — and a portion of Lot No. 324 —
Lot Nos. 791 and 799 — more particularly identified and delineated in the
segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341,
Sgs-3342 and Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to perfect their
rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired
ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein
Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public,
adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years (Record on
Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).

On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order
setting the petition for hearing and directing that the Republic of the
Philippines be notified thereof by furnishing the Solicitor-General, the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, a copy
of said Order together with Respondents’ petition by
registered mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).

On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry
filed an opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the petition once
the area involved is found to be within the timberland and therefore inalienable
under the Constitution (Record on Appeal, p. 7).  Upon
verification, however, the Director of Forestry found the area to be the portion
of the timberland already released by the government from the mass of public
forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition (Record on Appeal, p.
8).

On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of
Lands, filed his opposition to the petition alleging that the land is still, in
truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject of a land
registration proceeding under Act 496.

The lower court found that the petitioners
have complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle them to a
grant.  Thus, the dispositive portion of
its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal,
p. 19), reads:

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of Land Registration
issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818, all dated
May 7,
1969 (Record on Appeal, pp.
20-25).

On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, through the Solicitor-General, filed a
petition for review of the decrees of registration
under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of
the lower court, on the grounds that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack
of notice to the Solicitor-General of the subsequent hearings of the petition
for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings; that the parcels of land subject
matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are portions of the
public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for
disposition only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not
have a registerable title to the land subject
matter of the proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to decree
the confirmation of registerable title to respondents
over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not qualify under the
provisions of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, and that under the
circumstances, respondents employed actual fraud in procuring title over the
parcels of land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).

On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to
dismiss the Petition for Review on the grounds that:  (1) The trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of
the action or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review
of a decree of registration.  If the Solicitor-General was not
notified of the subsequent hearings, it was because he delegated his appearance
to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. 
Besides the setting aside or review was filed out of time. 
(2) The petition states no cause of action, the parcels of land involved
in the actions having been already transferred to innocent purchasers for value
long before the Solicitor-General even filed the petition for review (Record on
Appeal, pp. 27-40).

Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance
until the hearing of the merits of the case which was set for August 16, 1970, respondents filed
their answer to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970.  In their answer,
respondents reiterated their grounds in their motion to dismiss (Record on
Appeal, pp. 40-44).

On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended
Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that after having
fraudulently secured title over the parcels of land involved, the petitioners
executed simulated deeds of sale purporting to convey various lots composing
portions of the parcels involved to third parties for fictitious considerations
in an obvious attempt to remove the parcels of land involved from the coverage
of Section 38 of Act 496, but in truth, the aforementioned third parties are not
innocent purchasers for value, being mere dummies of the petitioners, holding
the parcels of land involved only in trust for the petitioners.  On
November 23, 1970,
respondents filed their Answer to the Amended Petition for Review (Record on
Appeal, p. 56).

On August
14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order denying petitioner’s
Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).

On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1971, the questioned
Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch
I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).

On February
25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit, in the Resolution
of a special Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.

Hence this
petition.

Without giving due course to the
Petition, the Court, through its First Division, resolved on May 5,
1975 to require the respondents to comment
thereon.  On May
30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the decision
of respondent Court and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction.  Neither was the discretion
exercised by respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.

In Its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to give due
course to the Petition and denied the urgent motion of respondents for leave to
file a supplemental and/or amended comment.  Petitioner filed its
Brief on November 29, 1975;
respondents, on March 2,
1976.  Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March 25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.

Petitioner assigns the following
errors:

The government’s cause is
meritorious.

I

It is evident from the facts of the case at
bar that private respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was rendered
before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097,
declaring the lot in question as public land.  It must be stressed
that said lot was declared public land by virtue of a court decision which has
become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata.  (Republic v. Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222
[1983]).  It is therefore beyond question that
the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under
R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision therein rendered is null and
void ab initio.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid
Lot No. 622 was released as an agricultural land for disposition under Public
Land Act only on July 6,
1965.  The lower court ordered the issuance
of the corresponding decrees of registration for the lots, pursuant to Sec.
48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942, providing for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
which reads:

As pointed out by petitioner, the question is
whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject of a
judicial confirmation of title under the aforequoted
provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.

The answer is in the
negative.

Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land.  Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded.  They are incapable of
registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the
present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng
Giap v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil.
693 [1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). 
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano v. Government, 41
Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401
[1960]; Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]; Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). 
A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court
to register under the Torrens System (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89
SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].

Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral
proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a
grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private
respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession
and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when
the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No.
267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from
the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land
for disposition under the Public Land Act.  (Record on Appeal, p. 19).  Consequently, under
the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period
of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.

II

Petitioner argues that the government, being a
necessary party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the
Solicitor-General, should have been furnished copies of all court orders,
notices and decisions, as in ordinary cases, in order to bind the
government.  Failure to give such notice deprives the State of its
day in Court, and renders the decision void.  (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).

The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly
notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19
but thereafter, notice of subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision
itself promulgated by the lower court on December 19, 1968 was sent
instead to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, admittedly
the duly authorized representative of the Solicitor-General in the cadastral
proceeding as shown in a telegram dated January 19, 1968. 
(Record on Appeal, p. 47).

In the case of Republic v. Director of
Lands (71 SCRA 426 [1976], the Supreme Court, applying the time-honored
principle of agency ruled that the service of the questioned decision on
the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be service on the Solicitor- General, and
added that technical transgressions relative to the filing and service may be
brushed aside when the adverse party (this time the Director of Lands and
Forestry and their counsel, the Solicitor-General) is aware of the matter which
his adversary would want the court to act upon.  Once it appears
that the party is already informed by one means or another of what he is to be
notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict observance
thereof is considered waived.  (Citing
Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890
[1969]).

In the case at bar, it does not appear that
the Solicitor-General was so apprised of the decision of the lower court in
question as there is no proof that the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy
thereof.  Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal
filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court, the Provincial
Fiscal on March 21,
1969 manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal upon
the intervention of the District Forester.  (Respondent’s Brief, p. 44).

It will be observed however that later
decisions of the Supreme Court tend to be more
strict in the matter of giving notice to the Solicitor-General. 
In a more recent case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
161 [1985], it was established that the Solicitor-General is the only legal
counsel of the government in land registration cases and as such, he alone may
withdraw the Government’s appeal with binding effect on the latter. 
He is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices and
decisions and as held the reglementary thirty-day
period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor-General’s
Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the special
counsel or the fiscal was served with that order.  Thus,
representatives of the Solicitor-General in the case
at bar, had no power to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. 
They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor-General and without
copies of court orders, notices and decisions, having been provided by either
the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to
the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the
government.

III

The petition for review of
Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No.
496 as amended was filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in representation
of the Republic of the
Philippines,
in the same Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, exactly a year
after the issuance of aforesaid decrees of registration, on the ground of actual
fraud.  (Record on Appeal pp.
43-44).

The basic elements for the allowance of the
reopening or review of a decree, are:  (1) that the petitioner has
real or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof through
fraud; (3) that the
petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree and (4) that
the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 
(Libudan v.
Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, et al. v. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513
[1969]).  It has been held however that the action to annul
a judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is
based have not been controverted or resolved in the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.  (Libudan v. Gil,
supra).  Review of the decree demands a
showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual malice. 
(Rublico v.
Orellana (supra).

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private
respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over parcels of land of
the public domain as it is a matter of record that the land in question was
opened for disposition and alienation only on July 6, 1965.  The matter was threshed out
in the lower court and the decision of the latter was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.  Actual malice is therefore absent.

However, it has been held that, if a decree issued
in pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within one
(1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same
is true if entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal
infirmity, such as want of due process, (Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengco,
110 Phil. 118 [1960] or lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the
cadastral case.  (Republic v. De
Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 [1969]).  Thus, on both counts,
the case at bar can properly be the subject of review, it having been shown that
the Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and copy
of the assailed decision but more importantly, the lower court as previously
stated had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic
Act 931 as amended by R.A. No. 2061.

IV.

As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in
question are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that a
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon
his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.  (Leung Yee v. F. L. Strong Machiner Co., et al., 37 Phil.
651 [1918].  Without the needed verification, he cannot
claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in contemplation of
law.

Moreover, it is well-settled that
a certificate of title is void, when it covers property of public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands.  Any title issued
on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser
for value, shall be cancelled.  (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring supplied). 
In the case at bar, it will be noted that in granting titles to the land
in dispute, the lower court counted the period of possession of private
respondents before the same were released as forest lands for disposition, which
release is tantamount to qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while
they were still non-disposable.  Thus, under the foregoing rulings,
even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their
titles to said lands derived from the titles of private respondents which were
not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain, may be
cancelled.

PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and the
decision of the Court of First Instance are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED,
because the lots in question still form part of the public domain. 
The certificates of title issued over them are hereby ordered
CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part as
one of the parties was my former
colleague.

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^[1]PENNED BY JUSTICE ANDRES REYES and
concurred in by Justices Luis B. Reyes, Crisolito Pascual and Godofredo P. Ramos; dissenting Justice Francisco Ma. Chanco.