EVELYN CHUA-QUA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, AND TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., RESPONDENTS.

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it
not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein
petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered
by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational
institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner
had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this
dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was
enrolled. Since it was the policy of
the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was
imparted such instructions in school by petitioner.^[1] In
the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got
married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G.
Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo.^[2]
Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua, being sixteen (16)
years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs.
Concepcion Ong.^[3]
Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a
church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10,
1976.^[4]

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the
sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application
for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following
ground: “For abusive and unethical
conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued
employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral
values, of the school.” ^[5]

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12,
1976.^[6]
Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution,
required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits^[7] were submitted by private respondent to
bolster its contention that petitioner, “defying all standards of decency,
recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI
boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous
relation.”^[8] More specifically, private respondent raised
issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom
after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked
and the other slightly open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre,
Jr., without conducting any formal hearing, rendered an “Award” in
NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to
terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that –

“The affidavits x x x although self-serving but were never
disputed by the respondent pointed out that before the marriage of respondent
to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with
petitioner, an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture
the circumstances under which such amorous relationship was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the
classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that
immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a sane
and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during
these times. x x x.”^[9]

Petitioner, however, denied having
received any copy of the affidavits referred to.^[10]

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission claiming denial of due process for not having been
furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor
arbiter. She further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive
and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher
to enter into lawful wedlock with her student.^[11]

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission
unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered petitioner’s
reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:

“Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and
Qua sitting on the student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chiu
are of the same tenor. No statements
whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or
scandalous acts.

x x x

“Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to
accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral
or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with
lights on and with the door open.

x x x

“Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance
application was precipitated by immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the
position of appellant. Aside from such
gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein appellant, no
evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the sequence of events from the
beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to
the date of the filing of the
present application for clearance in search of evidence that could have proved
detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our
attention. x x x.”^[12]

The case was elevated
by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6)
months salary as financial assistance.^[13]

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the
Office of the President of the Philippines.^[14]
After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision
reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full
back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her
actual reinstatement.^[15]

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case
with alternating reversals, one would think that this decision of public
respondent wrote finis to petitioner’s calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6,
1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration^[16]
of herein private respondent and
despite opposition thereto,^[17] reconsidered and modified the aforesaid
decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High
School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom
teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary.^[18]

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent
reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in this
Court in the present case:

“That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues
involved in the case, but went further to view the matter from the standpoint
of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children
whose interest must be held paramount in the school community, and on this
basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment and action of the
school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose actuations
and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors
that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was considered
by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school teacher
should at all times act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond
reproach and above suspicion;”^[19]

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the
following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public
respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or
termination of petitioner’s employment, despite Tay Tung’s claim to the
contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore,
illegal.

2.  Petitioner’s right to due process under the
Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of Laddy Maselliones,
Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in
evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the
petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.

3.  No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that
petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by
her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283
(now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her
employment. ^[20]

We first dispose of petitioner’s claim that her right to due
process was violated. We do not
agree. There is no denial of due
process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are
resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is
recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront and
cross-examine the affiants, but she did not do so, obviously because she was
convinced that the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in
the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community
toward the teachers and to strengthen the educational system, private
respondent submits that petitioner’s actuations as a teacher constitute serious
misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed
upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises
substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus,
petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not
abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated
the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a
“school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her
position to court a pupil or student.”^[21]

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground
to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in
love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with
him. She argued that she was dismissed
because of her marriage with Bobby Qua. This contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission thus:

“x
x x One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed
only after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant’s marriage to
Bobby Qua. Certainly, such belated
application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of
petitioner-appellee. The alleged
immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged
undignified conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why was the
present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged
demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive?”^[22]

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the
considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges
on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the
antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her
student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances
of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the
light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before
us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier
of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are
constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public respondent,
and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari
if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. The findings of fact must
be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound
thereby.^[23]

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion. As vividly and forcefully
observed by him in his original decision:

“Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of
Labor (actually the records referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes
‘A’ to ‘D’ of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the
arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and
unworthy of credit, leaving many questions unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during
off-school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of
the classrooms of the school. But the
records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school
was the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of
specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that, the
alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December,
1975, but the disciplinary action imposed by appellee was sought only in
February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in August,
1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by
appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. x x x The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over
one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even
much earlier, is open to question. The
basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more
inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed
motives known only to itself.”^[24]

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter
conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were
committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a
patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that “it is however enough for a
sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those
times.”^[25]
In reversing his decision, the National
Labor Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or
conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such
claim,^[26] a finding which herein public respondent
himself shared.

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could
adopt the volte–face in the questioned resolution, which we
hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing, however, is that the reversal of his original
decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs
which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise:

“x x x While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and
Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the classroom, it seems obvious and this
Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude
of the classroom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which
confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place
during those times of the day. x x
x.”^[27]

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the
imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of
Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took
advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in
their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that
the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and
universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their
marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of
contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school
in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify
the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with
and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by
the Constitution to labor. In
termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a
finding that the dismissal is unjustified.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we
declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between
petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we
believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any
prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED
and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay
Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages
equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and
separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, 189.

^[2]
Ibid., 84.

^[3]
Ibid., 14; Annex A, Petition.

^[4]
Ibid., id.,: Annex B, id.

^[5]
Ibid., id.; Annex C, id.

^[6]
Ibid., 43. Annex I, id.

^[7]
Annexes N-1 to N-4, Petition.

^[8]
Rollo, 15; Annex F, Petition.

^[9]
Rollo, 60-61.

^[10]
Ibid., 74.

^[11]
Ibid., 73-75.

^[12]
Ibid., 85-87.

^[13]
Ibid., 111-114.

^[14]
Ibid., 115-122.

^[15]
Ibid., 137.

^[16]
Ibid., 138-142.

^[17]
Ibid., 143-144.

^[18]
Ibid., 146.

^[19]
Ibid., 180-181.

^[20]
Ibid., 22.

^[21]
Ibid., 127.

^[22]
Ibid., 87.

^[23]
Llobrera vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 162 SCRA 788
(1988).

^[24]
Rollo, 135-136.

^[25]
Ibid., 60-61.

^[26]
Ibid., 86.

^[27]
Ibid., 148.