EUGENIO NADURA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Eugenio Nadura was employed as “miner” by the Benguet Consolidated,
Inc.—hereinafter referred to as Benguet—from September 20, 1951 to December 18,
1959, inclusive, or for a period of 8 years, 2 months and 28 days. Due to
occasional attacks of asthma, he was laid off, without separation pay, on
December 18, 1959. At that time his salary was P4.24 per day.

On March 30, 1960, he filed an action in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Baguio to recover from his former employer, separation pay equivalent to
one-half month for every year of service, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1787, or the total sum of P440.96 based on an average of 26
working days a month, at P4.24 per day, attorney’s fees in the sum of P300.00,
moral damages in the sum of P3,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of
P3,000.00, and the costs of suit. The action was premised on the claim that
under Republic Act No. 1787, illness is not one of the causes justifying
dismissal without separation pay.

The answer filed by Benguet averred that asthma is an illness analogous to
the causes for which an employee, without a definite period of employment, may
be dismissed without severance pay under Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 1787, and
that, should plaintiff be adjudged entitled to the same, the computation should
commence from the date of the effectivity of said Act on June 21, 1957.

When the case was called for trial the parties waived their right to present
evidence and submitted it for judgment on the pleadings. Thereafter the lower
court rendered judgment (a) sentencing Benguet to pay Nadura the sum of P440.96
(four months separation pay at P4.24 per day for 26 days a month) with legal
interest thereon from March 30, 1960 until fully paid and costs, but (b) denying
Nadura’s claim for damages and attorney’s fees.

Both parties appealed, Nadura from the denial of his claim for attorney’s
fees and exemplary damages, and Benguet from the portion of the decision on
holding it liable for severance pay.

Benguet claims that the lower court erred in holding that Nadura was entitled
to severance pay because his illness was not just cause for terminating
his employment. Pursuant to Section 1, Republic Act No. 1787, an employee,
without a definite period of employment, in a commercial, industrial or
agricultural enterprise, may be dismissed by the employer at any time for
just cause, and the same section enumerates the just causes for which an
employer may terminate such employment, as follows:

“a. The closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or enterprise,
unless the closing is for the purpose of defeating the intention of this
law;

“b. Serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employee of the orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

“c. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

“d. Fraud or wilful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or representative;

“e. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family, ur representative; and

“f. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing.”

Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall squarely
within the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1 (a) to
(e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1 (f) and says
that Nadura’s illness—occasional attacks of asthma—is a cause analogous to
them.

Even a cursory reading of the legal provisions under consideration is
sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial court said, “illness cannot be
included as an analogous cause by any stretch of the imagination”.

It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in subparagraph 1
(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the
voluntary and/or wilful act of the employee. How Nadura’s illness could be
considered as “analogous” to any one of them is beyond our understanding, there
being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his own
voluntary act.

Besides, even elementary rules of fairness and good conscience militate
against Benguet’s contention. Here is the case of a man who had served the
corporation for more than eight years, with apparent efficiency and loyalty.
Because during the last of these years of service he became asthmatic, his
employer seizes avidly upon this circumstance to dismiss him without even giving
him one month previous notice or paying him a measly one month salary to help
him carry on—without starving—after his dismissal. We do not think the law on
the matter ever intended to authorize and sanction such lack of charity, such
oppressive behaviour. We, therefore, find Benguet’s contention on this matter,
to be entirely devoid of merit. Nadura’s appeal must also be sustained.

The lower court declined to make an award of damages and attorney’s fees in
favor of Nadura on the ground that Benguet contested the latter’s claim in good
faith.

In connection with attorney’s fees, Article 2208 of the new Civil Code
provides that “while the rule is that, in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s
fees cannot be recovered, they may be awarded, in the discretion of the court,
in actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers”. Undoubtedly the present action falls within the meaning of “actions
for the recovery of wages of * * * laborers etc.”

Moreover, the same legal provision provides that attorney’s fees may be
awarded in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable.
Therefore, whether it is under one or the other case, Nadura is entitled to
recover attorney’s fees because Benguet’s refusal to pay Mm the severance pay he
was entitled to receive forced him to go to court to enforce his right.

Finally, in Philippine Milling Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 100 Phil., 566; we
already held that attorney’s fees may be recovered where the defendant based ife
defense and appeal entirely on a pure technicality, this resulting not only in
taking up the time of the courts but in delaying the grant of appropriate relief
to the plaintiff for more than three years. In the present case Benguet
dismissed Nadura since December 18, 1959 and until now his claim remains
unsatisfied.

We also believe that Nadura is entitled to exemplary or corrective damages
which, as is well known, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good. These damages are required by public policy, because wanton acts
must be suppressed and discouraged. From what we have said heretofore, the
conclusion is inevitable that Benguet had no plausible reason to resist Nadura’s
claim for severance pay. While it had the right to discharge him because his
employment was without a definite period, it was in duty bound to give him
either one month’s notice in advance or pay the corresponding severance pay.
Instead of complying with its obligation in this respect, it resisted Nadura’s
claim and forced him to litigate these many years. We are, therefore, of the
opinion, and so hold, that Benguet must pay exemplary damages.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed in sofar as it awards
Nadura the sum of P440.96 as separation pay, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from March 30, 1960 until fully paid, and the costs of suit; but it is
reversed insofar as it fails to grant attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. In
this connection judgment is hereby rendered sentencing Benguet to pay Nadura the
sum of P300.00 as attorney’s fees and the further sum of P1,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.