PINDAÑGAN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE P. DANS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Amado Santiago, presiding, in Civil Case No. 10394,
entitled “Pindañgan Agricultural Company, plaintiff, versus Jose P. Dans,
etc., et al., defendants.” The decision renders without effect the resolution of
the defendant officials, namely, The District Land Officer, The Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, rejecting Lease
Application No. 109 and Sales Application of July 9, 1949, both of the plaintiff
corporation, and all applications and provisional permits granted to the other
defendants over the land in question; orders the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to give due course to said lease and sales applications of
plaintiff corporation and to execute in favor of the plaintiff corporation
either a document of lease or of sale of said lands; condemns defendants Jose P.
Dans, Placido L. Mapa, and Pedro U. Asensi to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiff the sum of P8,000 as damages, and declares the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein by the judge as permanent.

The record discloses the following facts: The land in question contains an
area of over 491 hectares located at Barrios Pindañgan and San Pedro,
Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan and originally belonged to Cristina Gonzales
who had inherited it from her father Francisco Gonzales. Cristina Gonzales de
Schenkel mortgaged the land to the defunct Agricultural Bank of the Philippine
Islands, and for failure to pay the loan and to redeem the property, the
mortgage was foreclosed on November 22, 1922 and title to the land was
transferred to the Government on November 28, 1923. To get back the land
Cristina Gonzales filed with the Bureau of Lands a lease application, for it,
but the same was rejected because she was no longer a Filipino citizen, having
in the meantime married a Swiss citizen, Ernest Schenkel, Subsequently, she
formed a corporation known as the Cristina Gonzales Inc., which again applied
for the lease of the same property and to which Cristina Gonzales assigned all
her rights tinder the lease application Act No. 3219.

Before the ownership of the land was transferred to the Government, Cristina
Gonzales had tenants working thereon, among them 93 heads of families, and when
she lost ownership, said 93 heads of families wanted to occupy the land for
themselves. So they filed a formal protest against the lease application of
Cristina Gonzales & Co., claiming prior rights of possession thereon and
accusing the corporation to be a dummy of Cristina Gonzales. The protest was not
favorably acted upon and the property was leased to the corporation. So the 93
heads of families appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture, who dismissed their
appeal on December 3, 1926.

Cristina Gonzales & Co. filed Civil Case No. 4644 in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan to enjoin the said 93 heads of families from entering
into and occupying the land. On their part, the 93 heads of families instituted
another action against the corporation (Civil Case No. 4969, entitled “Gregorio
Torres, et al., versus Secretary of Agriculture”), to annul the lease
award in favor of said corporation. The Court of First Instance, acting upon the
latter case, annulled the lease award and declared the plaintiff tenants
entitled to the land as highest bidders. On appeal, the Supreme Court modified
the decision by denying award of the land to the tenants and instead remanded
the case to the land officials for further proceedings, in accordance with said
decision (G. R. No. 32243, 54 Phil., 851).

While G. R. No. 32243 was pending before the Supreme Court, Cristina Gonzales
again filed an application for the repurchase of the land under the provisions
of Act 3514, which authorized the sale of lands obtained by the Agricultural
Bank to their previous owners. The sale was granted inspite of the opposition of
the 93 heads of families. Cristina Gonzales was allowed to pay the land for
P50,840.23, in ten equal installments and the grant was conditioned upon the
outcome of said G. R. No. 32243. Due to her failure to pay the second
installment, the Director of Lands cancelled on August 5, 1932 the deed of
repurchase executed in favor of Cristina Gonzales de Schenkel.

Sometime in 1933, the 93 heads of families formed a company known as the
Pindañgan Agricultural Company, for the purpose of facilitating acquisition of
the land through administrative proceedings.

On November 10, 1933, Cristina Gonzales de Schenkel filed with the Secretary
of Agriculture a motion for reconsideration of the order cancelling both her
deed of repurchase and her second application for repurchase. The Secretary
granted her second application for repurchase, and so the Director of Lands
executed a second deed of repurchase in favor of Cristina Gonzales de Schenkel
for which she paid P5,084.62 as first installment. The Pindañgan Agricultural
Company (hereinafter called the company) protested against the execution of the
second deed of repurchase and also filed its own lease application (No. 109).
The protest was disregarded and the lease application of the Company was
rejected because of the execution of the second deed of repurchase. The tenants
composing the Company were, therefore, ordered to vacate the premises. Thereupon
the Company filed Civil Case No. 7421 with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan against the spouses Cristina Gonzales and Ernest Schenkel and the
land officials, to annul the second deed of repurchase and to declare their
rights to the property. Decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance
annulling and rescinding the sale made in favor of Cristina Gonzales de
Schenkel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, on the ground that
Cristina Gonzales had become a Swiss citizen and because of the ruling in the
Krivenko Case. A motion for reconsideration filed by the Company to have its
preferential right to the land declared by the Court, was denied, on the ground
that such matter is of an administrative character.

On July 9, 1949, the Company filed a sales application for the land as a
supplement and/or alternative to its lease application No. 109. However, on
October 4, 1949, the Director of Lands rejected such sales application, for the
following reasons:

“Investigation conducted in the premises in October, 1948 by representatives
of this Office disclosed that the lands herein referred to are actually occupied
and cultivated by 178 individual, holders of specific portions or area of
varying sizes, each of whom is making a claim in his own rights. Those occupants
and cultivators have been found to be former tenants, or successors-interest of
former tenants, of the original owner, and remained as such occnpan&stenants
when the Pindañgan Agricultural Company, Ine. took over the administration of
the property. The Investigating officers were able to ascertain that these
occupants-tenants have long wished, desired and hoped to perfect individual
claims on the portions actually cultivated by them as soon as it is legally
possible for them to do go. They disclaim any benefit derived from the
activities ofr the Pindañgan Agricultural Company, Inc., and they are not
agreeable to any arrangement whereby the corporation may be enabled to acquire
the property. It was further found that only a few of the actual occupants and
cultivators are members of the corporation, and even these members do not
recognize the corporation’s right to acquire for them their actual holdings. It
appears from the investigator’s findings that the Pindañgan Agricultural
Company, Inc. does not have actual and effective administration of the
property.

“Records further disclose that the provisional permit issued to the Pindañgan
Agricultural Company, Inc. in 1934 and renewed in 1935, by virtue of which the
corporation has been enabled to assume administration of the lands, carried the
following conditions:

‘8. The permit applied for shall be subject to revocation at any time, and
shall be good only during the pendency of the controversy regarding the
conveyance of the land covered by this application, in favor of Cristina
Gonzales under Act No. 3514.

‘9. That the object of this application for a permit, is to utilize the land
applied for while the rightful claimant to the said land remains undetermined
and that the permit automatically express upon decision of the case with respect
to the right of Cristina Gonzales, Inc. to acquire the
property.’

“Obviously, the corporation no longer has any right, power or authority to
occupy, hold or administer the property as a result of the decision of the
Supreme Court in G. R. No. 46798 referred to herein above. Upon this premise,
and considering the opposition of the actual occupants and cultivators to the
disposition of the lands to the corporation, this Office feels that the instant
sales application of the Corporation is not acceptable.

“It is timely to recall here that there are potent reasons of state behind
the policy of breaking up big landed estates and of creating a class of small,
independent farmers whenever and wherever it is possible. The same reasons
support the policy of equitable distribution of public property, and of
preventing corporate entities from having control of excessive area of the
public domain devoted to agriculture. The proposal of the Pindañgan Agricultural
Company, Inc. to acquire ownership of the 491.8964 hectares involved in this
case appears to be inconsistent with these policies, for the lands consist of an
old, productive landholding, and compose a latifundium in a place populated by
earnest, industrious farmers. The counter-proposal of the actual cultivators and
occupants to have direct and individual concession to them of their respective
holding in the premises in accordance with law, is believed just and
reasonable.” (pp. 2-3, Exh. “G”, Exh. “2”)

The order of the Director of Lands was based upon a report (Exh. “1-A”)
submitted by District Land Officer Pedro Yu Asensi dated October 5, 1948. In
said report the District Land Officer found, after an investigation, that only a
few of the occupants are stockholders of the Company and that those who are
members thereof have lost’ confidence in the company and in the men runningthe
same. Consequently, said District Land Officer recommended subdivision of the
land in favor of the actual occupants. The report in its pertinent parts
says:

“From the answers griven by the petitioners to the undersigned’s questions
and from information gathered thru conversation with some of them, the following
facts are deemed to have been established:

“The petitioners numbering a little less than 200 family heads, whose names
appear in a list attached hereto and marked Annex “I” of this report, are
actually occupying the land formerly owned by Dona Cristina Gonzales de Schenkel
located in the barrios of Pindañgan and San Pedro, Alcala, Pangasinan and have
been planting yearly thereon rice, corn and vegetables since they began
occupying the same in 1905. They succeeded, in occupying the land as leases or
tenants when it was still the property of the late Don. Francisco Gonzales,
father of Dona Cristina Gonzales. As tenants, they had been paying to the owner
of the land at P25.00 a hectare of 1st class riceland; P15.00 a hectare of 2nd
class riceland; and; P10.00 a hectare of 3rd class riceland. They continued
occupying the land as tenants of Dona Cristina Gonzales when the same passed
into her hands.

“When the land in question became private property of the National Government
as a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Dona Cristina
Gonzales in favor of the Agricultural Bank, the former tenants of said Dona
Cristina Gonzales continued occupying the land altho in 1923 they stopped paying
rental for the land for, they alleged, they did not know whom to pay. Since;
then they have not been paying rental for the land. But in inspite of this, they
do not claim nor intend to claim said land; altho each of them individually is
desirous of acquiring by purchase the portions they are actually occupying
either from the Government or from (the heirs of) Dona Cristina Gonzales de
Schenkel in the event the property is repurchased by the former owner.

“Only a few of the actual occupants of the land are stockholders of the
Pindañgan Agricultural Company Inc., the great majority of them are not. But the
stockholders do not seem to understand their actual relation with the company
for they said that after they were asked to contribute or pay P10.00 each they
do not know how the money they paid was spent since there was no accounting
made. As a matter of fact, both stockholders and those who are not, do not favor
that the Pindañgan Agricultural Company be given the right to lease it much less
to buy the same from the Government because they claim that they do not get any
benefit from the said company. In other words, the occupants of the land who are
the former tenants of Dona Cristina Gonzales de Schenkel have already lost their
confidence in the company and the men running it and because of this they
declared that they no longer recognize said company and the men managing it as
working for their interests and wellbeing as far as the land in question is
concerned. But contrary to the allegation contained in the last paragraph 2 of
the petition, the occupants of the land have not been paying yearly tribute to
the corporation since 1933.

* * * * * * *

“In view of the foregoing findings, the undersigned is of the opinion and so
recommends that the land in question be subdivided into as many lots as there
are actual occupants (numbering 178 family heads as per Annex “I”) and then sell
each lot to each of them at a price deemed reasonable by the Government, the
terms of payment should be that which is followed by the Bureau of Lands in
disposing by sale of private property of the National Government minus the
auction proceedings. This recommendation is in consonant with the announced
policy of the Government of splitting big tracts of estates into small parcels
and! resale them to the actual bonafide occupants thereof. The undersigned is
also of the opinion that regardless of the outcome of the appeals to the Supreme
Court made by Dona Cristina Gonzales de Schenkel and the Pindañgan Agricultural
Company Inc. in a civil case brought against the former by the latter in the
Court of First Instance in Lingayen in connection with the land in question,
that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru the Bureau of
Lands, has legal rights to dispose of the land during the pendency of the said
appeals, because the issues raised in the appeals do not question the ownership
of the National Government to the land originally owned by Dona Cristina
Gonzales de Schenkel.” (Exhibit “1-A”)

A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed witfe the Director of
Lands by the Company, but this was denied on January 6, 1950, in an order of the
Director of Lands, which in part reads thus:

“The facts about the antecedents of these lands, as stated in the second
paragraph of the order, are correct. They are the basic facts borne out by the
records of the case, both judicial and administrative, in which the lands have
been previously involved. From the records alone of these previous
administrative and judicial cases, it can be readily seen and concluded that the
Company had not come beyond the stage of merely proposing, or applying for, a
lease over these properties, which proposal or application were never approved.
Its Lease Application No. 109 and the provisional permit issued to it have been
rejected in 1936 yet; and if the corresponding orders to vacate, which were
issued with the rejection of said application and permit, have not been enforced
or executed it was because they were suspended by this Office due to the suit
filed in court by the Company which was decided by the Supreme Court only on
April 30, 1949. This Office never agreed, or compromised, to recognize occupancy
rights in favor of the Company during the progress of the litigation in the
courts, so that there can be no valid basis for the Company’s claim now for
preferential right merely because the Company had been enabled to continue
occupying the premises during the pendency of the suit. As a matter of fact,
those records will show that in the judicial cases herein referred to one of the
issues put forth by the Company on which it sought a favorable ruling, was its
claim for preferential right. The Company has formally pleaded this claim and
discussed it in the briefs but the Court of First Instance did not grant the
plea and the Supreme Court denied it.

“Under the circumstances of the case, we see no deprivation of a right on the
part of the Company by the investigation ex parte which was conducted by a
representative of this Office previous to the issuance of the rejection order
now under reconsideration. We believe that the facts found in that
investigation, stated in paragraph five of the order, could have come out, or
could have been established, as findings even if the Company was a party in that
investigation. In such a case as this, there is no extreme necessity for a
formal hearing with notice and confrontation, and this Office is not bound to
rely upon evidence which parties, interested or affected, may want to submit. As
we once had occasion to say: “The Bureau of Lands is an administrative and
regulative agency and is, for that reason, not bound to acquire its information
concerning all matters involved in a proceeding before it entirely from the
evidence of witnesses or other evidence produced before it, but may take into
consideration the results of its general investigations, general information
upon a given subject within its powers, and all matters which affect the matter
and concerning which it must determine the facts.” (In re: S. A. No. 13989
Antonio Mertel, Occidental Negros.)

“The Lands involved here comprise a considerably big area. They are not
public lands but private property of Government, already well-developed and
productive. In their disposition, we should act upon considerations of national
policy. We have stated this in the penultimate paragraph of our order under
reconsideration, and we reiterate it here. We believe that the Company, as a
corporation, has not acquired pre-emption rights, and, upon its application, the
sale of the lands must be at the Government’s option. We exercise that option by
denying the purchase proposed by the Company in line with the policy of breaking
up big landed estates especially in these parts of the country.” (Exhibit
“I”)

An appeal was prosecuted to the Secretary of Agriculture, who dismissed the
same on April 22, 1950. (Exh. “I”) In dismissing the appeal, the Secretary held
that the Company has not acquired pre-emption rights or other preferential
rights to the land, so that its disposition still lies with the Government; that
the investigation conducted ex-parte is in order, there being no necessity for a
formal investigation; and that national policy dictates breaking up of landed
estates in favor of actual occupants.

“It is the policy of the Government to purchase big landed estates, subdivide
the same into small lots, and distribute and sell them to the actual occupants
thereof. In this case, the land in question already belongs to the Government.
Why should it be sold to the appellant and give it a chance to exploit and make
enormous profits to the prejudice of the actual occupants thereof who are
willing, nay clamoring, to purchase their respective holdings from the
Government;

“Moreover, the subdivision of the land in question into small lota for
distribution and sale to the actual occupants thereof who are willing to acquire
the same under the provisions of the law governing the matter is, more or less,
in harmony with the campaign of the Government to establish peace and order and
prevent those landless citizens from following the banner of communism by making
them useful and responsible citizens of the country by providing them with small
lots from which they could derive their sources of livelihood and upon which
they could build their homes for themselves and their
families.

“Furthermore, it appears from the very statement of counsel for
appellant that the latter has subleased portions of the land in question to the
actual occupants thereof and charge “nominal rentals only sufficient to pay the
expenses of the administration and fees of the attorney’s who handled and
prosecuted the cases of the corporation in connection with the said land, among
whom, were Judges Harvey and Vickers”. With that actuation, the application of
the corporation should be rejected beeause it has violated the provision of the
Public Land Law—Section 90, paragraph (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, by
allowing persons other than the applicant to derive benefits from the land
applied for. It is claimed, however, by counsel for the appellant that the
occupants thereof were members of the corporation. If this were true, why did it
collect rentals from them? This only would go to show that there may be some
truth in the allegation of the occupants of the land in question that the
corporation or rather the officers thereof had gained enormous profit at the
expense of said occupants who were members of the corporation without any
accounting since its creation.” (Exhibit “J”)

On August 15, 1950, plaintiff company filed a second amended complaint with
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, former Director Jose P. Dans
of the Bureau of Lands, the District Land Officer Pedro U. Asensi, Emeterio de
los Santos and forty four other occupants of the land subject of the action. The
main allegations of the amended complaint are that plaintiff corporation has
been in the exclusive possession of the land since 1937, paying the
corresponding rentals up to March 3, 1947; that on July 1949, plaintiff filed a
sales application covering the land for the purpose of acquiring the same under
the provisions of Act No. 3038 and Commonwealth Act No. 141; that respondent
Director of Lands, notwithstanding the absence of notice to the plaintiff, heard
the protest against the application and its sales application was rejected by
the Director of Lands without hearing and with grave abuse of discretion and
without due process of law; that said arbitrary and illegal acts of the Bureau
of Lands was due to political considerations; that not long after the rejection
of plaintiff’s sales application, the political followers of the political
chieftains in the province of Pangasinan and the Director of Lands induced
newcomers to intrude into the land; that through the help of and in connivance
with the District Land Officer Asensi and in conspiracy with the Director of
Lands, the defendants nonofficials filed sales applications for certain portions
of the land in question, alleging falsely acquired possession of the said lands
applied for, and that their applications were prepared in the branch office of
the Bureau of Lands in Dagupan City; that through conspiracy with the lands
officials, defendants herein, the said newcomers, obtained provisional and
irrevocable permits to occupy the lands they have applied for, when the land so
applied for and occupied, were already cultivated and were already planted to
palay and other useful plants by plaintiff corporation; that the plaintiff filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Director of Lands, out the same
was denied; that thereupon the plaintiff appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, who was then the defendant Placido Mapa, who
in turn, with grave abuse of discretion, dismissed the appeal herein; that the
plaintiff has a clear and clean right to lease the land, or buy the same, or
both, and that its members have a preferential right to acquire the same in
accordance with law; that the defendants officials have unlawfully failed and
neglected to perform the duties enjoined them by law and had excluded plaintiff
corporation from the enjoyment of its rights; that the defendants officials are
about to give due course to the application and the provisional and revocable
permits of defendants; that the plaintiff is willing and ready to lease the land
or to purchase the same in accordance with law; that it has introduced
improvements therein amounting to P20,000 and has already suffered damages
amounting to P30,000. In its prayer, the plaintiff corporation asks that its
application for lease or sale be given due course; that the defendants be
ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P50,000 as
damages.

Motions to dismiss the said complaint were filed by the defendants, but said
motions were denied. Consequently, defendants filed their answers.

The defendants officials of the lands bureau and department denied the
allegations of arbitrariness, partiality and arbitrariness in their acts,
claiming that their investigations showed that the occupants of the lands
desired to acquire their landholdings for themselves and not for the plaintiff
corporation; that their actuations were not influenced by political
considerations, but in accordance with the avowed policies of the country and in
accordance with law, which policies and legal principles are set forth in their
respective findings and resolutions; and that said findings and results are not
subject to judicial review. The defendants non-officials, in their answer,
denied that they have ever transferred their rights to the lands occupied by
them, especially their rights of preference to acquire said holdings; denied
that plaintiff corporation has been in possession of the land and that they
themselves are in possession; denied that the lease granted by the Secretary of
Agriculture to plaintiff was against their own right or deprived them thereof;
alleged that the plaintiff company was organized that they may have an agent or
representative to protect and defend them in their rights, that they may
ultimately acquire their respective landholdings by purchase. By way of
counterclaim they alleged that by virtue of a preliminary injunction the
Provincial Sheriff had obtained from them 30% of their palay production, valued
at P10,580.00 and that they have suffered damages amounting to P5,000.

The case was scheduled for hearing on March 11, 1957, but upon motion of
Atty. Jose Cusi, principal counsel of record of the Director of Lands, it was
postponed to June 6, 1957. When the case was again called for hearing on June 6,
1957, Atty. Asensi, one of the defendants, asked for continuance for the reason
that said Atty. Cusi has not arrived due to derailment of his train at Malolos.
Sen. Primicias, counsel for the Company, objected to the postponement, and the
lower court suspended the session until 10:00 in the morning of the same
day.

Session was resumed at 10:00 o’clock A.M. and Asst. Prov. Fiscal D. Guillermo
appeared as counsel for the official defendants in collaboration with Atty.
Asensi. Said Fiscal reiterated the defendants’ request for postponement, for the
reason that he is not familiar with the facts of the case, which motion was
denied. At this juncture, Atty. Arturo Malazo appeared in collaboration with
Atty. Cardenas for the defendant non-officials and moved for a reconsideration
of the order of the court denying the motion for postponement by the Fiscal.
Objection to the motion was registered by Sen. Primicias. Fiscal Guillerrao
reiterated his request for continuance until the next day to enable defendants
to be represented by principal counsels. The lower court denied the motion and
ordered plaintiff to present its evidence.

The plaintiff presented only one witness, Atty. Cipriano P. Primicias,
president of the plaintiff company and Senator from Pangasinan. He recounted the
history of the land from the time Cristina Gonzales originally owned it, with 93
heads of families occupying various portions as her tenants, the various suits
that were occasioned by the attempts of Cristina Gonzales to regain possession
of the land, the oppositions thereto filed by the plaintiff company, which
litigations are set forth above as pertinent facts regarding the history of the
proceedings relating to the land. On the irregularities and harassment
perpetuated by the officials against the company, Senator Primicias declared
that plaintiff filed its sales application on July, 1949 but that on October,
1949, even without notice to plaintiff, the Administrative Officer of the Bureau
of Lands ordered their application rejected like a “bolt from the blue”; that
the abuse of the officials consisted in that the officials invited trouble on
the land, convincing some of the original incorporators of plaintiff company,
only three however, to create trouble and succeeded in doing so because they
belonged to the majority party; that the newcomers were asked to sign previously
prepared applications for sale of small lots, so when the Director of Lands made
his decision the said plaintiff company was not in possession; so in 1950, the
complaint had to be amended to include the newcomers; that said newcomers
grabbed the crops, which were valued at P8,000 in 1950.

The defendants officials presented also one witness namely: Pedro U. Asensi,
Division Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, and Division of Land Officer. He
declared that he was directed by the Director of Lands to make an accurate
inspection of the lands subject of litigation, upon the request of Congressman
Benito who was the lawyer or public defender for the non-official defendants;
that the defendants were then in actual possession of the land and for this
reason they were given provisional permit to occupy the lands; that he made a
report to the Director of Lands as a result of the investigation; that
subsequent to his investigation the persons occupying the lands were required to
file revocable permit applications for the portions they actually were
occupying; that these applications were protested by the plaintiff company on
the ground that the company had a previous right. Upon cross-examination he
admitted that the sales application of the company was not given recognition by
the Bureau of Lands for the reason that the Supreme Court in its decision on
April 30, 1949 did not recognize any previous rights or preference on the
company’s part to the land; that even while the case was pending in the Supreme
Court the defendants’ applications had already been approved by the Director of
Lands and said applicants were already in possession at that time of his
inspection.

After trial the judge rendered a decision the substance of which is indicated
in the beginning of this Opinion. From this decision the defendants officials
and non-officials appealed to this court, assigning the following errors:

By the defendants non-officials:

1. The lower court erred in issuing writs of preliminary injunction without
   giving notice to the parties and in disregarding the nature of injunction as an
   equitable relief.

2. The lower court erred in admitting the amended complaint of August 15, 1950
   over the objection of the appellants thereby allowing plaintiff-appellee to
   change or modify its original theory of the case.

3. The lower court committed a grave error and a wanton abuse of its discretion
   when it summarily and arbitrarily denied the several motions filed by the
   appellants-officials and appellants non-officials to postpone the hearing of
   June 6, 1957, in effect depriving defendants of their day in court.

4. The lower court erred in taking cognizance of the action when it had neither
   power, authority nor jurisdiction so to do, the subject-matter of the action
   being exclusively within the province of the Bureau of Lands and the Department
   of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

5. The lower court in finding in its decision of February 28, 1958 that the
   plaintiff-appellee had been in prior actual and material possession and
   occupation of the Government Agriculture land and in disregarding the findings
   of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
   Resources that the appellant non-officials had been in actual and material
   possession and occupation of the land prior to the filing of the instant
   action.

6. The lower court erred in declaring that the District Land Officer at Dagupan
   City, the Director of Lands and tine Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
   Resources had abused their discretion in order to justify its undue interference
   in a purely “administrative” matter.

7. The lower court erred in declaring that the plaintiff-appellee had
   preferential right to the sale or lease of the property, subject of the
   litigation.

8. The lower court erred in failing to declare that a preferential right to
   acquire the property by sale or lease pertained to the appellants
   non-officials.

9. The lower court erred in ordering the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
   Agriculture and Natural Resources to effect a direct sale of the agricultural
   land to the plaintiff-appellee in violation of the previous decisions and
   resolutions of our Honorable Supreme Court and the provisions of the Public Land
   Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141).

10. The lower court erred in ordering the immediate execution of a portion of
    its decision of February 28, 1958 pending appeal.

11. The lower court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
    appellants non-officials dated July 7, 1958 and the motion filed by appellants
    non-officials dated July 10, 1958.

By the defendant officials:

1. The lower court erred in giving credence to the entire testimony of Atty.
   Cipriano Primicias, even to his commentaries and legal conclusions on the matter
   in controversy.

2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant land officials are
   guilty of abuse of discretion in rejecting the plaintiff’s lease application No.
   109 and its sales application of July 9, 1949 because:
   1. Said land officials should have taken the cue from the decision of the
      Supreme Court in G. R. No. 46798 and approved plaintiff’s lease application No.
      109.

   2. That the denial of plaintiff’s sales application of July 9, 1949 was due to
      political pressure exerted on the land officials by the party then in
      power.

   3. That Atty. Primicias, President and General Manager of the plaintiff
      corporation, was then in the minority party and could do nothing against the
      might of his political enemies.

   4. That defendant officials encouraged and abetted defection among the members
      (or stockholders) of the plaintiff corporation.

   5. That defendant officials also encouraged newcomers to enter the land in
      controversy, file sales application for it which were prepared at the office of
      the District Land Officer at Dagupan, and issued illegally revocable and
      provisional permits to such newcomers.

   6. That the newcomer’s application were all dated subsequent to July 9,
      1949.

3. The lower court erred in holding that there is sufficient evidence to show
   that newcomers and opportunists took advantage of the political situation then
   prevailing in order to oust the original 93 heads of families from their
   possession of the land in question.

4. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant officials have been
   remiss in their duty of doing justice to their fellow men and otherwise shown a
   disposition to tolerate and countennance oppressive acts which, to say the
   least, are unworthy and unjustified.

5. The lower court erred in giving direct orders to the defendant officials in
   the dispositive part of the decision.

6. The lower court erred in holding defendant officials personally liable for
   damages, jointly and severally, to the plaintiff in the sum of P8,000 and costs.

The main issue in this appeal is whether or not there is sufficient evidence
in the record to support the trial court’s finding: that the defendants
officials have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, orwith grave abuse of
discretion, in denying both the company’s lease application No. 109 and its
sales application of July 9, 1949. For it is a rule in this jurisdiction that
the decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts,
except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion (Commissioner of Customs vs. Valencia, 100 Phil.,
165; 54 Off. Gaz 3505).

The first reason or ground alleged as a basis of the charge of abuse of
discretion is the fact that the District Land Officer, Pedro U. Asensi,
proceeded upon the land, conferred with the occupants, many of whom were members
of the plaintiff company, asked them their wishes in regard to the lands
occupied, and made investigations generally regarding the origin, nature and
extent of their landholdings all these without notice to the plaintiff company
to give itself or its representative opportunity to be present. But the
investigation made related only to the origin, nature and history of the
landholdings, which matters do not need confrontation or cross-examination. What
could or would have been the findings had the company been allowed to be present
is not disclosed or shown, even at the trial. We might expect that the occupants
would have been prevented, in view of the traditional bashfulness of the tenant
or landworker, to disclose their real desires as to their landholdings,
acknowledging instead, their loyalty to the company which claimed to champion
their rights to their landholdings. The presence of representatives of the
plaintiff would have, therefore, hampered the investigation and the disclosure
of the true facts. There is no law or regulation that requires that
investigations made by land administrative officer be in the presence of all
parties interested. Surely it wiiuld have been better if notice of the
investigation was sent. The investigation, however, was a fact-finding
investigation. It does not appear that it was made by question and answer. The
absence of the plaintiff, therefore, is not fatal to its validity, as the same
was not a trial. In any case, it is not claimed that the results of the
investigation would have been otherwise, had plaintiff or his representatives be
present.

We next come to the claim of plaintiff company to a right to be preferred
either as a lessee or purchaser over the occupants of the lands. It should be
borne in mind that plaintiff company’s application for lease was never given due
course. Precisely the object of the present suit for mandamus is to compel the
lands officials to give due course thereto. As this Court ruled in one of the
last litigations over the land, plaintiff company had no right of preference to
be recognized in the suit, as this matter falls within administrative
discretion; and the mere fact that the company had opposed the attempts of
Cristina Gonzales to get back the land, thus making said land available for
occupation by the public, did not create a right in the company to be preferred
over and above the occupants which it served.

Furthermore the record shows that all that plaintiff company had obtained
from the lands bureau over the land was a temporary permit to occupy it by way
of lease; but this lease was later cancelled as the applications of the
occupants were given recognition and preference, over and above that of the
company.

It should be remembered that the disposition of public lands is lodged
exclusively in the Director of Lands, subject only to the control of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus Commonwealth Act No. 141
provides:

“The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be the executive officer
charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of
Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.” (C. A. No. 141, Sec, 3, The
Public Land Act)

“Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive
control of the survey, classification, lease, sale of any other form of
concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and
his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.” (C. A. No. 141, Sec. 4, The Public Land
Act.)

“The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce with respect to
disposition of public lands, as far as the facts are concerned, being final
under Act No. 2874 Section 3 and Commonwealth Act No. 141 Section 3, and said
Secretary having accepted as a fact that the petition and occupation of certain
land by one R. L. was previous to the petition and application of one L. A., the
Supreme Court could not alter such conclusion (Alejandro vs. Aquino (1940) 70
Phil., 113; Vol. 12, Philippine Annotated Laws)

“As the Bureau of Lands, subject to control of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, is given “direct executive control of … sale or any other form
of concession or disposition and management of the public domain” by Sections 4
and 5’of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the conferred authority must be deemed
exclusive and as leaving no power in the courts, in the guise of official
function, to deprive the Bureau of such control.” (Director of Land vs. Abordo
(1942) 74 Phil., 44; Vol. 12, (Philippine Annotated Laws)

Consequent to the power and discretion granted the Director of Lands as set
forth above, the courts have no power to review, reverse or modify his
decisions, as approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The findings and actuations of the Director of Lands in the case at bar are in
accordance with the facts and circumstances, as well as with the avowed policy
of the Government initiated as early as the American occupation of permitting
occupants or tenants of public agricultural lands to acquire by purchase or by
homestead or free patents their respective landholdings (See Public iJand Act
926 and The Friar Lands Act No. 1120). This same policy has been adopted by the
Republic by the enactment of the law creating the Land Tenure Administration
under which parcels of private agricultural land occupied by tenants may be
purchased by or expropriated at the instance of the Administration for resale at
cost to the actual occupants. (Republic Act No. 1400). The same policy is
followed by the National Land Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
which enables landless tenants and farm workers to own agricultural lands
(Republic Act No. 1160).

In view of the well established policy of the State to enable occupants or
tenants of agricultural lands to acquire small landholdings, there cannot be any
abuse of discretion on the part of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in the case at bar when the old tenants of the
lands in question, the actual occupants, were preferred over the plaintiff
company in , the acquisition of the property. If the purpose of the plaintiff
company was to help the original tenants and occupants to secure their
landholdings, there certainly can be no objection to the disposition to said
tenants or occupants of their respective holdings in the land in question, in
preference to the plaintiff company.

The trial court found that politics was behind the denial of the company’s
two applications. We can take judicial notice of the fact that when these
applications were pending, Senator Primicias was the Minority Floorleader of the
House, but there is no evidence, except for Senator Primicias’ testimony, that
pressure was ever exerted upon the defendant officials by politicians to deny
said applications. But assuming that pressure was exerted, it does not appear
that any right of the company was prejudiced thereby, because the decisions of
the officials were based on the true facts.

Likewise, there is no proof to show that the defendant officials encouraged
and abetted defection of the three original stockholders and their going against
the corporation and the entry into the land of newcomers, except Senator
Primicias’ own testimony, which does not appear, corroborated by evidence
tending to show that the politicians actually did influence the officials.

On the other hand, we find that the occupants, through Atty. Justino Z.
Benito, the Public Defender, petitioned the Director of Lands to conduct an
investigation with regard to their holdings in the land in question; that in
compliance with a letter of the Director of Lands, the District Land Officer
Pedro U. Asensi, one of the defendant officials herein, conducted the
investigation on the premises on September 25, 1948; that over 100 occupants
were present during said investigation and these facts were proved: that a
little less than 200 persons, petitioners therein, were tenants of the
Gonzaleses as early as 1905, and that they were occupying said land since then
up to the date of the investigation; that they are desirous to own the land they
occupy; that only a few of them are members of the Company and those who are
stockholders or members of the Company do not know their exact relation with
said Company, and that they have not derived any benefit from their membership;
that these tenants are willing to purchase their landholdings from the
Government. Based upon these findings, the District Land Officer, on October 5,
1948, recommended to the Director of Lands for the subdivision of the land and
its sale to the occupants. (Exhibit 1-A, with annexes). It is apparent that the
report on the investigation was the basis of the order of the Director of Lands
complained of, dated October 4, 1949, and of the order of the dismissal of the
appeal by the defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on April
22, 1950.

Consequent to the above findings, we find that there is no substantial
evidence to support the findings and the decision of the trial court, and we
therefore declare that said court has committed error in disturbing the decision
of the administrative officials. We might add that the present action is one for
mandamus, in which petitioner must show a clear legal right on its part and a
corresponding legal duty on the part of the officers to grant due course or
approve its lease or sales application before petition for the mandamus can be
granted. We find that petitioner has not made a case and its petition must be
denied.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby set aside
and the petition dismissed, with costs against plaintiff-appellee. So
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.