TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA AND ANTONIO, ALL SURNAMED PEREZ Y TUASON, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, JUDICIAL GUARDIAN. J. ANTONIO ARANETA TRUSTEE AND APPELLEE, VS. ANT…

This case ccmes by appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch) denying a petition for the modification of its order
of 5 December 1655 on the ground that it had already been affirmed by the
Supreme Court on 16 May 1958 (G. R. No. L-11788).

The said order of the Court of First Instance, resolving certain incidents in
Special Proceedings No. Q-73, according to a compromise made’ by the parties,
had adjudged inter alia—

“3. That the trustee shall file his bill for services rendered by him as such
trustee up to December 31, 1955, and the measure of his fees as agreed upon
between him and Attys. Lichauco and Brady shall be that which this Court adopted
and approved in the other case entitled “Trusteeship of Minors Barretto y
Tuason, et al., Sp. Proc. No. Q-74”; and

4. That Atty. Araneta is allowed to collect by way of attorney’s fees in the
certiorari incident which reached the Supreme Court docketed as G. R. No. L-6182
the sum of Fifteen Thousand (P15.000.00) Pesos.”

The guardian of the minors Perez y Tuason petitioned for the relief from the
effects of the order on 1 June 1956 under Rule 38. He also sought a ruling (1)
reducing the fees of the trustee so as to place them on a par with the rates
allegedly collected by trust companies, at about 5 per cent of the gross income,
and (2) that in view of the fees collected by the trustee as executor in the
Estate of Angela Tuason, the trustee should be declared as having been overpaid,
and that the excess be ordered credited to the trust estate in the amount of
P51,000.00.

The guardian’s petition for relief was denied by the court below on 19
October 1956, and as noted at the start, the denial was upheld by this Court on
appeal (G. R. No. L-11788, 16 May 1950). Thirty-five days after the denial of
the petition for relief by the court of first instance, the appellant-guardian
filed in that court, on 4 November 1956, a motion seeking that paragraphs 3 and
4 (jam quot.) of the original order of 5 December 1955, be modified—

“in the sense that it shall state that from now on the trustee shall not he
entitled to attorney’s fees, and that he may charge only such fees as are now
being’ charged by regular trust Companies.”

The apparently inconsistent remedy thus sought was justified by the guardian
by arguing that the settlor had expressly authorized the trustee to collect only
“honorarios razonables”, which should be on a par with what is usually charged
by trust companies; that being an attorney himself, the trustee should not
collect attorney’s fees in addition to his fees as trustee; and that having been
allegedly overpaid as executor of the estate of the settlor, the averred
overpayment should be charged against his fees as trustee.

This motion of the guardian was left unacted upon by the court, apparently
because the same was but a reiteration of the views expressed by the
appellant-guardian in his petition for relief, denied on 19 October 1956, and
then in process of appeal to the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court had
affirmed the denial of the petition for relief, and after the records had been
returned to the Court of First Instance, the guardian petitioned, on 11
September 1958, that his unacted motion of 23 November 1956 be finally resolved.
After a reply from the trustee, the Court a quo, on 28 October 1958,
issued the following order:

“ORDER

Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr., counsel for the judicial guardian, has called the
attention of the Court that notwithstanding the lapse of considerable time his
motion dated November 23, 1956 has not been resolved. In this connection, the
matters contained in said motion of November 23, 1958 are covered by the order
of this Court dated December 5, 1955 against which a petition for relief was
presented by the said attorney for the judicial guardian, in view of which the
Court considered it unnecessary to resolve said motion pending decision of the
petition for relief.

The petition for relief was denied and it follows, therefore, as a
consequence that the order of this Court of December 5, 1955 stands in full
force and effect.

In view of the foregoing, and under the circumstances above-stated, the said
motion is hereby DENIED.”

Whereupon, the guardian of the minors duly appealed to this Court on points
of law. We find the appeal untenable.

With regard to the fees of the trustee set in the compromise between him and
the appellant-guardian, the same were approved by the court below in its order
of 5 December 1955, and virtually confirmed by this Court in its decision in G.
R. No. L-11788. The court of first instance, therefore, correctly held that said
fees may no longer be disturbed.

If the guardian’s petition for modification of the lower court’s order of 5
December 1955 referred to future fees of the trustee, then the petition was
correctly denied, it being premature. The time to determine the reasonableness
of the future fees of the trustee is when he files a claim for the same. No
argument is required to demonstrate that reasonableness of the fees can not be
decided in advance, since reasonableness depends upon variable circumstances,
such as “(1) the character and powers of the trusteeship; (2) the risk and
responsibility; (3) time; and (4) labor and skill required in the administration
of the trust”, as well as the care and management of the estate (54 Am. Jur.,
410). For this very reason, the court may not set in advance that the trustee’s
fees should not exceed that charged by trust companies, unless equality of
circumstances is proved. Moreover, it is difficult to see how trust companies,
which are fully dedicated to the professional management of trust estates, can
be equated with individuals who are only occasionally charged with
trusteeships.

The second claim of the appellant, that the trustee should not be permitted
to collect attorneys’ fees frcm the trust estate, has also been foreclosed by
the terms of the compromise set forth in the order of 5 December 1955,
repeatedly mentioned, which this Court already affirmed.

The argument that the trustee has been overpaid and should credit the excess
in favor of the trust estate is merely a subtle attempt to undermine the
condusiveness and binding effect of the final order of the court below allowing
said fees. For obvious reasons, any attempt to disturb such order, affirmed as
it has been, by this Court, must be firmly rejected, the parties being bound
thereby, not only as to the points actually adjudicated, but also as to any
claim or issue that could have been raised prior to the adjudication.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
guardian-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur;