SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN AND RACQUEL BOCASAS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. AND MARCELO OLIGAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA AND EUFRAC…

Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendants
Pangasinan Transportation Co. (PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan to pay the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. D-1468 (L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No.1470 (L-28015) the sum of P3,500.00.

The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were
filed by the spouses Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses
Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin, respectively, for damages allegedly
suffered by them in connection with the death of their respective daugh­ters,
Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to the al­leged negligence of the
defendants and/or breach of con­tract of carriage.  In their complaints, plaintiffs-aver­red,
among others, that in the morning of April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned
daughters were among the passengers in the bus driven by defendant Marcelo
Oligan and owned and operated by defendant PANTRANCO on an excursion trip from
Dagupan City to Baguio City and back, that the bus was open on one side and
enclosed on the other, in gross violation of the rules of the Public Service
Commission; that defendant PANTRANCO acted with negligence, fraud and bad faith
in pretending to have previously secured a special permit for the trip when in
truth it had not done so; that upon reaching an uphill point at Camp 8, Kennon
Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip, defendant driver, through utter lack of
foresight, experience and driving knowledge, caused the bus to stall and stop
for a few moments; that through the said defendant’s fault and mishandling, the
motor ceased to function, causing the bus to slide back unchecked; that when
the said de­fendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus toward the
mountainside, Leonila and Estrella, together with seve­ral other passengers,
were thrown out of the bus through its open side unto the road, suffering
serious injuries as a result of which Leonila and Estrella died at the hospital
on the same day; and that in connection with the incident, defendant driver had
been charged with and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight physical
injuries on account of the death of Leonila and Estrella and of the injuries
suffered by four others, although it may be said, by way of parenthesis, that
this case is now pending appeal in a higher court.  The plaintiffs prayed for awards of moral,
actual and exemplary damages in the total sum of P40,000.00 in Civil Case No.
D-1468, and in the total sum of P25,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1470 as well as
attorney’s fees in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00 respectively.

Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints
alleging, among others, that at the time of the accident, defendant driver was
driving the bus at the slow speed of about 10 kilometers per hour; that while
the said defendant was steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing a
sound coming from under the rear end of the bus, Leonila and Estrella
recklessly, and in disobedience to his shouted warnings and advice, jumped out
of the bus causing their heads to hit the road or pavement; that the bus was
then being driven with ex­traordinary care, prudence and diligence; that
defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of
its employees, particularly of defendant driver; and that the decision con­victing
the said defendant was not yet final, the same having been appealed to the
Court of Appeals where it was still pending.

By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried
jointly.  On October 17, 1966, the court a
quo rendered its decision therein in which it made the following
findings:  that upon reaching the fatal
spot at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking of metal below the floor of the
bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped, rolling back a few moments later;
that as a result, some of the passengers jumped out of the bus, while others
stepped down; that defendant driver ma­neuvered the bus safely to and against
the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the
safety of the many passengers still inside the bus; that while defendant driver
was steering the bus towards the mountainside, he advised the passengers not to
jump, but to remain seated; that Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of
the bus, but that they panicked and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of the
motor resulted from the breakage of the cross-joint; that there was no
negligence on the part of either of the defend­ants; that only the day before,
the said cross-joint was duly inspected and found to be in order; and that
defendant PANTRANCO had exercised the requisite care in the selection and
supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver.  The court concluded that “the accident
was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some extra-ordinary
circumstances independent of the will of the Pantanco or its employees.”

One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and
conclusion of the trial court, the defend­ants, instead of the plaintiffs,
should come to this Court on appeal.  The
answer lies in the dispositive portion of the decision, to wit:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
renders judgment:  (a) Absolv­ing the
defendants from any liability on account of negligence on their part and
therefore dismissing the complaints in these two cases; (b) However, as stated
above, the Court hereby orders the defendant Pantranco to pay to the plaintiffs
spouses Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 the
amount of P6,500.00; and the amount of P3,500.00 to the spouses Pedro Garcia
and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470, not in payment of liability
because of any negligence on the part of the defendants but as an expression of
sympathy and goodwill.” (Understanding supplied).

As to what impelled the court below to
include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its decision, can be gathered
from the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which reads:

“However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of
P8500.00 in the instant cases without any admission of fault or negligence had
been made by the defendant Pantranco and that actually in Civil Case No. D-1469
for the death of Pacita Descalso, the other deceased passenger of the bus in
question, the heirs of the deceased received P3,000.00 in addi­tion to hospital
and medical bills and the coffin of the d ceased for the dismissal of the said
case without Pantranco accepting liability. 
There was as a matter of fact during the pre-trial of these two cases a
continuing offer of settlement on the part of the defendant Pantranco without
accepting any liability for such damages, and the Court un­derstood that the
Pantranco would be willing still to pay said amounts even if these cases were
to be tried on the merits.  It is
well-known that the defendant Pantranco is zealous in the preservation of its
public relations.  In the spirit
therefore of the offer of the defendant Pantranco aforesaid, to assuage the
feelings of the herein plaintiffs an award of P6,500.00 for the spouses Marcelo
Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No.D-1468 whose daughter Leonila
was, when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the Far Eas­tern
University, and P3,500.00 for the spou­ses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin
in Civil Case No. D-1470 whose daughter Estre­lla was in the fourth year High
at the Dagu­pan Colleges when she died, is hereby made in their favor.  This award is in addition to what Pantranco
might have spent to help the parents of both deceased after the acci­dent.”

Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be
absolutely free from fault or negligence, and having in fact dismissed the
complaints against them, the court should not have ordered them to assume any
pecuniary liability.  There would be
merit in this argument but for the fact that defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was
guilty of breach of contracts of carriage. 
It will be noted that in each of the two complaints it is averred that
two buses, including the one in which the two deceased girls were riding, were
hired to transport the excursionists-passengers from Dagupan City to Baguio
City, and return, and that the said two passen­gers did not reach their
destination safely.

As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound
to carry its passengers “safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the ut­most diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.” (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did
defendant-appellant PANTRANCO measure up to the degree of care and foresight required
of it under the circumstances?  We think
not.  The court below found that the
cross-joint of the bus in which the de­ceased were riding broke, which caused
the malfunction­ing of the motor, which in turn resulted in panic among some of
the passengers.  This is a finding of
fact which this Court may not disturb. 
We are of the opinion, how­ever, that the lower court’s conclusion drawn
from that fact, i.e., that “the accident was cause by a fortui­tous event
or an act of God brought about by some extra­ordinary circumstances independent
of the will of the Pantranco or its employees,” is in large measure
conjectural and speculative and was arrived at without due regard to all the
circumstances, as required by Article 1755. 
In Lasam vs. Smith (5 Phil., 660), this Court held that an accident
caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito.  The rationale of the carrier’s liability is
the fact that “the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the
carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the
carrier.” (Neces­sito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil., 75.)

When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the
common carrier’s is at fault or that it acted negligently (Article 1756).  This presumption is only re­butted by proof
on t e carrier’s part that it observed the “extraordinary diligence”
required in Article 1733 and the “utmost diligence of very cautious
persons” required in Article 1755 (Article 1756).  In the instant case it appears that the court
below considered the presumption re­butted on the strength of
defendants-appellants’ evidence that only the day before the incident, the
cross-joint in question was duly inspected and found to be in order.  It does not appear, however, that the carrier
gave due re­gard for all the circumstances in connection with the said
inspection.  The bus in which the
deceased were riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be
traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads.  Thus the en­tire bus, including its
mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under
ordinary cir­cumstances.  The mere fact
that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order would not
exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular circum­stances
under which the bus would travel were also considered.

In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the
complaints.  The awards made by the court
should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of con­tracts of
carriage.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is modified as indicated above, and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO
is ordered to pay to plaintiffs-appellees the amounts stated in the judgment
appealed from, as damages for breach of contracts, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaints.  Costs against defend t-appellant PANTRANCO.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., on official leave.