G.R. No. L-37324. October 26, 1977

ELADIO CONTRATISTA, PETITIONER, VS. ARTEX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 26, 1977 FIRST DIVISION CASTRO, C.J.:
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CASTRO, C.J.:


This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
resolution dated May 28, 1973 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission en
banc
which set aside the decision dated February 14, 1973 of one of its
members affirming the decision dated January 2, 1970 of the Acting Referee of
the Regional Office No. 8 of the Department of Labor in Cebu
City, which decision awarded death and related benefits to Eladio
Contratista in the total amount of P12,196.80.

On July 17, 1968 Eladio Contratista (hereinafter referred to as the claimant) filed
with the Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in Manila a, notice
and claim for compensation against the Artex
Development Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ARTEX) for the death of his
son Alexander who worked as a doffer at the textile mill of- ARTEX with a daily
wage of p6.40.  On August 13, 1968 the Acting Chief Referee of the
Regional Office No. 4 notified ARTEX of the claim and requested it to submit
its employer’s report within ten days from receipt of the said notice: On September 13, 1968, ARTEX filed its report
wherein it admitted knowledge of Alexander’s death.  Subsequently, the claimant requested the
trans­fer of the case to the Regional Office No. 8 of the Department of Labor
in Cebu City.

It appears that at about four o’clock in the afternoon of July 10,
1968, Alexander, with Cristobal Contratista
(a co-employee), repaired to the store-boarding house managed by Anastacia Albino (mother of the personnel manager of ARTEX)
inside the ARTEX compound at Barrio Panghulo, Malabon, Rizal.  Inside the store-boarding house, Gervacio Antojado, one of Anastacia’s helpers, stabbed Alexander.  Shortly thereafter, members of the Malabon Police Department, called by Anastacia,
arrived and arrested Alexander.  Three of
them brought Alexander to the municipal hall, but before reaching the said hall
he died.

The Acting Referee, in a
decision dated
January 2, 1970, declared the death of Alexander compensable
under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, as amended, and
awarded death and related benefits.  On
motion for reconsideration tiled by ARTEX on the ground that the findings
therein contradicted the evidence
presented by the claimant, including the NBI certificate on the post-mortem
examination of Alexander, the Acting Referee, in an order dated
February
24, 1970
, set aside
the said decision and reopened the case for reception of ARTEX’s
evidence.  On the date set for the
reception of its evidence, ARTEX omitted to do so.  Consequently, the Acting Referee, in a
resolution dated
September 2, 1970, set aside the order dated February
24, 1970
, revived
the decision dated
January 2, 1970, and denied ARTEX’s
motion for reconsideration.

After referral of the decision of the Acting Referee to the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review, Associate Commissioner Eugenio I.  Sagmit, in a decision dated February 14, 1973, affirmed the same.  ARTEX then, in a two-page motion, sought
reconsideration by the Commission en banc of the decision of Commissioner Sagtit.  ARTEX
insisted on the non-compensability of Alexander’s death, attaching to its
motion a photostatic copy of the report of the Malabon Police Department dated July 13, 1968 regarding he circumstances
resulting in Alexander’s death.

Subsequently, the
Commission en banc,
[1] in a resolution dated May 28,
1973
, set asise the decision
dated
February 14, 1973 of Commissioner Sagmit and absolved ARTEX
from liability.

Hence, the present recourse.

1.  At the outset,
ARTEX points out that the claimant failed to file any notice of appeal with the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission as required by section 1 of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.  ARTEX contends that the
failure of the claimant to comply with this requirement rendered the decision
sought to be reviewed final and executory.  This, then, according to ARTEX, precludes
this Court from taking cognizance of the case at bar.

This contention is without merit. 
In Vargas vs. Philippine American Embroideries Inc.,[2] this
Court, resolving the same
jurisdictional problem, ruled that

“there is a difference in phraseology between …section [1] of Rule 44 of the former Rules of
Court and section 1 of Rule 43 of the present Rules, and this difference is by
no means an inconsequential one.  For
while the former explicitly required a notice of appeal for the perfection
of the appeal, the latter does not say so. 
Indeed, that a new perspective regarding the filing of the notice of
appeal has been intro­duced is reflected in section 2 of Rule 43 of the present
Rules which, while requiring the fact of the date of the filing on time of the
petition for review to be stated on its face, does not demand that the same
statement be made with respect to the fact of filing of the notice of
appeal.  The point clearly suggested then
is that the filing of the notice of appeal is no longer compulsory.  Indeed, were the filing of the notice of
appeal an indispensable act, then the present Rules would have simply said so
in the same manner that they do with regard to the petition for review.”

2.  The claimant
points out that ARTEX failed to controvert his right to compensation within the
period fixed by section 45[3] of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended.  He alleges that although ARTEX
knew of Alexander’s death, it filed the prescribed form of controversion
notice (the employer’s report) only on September 13, 1968, sixty-five (65) days
after it acquired knowledge of the decedent’s death, and after the Acting Chief
Referee of the Regional Office No. 4 had notified it of his claim and required
it to submit the said report.

The failure of ARTEX to
seasonably controvert the right of the claimant to compensation was brushed
aside by the Commission en banc as “an issue of secondary
importance.” The
Commission completely overlooked the
significant consequence of such omission on the part of ARTEX.  Indeed, section 45 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, explicit in its terms, states that failure of the
employer to comply with the controversion
requirement, in the form prescribed and within the period provided, “shall
constitute a renunciation of his right to controvert the claim.”
[4] Guilty
of delay in controverting the right of the claimant
to compensation, ARTEX
must be
deemed to have waived its right to question the compensability of the death of
Alexander as well as the validity or reasonableness of the claimant’s aforestated right.
[5] To put it succinctly, ARTEX waived its right
to interpose any defense, including that of non-compensability of the death of
Alexander, and to prove anything in relation thereto.
[6]

True it is that the Acting Chief Referee of the Regional.  Office No. 4 required ARTEX to submit its
employer’s report, the Acting Referee of the Regional Office No. 8 heard the
case on the merits and scheduled a hearing purposely for reception of ARTEX’s evidence, and the Commission en banc admitted in
evidence the photostatic copy of the report of the Malabon Police Department ARTEX submitted to it as an annex
to its motion for reconsideration of the decision of Commis­sioner Sagmit.  All these,
however, did not serve to effect reinstatement of ARTEX’s
right of controversion.

For the employer to regain the right of contro­version,
section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and section 3 of Rule
8, Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,[7] require
the employer to file a petition under oath specifying therein the reasons for
the failure to controvert the claimant’s right to compensation.  And on the basis of the reasons advanced by
the employer, the
may Commission
may reinstate his right of controversion.
[8]

In the case at bar, however, ARTEX made no move for the reinstatement of its lost right of controversion.  Both
the Acting Referee of the Regional Office No. 4, in his decision dated
January
2, 1970
, and
Commissioner Sagmit, in
Ills decision dated February 14, 1973, noted ARTEX’s failure
to controvert on time the claimant’s right
to compensation.  Commissioner Sagmit even stressed ARTEX’s
failure to seek reinstatement of its lost right of controversion.  Amply apprised of the necessity on its part
to seek reinstatement of its
lost right of controversion
in the manner prescribed by section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, and section 3 of Rule 8 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, ARTEX nevertheless failed to do so.

3.  The claimant
assails as erroneous the admission in evidence by the Commission en banc
of the photostatic copy of the report of the Malabon Police Department submitted in the compensation
proceedings for the first time by ARTEX as an annex to its motion when it
sought reconsideration by the Commission en banc of the decision
of Commissioner Sagmit.  The claimant points out ARTEX never formally offered the copy of the
police report in evidence during the hearing of the case on its merits nor
during the hearing scheduled, after the reopening of the case by the Acting
Referee of the Regional Office No. 8 at the instance of the said ARTEX,
specifically for reception of its evidence. 
These omissions notwithstanding, the claimant avers, the
Commission en banc considered the copy of the police report and predicated its
factual findings solely on the basis thereof.

In its questioned resolution, the Commission en banc
categorically names Alexander as the “assailant” and Anastacia and Gervacio as the
“victims” in the stabbing incident inside the ARTEX compound.  It states that three members of the Malabon Police Department “arrested” Alexander,
then under custody of the ARTEX security guard, and brought him to the police
headquarters.  It relates that along M.H.
del Pilar street, on the
way to the police headquarters, Alexander “assaulted the policemen and it
was at this time that after several attempts to stop him from further assault
/failed7, Alexander Contratista was fired upon by
Patrolman Bautista causing him to fall and die on the spot.” The
Commission en banc then concludes that “when Alexander Contratista died, he was not in the course of his
employment nor can his death be attributed to a factor or cause incidental to
his employment or an off-shoot of the same.”

The Workmen’s Compensation
Commission enjoys ample discretion in the conduct of compensation pro­ceedings.  For, section 1 of Rule 10 of its Rules
[9] frees
it, in the hearing, investigation, and deter
mination of any question or
controversy in compensa­tion cases, from the narrow constraints provided by
technicalities, legal forms, and technical rules of evidence.[10] However, such discretion of the
Commis­sion in its procedural operations in no way includes the license to
capriciously disregard substantial, nay essential, evidentiary rules designed
to insure an irreducible minimum of fair play. 
Among these rules is that which dictates that all parties must be fully
apprised of the evidence submitted for consi­deration and must be afforded opportunity to object
to the evidence adduced or to proffer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.  In the case at bar, the Commission en banc
admitted and thereafter considered the photostatic
copy of the report of the Malabon Police Department
(submitted to it by ARTEX as an
annex to its motion for reconsideration of the deci­sion of Commissioner Sagmit) without according the claimant any opportunity at
all to object to it or to present evidence in explanation or rebuttal.  Conse­quently, the submitted copy of the
police report should not have been considered at all by the Commis­sion en banc.[11]

Other circumstances
emasculate the probative value of the report of the Malabon
Police Department.

The Acting Referee
rendered his decision in favor of
the
claimant on January
2, 1970
. Subse­quently,
on motion for reconsideration filed by ARTEX, the Acting Referee, in an order
dated
February 24, 1970, set aside his decision and reopened the
case for reception of ARTEX’s evidence.  ARTEX failed to submit its evidence on the
date scheduled for the purpose.  Consequently,
the Acting Referee, in a resolution da
ted September
2, 1970
, revived his
decision in favor of the claimant.

Commissioner Sagmit rendered his decision affirming that of the Acting
Referee on
February 14, 1973. 
ARTEX sought reconsideration by the Commission en banc of Commissioner Sagmit’s decision
on March 9, 1973.  To
its motion for reconsideration ARTEX attached a photostatic
copy of the police report involved herein.

Significantly, ARTEX
presented the copy of the police report as evidence only after the lapse of
more than three (3) years
after the Acting Referee had rendered his
decision, and after Commissioner Sagmit had rendered
his.  It seems rather strange that ARTEX,
despite the opportunity afforded it when the Acting Referee reopened the case
and despite the long intervening period from January 2, 1970 (when the Acting
Referee rendered his decision) to February 14, 1973 (when Commissioner Sagmit rendered his deci­sion) failed or omitted to
seasonably submit in evidence the copy of the police report.  True it is that the members of the Malabon Police Department who executed or prepared the
police report could still be called to identify it, authenticate it, and
testify
on the circumstances
attendant to its execution or prepara­tion as well as on the contents thereof,
but could such testimony, particularly with reference to the contents of the
said report, be at all reliable, considering that no factor more strongly tends
to obscure memory than the lapse of time?

Moreover, ARTEX offers no
explanation whatsoever for its delay in presenting the copy of the police
report.  It merely attached a photostatic copy of the said report to its motion for
reconsideration of Commissioner Sagmit’s
decision.  Could it not then be that
ARTEX presented the copy of the report as a mere afterthought, expectant that
the same might sway the Commission en band in its favor?

More, the verity of the
factual recitals in the police report is open to serious doubt.  The report pinpoints Alexander as the
“assailant” not only of Gervacio Antojado but also of the three members of the Malabon Police Department who were taking him to the police
headquarters. Alexander’s assault on the policemen, according to the report,
prompted the
said policemen to shoot him.  Under the circumstances, would an unarmed and
wounded man risk his life by
challenging the combined armed might of three policemen?  And, even assuming that Alexander
“assaulted” the three policemen, could it be said that in shooting
him they employed reasonable means to repel Alexander’s
“assault”?  The policemen could
have easily overwhelmed Alexander
without resort to unjustified violence.

The facts that a member
of the Malabon Police Department conducted the
inquiry into the circums­tances attendant to Alexander’s death and that he
likewise prepared the police report strongly suggest a disposition, in the
reporting, in favor of his colleagues in the service.  For, as aptly observed by Commissioner Sagmit ?

“Nothing is more natural than for the police investigators,
under a mis­guided esprit de corps, to shield their own co-policemen
from a report that would indict them for the crime of homicide, if not
cold-blooded murder of a ‘suspect’ who was
a plain nobody and a
transient in
Malabon.  Under
the circumstances, it was not difficult for the ‘killer’ policemen to concoct a
story to justify their felony considering that /Alexander
7 was alone and unarmed against three armed
policemen of the so-called Malabon’s finest x x x.”

All these considerations
subject to grave doubt, to an immeasurable extent, the veracity of the account
in the police report regarding the circumstances surrounding Alexander’s
death.  Indeed, if the report reflected
with fidelity and accuracy the incident involving Alexander and the three
policemen, there could have been no reason then for ARTEX to have delayed
presenting in evidence the said report.

4.  The claimant takes
exception to the finding of the Commission en banc that
“when Alexander Contratista died, he
was not in the course of his employment nor
can his death be attributed to a factor or cause incidental to his employment
or an off-shoot of the same.”

Of course, the Commission
en banc here refers to the death of Alexander as the result of
his alleged assault on the policemen who were taking him to the police
headquarters.  And this death occurred on
the way to the said headquarters, not in or about the premises of ARTEX.

Suffice it to reiterate
that the Commission en banc predicated its factual findings solely
on the
basis of the copy of the police report.  And, as heretofore discussed, the copy of the
report
carries no probative value, considering all the highly suspicious
and dubious circumstances attendant to its preparation and submission, which
circumstances in effect negate the veracity of the factual recitals therein.

There only remains, then, on record, the evidence presented at
the hearing before the Acting Referee. 
The totality of this evidence establishes that at about four o’clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1968, Alexander, with a
co-employee, repaired to the store-boarding house managed by Anastacia inside the ARTEX compound.  Inside the store-boarding house, one of Anastacia’s helpers stabbed Alexander. Anastacia
sought help from the Malabon Police Department.  When the three policemen arrived, they took
Alexander, instead of Anastacia’s helper who stabbed
him, into custody and brought him to the municipal hall.  Before reaching the said hall, Alexander
died.

That Alexander wanted to
take refreshments to satisfy his thirst or to relieve his hunger may be
reasonably inferred from the fact that he repaired
to the store-boarding
house inside the ARTEX compound during walking hours.  True it is that the act of taking
refreshments constitutes more a personal act rather than an act of
service.  This notwithstanding, an act and other acts of an employee
necessary to his life and comfort while at work as well as conducive to the
proper conduct of his work constitute acts related to his employment.  And any injury and the ensuing death
occurring while in the performance of such acts can be justifiably
characterized as compen­sable for having arisen out of and in the course of the
employment.

In the case at bar, it matters none that Alexander’s death
occurred on the way to the municipal hall or outside his place of employment.
For, Alexander’s death resulted from a compensable injury he suffered within
his place of employment while he was engaged in an act related thereto.  And even conceding as true that Alexander’s
death resulted from the fatal wound he sustained when the policemen taking him
to the police headquarters shot him because he allegedly assaulted them, still
his death bears intimate connection with the original injury.  For, without the original injury — the stabbing
— which started the chain of
causation, Alexander’s death at the hands of the policemen would not have
resulted.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution dated May 28,
1973
of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission en banc is hereby set aside, and the
respondent Artex Development Co., Inc. is hereby
ordered:

1. To pay the claimant Eladio Contratista the amount of P1,996.80 as death benefits and
the amount of P200 as burial expenses, or the total amount of TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED NINETY SIX PESOS AND EIGHTY CENTAVOS (P2,196.80) in lump sum;

2. To pay the counsel for the claimant the sum of P219.68
(equivalent to ten percent of the adjudged amount) as attorney’s fees; and

3. To pay the Workmen’s, Compensation Fund the amount of TWENTY
PESOS (P20) in the concept of administrative fees.

Costs against the Artex Development Co., Inc.

The Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to fur­nish a copy of this decision as
well as a copy of the Malabon
police report adverted above o the Secre­tary of Justice for
such action
on as he may deem warranted in the
premises.

Makasiar, Martin, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs and files a separate opinion.

Muñoz Palma, J., concur on the basis of the principle of non-controversion.


[1]
Commissioner Sagmit filed his dissenting opinion.

[2] L-23762, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 680.

[3] Section 45, in part, reads: “In case the
employer decides to controvert the right to compensation, he shall, either, on
or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after he has knowledge
of the alleged accident, file a notice with the Commissioner, on a form
prescribed by him, that compensation is not being paid, giving the name of the
claimant, name of the employer, date of the accident and the reason why
compensation is not being paid. Failure on the part of the employer or the
insurance carrier to comply with this requirement-shall constitute a
denunciation of his right to controvert the claim unless he submits reasonable
grounds for the failure to make the necessary report, on the basis of which
grounds the ‘Commissioner may reinstate his right to controvert the
claim.”

[4] Caltex (Philippines)
Inc. vs. Villanueva, L-15658, August 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 995; Insular Lumber Company vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-25756,
January 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 105.

[5] Tan Lim Te vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commis­sion, 104 Phil. 522; Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-22096, Sep­tember 29,
1967, 21 SCRA 366; National Development Company vs. Galamgam,
L-29634, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 495; Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-30428, February 7, 1973, 49 SCRA 365.

[6]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-19377,
January 30, 1974, 10 SCRA 41; La Mallorca vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-29315, November 28, 969, 30 SCRA 613;
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, L-22439, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 132; General Textiles
Inc. vs. Taay, L-29348, November 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 375; Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, L-30428, February 7, 1973, 49 SCRA 365.

[7]
Section 3 of Rule 8 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission reads:

“An employer or carrier who
has failed to controvert the right to compensation within the period and in the
manner stated in the preceding sections may file with the Unit before the award
is rendered or before such award
has become final, a petition under oath specifying therein the reasons for his
failure to controvert the right to compensation and the grounds relied upon, in
which case the Unit may, upon reasonable grounds, reinstate the employer’s
right to controvert. Upon the re­instatement of the employer’s right to
controvert, he shall be required to file, within five (5) days from notice, the
required employer’s report, if he has not done so.”

[8]
Agustin vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-19957, September 29, 1964, 12 SCRA 55; Magalona
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-21849, December 11, 1967, 21
SCRA 1199; Seven-Up Bottling Company of the Philippines vs. Tero, L-31995, February 12, 1973, 49 SCRA 378.

[9]
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
reads:

“The hearing, investigation
and deter­mination of any question or controversy in workmen’s compensation
cases shall be with­out regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical
rules on evidence. Substantial evidence, whenever necessary, shall be
sufficient to support a decision, order or award.”

[10]
A.D. Santos vs. Dabocol, L-19051, November 23, 1966, 18 SCRA 744; Layag vs. Republic of the Philippines,
L-23640, May 22, 1968, 23
SCRA 646.

[11] Magalona vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra.
Vide Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Pepito, L-21335,
December 17, 1966, 18
SCRA 1028.


105
Clean
Clean

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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

I concur.  Aside from the
respondent-employer’s failure to seasonably controvert the claim and the
consequent waiver of all jurisdictional defenses, it seems clear that the chain
of tragic events resulting in the death of petitioner’s son, Alexander Contratista, arose out of and in the course of Alexander’s
employ­ment during working hours and has therefore been properly held to be
compensable.

What is most disturbing in this case,
however, are the highly questionable acts of the three policemen from the Malabon Police Department. 
They had been summoned to the store-boarding house where the deceased
employee Alexander Contratista had been stabbed by a
store helper Gervacio Antojado,
and yet instead of taking custody of Gervacio Antojado, they arrested the stabbing victim Alexander and
were taking him to police headquarters in­stead of to the hospital.  Worse, according to the police report itself,
on the way to the police headquarters Alexander allegedly “assaulted the
policemen and it was at this time that after several attempts to stop him from
further assault [failed], Alexander Con­tratista was
fired upon by Patrolman Bautista, causing him to fall and die on the spot”
(at page 7, main opinion).  Certainly,
under these circumstances the shooting to death of Alexander to stop his
alleged assaults could hardly be deemed justifiable.

Thus, the Chief Justice plainly states in his main opinion that
“the verity of the factual recitals in the police report is open to
serious doubt” (at page 9) and cites Commissioner Sagmit’s
rejection of the police report as a “concoction” to
“shield” the three policemen from “the crime of homicide, if not
cold-blooded murder of a ‘suspect’ who was a plain nobody and transient in Malabon” and “to justify their felony considering
that [Alexander] was alone and unarmed against three armed policemen of the
so-called Malabon’s finest x x
x.” (at page 10).

The uncalled for acts on the part of the three peace officers
who, having arrested and taken into their custody the very stabbing victim and
named him in their report as the “assailant” and the stabber as the
“victim”, killed him on the spot in the course of taking him to
police headquarters instead of to the hospital are therefore properly referred
to the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution as facts
may warrant.