G.R. No. L-18572. July 31, 1963
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. NATIONAL SURETY CO., INC., BONDSMAN AND APPELLANT. PEDRO IGNACIO, ET AL., ACCUSED, PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SURETY CO.,…
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
were charged with murder before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Both were allowed to put up a bond
for their provisional liberty. With regard to accused
Ignacio a bond of P20,000.00 was put up by the Philippine
International Surety Co., Inc.
When the case was called for hearing on April 8, 1959,
accused Ignacio failed to appear in spite of the notice
given him and his bondsman to appear on said date, and
as a consequence the court a quo issued an order declaring
the bond confiscated and requiring the bondsman to show
cause why judgment should not be rendered against it
on the bond. After the efforts made in locating said
accused so that he may be produced in court, the bondsmen’s efforts were at last rewarded when on January 19,
1960 he was apprehended and surrendered to the court.
In view of such surrender, the bondsman prayed that
its bond be cancelled and the confiscation thereof issued
by the court be lifted. On February 8, 1960, the court
denied the motion for the lifting of the confiscation, but
amended its order by reducing the bondsman’s liability by
50%, that is, P20,000.00 to P10,000.00. Hence this appeal.
When the bondsman was informed of the failure of
accused Ignacio to appear at the hearing called on April
8, 1959 and of the confiscation of the bond put up by
it, the bondsman began to take steps with a view to his
apprehension and surrender. The efforts in this direction
are narrated by its counsel as follows:
“Upon
learning the failure of the accused to appear in court on April 8,
1959, and the confiscation of the bond, appellant at once took positive
steps to produce the accused before the lower court, consisting in the
assignment of men to apprehend Pedro Ignacio. On April 28, 1959
appellant filed a ‘Manifestation and Motion to Stay Order of
Confiscation’, which the lower court denied in its order of April 11,
1959. On May 6, 1959, appellant filed a ‘Motion for Extension of Time’
which was granted by the presiding Judge on May 15, 1959 giving the
appellant thirty (30) days from May 15, 1959 within which to produce
the accused before the court. An Additional Motion for Extension of
Time filed on June 11, 1959 was denied by the lower court on August 13,
1959 and a judgment was rendered against the bond. On October 1, 1959,
the lower court issued an order reconsidering a previous order
declaring Pedro Ignacio as having waived his right to be present during
the trial and declared that with respect to the said accused, the case
was considered suspended. On October 3, 1959, a writ of execution was
issued by the lower court against the appellant and filed with the
Sheriff of Manila. Then, on December 5, 1959, the lower court issued
another order denying the motion of the appellant for extension of time
to apprehend the accused and the postponement of the auction sale of
the properties located in the offices of the appellant. The Office of
the Solicitor General, in representation of the Government gave its
conformity to the postponement of the auction sale, to give a chance to
appellant to proceed with its plan to capture the accused because at
that stage the appellant had already incurred considerable expenses and
had obtained reliable information which would culminate in the final
capture of Pedro Ignacio. The appellant intensified effort, sparing no
opportunity, unmindful of the expenses involved, sending all its men to
the provinces. The auction sale was again set on February 11, 1960.
However, on January Id, 1960, after appellant had already spent
thousands of pesos and after its own arresting officers and outsiders
were deputized, the effort of the appellant was rewarded. On said date
appellant surrendered the person of Pedro Ignacio to the Honorable
Judge, Magno S. Gatmaitan, presiding and on the same date, a ‘Motion to
Surrender Accused was filed with the lower court and the Honorable
Judge accepted the surrender by annotating the acceptance on the bottom
right margin of the motion.”
Appellant now contends that taking into account all
the expenses, efforts, and difficulties it had undergone to
locate and produce the accused, the court a quo erred in
not exercising its discretion in completely exonerating it
from its liability under the bond.
Under the rules of this Court, when the appearance
of an accused is required, his surety shall be notified to
produce him before the court on a given date. If the
accused fails to appear as required, the bond is declared
forfeited and the bondsmen are given 30 days within
which to produce the accused and to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against them for the
amount of the bond. Within said period of 30 days the
bondsmen (a) must produce the body of the accused, or
give the reasons for his non-production; and (b) must
explain satisfactorily why the accused did not appear
when first required to do so. If they fail to comply with
these requisites, the court shall render judgment against
them on the bond (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
The court a quo did precisely what our rules require.
It gave appellant sufficient time to show cause why it
failed to produce the accused when his presence was
required, or why judgment should not be rendered against
it for the amount of the bond. This appellant failed to
do, and was only able to surrender the accused on January
19, 1960, or almost 9 months after the failure of the
accused to appear at the hearing. There is, therefore,
no plausible reason for relieving appellant from its liability notwithstanding the efforts it made to locate and
surrender the accused.
We find fitting the following comment of this Court.
It is a well-settled doctrine that a surety is the jailer
of the accused. He takes charge of, and absolutely
becomes responsible for the latter’s custody, and under
such circumstance, it is incumbent upon him, or rather,
it is his inevitable obligation, not merely a right, to keep
the accused at all times under his surveillance inasmuch
as the authority emanating from his character as surety
is no more or less than the Government’s authority to
hold the said accused under preventive imprisonment.’
(People vs. Tuising, 61 Phil. 404.)” (People vs. Rizal
Surety and Insurance Company, 94 Phil., 31, November
27, 1953; See also People vs. Luzon Surety Company,
Inc., G.R. L-14457, June 30, 1961.)
The most that can be said considering the efforts made
by appellant in locating and producing the accused is
that it is entitled to a mitigation of its liability following
the policy enunciated by this Court in People vs. Puyal,
94 Phil., 415. But this discretion has already been exercised by the court a quo when on this matter it said: “all
that the Court can give unto the bonding company is
reduction of liability for the reason that after all it is
only fortunate enough to bring the accused to the Court
before the execution could be carried out. Under the
circumstances, the Court believes that reducing its liability to 50% would be good enough.”
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellant.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.