🎧 Case Brief Lecture

ARISH TAN ESPALDON, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., MARIA ROUELLA BONIFACIO AND/OR A.P. MOLLER A/S, RESP…

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Espaldon versus National Labor Relations Commission

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Arish Tan Espaldon, a seafarer, against the National Labor Relations Commission and Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Incorporated, together with its officers and its foreign principal. Espaldon asks the Supreme Court to annul the Commission's decision and resolution, which reduced his award from total permanent disability benefits to a mere Grade 11 disability grading. The case matters because it is the Court's clean statement of two working rules in seafarers' claims: how the 120-day and 240-day periods are reckoned, and what happens when a seafarer seeks a second medical opinion but ignores the contractual procedure for resolving the conflict.

Procedural History

Espaldon filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for total permanent disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, giving credence to the findings of his private physician, Doctor Escutin, and awarding sixty thousand dollars in disability benefits plus ten percent attorney's fees. The employer appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which partially granted the appeal. The Commission reversed the award of total permanent disability but affirmed that Espaldon suffered a disability, ordering payment of seven thousand four hundred sixty-five dollars, equivalent to a Grade 11 disability. Espaldon's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the case was submitted for decision after the parties filed their memoranda.

Facts

Espaldon was hired as an Able Seaman for a six-month contract and, after passing the pre-employment medical examination, was deployed in July 2012. In December 2012, while pulling a marine rope to secure a fender, he suddenly felt severe pain in his lower back and right hip. He was given first aid and light work. Upon reaching Singapore, he was diagnosed with a prolapsed intervertebral disc and declared not fit to work or travel, and he was repatriated.

Upon his return, the company referred him to its designated physicians. He underwent examination, medication, and twenty-two physical therapy sessions, and in April 2013 the company-designated physician gave him an interim disability grading of Grade 11. The company physicians had recommended spinal surgery, which Espaldon refused.

Before that grading, in May 2013, Espaldon had already filed his complaint. Only in August 2013, more than three months after filing suit, did he consult a private orthopedic surgeon, Doctor Escutin, who diagnosed a herniated nucleus pulposus with nerve radiculopathy and declared him permanently disabled and unfit to work as a seaman.

Issues

  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in setting aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and denying the claim for total permanent disability benefits.
  • Whether or not the company-designated physicians failed to make a timely assessment within the 120-day period required by law.
  • Whether or not the findings of the seafarer's private physician may prevail over those of the company-designated physicians despite non-compliance with the contractual procedure for a second opinion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 20, paragraph A, subparagraph 3 of the 2010 POEA Memorandum Circular, the standard terms governing the employment of seafarers, provides:

SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits. — A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness. The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: 3. For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

This is the provision that supplies the three-day reporting rule and the third-doctor mechanism whose breach proved fatal to Espaldon's claim.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the petition. The Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion; it correctly weighed the evidence and found that the company had complied with its obligations.

On the second issue, the Court held that the 120-day period is reckoned from the time the seafarer receives treatment from the company-designated physician, not from the date of injury. Treatment began in January 2013 and the assessment came in April 2013, a total of one hundred four days, well within the period. Even reckoned from the injury, only one hundred twelve days had lapsed. The Court also noted that the employer may extend the period to a maximum of 240 days for the accuracy of the assessment.

On the third issue, the Court held that while a seafarer may seek a second opinion, the conflict must be resolved through the agreed procedure, and non-compliance renders the company physician's findings final and binding. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor's certification is the final determination that must prevail.

The Court found that Espaldon filed his complaint first and consulted Doctor Escutin only afterward, making the second opinion a mere afterthought. It also gave greater evidentiary weight to the company physicians, who had monitored him through therapy and an MRI, over Doctor Escutin, who examined him only once. Finally, the Court noted that Espaldon himself declined the recommended surgery, which hampered his recovery.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the 120-day period for the company-designated physician's assessment is counted from the commencement of treatment, not from the date of injury, and may be extended to 240 days for accuracy. Second, the seafarer has the right to a second opinion, but if the physicians disagree, the parties must jointly agree on a third doctor whose decision is final and binding; failure to follow this procedure makes the company physician's assessment final. Third, greater evidentiary weight is given to the physician who closely monitored and treated the seafarer over one who examined him only once. Fourth, a seafarer cannot be compelled to undergo surgery, but he cannot hold the employer liable for total permanent disability where his own refusal of treatment hampered his recovery.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission were affirmed, leaving Espaldon entitled only to a Grade 11 disability benefit.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the right to a second opinion is real, but it must be pursued through the third-doctor procedure, or the company physician's findings become final and binding. Examiners use this case to test the reckoning of the 120-day period and the consequences of skipping the contractual arbitration mechanism.