G.R. No. L-24981. January 30, 1970
MARTIN V. DELGRA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO I. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE, DAVAO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question the herein petition for certiorari presents
is whether or not, upon the facts hereinafter recited, respondent judge
committed a grave, abuse of discretion in issuing his order of September 13,
1965 declaring petitioner (an assistant provincial fiscal of Davao) in contempt of court and committing him to prison “for 24 hours until
such further order or notice from this Court ordering
his release.”
The setting is the courtroom of Branch II of the Court of First
Instance of Davao.
The date is September 13, 1965. Being tried is Criminal Case 8666, entitled
“People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Florencio Suarez, et al., Accused”, for attempted
robbery with physical injuries. On the
witness chair is one Pascuala Kudera,
an offended party in the case. She is being cross-examined by defense
counsel Amado Ceniza. The transcript records the incident that day
as follows:
“CROSS EXAMINATION BY ATTY. CENIZA:
May it please the Court.
Q You stated that Angeline
Patigue and Florencio
Suarez frequented your house, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is the reason why you know them
very well?
A Yes, sir.
Q So that as alleged by you that during that
incident in question they were wearing masks and you would be able to recognize
them with or without masks?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact during that evening when they
were there and they greeted you and that they wanted to buy cigarettes from you
they even told you their names when they were still outside your house, is that
correct ?
A They were not the ones who voluntarily gave
their names but I called their names and they said ‘NANG’.
FISCAL
DELGRA:
The interpretation your Honor is not exactly correct, what the witness
said is that – they were not the ones who volunÂtarily gave their names but I
called ‘ANGEL’ and they answered ‘NANG’.
ATTY.
CENIZA:
Q Do you mean to say that you called the names
of the two (2) accused?
FISCAL
DELGRA:
There is a need for the correction of the interpretation because while the
Interpreter said as a supposed translation that – ‘I called their names’ but
she only said – ‘ANGEL?’ she called the name ‘ANGEL?‘ ….
(discusÂsion and arguments ..,..)
COURT:
Witness may answer the question.
FISCAL
DELGRA:
The witness may answer the question but may we say something, your Honor.
COURT:
There is already a ruling of the Court…. (further
discussion and arguments)
FISCAL;
Yes, your Honor, but can we …. (further manifestations ….)
COURT:
Get ready, Bailiff, I have to do someÂthing…. there is already a
decision objection overruled, witness may answer.
FISCAL
DELGRA:
Yes, but I have the right to . . .
COURT:
Witness may answer, there is already a ruling
FISCAL
DELGRA:
It is not on the ruling but on the clarification of the interpretation.
COURT:
But you have the right to respect the ruing of the Court so that we can
proceed with the trial.
FISCAL
DELGRA:
That is why in accordance with the rules (still talking ….)
COURT:
Enough the witness may answer the question.
FISCAL:
May we ask for a reconsideration of the ruling of the Court, your Honor,
on the….
COURT:
Not granted.
FISCAL:
We have not yet stated what our grounds are for asking a reconsideration ….
COURT:
Bailiff –
Make of record that Fiscal Delgra is defying the
authority of the Court, – that the Court made already a ruling and Fiscal Delgra is still defying.
FISCAL:
May we state that there is no defiance, that we are just asking for a reconsideraÂtion, that we are stating our grounds.
COURT:
You bring him out, to jail. (At
this stage the Bailiff brings out Fiscal Delgra from
the courtroom).”
Fiscal Delgra, however, was not brought
directly to jail by the bailiff as ordered by the court. Upon the request of the Fiscal, they first
went to the Fiscal’s office. There, the bailiff was prevailed upon by Fiscal
Delgra and other fiscals not to execute the order of
the judge pending a request which they would make to the judge to reconsider
his stand.
On the same day, September 13, 1965, when the judge learned of
the bailiff’s failure to carry out his instructions, he immediately wrote out
an order finding Fiscal Delgra guilty of direct
contempt, directing “the Chief of Police of Davao
City or any of his policemen to arrest the said Fiscal Martin Delgra and to
commit him to the Municipal Jail for 24 hours until such further
order or notice from this Court ordering
his release“,[1] and commanding the “bailiff assigned to
the Sala II to serve a copy of this order to the Chief of Police immediately upon
receipt of the same.”
Petitioner seasonably came to this Court on certiorari
with preliminary injunction. We issued a
cease-and-desist order on September 20, 1965 upon a P1,000-bond.
1. It is unfortunate
that the transcript does not fully reflect all the utterances made by both
fiscal and judge during the incident. Our
task is not made any easier by the battle of
affidavits presenting hopelessly conflicting versions.
We thus prefer to view
this case in the light of the transÂcript of stenographic notes. It may be incomplete. But its integrity is not assailed by the parties.
The root of the controversy between fiscal and judge sprang from
an alleged misinterpretation into English from the Cebuano
dialect of the witness’ statement. The
official translation was “I called their names”. Fiscal Delgra’s
objection to the translation and his having called the attention of the court
to the fact that the witness said “I called Angel[2]
and they answered ‘NANG’“, should have deserved
the court’s attention. The unforÂtunate
incident could have been obviated had respondent judge listened with care to
the fiscal’s observation following defense counsel’s
next question premised on the allegedly wrong translation of the witness’
answer, thus: “Do you mean to say that you called the names of the two (2)
accused?” Which drew from the fiscal the statement that “[t]here is a
need for the correction of the interpretation because while the Interpreter
said as a supÂposed translation that – called their names’ but she only said
-‘ANGEL?’ she called the :name ‘ANGEL?’ …. (discussion
and arguments ….).”
The remarks of the prosecuting attorney should not have escaped
notice of the judge. That was the second
time that this alleged mistake in translation was drawn to his attention. The judge could have ruled on the objection
to that translation instead of directing the witness to answer the succeeding
question propounded by the defense counsel.
It bears repeating to say that had the judge ruled on that objection
immediately, had he not been too quick in cutting the fiscal short, the incident
now in question would not have transpired.
We are informed that the
judge comes from Zambales. Assertion is made and it is not disputed that
the judge then did not have a working knowledge of the Cebuano
dialect, in which the witness was testifying.
Prudence suggested that he first inquire from his own interpreter about
the correctness of the translation. If
he was still not satisfied, he could have sought the aid of other people
present who spoke the Cebuano dialect. As it was, the judge thought that allowing
the witness to answer the succeeding question would clarify the matter. But what escaped him was that, with the
question so suggestively framed: “Do you mean to say that you called the
names of the two (2) accused?“, the witness could
alter her answer.
Be that as it may, the fiscal pressed his bid for the correction. The fiscal while bowing to the court’s
authority to rule on the problem of whether the particular question should be
answered, sought permission to speak in this wise: “may we say something, your Honor”. This drew the court’s warning that:
“There is already a ruling of the Court.” The picture that we have
from here on is quite hazy. The words spoken by both fiscal and judge have not
been completely transcribed. What is
indubitably clear, however, is that the judge refused to allow the fiscal to
speak fully. And as the fiscal tried to
explain starting with “Yes, your Honor, but can we ….” the judge
exhibited undisguised impatience with the ominous statement: “Get ready,
Bailiff, I have to do something …. there is already
a decision objection overruled, witness may answer.” At one point, the
fiscal merely sought clarification of the interpretation, followed by a desire
to reason out, but the judge stopped him with “Enough, the witness may
answer the question.” Then the fiscal moved for reconsideration. But the judge summarily disallowed him to
state his grounds therefor. There is thus reason for belief that the
fiscal could have felt that his right to state his position was being throttled
by the judge’s seemingly arbitrary attitude.
As to whether the fiscal defied the court in a threatening
attitude, credible evidence – the language in the transcript of the proceedings
– points to the contrary. What is truly
significant is that the situation would not have reached grave proportions if
the judge only listened carefully to the pleas of the fiscal and patiently
allowed the fiscal to make his manifestation – to set the record aright –
which, unfortunately, the judge did not.
2. The controlling provision here is Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, which punishes direct contempt, thus: “A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
court or judge, x x x may
be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior
court, or a judge thereof, or by fine not exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.”
It has been said that “[c]ontempt
of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence, a defiance of the court.”[3]
From the transcript, we read no statement of the fiscal that rises to the level
of contumacy. Nothing he said
constitutes an affront to the dignity of the court. Of course, the transcript has not preserved
the exact words uttered during the incident, but the judge has not pointed out
to us any word or phrase uttered by the
fiscal which may amount to contempt. The judge could do no better than say in his order here under review that the fiscal acted with
“provoking gesture(s)” and exhibited a “threatening attitude”.
Before us, the judge submits that the fiscal was defiant with his
“offensive expresÂsions” and “aggressive gestures”. But these are at best generalÂities and conclusions of law. True, the proceedings bogged down in the sense that the judge wanted the
witness to continue testifying but the witness could not because the fiscal
insisted in that a ruling on the
translation of the testimony be made. But this was the fiscal’s
right.
Such was not an undue imposition upon the court. The inaccuracy
he tried to point out to the judge appears to be material and substantial. The fiscal underscored the need for immediate
correction. He strongly felt that if
uncorrected, the next question would be on a false premise; worse, it could be
misleading. We perceive it to have been
a better attitude had the judge squarely met and decided favorably or adversely
the fiscal’s objection to the translation.
Defiance by the fiscal of the judge’s
authority would seem unlikely, if viewed
from the fiscal’s personal record. Prior to his appointment as assistant
fiscal, he had been in active law practice for eight years. He had already served as
such fiscal in the sala of Judge Vicente Cusi
for seven years. Standing unrebutted on record is the fiscal’s
claim that during such periods
of time, he had never been called down for conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Holding fast to the principles that contempt proceedings are
criminal in nature;[4]
that “the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative,
not vindictive principle”;[5] that “a judge should always bear in
mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not
for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise”;[6] and that such “power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
to unless necessary in the interest of justice”,[7] we find that the fiscal did not so misbehave
as to obstruct or interrupt court proceedings.
He should not have been ordered incarcerated. In so directing, respondent judge abused his
discretion such as to call for the exercise of the supervisory powers of this
Court. Certiorari lies.
3. This is an appropriate occasion as any to define once again the
role of a judge in relation to those who appear before him. Canon 1 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics informs us that “[t]he assumption of the office
of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in respect to his personal conduct
which concern his relation to”, amongst others, “the practitioners of
law in his court”. Judges should be
temperate and patient,[8]
courteous to counsel.[9]
They should avoid interrupting advocates in their arguments, and shy away from
a controversial tone in addressing them.[10]
In conversations between judge and counsel, the judge should be studious to
avoid controversies.[11]
Well it is to recall that: “Patience and gravity of hearing is an
essential part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned
cymbal. It is no grace to a judge x x x to show quickness of conceit
in cutting off x x x
counsel too short.”[12]
We have said and we repeat that “[w]e prefer to think that restraint still
is a trait desirable in those who dispense justice.”[13]
Upon the view we take
of this case, the petition
for certiorari is hereby granted, and the order of respondent judge of September
13, 1965 adjudging
petitioner in direct contempt is hereby declared null and void; and the
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Emphasis supplied.
[2]
Angel, according to respondent judge, was one of the defendants, in
the case then being tried.
[3]
Matutina vs. Buslon,
L-14637, August 24, 1960.
[4]
Benedicto vs. Canada
(1967), 21 SCRA 1066, 1070, citing cases,
[5]
Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel
(1967), 20 SCRA 1241, 1247, citing Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 90, VillaÂvicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 798; In re Quirino,
76 Phil. 630, 636; People vs. Rivera, 91 Phil. 354, 358. See also: Austria
vs. Masaquel (1967), 20 SCRA 1247, 1260.
[6]
Austria vs. Masaquel, supra,
at p. 1260.
[7]
Id., p. 1261, citing Victorino vs.
Espiritu, L-17735, July 30, 1962.
[8]
Canon 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
[9]
Canon 10, id.
[10]
Canon 14, id.
[11]
Canon 14, id.
[12]
Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., pp. 214-215, citing Bacon in his Essay “Of Judicature”,
[13]
Ysasi vs. Fernandez (1968), 26 SCRA 393, 409, cited
in Luque vs. Kayanan,
L-26826, August 29, 1969.