FILEMON PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Originally, a complaint for slight physical injuries against the petitioner
Filemon Perez was filed in the
Municipal
Court of
Cebu
City and the accused, having been
found guilty, was thereby sentenced to ten days of arresto menor. The case was
appealed to the Court of First Instance of that province, which court,
considering the aggravating circumstance of treachery to be attendant to the
crime, had raised the penalty to twenty one days of arresto menor plus
indemnification in the sum of P25.00 for actual or compensatory damages, and
P500 for moral and exemplary damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, plus costs. Upon further
appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the Court of First Instance
decision in all aspects except for the moral and exemplary damages which it
reduced to P100.

Finally, the accused, still unsatisfied, has brought his case here by a
petition for certiorari to review the latter decision.

As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence adduced by the parties
show—

For the prosecution, “That at about 5:30 in the morning of January 15,
1949, complainant Isidro Macasero went to appellant’s house to get his two
mirrors which were deposited therein for safekeeping. He knocked at the door and
when appellant opened it he greeted said appellant saying, ‘Good Horning, Manoy
Imon.’ In answer to his greetings, appellant immediately struck him at the left
eyebrow with a wooden rod. When he turned his back and ran towards his house,
appellant ran after him and struck him again at the back of the head. Upon being
overtaken, appellant, with the help of his carpenter Luis, held him and tried to
drag him back to said appellant’s house but they were unable to do so because he
held fast to the trunk of a fallen acacia tree. He was brought to the Southern
Islands Hospital where he was treated five times and examined by Dr. Espina. He
was found to be suffering from lacerated wounds about one half inch long at the
left supra orbital and occipital regions; multiple contusions at the cheek, left
shoulder, right and left lumbar region, at the back and left forearm; and
abrasions at the left forearm and left leg. As a result Of said injuries his
face became swollen, his body ached, his head suffered pains, and he was unable
to earn his livelihood as a barber of from P5 to P6 a day for one month.
Thereafter, he resorted to home treatment as he was embarrassed to be seen
around with a swollen face.”

For the defense, “that about 4:30 in the morning of January 15, 1949, complainant went to appellant’s house
to get his two mirrors. He forcibly opened the door by pushing- and kicking- it.
Upon seeing appellant’s wife downstairs complainant rushed at her and tried to
choke her. She shouted to appellant who was sleeping’ He woke up, rushed
downstairs, and shouted at complainant asking the latter what he was doing to
her. As complainant would not release her, appellant hit him with a rod at the
back about the waist. It was only after appellant hit him again at the back of
the head that complainant released her, whereupon said complainant faced and
boxed appellant. It was then when said appellant hit complainant at the foot of
the stairs. Thereupon, appellant caught and held complainant. Appellant told his
wife to look for a policeman. Appellant then filed a complaint for trespass to
dwelling against complainant but it was dismissed by the fiscal apparently for
lack of merit.”

The main issue that has been raised in the trial court as well as in the
appeals court is one of credibility of the testimony of the opposing witnesses,
which was settled by both courts in favor of the prosecution.

In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the Court of Appeals
took into account the personal circumstances of the parties as well as their
relationship to each other the complainant being a barber, a younger cousin of
the wife of the accused and also the encargado of the latter’s properties in
Cebu during the Japanese occupation. It has also been
noted from the evidence that the accused, on the other hand, is intelligent,
a-law graduate, a former secretary of ex-Senator Rodriguez, senate clerk and
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; that at the time of the incident he was
chief of the treasury agents of the Department of Finance; that he seemed to
have amassed considerable real estate properties; and that complainant looked
upon him with respect.

Indeed, this Court, after going over the record, finds it difficult to
believe the version of the accused. It is incredible that a person in
complainant’s position would forcibly gain entrance into the house of one whom
he looks up to with respect and commit the acts imputed to him, unless he had
been so seriously aggrieved. The evidence fails to show any such grievance that
could have driven complainant to go beyond his bounds as a former employee and
younger relative of the accused’s wife. And if there truly was an assault upon
the latter’s wife, as he claims, it is quite strange why the said accused, who
is supposed to know his law, did not file a criminal complaint for assault
against the complainant.

Another reason for Us to disbelieve the version of the accused is his silence
and indifference over the alleged actuations of the complainant that he had
failed to account for some money entrusted to him and that also on certain
occasions he went to the extent of knocking and kicking the door of the house of
the accused, uttering bad words and hurling challenges at the latter’s wife to
the extent of threatening her with bodily harm. The failure of the accused to
charge the complainant for these alleged acts militate against the veracity of
his story.

We, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals in its conclusion of fact
“that appellant who has just fallen asleep and was awakened and annoyed by the
constant knocking at the door at an early hour of the morning for such trivial
matter as the mirrors and his patience having been exhausted what with similar
incidents between his wife and complainant on previous occasions dealing with
the same mirrors he lost control of himself and with a wooden rod struck
complainant without much ado upon seeing him when he opened the door. And not
contented, he ran after complainant and again struck him at the back of the
head.

However, We disagree with the conclusion that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. Although the attack was
sudden and unexpected, the fact that the accused had just been aroused from his
sleep when he attacked the victim shows that he did not plan nor make any
preparation to hurt the latter in such a manner as to insure the commission of
the crime or to make it impossible or hard for him (the victim) to defend
himself or retaliate. (See People vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926.) It has been held
that mere suddenness of an attack is not enough to constitute treachery when the
mode adopted does not positively tend to prove that the assailant thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of his defense. (People v.
Delgado, et al., 77 Phil. 11) In the complaint seems to have been at the spur of
the moment when the said accused was awakened by the complainant’s constant
knocking: at the door of his house at a very early hour.

With respect to the damages awarded, Article 2219(1) of the Civil Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in “a criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries”. On the other hand, Article 2230 of the same Code states that
“In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
x x x.” Considering, as oar findings show, that where there was no treachery nor
any other aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the accused
should not be made to pay for both moral and exemplary damages, but only for
moral damages, aside, of course, from the actual damages involved.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense
that the penalty is reduced to eleven (11) days of arresto menor and that
the accused shall pay P50 as moral damages. In all other respects, the decision
is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon J.P. and Zaldivar JJ., concur.