G.R. No. L-31501. June 30, 1970
DATU BLAH SINSUAT, PETITIONER, VS. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF COTABATO, RESPONDENTS.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
A petition for the issuance of writs of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed by petitioner Datu Blah Sinsuat against respondent Salipada
K. Pendatun, the Commission on Elections — hereinafter referred to as
COMELEC, and the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Cotabato — hereinafter
referred to as BOARD.
The action for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Comelec, known as Case Resolution No. RR-692, and its
accompanying minute resolution, both dated January 19, 1970, in Case No. 692
entitled “Datu Blah Sinsuat vs. Salipada K. Pendatun”[1]
insofar as said resolutions sustain the actions or the Board (1) in rejecting
and excluding from the canvass 22 election returns from 22 precincts located
in the municipalities of Dinaig, Ampatuan, Upi and Maganoy, province of
Cotabato; and (2) in including in the canvass 10 election returns from 10
precincts located in the municipalities of Datu Piang and Pikit, also in the
province of Cotabato, particularly the election return from precinct No. 15 of
Pikit.
The action for prohibition seeks to prohibit respondent Comelec
from enforcing the two resolutions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and
also to prohibit respondent Board from giving effect to said resolutions.
The action for mandamus seeks to compel respondent Board to count
the 22 election returns that were rejected by the Board, or, “in the
alternative, to compel respondent Commission to summon the Members of the
Boards of Election Inspectors in these precincts and to order the ballot boxes
in question to be brought before it so that the true result of the election can
be determined by resorting to the ballot box copies of the election returns or
to the Tally Sheets, or even to counting the votes in the ballots”[2];
and to compel the respondent Board to reject the 10 election returns that were
included in the canvass, hereinbefore adverted to, or, in the alternative, to
order respondent Comelec to order the boards of election inspectors in the
precincts concerned to prepare genuine election returns, and in the particular
case of Precinct No. 15 of Pikit “to order that the ballot box copy be
retrieved for the purpose of determining the true result of the count it that
is possible”[3].
The petitioner finally prays that after what he seeks in his
petition had been granted by this Court, and had been complied with, that
respondent Board be directed to proclaim the winner as a result of the canvass.
Upon the filing of the verified petition, this Court issued an
order requiring the respondents to answer and at the same time restraining the
Comelec from enforcing its resolutions of January 19, 1970 (Case Resolution No. RR-692, and its
accompanying minute resolution), and also restraining respondent Board from
proceeding with the canvass and proclamation as directed in those resolutions.
In due time respondents Pendatun and Comelec filed their answers
to the petition. Respondent Board filed
a manifestation, stating that its situation in the present case is similar to
that of respondent Comelec, and that it elects not to file an answer. In their answers, both respondents Pendatun
and Comelec insist in the correctness of the rulings and orders of the Comelec
in the two questioned resolutions.
From the record We find the following facts pertinent to the
resolution of the issues involved in this case.
In the national elections held on November 11, 1969, Datu Blah
Sinsuat and Salipada K. Pendatun were the official candidates of the
Nacionalista Party and of the Liberal Party, respectively, for the office of
Representative the lone representative district of Cotabato. There were two other candidates, Apolinario
Tolentino and Leopoldo Jalandoni.
By order of the Comelec, the Board canvassed the election
returns for the office of Representative at Camp
Crame, Quezon
City. The
canvass started on November 28, 1969
and lasted until December 10, 1969. However, the Board did not proclaim the
winner in view of the directive of the Comelec not to make the proclamation in
order to enable the parties to appeal to the Comelec from any ruling of the
Board relating to the inclusion or the rejection of any election return in
connection with the canvass. Upon the
termination of the canvass, although no proclamation of the winner would be
made, an unofficial tabulation of the votes was made by the Board, and it
appeared that candidate Pendatun obtained 76,466 votes as against 71,492 votes
for candidate Sinsuat, or a margin of 4,974 votes in favor of the former.
While the canvass was in progress, Pendatun filed petitions with
the Comelec praying, among others for the rejection of all the returns in the
municipalities of Ampatuan and Maganoy upon the ground that said returns had
been prepared at gunpoint. The Comelec
restrained the Board from making any proclamation until after the petitions of
Pendatun shall have been resolved.
On December 11, 1969
Sinsuat filed with the Comelec a petition questioning, or appealing from, the
action of the Board in rejecting the election returns upon the ground or
statistical improbability pursuant to the doctrine enunciated in the case of
Lagumbay vs. Comelec, et al.[4],
in the following precincts:
(1)
Dinaig: Precinct No. 37;
(2)
Ampatuan: Precincts Nos. 13-M,
23-A and 23-M;
(3)
Maganoy: Precincts Nos. 4-A, 6-B
and 14; and
(4) Upi: Precincts
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 4-A, 5, 6, 6-A, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 24-A, 29, 31 and 35.
In the same petition or December 11, 1969 Sinsuat also questioned,
or appealed from, the action of the Board in including in the canvass 38
election returns from 38 precincts located in the municipalities of Nuling and
Pikit, which were the copies of the election returns furnished the Board by the
Provincal Treasurer, upon the ground that the Provincial Treasurers copies were
“tampered and spurious” and different from the copies which were
“clear, clean, regular and valid” that were furnished the Comelec and
the Nacionalista Party[5]. The precincts in question are the following:
(1)
Nuling: Precincts Nos. 7, 8, 9,
10, 12, 14-A, 15, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 32-A, 32-B, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 39-A,
40 A and 41 (23 returns);
(2)
Pikit: Precincts Nos. 4, 5, 6, 15,
21, 21-A, 26, 29, 33, 34, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 54 (15 returns)
In his petition of December 11, 1969, Sinsuat prayed that the
election returns from Dinaig, Ampatuan, Maganoy and Upi, which were rejected
upon the ground of statistical improbability be included in the canvass; and
that in lieu of the Provincial Treasurer’s copies of the election returns for
the 23 precincts from Nuling and 15 precincts from Pikit the Comelec copies of
the election returns be included in the canvass.
On December 16, 1969 Sinsuat filed a “Supplemental Petition
And Appeal” also questioning, or appealing from, the action or the Board
in including in the canvass the election returns from 6 precincts of Pikit,
namely: Precincts Nos. 10, 16, 27, 31, 33, and 15, upon the ground that said
returns were obviously manufactured, because it appears in those returns that
there was an excess of votes over the number of voters who voted. In the same supplemental petition Sinsuat
questioned, or appealed from the action of the Board in including in the
canvass 4 election returns from 4 precincts of Datu Piang, namely: Precincts
Nos. 23, 13-A, 14 and 19 upon the ground that those returns are statistically
improbable under the doctrine laid down in the case of Lagumbay vs. Climaco, supra. Likewise, in the same pleading Sinsuat
questioned, or appealed from, the action of the Board in rejecting the election
returns from Precincts Nos. 6 and 35 of Upi, from Precincts Nos. 4-A, 6-B, and
14 of Maganoy, and from Precinct No. 31 of Dinaig, claiming that the doctrine
in the Lagumbay case is not applicable to said returns. In the supplemental petition Sinsuat also
alleged that the election return from Precinct No. 54 of M’lang was not in the
possession of the Provincial Treasurer and the Board failed to include the same
in the canvass. Sinsuat, therefore, prayed
the Comelec to order the rejection or the election returns from precincts Nos.
10, 16, 27, 31, 33, and 15 of Pikit, and of the election returns from Precincts
Nos. 23, 13-A, 14 and 19 of Datu Piang; the inclusion of the returns from
Precincts 6 and 35 or Upi, Precincts Nos. 4-A, 6-B and 14 of Maganoy, and
Precinct 31 of Dinaig; and the production of an authentic copy of the return
or Precinct No. 54 of M’lang and include the same in the canvass.
In connection with the supplemental petition the Comelec points
out in its resolution of January 19, 1970 that Precinct No. 6 of Upi and
Precincts Nos. 4-A, 6-B and 14 of Maganoy had already been included in
Sinsuat’s original petition of December 11, 1969, and with respect to Precinct
No. 35 of Upi the Board had actually included the election return of said
precinct in its canvass[6].
In his answer to the original petition, filed under date of December 15, 1969, Pendatun insisted
in the correctness of the actions of the Board complained of by Sinsuat. However, regarding the 23 election returns
from Nuling and the 15 election returns from Pikit which Sinsuat claimed to be
the Provincial Treasurer’s copies which were tampered with Pendatun manifested
in his answer that he interposed no objection to the use of the Comelec copies
of the returns in the canvass if said returns appear on their faces to be
authentic[7]. By way of a counterclaim Pendatun reiterated
his previous petitions for the rejection of all the election returns from the
precincts of Ampatuan and Maganoy upon the ground that said returns were
prepared at gunpoint; and at the same time he questioned the inclusion by the
Board in the canvass of the election returns from the 21 precincts in the
municipality of Upi, namely: Precincts Nos. 12, 15-A, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29-A, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 38-A upon the ground that
on the face of said returns the same appear to be statistically improbable
although crude alterations had been made to break the pattern of uniform 100%
voting to avoid the application of the doctrine in the Lagumbay case. Pendatun prayed for the dismissal of
Sinsuat’s petition; and, on his counterclaim, he prayed that the elections in
Maganoy and Ampatuan be declared null and void, so that all the election
returns from all the precincts in those two municipalities should be rejected;
and that the Board be ordered to reject the election returns from the precincts
in Upi mentioned in his counterclaim.
On December 23, 1969 Pendatun likewise filed an answer to the
supplemental petition of Sinsuat, traversing the pertinent allegations
contained in said supplemental petition, and by way of special and affirmative
defenses he alleged that the supplemental petition was defective for hot having
been verified and for alleging matters which were not new and which could have
been incorporated in the original petition.
A hearing was held before the Comelec on December 24, 1969 on the
petition and supplemental petition of Sinsuat and on the counterclaim of Pendatun,
which pleadings practically partook of the nature of an appeal from the
actions taken by the Board in either including or rejecting certain election
returns during the canvass, as the case may be.
During the hearing the Comelec examined, in the presence of the counsel
for both parties, the copies for the Provincial Treasurer of the election returns
for the 23 precincts of Nuling and 15 precincts of Pikit which were questioned
by Sinsuat as having been tampered with.
As a result of the examination of those returns the members of the
Comelec and the counsel for both parties actually found the returns to have
been tampered with. The Comelec,
therefore, required the production of the copies of election returns for the
23 precincts of Nuling and for the 15 precincts of Pikit which were furnished
the Comelec. The Comelec examined the
Comelec copies one by one, also in the presence of the counsel for both
parties. The Comelec found the Comelec
copies to be clean and without any alteration, and were serviceable for the
canvass. In open court the Comelec
promulgated an order which directed the Board to use the Comelec copies of the
election returns of the 15 precincts of Pikit and of the 23 precincts of
Nuling. The order also required both
parties to file simultaneously, until December
26, 1969, their memoranda in support of their respective petition
in connection with the petition and supplemental petition filed by
Sinsuat. The order further allowed
Sinsuat to file an amended petition to include precinct No. 39 of Pikit. In his amended petition Sinsuat claimed that
the Provincial Treasurer’s copy of the election return for that precinct was
also tampered with and the Comelec copy should instead be used in the canvass.
After the promulgation of the resolution mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, the counsel of both parties, assisted by the personnel of
the Comelec, made a tentative canvass to find out the result after using the
Comelec copies of the election returns from the 38 precincts located in Nuling
ahd Pikit. The tentative canvass showed
that then votes of Pendatun were reduced by 2,779, leaving him a total of
73,687; whereas the votes of Sinsuat were increased by 668, giving him a total
of 72,160 votes. The margin of Pendatun
over Sinsuat was thereby reduced from 4,974 to 1,527 votes.
Because of this development, that after using the Comelec copies
of the election returns from 38 precincts, above-mentioned, Pendatun still had
a margin of some 1,527 votes over Sinsuat, the members or the Comelec were of
the view that the matter regarding the application of the doctrine of
statistical improbability with regards to election return which were questioned
on that ground would be decisive. In this connection, the Comelec says:
“Such being the turn of events as a result of the use of the
COMELEC copies for the 23 precincts of NULING and 15 precincts or PIKIT, it
became crystal clear that the question or statistical improbability especially
in its application to Prec. No. 37 of DINAIG; Prec. Nos. 13-M, 23-A and 23-M of
AMPATUAN; Prec. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 4-A, 5, 6, 6-A, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 24-A,
29 and 31 of UPI, and its non-application to Prec. Nos. 10, 16, 27, 31, 33, and
15 of PIKIT; and Prec. Nos. 13-A, 14, 19 and 23 of DATU PIANG; has become the
crux of the case, resolution of which was completely determinative of
the outcome of the elections in the lone congressional district or
Cotabato. For this reason, the parties
have agreed that the Commission should rule on this particular question for if
the action or the Board of Canvassers in applying the doctrine of statistical
improbability as enunciated in Lagumbay vs. Climaco were to be
sustained by the Commission, there would be no further need to pass on the
questions involving remaining precincts dispute nor would there be need to rule
on the counterclaim and/or appeal of PENDATUN praying for the rejection of the
returns in the municipalities of AMPATUAN and MAGANOY and in the 21 precincts
of UPI.
“Thus, it had been agreed that the case be submitted for
decision on this question of statistical improbability. The parties were then given time to file
their respective Memorandum.”
On the same day, December
24, 1969, the Comelec directed the Board to reconvene on December 31, 1969 at Camp
Crame and to formally recanvass the
votes oh the basis of the Comelec copies of the returns from those 38 precincts
located in Nuling ahd Pikit.
On January 7, 1970
Sinsuat filed a motion for reconsideration or the Comelec’s resolution or December 24, 1969, praying that
precinct No. 15 of Pikit be excluded therefrom and/or that the Board be
ordered to reject the election return for Precinct No. 15 of Pikit. It is alleged in this motion for
reconsideration that during the canvass by the Board oh December 31, 1969 “it was found out that
even the Comelec copy of the return for precinct 15 of Pikit was tampered with
and appeared obviously manufactured and/or statistically improbable”[8]. It was further alleged that counsel for
Sinsuat had vigorously objected to the admission of the same but the Board had
counted and tabulated said return.
On January 19, 1970
the Comelec issued a minute resolution denying Sinsuat’s motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of December
24, 1969. Pertinent portion
of this minute resolution reads as follows:
“Considering the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal
dated January 3, 1970 of candidate Datu Blah T. Sinsuat praying that the
Resolution of the Commission of December 24, 1969 be reconsidered so as to
exclude the Comelec copy of the return for Prec. No. 15 of Pikit, Cotabato
among those to be used by the Board of Canvassers in the recanvass, and the
opposition of LP candidate SALIPADA K. PENDATUN in his Memorandum dated
January 12, 1970, the Commission RESOLVED to deny the Motion for lack of
merit.”[9]
The foregoing minute resolution is one of the two resolutions
that are now being questioned in the present proceedings before this Court.
Also on January 19, 1970
the Comelec issued Case Resolution No. RR-692[10],
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“In view of the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED:
1) To sustain the
action of the Board of Canvassers in rejecting as statistically improbable the
election returns for:
DINAIG: Prec. No. 37;
AMPATUAN: Prec. Nos. 13-M, 23-A, and 23-M;
UPI: Prec.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 4-A, 5, 6-A, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 24-A, 29 and 31;
“2) To overrule the
Board of Canvassers insofar as it ordered the rejection or Prec. No. 6 of UPI
it appearing that in this precinct NP candidates PADILLA and PALMARES did not
receive any votes and to order the Board of Canvassers, therefore, to include
said return in the canvass;
“3) To reiterate its
Resolution of December 24, 1969 directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers
to use the Comelec copies of the returns for the 23 precincts of Nuling and 15
precincts or PIKIT enumerated in said Resolution;
“4) To uphold the
action or the Board of Canvassers in rejecting the returns in Prec. Nos. 6-B
and 14 of MAGANOY as statistically improbable;
“5) To order the
Board of Canvassers to look for serviceable copies of the returns for Prec. No.
4-A of. MAGANOY and Prec. No. 31 of DINAIG and if need be to order the opening
of the ballot boxes in said precincts solely for the purpose of retrieving
the ballot box copies, and should the Board hot succeed in finding a
serviceable copy for said precincts, to report to the Commission for further
instructions;
“6) To sustain the
action or the Board in including in the canvas Prec. Nos. 10, 16, 27, 31, 33
and 1511
of PIKIT since the excess or votes over the number of voters in Prec. No. 16
for PENDATUN is only one and the excess of votes in the other precincts refers
to the senatorial candidates;
“7) To sustain the
action of the Board in including in the canvass the returns for Prec. Nos.
13-A, 14, 19 and 23 of DATU PIANG where two NP senatorial candidates got the
same number of votes as six LP candidates and there is therefore, no systematic
blanking of the candidates of the other party;
“8) To order the
Board to require the production of serviceable copies of Prec. No. 54 or
M’LANG, and if necessary, to order the opening of the ballot box solely for the
purpose of retrieving the ballot box copy of said returns. For this purpose, authority is hereby given
to the Board to order the opening of the said ballot box if necessary, and
should not serviceable copy of said return be found, to report to the
Commission for further instructions;
“9) To order the
Board of Canvassers to use the Comelec copy of Prec. No. 39 of PIKIT crediting
to SINSUAT 49 votes and PENDATUN, 66 votes, the votes they received in clean
Comelec copy;
“10) To hold that
further hearing on the two Petitions or LP candidate PENDATUN for the rejection
or the returns of MAGANOY and AMPATUAN and on his counterclaim for the
rejection or the 21 returns or UPI, to wit: Prec. Nos. 12, 15-A, 17, 18, 19,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 29-A, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38 and 38-A would be
unnecessary in view of the fact that the disposition of the returns questioned
by NP candidate DATU BLAH T. SINSUAT in his Appeal as set forth above is
already determinative of the outcome or the result of the election in the lone
congressional district or Cotabato and the winner in said elections could be
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on the basis of our instructions herein;
and
“11) To direct the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Cotabato to reconvene and complete its
canvass of the election returns for the office of representative for the lone
district or said province in accordance with the herein resolution, and to
proclaim the presumptive winner at 5:00 P.M. or SATURDAY, January 24, 1970,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
“SO ORDERED”
Not satisfied with the decision or the Comelec, as embodied in
the two foregoing resolutions, Sinsuat filed before this Court the instant
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction.
Sinsuat now urges that the Comelec erred in its application, or
non-application, as the case may be, of the doctrine of statistical
improbability as enunciated in the Lagumbay case. In this connection We consider it necessary
to restate the doctrine, in order to find out if the Comelec had acted rightly.
This Court, in the Lagumbay case, has classified into two sets
the election returns that should be rejected for being statistically
improbable and obviously manufactured, as follows:
(1)
Those election returns where it appears
that the number of registered voters equal the number of ballots used and the
number of votes cast and tallied uniformly for all the candidates of one
political party, whereas all the candidates of the other party appear to have
obtained no vote at all; and
(2)
Those election returns where it
appears that all the reported votes were cast and tallied uniformly for all the
candidates of one political party, whereas the candidates of the other party
appear to have obtained no vote at all.
Thus this Court said:
“It appearing therein — contrary to all statistical
probabilities — in the first set, in each precinct the number of
registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number or votes
reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal
Party, the party in power; whereas all the candidates of the Nacionalista
Party got exactly zero; and in the second set, — again contrary
to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes were for candidates
of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same
number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in
another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were
given exactly zero in all said precincts.”
1. We find that of the 22 election returns that were declared by
the Comelec as statistically improbable, thereby sustaining the action of the
Board in rejecting them, 19 fall under the first set and 3 fall under the
second set. Those that fall under the
first set are the returns from Precincts Nos. 1, 3, 4, 4-A, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14,
15, 16, 25-A, 29 and 31 of Upi; Precincts Nos. 6-B and 14 of Maganoy; and
Precincts Nos. 13-M, 23-A and 23-M of Ampatuan.
Those that fall under the second set are the returns from Precincts Nos.
2 and 6-A of Upi and Precinct 37 or Dinaig.
Regarding these 22 election returns, the Comelec, in its Case Resolution
No. RR-692, dated January 19, 1970,
made the following findings:
“In the returns for 17 precincts of UPI, to wit: Prec. Nos. 1,
2, 3, 4, 4-A, 5, 6, 6-A, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 25-A, 29 and 31, SINSUAT was
credited with all the votes registered or cast in said precincts as against
zero for PENDATUN.
“In precincts Nos. 13-M, 23-M, and 23-A of AMPATUAN, SINSUAT
received all of the votes registered or cast in said precincts as against zero
for PENDATUN.
“In Precinct No. 37 of DINAIG, SINSUAT got 208 votes as
against zero for PENDATUN.
“In these 17 precincts of UPI, 3 precincts of AMPATUAN and
one precinct of DINAIG, which have a total votes of 4,346 credited to SINSUAT
as against zero for PENDATUN, the returns showed a 100% voting for all of the
NP candidates from the President, Vice-President, the eight Senatorial
candidates, Congressman and the provincial board member12
and uniform zero votes for all the LP candidates from President down to
Congressman, except in Precinct No. 6 of UPI, where NP Senatorial candidates
PADILLA and PALMARES did not receive any votes at all. In short, the pattern of
voting in said precincts falls squarely within the sphere of the Lagumbay
doctrine of 100% registered or cast votes for all the candidates of one party
as against zero per cent for each and all the candidates of the other party and
the independent candidates. The
Commission, therefore, believes that the Board of Canvassers committed no error
in rejecting as statistically improbable or obviously manufactured the returns
in said precincts.”
x x x x
“In Prec. No. 14 of MAGANOY, there were 106 registered voters
and all of whom voted. President Marcos, the NP official candidate, got 106
votes, Osmeña, got zero. Diokno, Espina,
Palmares, Puyat, Tolentino, and Tamano got 106 votes; Lopez’ vote had been
tampered with to make it appear in figures as 104 and in words 100; Padilla’s
vote had been altered also to make it appear to be 100 in words and
figures. SINSUAT’s vote had also been
tampered with to make it appear as 100.
It appears, however, that the original votes of all these candidates in
words and figures is 106 and the tampering in the votes was made obviously to
avoid the application of the doctrine or statistical improbability. The original writings which are still discernible
should be read and thus read would show that all the candidates of the NP in
these precincts, namely, the President, Vice-President, eight Senators,
Congressman and member of the Provincial Board received uniformly the same
number of votes as the number of registered votes in these precincts, whereas
all the other candidates uniformly got zero. Consequently, the returns for
Prec. No. 14 or MAGANOY should be rejected as statistically improbable.
“Similarly, in Prec. No. 6-B of MAGANOY, it appeared that
there are 75 registered voters in said precinct. All the candidates of LP
received uniformly zero votes. The votes in figures of Espina, Padilla,
Palmares, have been changed to 70. Their votes in words, however, had been
unchanged. Consequently, since in these returns there is a uniform 100% voting
or all the registered votes for all the candidates of the NP and uniform
blanking of all the candidates of the LP and the Independent candidates, said
returns must also be rejected as statistically improbable.
“Parenthetically, it may be stated here that in the senatorial
canvass, the returns for Prec. Nos. 6-B and 14 were rejected for the same
reasons.”13
We have carefully examined the photostat copies of the 22
election returns in question14, and We find the foregoing
observations of the Comelec to be correct, except for the omission of the name
of candidate Lorenzo Sumulong which appears as one or the eight NP senatorial
candidates who also got 106 votes in the election return of Precinct 14 of
Maganoy15. However, the statement in the resolution
“that all the candidates of the NP in this precinct namely, the President,
the Vice-President, eight senators, congressman, member of the provincial
board received uniformly the same number of votes as the number of registered
votes in these precincts, whereas all the other candidates uniformly got
zero” is correct.
It will be noted, as shown in the record, that the Comelec and
the Board, in applying the doctrine of statistical improbability, had strictly
adhered to the factual premise that there should be 100% voting of the reported
votes cast and uniformly tallied for all the candidates of one party and a
uniform or systematic blanking of all the candidates of the other party. So
much so, that the Comelec did not reject the election return of precinct 6 or
Upi because it appears in this return that while all the candidates of the
Liberal Party received exactly zero, 100% of all the votes cast were uniformly
credited to the Nacionalista Party candidates from President down to member of
the provincial board (248 votes each), except two candidates for senator
(Padilla and Palmares) who were not credited with any vote (blank – not zero)16. Likewise the Board did not reject the
election return of precinct No. 35 of UPI17 because it appears therein that
all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party from the President down to member
of the provincial board, except senatorial candidate Ambrosio Padilla, were
each given uniformly 100% of the total votes cast (276 votes) and Liberal Party
candidate Gerardo Roxas was also credited with 276 votes, and all the other
candidates (including Padilla) were given zero.
The reason for not applying the doctrine of statistical improbability on
these two election returns (Precs. Nos. 6 and 35 of Upi) is obviously because
the factual premise, of 100% voting of the reported votes cast uniformly
credited to all candidates of one party as against zero vote for the
candidates of the other party, does not obtain in these two election
returns. On the other hand, it appears
that the election return from Precinct 8-A of Pagalungan was rejected by the
Board, upon the ground of statistical improbability as pleaded by Sinsuat,
because in this election return it appears that the number of votes reported
cast was 100% uniformly credited to all the candidates of the Liberal Party
while all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were each given zero.18
The doctrine of statistical improbability was enunciated by this
Court, in the Lagumbay case, in January, 1966.
In a number of election cases that came up to this Court after the 1967
and 1969 elections this doctrine had been invoked, but this Court has so far
not applied the doctrine because in those cases the factual basis laid down by
this court in declaring an election return to be statistically improbable, that
is, that 100% of the reported votes cast appear to be uniformly tallied for all
the candidates of one party as against zero vote for the candidates of the
other party, was not shown. This Court
has been very restrictive in the application of the doctrine19. This attitude of the court was made explicit
in the language of Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in the case of Alonto vs.
Comelec20,
as follows:
“x x x We do not find in the returns here questioned that
uniformity of tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party, and the
systematic blanking of the opposing candidates, that lead us to reject the
returns in the Lagumbay case. And in
Sangki vs. Comelec, L-28359, Dec. 26,
1967, We have warned against undue expansion of the Lagumbay
doctrine without due regard to the factual basis upon which it was based. x x
x”
The attitude of this Court is reaffirmed in the most recent case
of Ilarde v. Comelec, et al.,21 where this Court, in a per curiam
decision, said:
“Under Categories A, B-1, B-2 and B-3, petitioner seeks the
exclusion of the questioned returns for being statistically improbable while
admitting that they do not fall squarely within the doctrine of statistical
improbability enunciated in the case of Lagumbay v. Climaco, L-25444, January
31, 1966. The Court finds that the
COMELEC adhered to its admonition to canvassers in subsequently decided cases
of proceeding with extreme caution in rejecting returns as obviously
manufactured because of statistical improbability, and of viewing the doctrine
restrictively so as not to result in the disenfranchisement of innocent
voters, and therefore ruled properly against petitioner’s urging to expand the
doctrine’s application. The thrust of
all the subsequent cases is to restrict the doctrine of the Lagumbay case to
the unique uniformity of tally in favor of candidates and the systematic
blanking opposing candidates in the same locality, such as to make the
fraud ‘palpable from the return itself … (and) there is no reason to accept
it and give it prima facie value’, and leading to no other reasonable conclusion
than that the returns were obviously manufactured because they were as ‘utterly
improbable and clearly incredible’ as ‘to win the sweepstakes ten times.'”22
Implicit from the aforequoted pronouncements of this Court is the
view that if it is shown that in the election return there appears the unique
uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging
to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of the opposing
party then the doctrine of statistical improbability enunciated in the
Lagumbay case must be applied.
We believe that the situation of the 22 election returns, now in
question, fully warrants the application of the doctrine of statistical
improbability. In these 22 election
returns We have a clear case of the unique uniformity of tallies of all the
votes reported cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and
the systematic blanking of all the opposing candidates. We have before Us a case where the doctrine
laid down in the Lagumbay case is squarely applicable.
2. Sinsuat tries to differentiate the case of the 22 election
returns in question from the 50 election returns involved in the Lagumbay case,
pointing out that in the Lagumbay case no explanation was offered why even the
election inspectors of the Nacionalista Party did not vote for the candidate
of the Nacionalista Party, whereas in the case of these 22 election returns
there are affidavits of the election inspectors of the Liberal Party explaining
why Pendatun obtained zero vote in their respective precincts where these 22
returns came from. On January 29, 1970 Sinsuat attached to
the record of this case affidavits alleged to have been executed by Liberal
Party Inspectors, poll chairmen and poll clerks, purportedly to show that it
was not improbable for him to have garnered all the votes in the precincts
where the 22 returns in question came from23.
Pendatun claims that he was not given copies of these affidavits until
after the hearing of this case before this Court on January 29, 1970.
Pendatun also claims that these affidavits were never formally offered
as evidence in the proceedings at Comelec level, and that the supposed affiants
were not called to affirm their supposed statements and were not made available
for cross-examination by the adverse party.
We do not find in the record that these claims of Pendatun are
contradicted by Sinsuat.
Sinsuat invokes the decision of this Court in the case of Sangki
v. Comelec, et al.24, claiming that in that case this
Court did not apply the doctrine of statistical improbability on the election
returns where Pendatun as candidate for Governor was credited with all the
votes cast ih certain precincts in the province of Cotabato in the elections of
November 14, 1967 as against governatorial candidate Sangki who was given zero
vote because Pendatun presented affidavits of Nacionalista Party inspectors
explaining why they did not vote for Nacionalista Party official candidate
Sangki. We find in the decision,
however, that the reason why this Court did not apply the doctrine was because
the factual setting of the election returns assailed as statistically
improbable in the Sangki case is different from that of the 50 election returns
in question in the Lagumbay case. The
returns involved in the Sangki case did not reflect a “unique
uniformity” of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates
of one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates or the opposing
party, for while it appears in those returns that Sangki obtained zero the
other candidates of his party (Nacionalista) obtained scattered votes. Thus, this Court said:
“As we go into the bases for the statistically improbable
doctrine hammered out in Lagumbay vs. Climaco, supra, and assess
the merits of petitioner’s and intervenors’ position, we readily read meaningful
differences in factual setting between this case and that of Lagumbay.
“In Lagumbay, the declaration that the election returns
therein questioned were ‘utterly improbable and clearly incredible,’ and thus,
should be rejected, emphasized that the number of registered voters in about
fifty precincts equal the number of ballots reportedly cast and tallied for each
and every candidate of one party only – the Liberal Party. Here, respondent Pendatun points out, which
is not denied by petitioner nor intervenors, that the number of registered
voters in the questioned precincts of Pagalungan and Pikit is not the
same as the number of ballots cast and tallied for the position of Governor,
Vice-Governor, and other candidates or the Liberal Party.
“In Lagumbay, too, all the Liberal Party candidates
were credited with exactly the same number of votes while all the Nacionalista
Party candidates received nothing. Here,
only candidates Abdullah Sangki and Constancia Saluda were shown to have
received zero votes; other candidates of the Nacionalista Party for other positions
voted upon were not blanked in the disputed returns. A fact which stands in bold relief is that
candidate Magnolia Antonino for Senator – who is not of the Liberal Party –
received in all the questioned precincts a liberal share of the votes.
“In Lagumbay, there was uncertainty as to what happened
to the vote of the Nacionalista Party inspector in the disputed precincts, because
the absence of his vote was unexplained.
Here, respondent Pendatun explained, through affidavits of a good number
of the Nacionalista Party inspectors themselves attached to his answer, that
some did not vote because they were nor able to register as voters; that two
Nacionalista Party inspectors in Pagalungan did not vote for candidates Sangki
and Saludo but for the Liberal Party candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor
because they ‘are more qualified than the former two who are foreign to our
Muhicipality;’ and that other Nacionalista Party inspectors believed that the
Liberal Party candidates ‘are more qualified than the Nacionalista Party
candidates.’ These averments we are
constrained to say, reduce this particular point to a question of fact.”25
A reading of the last paragraph of the afore-quoted portion of
the decision in the Sangki case would apprise one that the offer of affidavits
by governatorial candidate Pendatun was not the reason for not applying the
doctrine of statistical improbability as laid down in the Lagumbay case, for as
this Court said “these averments, we are constrained to say, reduce this
particular point to a question of fact”26.
In other words, the matter regarding the submission of affidavits to
explain the zero vote obtained by an opposing candidate gives rise to a
question of credibility of the affidavits of which the Comelec, or any lower
tribunal, as the case may be, is more called upon to determine rather than this
Court.
In the present case, in connection with the affidavits presented
by Sinsuat, the following is what the Comelec says:
“SINSUAT submitted the affidavits of LP inspectors in several precincts
of UPI explaining why they have voted for him, the NP candidate, and not
PENDATUN, the LP official candidate. He
submitted also the affidavits of several citizens and leaders from UPI and
chairmen and poll clerks in these precincts where he got 100% of all the votes
and the members of the Board of Inspectors of the Municipalities of AMPATUAN,
MAGANOY and DINAIG to bolster his contention that it was not impossible for him
to get all the votes in the questioned precincts in said towns.
“On the other hand, PENDATUN contended that in all previous
elections where he had run for an elective office, he had consistently
obtained substantial votes in the municipality or UPI, AMPATUAN, DINAIG and
MAGANOY and therefore, it was unbelievable that he did not receive a single
vote in said municipalities. He also
claimed that as a matter of fact, in the municipality or UPI, CHRISTIANS,
TAUSAGS from JOLO and other natives tribes outnumber the Muslims to which he
and SINSUAT belong and the Joloanos of UPI have actually some cause to be
resentful against SINSUAT for his harrassments and abuses against them in the
past.
“In any event, in the face of this conflicting claims of the
parties on the probabilities or improbabilities of SINSUAT garnering all the
votes in said four municipalities and the blanking of PENDATUN the Commission
believes that the presumption of the return being obviously manufactured in
view of its 100% pattern of voting is not overcomed by the affidavits submitted
by SINSUAT consisting of the affidavits of some LP inspectors and NP and
Muslims leaders in said municipalities.
On the contrary, the Commission is more inclined to believe that
considering that PENDATUN had in the past been elected as senator, governor,
congressman and during the last war was one of the outstanding leaders of the
resistance movement in Mindanao, a fact of history which the Commission can
properly take cognizance of, it would be too much strain on ones credulity to
accept that respondent would not have received any single vote in the 17
precincts of UPI, 3 precincts or AMPATUAN and one precinct or DINAIG as
mentioned above while his opponent in the same precincts received a total of
4,346 votes when in the past elections he had received substantial votes in
said municipalities.”27
We have examined the affidavits ourselves and, like the Comelec,
We are of the view that those affidavits cannot be given the effect as intended
by Sinsuat. We have noted that all the
affidavits of the Liberal Party inspectors28 who explained why they voted for
Sinsuat and not for Pendatun were made either on November 25, or 26, 1969, even
before November 28, 1969
when the canvassing had started. The
affidavits of the poll chairmen and poll clerks who stated that the elections
in their precincts were peaceful and regular29 were made on November 30, 1969 when the canvassing had hardly
started. The wordings of the affidavits
cannot but give the impression that the affiants were only made to sign
statements already prepared and ready for their signatures. We cannot give weight to affidavits under the
circumstances obtaining in this case.
Affidavits may be manufactured in the same way that election returns
can be manufactured. Affiants may be
made to sign affidavits at gunpoint, in the same way that election inspectors
can be made to sign election returns at gunpoint. An election case should not be decided oh
the basis of affidavits that are dubious, even if they are not contradicted by
counter-affidavits.
3. Sinsuat likewise maintains that the doctrine of statistical
improbability, enunciated in the Lagumbay case, is not applicable to a single
office involved in an election. He
contends that: “it is the multiple office nature of the election that made
it inherently improbable for the returns questioned in Lagumbay to be
true. Such a situation cannot exist in a
single office election like one at bar; for there is nothing incredible in one
candidate getting all the votes in the precinct as against his opponent.”30
Sinsuat makes capital of the fact that the Lagumbay case involves
a senatorial election where there were eight candidates to be elected. Of course, no particular mention was made
about the single office of President, or Vice President, or Representative, in
the Lagumbay case because not one of those three offices was involved in said
case. Sinsuat loses sight of the fact
that in declaring an election return to be statistically improbable, this
Court referred to the document as a whole.
Thus this Court said:
“It appearing therein that – contrary to all
statistical probabilities – in the first set, in each precinct the number
of registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes
reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal
Party, the party in power; whereas all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party
got exactly zero….”31
x x x x
“It must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one
return gives to one candidate all the votes in the precinct, even as it
gives exactly zero to the other.
This is not a case where some senatorial candidates obtain
zero exactly, while some others receive a few scattered votes. Here, all the eight candidates or one
party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same
number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got
precisely nothing.
“The main point to remember is that there is no blockvoting
nowadays.”
This Court, in the Lagumbay case, in declaring the election
returns therein questioned as statistically improbable “opined that the
election result in said precincts as reported was utterly improbable and
clearly incredible”; and “where the fraud is so palpable from the returns
itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for
itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie
value.”
It is clear from the foregoing statements of this Court in the
Lagumbay decision that it is the entire election return, which necessarily
includes the report of votes obtained by candidates for all offices therein
indicated, that is not given prima facie value and should be
rejected. In other words, where a return
is statistically improbable the doubt is cast not only on one office
mentioned in the return but on all the offices included therein.
In some cases that came up to this Court involving the office of
Mayor, and one case involving the office of Governor, the doctrine of
statistical improbability was invoked for the obvious purpose of annulling the
election returns32. In none of those cases did this Court apply
the doctrine, not because only a single office is involved and the doctrine is
not applicable to a single office like that of Governor or Mayor, but because
the attendant facts and circumstances in all those cases did not jibe with the
factual premise upon which the doctrine of statistical improbability was based
in the Lagumbay case. It can be implied
from the decisions of this Court that if, in the canvass or election returns in
connection with the elections where the office of Governor or of Mayor is involved,
it appears in the election returns that all candidates of one party (including
the candidate for Governor, or for Mayor) were credited with uniform number of
votes reported cast as against the opposing candidates who are all given zero,
the doctrine should apply. We fully
agree with the observations of the Comelec, in this connection, as follows:
“x x x Although only one is being voted for as Congressman this
fact does not make said election an election for a single office because it is
being held jointly with the election for President, Vice-President and the
eight Senators and only one return is prepared for all said offices after the
votes are counted for all the candidates in the proceeding. A fortiori if the only one return
(which for this reason may also be called a ‘single return’) is actually
manufactured or fabricated because all the eight Senators of one party have
received all the votes, either registered or cast, in a particular precinct,
whereas the eight Senatorial Candidates of the other party uniformly got zero,
then the return should be considered also manufactured where it appears that
the congressional candidate of one party got the same number of votes as the
eight senatorial candidates and the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates, while the congressional candidates of the other party got zero,
together with the Presidential, Vice-Presidential and the eight senatorial
candidates of his party. It is illogical
to suppose that the same return is manufactured for the senators but not with
congressman, that is that it lies for the senatorial results but tells the
truth for the congressional result. Falsus
in unnum falsus in omnibus. A manufactured return is no return and should
be rejected in toto as distinguished from a tampered return which
is a good return but had been altered hence, the need to restore the original
entries of the return.”
Accordingly, We hold that the Comelec did not err when it upheld
the action of the Board in rejecting the 22 election returns in question upon
the ground that those returns are statistically improbable and should be
considered as election returns that are “obviously manufactured”,
and, therefore, should be rejected, in accordance with the ruling in the
Lagumbay case.
4. In the alternative, Sinsuat urges that assuming that the 22
election returns in question are statistically improbable under the doctrine
of the Lagumbay case, the Comelec should not simply annul them outright but it
should first strain every effort to determine the true result of the elections
from the precincts concerned. The
position of Sinsuat is that the Comelec should order the preparation or new
returns in lieu of the returns thus rejected.
The Comelec, in its Resolution No. RR-692, says that even under its
broad powers under the Constitution it does not have the power to order the
preparation of a new return where a return was previously made but is found to
be manufactured. We agree. The proposition of Sinsuat has no support in
law and the decisions of this Court.
The thrust of the deicision in the Lagumbay case is to consider
an election return that is statistically improbable as of no value and should
be rejected, no votes in the precinct concerned be counted in the canvass, and
the recourse of the party affected by the rejection of the return is to file
an election protest before the proper court or tribunal. This means that the rejected returns can not
be substituted by returns to be made anew by the boards of inspectors upon
order of the Comelec. Thus, this Court
said:
“Hence, denying prima facie recognition to such
returns on the ground that they are manifestly fabricated or falsified, would
constitute a practical approach to the Commission’s mission to insure free and
honest elections.”
x x x x
“At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty
precincts may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. All we hold now, is
that the returns show ‘prima facie‘ that they do not reflect true and
valid reports of regular voting. The
contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco – in the corresponding election
protest.”
Sinsuat would have this Court modify the ruling in the Lagumbay
case, when he says that the Comelec should strain every effort to determine the
true result of the count, and this is to be done by resorting to other copies
of the election returns or to the tally sheets inside the ballot boxes, or it
may compel the boards of inspectors to gather again and count the votes. We find no law, or jurisprudence construing
our election laws, which sanctions this procedure suggested by Sinsuat. On the other hand, We have the decision in
the second Pacis case33 where this Court upheld the action
of the Comelec in rejecting an election return which it found that it was prepared
at the point of a gun and ordered that no vote should be counted in the
precinct where that return came from.
This Court said:
“As deserving of serious consideration is the directive of
the Comelec rejecting the entries for Mayor in all election return copies for
Precinct 22. It will be recalled that in
Comelec’s resolution of May 11, 1968
it was found that all the four copies of the election returns for this precinct
are clean in all respects. x x x But then Comelec found that it was prepared ‘at
the point of a gun’ and that ‘other surrounding circumstances belie its
authenticity.” x x x
“We must now say that an election return prepared at
the point of a gun is no return at all; it is not one notch above a falsified
or spurious return. Comelec was
correct in ruling that there was no valid return for the office of Mayor at
Precinct 22 and that no vote should be counted for said precinct in the canvass
of votes for Mayor.”34
An election return that is statistically improbable, otherwise called
an “obviously manufactured” return, is no return at all, like a
return prepared at the point of a gun.
Like a gunpoint return, a statistically improbable return is not valid
and no vote should be counted for any candidate in the canvass of votes in the
precinct where that return comes from.
Sinsuat cites the decisions of this Court in the cases of Mutuc
v. Comelec35.
Pacis v. Comelec36,
and Macud v. Comelec37, to support his submission that
the Comelec should not have rejected outright the 22 returns in question but
should have strained every effort to find out if the returns are really
manufactured or not. We do hot find the
decisions in these three cases to be in point.
Not one of these three cases deals with an election return that was
declared statistically improbable.
These three cases deal with an election return that was either
incomplete, or tampered with, or prepared at gunpoint.
In Mutuc what was involved was an election return from
precinct 124 of Makati, Rizal that
was incomplete because while it contained the list of the names of the
candidates there was no entry of the votes cast for them. The copies of the return furnished the
municipal treasurer, the provincial treasurer and the Comelec were similarly
incomplete. In this case this Court
directed the Comelec to order the board of inspectors of the precinct concerned
to open the ballot box of the precinct for the purpose of retrieving therefrom
a copy of the election return to be used in the new canvass by the municipal
board of canvassers if said ballot box copy had been properly accomplished;
or, in the event that said copy is blank or incomplete, to count all the votes
cast in said precinct and then accomplish a return based on the count. The ruling in Mutuc was applied by
this Court in the recent case of Tiglao v. Comelec38,
which involved the election returns from two precincts of Apalit, Pampanga,
where the name of candidate Rogelio Tiglao for the office of Representative was
not listed and no vote was credited to him.
In this case this Court directed the Comelec to order the boards of
inspectors of the two precincts concerned to open the ballot boxes of said
precincts, to count the votes for Tiglao only if any, and then accomplish a new
election return. It will thus be noted
that in Mutuc and Tiglao the only purpose of having the ballot
boxes opened, as ordered by this Court, was to complete the election returns
that appear on their faces to be incomplete because no votes were credited to a
particular candidate or candidates. The
ruling of this Court in these cases is in consonance with Section 150 of the
Revised Election Code which provides that immediately after the count the
board of inspectors shall make complete and sign a written statement of
the count, which shall include, among other things, the total number of votes
polled by each candidate, writing out the said number in words and
figures. This is a mandatory duty of the
boards of inspectors, such that if the boards had not performed their duty
accordingly they could be compelled to do so, either by the Court or by the
Comelec, and for this purpose the ballot box may be opened in order to refer to
the tally sheet or to count the votes of the candidate who is not credited
with votes on the face of the election return.
In Pacis were involved four election returns, from
Precincts 18, 19, 21 and 22 of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, which were excluded by
the municipal board of canvassers in the canvass of votes for the office of
municipal mayor in the elections of November
14, 1967. These four election
returns were copies for the municipal treasurer or Sanchez Mira, which the
latter submitted to the municipal board of canvassers. Of these four copies three appeared to have
been tampered with. The Comelec
sustained the action of the board or canvassers in excluding those four
election returns, because it had earlier been shown to the Comelec that in the
early morning following the election day, at the time when the members of the
boards of inspectors in these four precincts — the polling places being all
located in the school building of barrio Namuac — were preparing the election
returns they were terrorized and coerced by armed men to change or alter the
election returns which they were then preparing, obviously to favor a
particular candidate for mayor. In this
case this Court ruled that the municipal board of canvassers and the Comelec
should not have disregarded these four election returns without first
ascertaining it there are other copies of the returns that could be used in the
canvass, considering that there are four copies of the official election
returns. This Court observed that
because the municipal treasurer’s and Comelec’s copies were allegedly tampered
with, the Comelec should have inquired about the copies of the returns for the
provincial treasurer, and if these copies are also altered Comelec should get
the copies of the election returns inside the ballot boxes. This Court said that “every effort then
should be strained to ascertain the existence of serviceable returns
from Precincts 18, 19, 21 and 22.”
And so this Court ordered the Comelec “to conduct an investigation
to ascertain the true returns from Precinct 18, 19, 21 and 22 of Sanchez Mira,
and thereafter to instruct the board of canvassers to use the true returns for
the purpose of canvass in said precincts.”
Complying with the directive of this Court, the Comelec conducted an
investigation. Eventually the Comelec
made findings, which were embodied in a resolution: (1) that the ballot box
copy of the election return of precinct 18 was intact and clean; (2) that all
the copies or the election returns of precincts 19 and 21, including those
inside the ballot boxes, had been tampered with, but somehow the Comelec, upon
a close examination of the ballots, and by expert testimony of an NBI
handwriting expert and testimonies of credible witnesses, was able to ascertain
the original entries of the votes for mayor in those election returns; and (3)
that all the copies of the election returns of precinct 22 were clean but were
prepared at the point of a gun. The
Comelec then instructed the municipal board of canvassers to count the votes
for mayor appearing in the ballot box copy or the election return of precinct
18; to count the votes for Mayor as found by the Comelec to be originally
entered in the election returns for precincts 19 and 21, without ordering the
preparation of new returns; but not to count the votes for mayor appearing in
the four copies of the election return for precinct 22 because those copies
were prepared at the point of a gun. The
board of canvassers canvassed the votes in these four precincts as directed by
the Comelec. Again the action or the
Comelec and the municipal board of canvassers was questioned before this Court
ih the second Pacis case.39
We upheld the Comelec in the second Pacis case.
It will be noted in Pacis that in complying with the
directive of this Court to secure the serviceable copies of the election
returns, the Comelec ordered the opening of the ballot boxes in the four
precincts. It was certainly within the
power of the Comelec to order the opening of the ballot boxes to retrieve the
ballot box copies and determine if they can be used in the canvass, considering
that all the copies outside the ballot boxes were considered unserviceable for
use in the canvass.40
It will be noted, also, that in the directive of this Court to the
Comelec to conduct an investigation to ascertain the true returns, this Court
did not direct, nor even hinted, that it no serviceable returns could be
secured the Comelec may resort to the count of the votes as they appear in the
ballots inside the ballot boxes in order to ascertain the true results of the
election in those four precincts. Unlike
in Mutuc and in Tiglao where this Court ordered the counting of
the ballots only for the purpose of completing the election returns in
so far as the candidates who were not credited with votes were concerned, in Pacis
this Court did not direct the Comelec to count the votes because the election
returns involved were complete on their faces.
Because the copies of those four returns outside the ballot boxes were
impugned as tampered or falsified the Court simply directed the Comelec to
secure serviceable copies of the election returns, and in this
connection the ballot boxes had to be opened in order to ascertain if the
copies of the returns inside the ballot boxes were serviceable. The Comelec could not go farther than to try
to secure serviceable copies of the returns.
If no serviceable copies could be obtained it can not order the board of
inspectors to prepare new election returns based on the tally sheets or on the
count of the ballots found inside the ballot boxes. So much so that after the Comelec had found
that all the copies of the election returns in precinct 22 were prepared at
gunpoint it directed the members of the board of canvassers not to count any
vote for mayor in that precinct, and We upheld the action of the Comelec. We did not order the count of the ballots in
precinct 22 in order to ascertain the true result of the election in that
precinct and the preparation of new election returns. When all the copies of the election return
for a particular precinct are found to be unserviceable – either because
they are all tampered with, or obviously manufactured or prepared at gunpoint –
then no vote from the precinct should be counted at the canvass.
Neither do We find in Macud any ruling of this Court which
upholds the proposition or Sinsuat. It
is claimed by Sinsuat that in Macud this Court sustained the Comelec in
ordering an election return to be accomplished based on the tally sheet. We do not find any statement in the decision
regarding this matter. We only find a
statement that the board of canvassers used an election return that was
prepared by the board of inspectors under the supervision of the
representative of the Comelec. The
decision makes no mention of the circumstances that brought about the
preparation of the election return under the supervision of the Comelec
representative. It could be another case
of an incomplete return which had to be completed under the supervision or the
Comelec representative — and in this connection the tally sheet might have
been consulted.
The 22 election returns now in question are the copies or the
election returns corresponding to the Provincial Treasurer or Cotabato, which
the latter official submitted to the Board to be used in the canvass. These election returns are not questioned as
having been tampered with. There is,
therefore, no ground for the Comelec to order the production of the other
copies — the copies corresponding to the municipal treasurer and to the
Comelec, or to order the opening of the ballot boxes for the purpose of retrieving
the ballot box copies, to compare them with these 22 election returns in search
for “serviceable copies” to be used in the canvass, in consonance
with the ruling in the case of Cauton v. Comelec, supra.
These 22 election returns are complete on their faces – in the
sense that every candidate to be voted for appears listed in each and every
such return and opposite the names of the candidates there are entries of the
number of votes received, or zero vote, in words and figures, as the case may
be. And so, there is also no ground for
ordering the opening of the ballot boxes in order to secure the needed data to
make these returns complete, in consonance with the ruling of this Court in the
cases of Mutuc v. Comelec, supra and Tiglao v. Comelec, supra.
It is not pretended at all in the present case that discrepancies
exist between these 22 election returns and other authentic copies of the same
returns, as would warrant a recount of the votes in accordance with the provisions
of Section 163 and 168 of the Revised Election Code.
Neither do We find any allegation in the record that the members
of the boards of inspectors committed an error in the preparation of these
election returns, as would warrant a correction or amendment of the returns
under Section 154 of the Revised Election Code.
Sinsuat urges that the Comelec could even order the boards of
inspectors to recount the ballots inside the ballot boxes in the precincts
where these 22 election returns come from to ascertain the true results of the
elections in these precincts, and then order the preparation of new
returns. If the ballots inside the
ballot boxes are to be counted, as Sinsuat wants done, in order to check if the
count of the votes tally with those that are reflected on the election returns
in question, then the proceeding would already be in the nature of a full-blown
election contest — a proceeding that the Comelec has no power to initiate, and
much less has it the power to decide the true results of the election. Sinsuat would want the Comelec to perform a
function which the law and the Constitution does not authorize it to
perform. It certainly is not within the
broad powers of the Comelec in the enforcement and administration of the laws
relative to the conduct of elections to ascertain that every election
return reflects the true result of the election in a precinct. The Comelec is concerned only in seeing to it
that the election return used in the canvass is one that is not manufactured,
nor falsified, nor tampered with, nor prepared under coercion or under circumstances
that affects its regularity or genuineness.
The task of determining whether an election return reflects the true
result of the election in a certain precinct pertains to the proper court of
justice or to the proper electoral tribunal, as the case may be, in an election
contest that is properly brought before said body.
We have held that canvassing boards will not be compelled to
canvass returns that are obviously manufactured.41 In the case now before Us the Board rejected
the 22 election returns because they are obviously manufactured. The Comelec confirmed the action of the
Board. We have declared in this decision
that both the Board and the Comelec are right in their action. The uselessness of these 22 election returns
has therefore been definitely pronounced.
A party that relies on election returns that are obviously manufactured,
as in the case of the 22 election returns now in question, must suffer the
consequences of his own act. After all,
the law gives him another recourse, and, that is, to file the corresponding
election protest.
We hold, therefore, that the Comelec had not neglected to perform
an act which the Constitution and the law specifically enjoin as a duty
resulting from office when, after approving the action or the Board in
rejecting the 22 election returns in question, it did not order the production
of the other copies of those election returns, nor order the opening of the
ballot boxes in order to retrieve the ballot box copies, nor order the recount
of the votes, for the purpose of determining the true result of the election in
the precincts where those 22 election returns came from.
5. It is next contended by Sinsuat that the Comelec erred in
upholding the action of the Board in including in the canvass the election
returns from precincts Nos. 13-A, 14, 19, and 23 of Datu Piang. It is claimed by Sinsuat that if the doctrine
or statistical improbability is applicable to a single office involved in an
election – like that of Representative — these four election returns should
also be rejected. We cannot sustain the
contention of Sinsuat. We do not find in
these four election returns the factual basis for the application of the doctrine
of statistical improbability, as enunciated in the Lagumbay case, that is, that
there should be 100% tally of reported votes cast uniformly credited to all
the candidates of one party as against uniform zero votes or systematic blanking
of the opposing candidates. We find that
in these four returns the Liberal Party candidates for President,
Vice-President, Representative, and six for Senator (Cases, Ganzon, Liwag,
Roxas, Sagun and Ziga), along with two Nacionalista Party candidates for
Senator (Palmares and Tamano) and Nacionalista Party candidate for member of
the provincial board in the special election (Ampatuan), all obtained
uniform number of votes; as against zero vote given to the Nacionalista Party
candidates for President, Vice-President, Representative, six for Senator
(Diokno, Espina, Padilla, Puyat, Sumulong, and Tolentino), along with two
Liberal Party candidates for Senator (Ilarde and Mañalac) and the Liberal Party
candidate for member of the provincial board (Buenaflor). In these four election returns We find NP
senatorial candidate Palmares and Tamano credited with the same number of votes
as the six LP senatorial candidates; while LP senatorial candidates Ilarde and
Mañalac did not get any vote. In the
special election for board member NP official candidate Ampatuan garnered all
the votes while LP candidate Buenaflor for the same office got no vote. The Board and the Comelec, therefore, did not
commit error when they included these four election returns in the canvass,
because the Lagumbay doctrine is not applicable.
We quote with approval the ruling of the Comelec regarding these
four election returns, as follows:
“In the returns for Prec. Nos. 13-A, 14, 19 and 23 of DATU
PIANG, it appeared that six LP senatorial candidates got uniformly the same
number of votes as PALMARES and TAMANO, NP senatorial candidates, and ISKAK
AMPATUAN, NP official candidate for member of the Provincial Board. For this reason, the Board of Canvassers included
these precincts in the canvass. The
Commission upholds the action of the Board in the returns in these precincts since
there is no 100% voting for all the candidates of the LP as three candidates
of the NP, two for Senators and one for member of the provincial board, have
received the same number of votes as the LP candidates. As the Supreme Court said in the Alonto
case, supra:
‘x x x We do not find in the returns here questioned uniformity of
tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party, and the systematic
blanking of the opposing candidates, that lead us to reject the returns in
the Lagumbay case x x x’ “42
Thus, as We have pointed out at the earlier part of this
decision, the Comelec did not apply the Lagumbay doctrine to the election
return in Precinct 6 of Upi, because in said return it appears that there was
no 100% voting for all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party even it all the
Liberal Party candidates got zero vote each.
All the NP candidates for President down to member of the provincial
board uniformly got 248 votes each, except senatorial candidates Padilla and
Palmares who was not credited with any vote (blank, not zero). Likewise, the Board did not apply the
Lagumbay doctrine to the election return of Precinct 35 of Upi because in said
return it appears that all the NP candidates, except senatorial candidate
Padilla, were uniformly credited with 276 votes along with LP senatorial
candidate Roxas who was also credited with 276 votes; while all the other
candidates, including Padilla, were given zero vote. So, it can be observed
that the Board and the Comelec had consistently applied the rule of
“uniformity of tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party, and
the systematic blanking or the opposing candidates.”43
The action of the Board in not rejecting these four election
returns is but in line with the rulings of this Court restrictively applying
the Lagumbay doctrine to the factual basis that We have herein adverted to.44
6. It is also contended by Sinsuat that the Comelec erred in
upholding the action of the Board in including in the canvass the election
returns from Precincts Nos. 10, 16, 27, 31, 33 and 15 of Pikit. It is claimed by Sinsuat that in these six
precincts there has occurred an excess of votes over the number of voters who
voted. In his petition, Sinsuat
indicates the “excess” votes as follows:
1. In Precinct No. 10 –
No. of registered
voters – – – – 154
No. of voters who voted – – – – – 154
Votes counted for Osmeña – – 154
Votes counted for Pendatun – 154
Votes cast for Lopez – – – – – – – 134
Votes cast for Magsaysay – – – 23
157
Or an excess of 3 votes cast for the candidates for Vice-President,
over the 154 voters who voted.
2. In Precinct No. 16 –
No. or voters who
voted – – – – – – – 269
Votes counted for Pendatun – – – 270
or an excess of one vote.
3. Precinct No. 37 –
No. of voters who voted
– – – – – – – 414
Votes counted for Pendatun – – – –
414
but in summing up the votes
counted for the 4 candidates
for members of the provincial
board the total is 442, or an
excess or 28 votes over the
414 votes cast.
4. Precinct No. 31 –
No. of registered
voters – – – – – – – 453
No. of voters who voted – – – – – – – 447
Votes counted for Pendatun – – – – 447
Votes counted for Senators:
Ganzon – – – – 447 Padilla
– – – – – – – – – 400
Ilarde – – – – – – 447 Cases – – – – – – – – – 5
Liwag – – – – – 447 Diokno – – – – – – – – – 1
Mañalac – – – – 447 Palmares
– – – – – – – 30
Roxas – – – – – 447 Puyat –
– – – – – – – – – 5
Sagun – – – – – 447 Sumulong
– – – – – – – 10
Ziga – – – – – – – 447 Tamano
– – – – – – – – 10
Tolentino – – – – – –
– – 5
TOTAL….. 466
It appears that the total number of votes counted for the
senatorial candidates on the right column (above) is 466 or an excess of 19
votes over the number of votes cast.
5. Precinct No. 33–
No. of voters who
voted – – – – – – 238
Votes counted for
Pendatun – – – – 238
Votes for Vice-President:
Lopez – – – – – – 152
Magsaysay – – 87
239
or an excess of one vote cast for Vice-President over the number of
voters who voted.
6. Precinct No. 15 –
In this precinct the election return shows
that Pendatun got 700 votes. Sinsuat alleges that on the line of “Ballots
found in the compartment for valid ballots” there are written the words
“Two Hundred Fifty plus Four Hundred Fifty”. Sinsuat further alleges that from the
certificate of the election registrar of Pikit, Mr. Bernardo P. Decrepito,
dated September 18, 1969
it appears that the number of registered voters in this precinct is 695.45
We agree with the ruling of the Comelec regarding these six election
returns, as follows:
“Petitioner SINSUAT claims that the returns in six precincts
of PIKIT, to wit: Prec. Nos. 10, 16, 27, 31, 33 and 15 should have been
rejected by the Board on the ground that in these precincts there was an excess
of votes over those of the number of voters who voted. The Commission, however, notes that, except
with respect to Precinct No. 16 where PENDATUN received 270 votes, while the
number of voters who voted was only 269, resulting in an excess of one vote,
the votes received by PENDATUN did not exceed the number of voters who voted.
What actually is claimed to be in excess of the number of registered voters are
the votes for the senatorial candidates.
Since the Board is canvassing only the congressional votes there is actually
no excess of votes in these six precincts, except in Precinct No. 16. Granting that to determine whether there is
an excess of votes in these six precincts we have to consider the totality of
votes cast for the other candidates, particularly the senatorial candidates,
the Commission believes that the excess of votes in these precincts is not very
great as to be ruled out as statistically improbable following the doctrine
of State ex rel Mitchel vs. Stevens, supra. Alonto vs. Comelec, 22 SCRA 878
would appear to be more applicable where the court said:
‘Nor do we find that the alleged excess of votes cast (detailed and
enumerated in the petition) is adequate to support the conclusion that the returns
are obviously manufactured for reasons of statistical improbability. x x x’
(On page 882)
“The Commission, therefore, believes that the Board committed
no error in not rejecting ‘ the returns from Prec. Nos. 10, 16, 27, 31, 33, and
15 of PIKIT.”46
In the recent case of Ilarde v. Comelec, supra, petitioner
Ilarde questioned, the action of the Comelec in not excluding from the canvass
those election returns where senatorial candidate Tamano appears to have been
credited with votes in excess of the number of registered voters. In upholding the Comelec this Court ruled:
“…The same finding (not statistically improbable) holds true
with regard to the instances cited where the COMELEC ruled against the
exclusion of some returns questioned by petitioner, since the COMELEC found
that the number of votes cast in favor of Tamano were not greatly in excess of
the registered number of voters and could be attributed to mistakes or errors
of the poll inspectors, while it had rejected other returns where such excess
was very great. (Alonto v. Comelec, supra)”
7. Sinsuat also questions the action of the Comelec in not
ordering the exclusion from the canvass of the Comelec copy of the election
return for Precinct 15 of Pikit, upon the ground that it is a tampered
return. The action of the Comelec in
this connection is embodied in its minute resolution dated January 19, 1970, and this is one of the two
resolutions no being questioned before this Court.47
To resolve the controversy in connection with this Comelec copy
of the election return of Precinct 15 of Pikit, We consider it necessary to
state the factual circumstances attending this particular return. The record shows, and this is not disputed,
that on November 28, 1969 (the very day, when the canvass started at Camp
Crame, Quezon City) counsel for Sinsuat sent a letter to the Comelec requesting
that they be allowed to take photostat copies of the Comelec copies of the
election returns from precincts in the municipalities of Pikit, Pagaluñgan,
Datu Piang, Carmen, and Sultan Sa Barongis.
On December 2, 1969
the Comelec, by resolution, granted said request.48 Accordingly, photostat copies of the Comelec
copies of the election returns from the municipality
of Pikit, including that of
Precinct 15, were actually taken. During
the canvass by the Board at Camp Crame, Sinsuat objected to the use in the
canvass of the Provincial Treasurer’s copies of the election returns from the
municipality of Pikit, among them the Provincial Treasurer’s copy for Precinct
15, because, according to Sinsuat, the Provincial Treasurer’s copies were
tampered with, and he asked the Board that the Comelec copies which were clean
and untampered with be used instead. The
Board overruled the objection of Sinsuat to the use of the Provincial
Treasurer’s copies. On December 11,
1969, Sinsuat filed with the Comelec a petition questioning, among others, the
action of the Board in including in the canvass the Provincial Treasurer’s
copies of the election returns from thirty eight precincts located in the
municipalities of Nuling and Pikit, upon the ground that the Provincial Treasurer’s
copies were “tampered and spurious” and different from the Comelec
copies of the same election returns which were “clear, clean, regular and
valid”. Sinsuat prayed that in lieu
of the Provincial Treasurer’s copies for the 23 precincts of Nuling and 15
precincts of Pikit (which included Precinct 15) the Comelec copies of the
election returns for those precincts be used in the canvass. In his answer to
that petition of Sinsuat, Pendatun manifested that he interposed no objection
to the use of the Comelec copies. A
hearing on the petition of Sinsuat was held by the Comelec on December 24, 1969. What transpired during this hearing may best
be gathered from the resolution of the Comelec which recites as follows:
“In the hearing before the Commission on December 24, 1969, oh
the appeal of SINSUAT and the counter-claim of PENDATUN, which actually
partook the nature of an appeal, the Commission examined in the presence of
counsel of both parties the provincial treasurer’s copies of the election
returns for the 23 precincts of NULING and 15 precincts of PIKIT questioned by
SINSUAT as having been tampered with.
Examination of said returns by the members of the Commission and by counsel
of both parties confirmed the tampering.
The Commission, therefore, required the production of the Comelec
copies which it examined one by one, also in the presence of counsel of both
parties. The Commission found the
COMELEC copies of the returns for the 23 precincts of NULING and 15
precincts of PIKIT to be without any alterations and were therefore
serviceable, so it promulgated in open court the following resolution:
‘A. In the matter of the hearing on the Petition of Candidate DATU
BLAH SINSUAT, dated December 11, 1969,
and the Answer thereto of Congressman SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, dated December 15, 1969; the Supplemental
Petition and Appeal of Cahdidate Datu Blah T. Sinsuat, dated December 16, 1969, and the Answer
thereto by Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun dated December 16, 1969. After hearing arguments of counsels for
opposing parties oh the Basic Petition and Supplemental Petition, the
Commission, after ordering the production for examination of the election
returns copies for the Provincial Treasurer and the Comelec of the precincts
hereinafter treated, RESOLVED as follows:
1. It appearing
after an examination of the Provincial Treasurer’s copies of the election
returns that there exist alterations and/or erasures in the entry of votes for
the Office of Congressman which affect the integrity of the said election
returns (Provincial Treasurer’s copy), while the corresponding Comelec copies
thereof, which were likewise examined by the Commission and by counsels for
both parties were found to be clean, untampered with, and, therefore,
serviceable copies, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Cotabato is hereby
directed to use the Comelec copies of the election returns of the following
precincts in its canvass in lieu of the Provincial Treasurer’s copies thereof;
A. PIKIT, Cotabato:
Precincts Nos. 4, 5, 6, 15, 21, 21-A, 26, 29, 33, 34, 40,
41, 42, 43, and 54.’ “
x x x
“After the promulgation of the foregoing resolution, the
counsel of both parties assisted by some personnel of the Commission made a tentative
canvass to find out the outcome of the substitution of the COMELEC copy as
basis of the canvass and as a result PENDATUN’S lead was reduced by 2,779
votes leaving him a total of 73,687 votes, whereas SINSUAT’S votes were
increased by 668 votes giving him a total of 72,160 votes. The margin of PENDATUN and SINSUAT was thus
reduced to 1,527 votes.”49
x x x x
On December 31, 1969
the Board, pursuant to the directive of the Comelec, reconvened to recanvass
the election returns in accordance with the findings of the Comelec as embodied
in its resolution of December 24,
1969, above adverted to. In
that recanvass Sinsuat, through counsel, raised for the first time ah objection
to the inclusion in the canvass of the Comelec copy of the election return of
Precinct 15 of Pikit upon the ground that it was a tampered return. The Board, however, disregarded the objection
of Sinsuat.
On January 7, 1970 counsel for Sinsuat filed with the Comelec a
motion, dated January 3, 1970, “for reconsideration and/or appeal from
the order of the Board of Canvassers”, and praying “that the
resolution of the Honorable Commission on Election dated December 24, 1969 be
reconsidered, so that Prec. No. 15 be excluded therefrom and/or that the
Provincial Board of Canvassers be ordered to reject the election return for
Prec. No. 15 of Pikit, Cotabato and the votes of Pendatun reflected thereon be
removed and deducted from the over-all count made in his favor.” The ground for this motion was that it was
found out during the recanvass that even the Comelec copy of the election
return for Precinct 15 of Pikit was tampered with and appeared obviously
manufactured and/or statistically improbable, and that during the recanvass by
the Board Blah Sinsuat, through counsel, vigorously objected to the admission
of the same, but that the Board had unlawfully counted and tabulated said
return for Precinct 15.50
Acting on that motion for reconsideration, the Comelec appointed a
committee composed of Comelec personnel to examine the Comelec copy of the
election return for Precinct 15 of Pikit.
The committee submitted a report to the Comelec which, among others,
states, as follows:
“Observations
on Prec. No. 15,
Pikit, Cotabato
“For Prec. No. 15, Pikit, Cotabato, copy for the Comelec,
bearing Serial No. 47177, the following observations are made:
“1. On Data on Voters –
“With respect to the entry on the number of voters registered
in precinct, it is noted that there are erasures made in the original entry
which with a magnifying glass could be read as 692. The words in the original entry ‘six hundred
ninety-two’ six and ninety-two have been erased. Over the word ‘six’ is written the word
‘seven’. In the total number in figures
the original entry 692 could also be discerned and over which is superimposed
the figure 700. In the entry on the
number of voters who actually voted the original entry has been erased but
which could still be read as ‘two hundred fifty’. It is observed that in the original entry in
words, the words ‘two’ and ‘fifty’ have been erased and over the word ‘two’ is
superimposed the word ‘seven’. In the
entry on total number in figures there appears to have been a superimposition
over the original entry which could not be appreciated with certainty. The superimposed figures written is 700.
“2. On Data on Ballots –
“In the entry on data on ballots, in the space ballots found
in the compartment for valid ballots the original entry appears to have been
erased and over which was written the words ‘four hundred fifty’. It is also observed that over the
superimposed entry is written the words ‘two hundred fifty plus’. In the entry on total number in figures the
original entry which could be read as 250 has been erased and over which
is written the figure 700. In the entry
for valid ballots withdrawn from the compartment for spoiled ballots, for
having been mistakenly placed therein it appears in the entry on total number
in words the word ‘none’ has been written.
However, with respect to the entry in total number in figure the original
entry which could be read as 1 appears to have been erased and the figures 0
was written.
“3. For the Office of Representative in the entry for the votes for
candidate Salipada Pendatun the original entry appears to have been erased in
that the words ‘two’ and ‘fifty’ have been erased and over the word ‘two’ is
written the word ‘seven’. The original
entry could be read however and ‘two hundred fifty’ as altered reads ‘seven
hundred’. In the total votes obtained in
figures the original entry which could be read as 250 has been erased and over
which is written the figure 700.
“The Committee also observes that the election return for
Prec. No. 15, Pikit, Cotabato, copy for the Comelec, contains alterations in
the entries not only on the data on voters, data on ballots, and votes for the
Office of Representative as stated above but also for the Office of President,
Vice-President, Senators, and Special Election for Members of the Provincial
Board, with respect to the votes of candidates Osmeña, Lopez, Ganzon, Ilarde,
Liwag, Mañalac, Padilla, Roxas, Sagun, Ziga and Buenaflor, all of which
erasures or alterations are not authenticated by any initials of any members of
the Board of Inspectors. It is observed
also that both the election returns, copy for Provincial Treasurer and for the
Comelec, bear the signatures of the members of the board of inspectors which
upon comparison of both copies appears to be similar. The same observation is made with respect to
the envelopes and seals of both election returns.”51
A hearing on this motion for reconsideration was held before the
Comelec on January 9, 1970, with all the three members of the Comelec
present. During the hearing the report
of the committee that examined the Comelec copy of the election return for
Precinct 15 of Pikit was submitted.
Counsels for both parties appeared, and manifestations were made by the
counsels and also by the members of the Comelec. Without taking any evidence to ascertain how
it happened that the Comelec copy in question came to be tampered, the Comelec,
on January 19, 1970, issued a minute resolution denying Sinsuat’s motion for
reconsideration “for lack of merit”.52
The Comelec, in its Case Resolution No. RR-692, specifically ordered the
Board to use for Precinct 15 of Pikit “the Comelec copy in accordance with
the Resolution of the Commission of December 24, 1969”.53
It is contended by Sinsuat that the Comelec, in ordering the
Board to use in the canvass the Comelec copy of the election return of Precinct
15 of Pikit, “violated its clear duty to direct that only genuine returns
be counted”.54
This Court ordered the counsel for the Comelec to file with the
record of this case an enlarged photostat copy of this Comelec copy in
question. We have carefully examined
this enlarged photostat copy, and We find that there are really very visible
erasures and alterations thereon. We
have also found the report of the committee appointed by the Comelec to examine
this Comelec copy to be correct. The
Court is at a loss to understand, how come that, if the original of this photostat
copy was the one that was examined by the members of the Comelec, and by the
counsels for both parties, on December 24, 1969 that they could not have
noticed the erasures and the alterations that now appear on this photostat
copy, if those erasures and alterations were actually existing on the original
(Comelec copy) that was examined on December 24, 1969. The record shows that on December 2, 1969
Sinsuat was authorized by the Comelec to secure photostat copies of the Comelec
copies of the election returns for precincts in Pikit (including Precinct 15)
and that he had actually taken photostat copies and had those photostat copies
during the canvass by the Board which ended on December 10, 1969. On December 11, 1969 Sinsuat filed a petition
with the Comelec precisely assailing as tampered and spurious the Provincial
Treasurer’s copies of the election returns from 15 precincts in Pikit
(including Precinct 15) and prayed that in lieu of the Provincial Treasurer’s
copies the Comelec copies which were clean and untampered be used in the
canvass. In that petition of December
11, 1969 Sinsuat did not make any assertion that the Comelec copy for Precinct
15 of Pikit be not used in the canvass because it was a tampered copy. By that time Sinsuat, or his counsel, must
have seen the Comelec copy already and had in fact a photostat copy of the
same. And then, on December 24, 1969,
during an open hearing, when the members of the Comelec and the counsels for
both parties examined the Comelec copies of the election returns from Pikit
(which included that of Precinct 15) neither Sinsuat hor his counsel made any
objection to the use of that Comelec copy for Precinct 15 upon the ground that
it is a tampered copy. After the
examination of the Comelec copies by the members of the Comelec and by the
counsels for both parties on that day, Sinsuat and his counsel even agreed to
the making of a tentative tabulation of votes based on the clean Comelec copies
which had then been examined, and these included the copy for Precinct 15 of
Pikit. It was only on December 31,
during the recanvass, when Sinsuat, for the first time, objected to the use of
the Comelec copy in the canvass upon the ground that it is tampered. And We have noted in the very allegation of
Sinsuat in his petition before this Court that he admits that on December 24,
1969 the Comelec copies of the election returns from 15 precincts of Pikit were
clean and untampered. Thus, in paragraph
9, Section V (The Facts) of his petition Sinsuat makes the following
allegation:
“9. During the
hearing on December 24, 1969, the respondent Commission indeed found as true
the allegations of tampering of the Provincial Board’s copies of the election
returns froth the twenty-three (23) precincts from Nuling and fifteen (15)
others from Pikit. So, it ordered the
Comelec copy of these returns to be used (See pp. 5-6, Annex ‘H’) because it
found them clean as of then.”55
What happened to that Comelec copy which the Comelec and the
counsel for both parties had examined on December 24, 1969? How come that on December 24, 1969 the
Comelec and the counsel for both parties examined and found the Comelec copy of
the election return for Precinct 15 of Pikit to be clean and untampered, and
yet during the canvass by the Board on December 31, 1969 there appeared a
Comelec copy of the election return for that same precinct that was very
visibly tampered and altered?
We do not doubt the veracity of the statements in the Comelec
resolution of December 24, 1969, as embodied in Case Resolution RR-692 of
January 19, 1970, to the effect that when the Comelec copies of the election
returns of 15 precincts of Pikit (which included the Comelec copy for Precinct
15) were examined it was found that all said copies were “clean, untampered
with, and, therefore, serviceable”.
But it is also undeniable that when the Board met on December 31, 1969
to recanvass the returns it was found that the Comelec copy of the election
return for Precinct 15 bore very visible alterations, or signs of tampering, as
shown on the enlarged photostat copy of said election return which is now
attached to the record. The Court cannot
close its eyes to the realities that appear on this enlarged photostat
copy. And so, granting that this Comelec
copy was found to be clean and untampered with on December 24, 1969, the
logical conclusion is that it was tampered with after December 24, 1969 but
before it was submitted to the Board for recanvass on December 31, 1969.
It is Our considered view that when Sinsuat, in his motion of
January 7, 1970 for the reconsideration of the Comelec resolution of December
24, 1970, called attention to the fact that the Comelec copy of the election
return of Precinct 15 of Pikit was tampered with, the Comelec should have taken
steps to ascertain how the tampering came about, because that Comelec copy was
found to be “clean and untampered” by the Comelec itself on December
24, 1969. It is not denied that when
this Comelec copy was brought before the Comelec during the hearing on January
9, 1970, it appeared to be really tampered with because of the erasures, alterations
and superimpositions found therein.
We have said in the case of Pacis vs. Comelec supra56
that “the purpose of the Election Code ‘to protect the integrity of the
election and to suppress all evils that may vitiate its purity and defeat the
will of the voters’ gives Comelec authority to ascertain whether the
genuineness of a given election return may be salvaged by an examination of the
said return“.57
Technically, the procedure should be to remand this case to the Comelec
to make a specific finding on the matter regarding the erasures, alterations
and superimpositions as they now appear on the Comelec copy. But because We have before Us the enlarged
photostat copy of the return in question and the report of the committee that
examined said return, We believe that what the Comelec had failed to do — that
is, to examine carefully the return and ascertain what had been altered or tampered
with — this Court may as well do in an effort to salvage the genuineness of
this election return. We are brushing
aside technicality in order to expedite the resolution of the question
involved, because this case affects the public interest.
While the original of the Comelec copy of the election return of
Precinct 15 of Pikit is not before this Court, We are satisfied that the
enlarged photostat copy can serve our purpose in the examination of the return
in question. The erasures, alterations,
and superimpositions are visible to the naked eye. The original entries that have been erased
and superimposed are still discernible.
We have minutely examined the photostat copy, and have taken into
consideration the report of the committee constituted by the Comelec to
examine the Comelec copy of the election return of Precinct 15 of Pikit, and We
agree with all its findings, specifically its finding regarding the votes of
Pendatun, as follows:
“For the office of Representative in the entry for the votes
for candidate Salipada Pendatun the original entry appears to have been erased
in that the words ‘two’ and ‘fifty’ have been erased, and over the word ‘two’
is written the word ‘seven’. The
original entry could be read however and ‘two hundred fifty’ as altered reads
‘seven Hundred’. In the total votes
obtained in figures the original entry which could be read 250 had been erased
and over which is written the figure 700.”
It is Our view that the true entry in the Comelec copy of the
election return of Precinct 15 of Pikit of the votes of Pendatun was 250 and
not 700; and so, while We uphold the Comelec ruling that the Comelec copy of
the election return of Precinct 15 of Pikit be used in the canvass, the Board,
however, should credit Pendatun with only 250 votes this precinct.
8. It is stated in the main resolution, appealed from, that the
Comelec had rid opportunity to examine the election returns from Precincts 4-A
of Maganoy and Precinct 31 of Dinaig, and so it could not make a definite
ruling with respect to those election returns.
The resolution also states that the election return from Precinct 54 of
M’lang was not included in the canvass of the votes.58
Upon motion of Sinsuat, this Court, in a resolution of February
6, 1970, authorized the opening of the ballot box of Precinct 54 of M’lang in
order to retrieve therefrom all the copies of the return which were alleged to
have been placed by mistake inside the ballot box by the board of
inspectors. In the memorandum of data,
or report, submitted by Sinsuat to this Court it is stated that per certified
copy of the Provincial Treasurer’s copy of the election return of Precinct 54
of M’lang there were 35 voters who voted in the precinct, and Pendatun is
credited with 5 votes, Sinsuat with 18 votes, and the other candidates with 12
votes. An enlarged photostat copy of the
Provincial Treasurer’s copy of the election return for this precinct is
attached to the record, and is not objected to by Pendatun.59 The Board may, therefore, use the Provincial
Treasurer’s copy of the election return for this precinct in the canvass.
The memorandum of data of Sinsuat also reports that, as certified
to by the Comelec, in Precinct 31 of Dinaig there are 123 votes involved, while
in Precinct 4-A of Maganoy there are 102 votes involved; but no certification
could be issued by the Comelec on the breakdown of the votes in these two
precincts due to the unauthorized alterations in the entry of votes cast for
the office of Representative both in the Comelec and in the Provincial
Treasurer’s copies.60
There is, therefore, need for the implementation of the order of the
Comelec to the Board to look for serviceable copies of the returns for these
two precincts, and if need be to open the ballot boxes solely for the purpose
of retrieving the ballot box copies, and should the Board not succeed in
finding serviceable copies, to report to the Comelec for further instructions.61
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, with the modification that in
using the Comelec copy of Precinct 15 of Pikit the Board should credit
respondent Pendatun with only 250 votes, Case Resolution No. RR-692 of
respondent Commission on Elections, and its accompanying minute resolution,
both dated January 19, 1970, appealed from, are affirmed in all other respects;
and the writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition prayed for are
denied. The restraining order issued by
this Court on January 23, 1970 is lifted, and respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Cotabato is ordered to immediately convene and implement the
orders of respondent Commission on Elections in its Case Resolution No. RR-692
as modified in this decision, complete the canvass of votes cast for the office
of Representative of the lone representative district of Cotabato in the
elections of November 11, 1969, and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate
for the said office.
Petitioner Datu Blah Sinsuat is ordered to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., with whom
Castro, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur, concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
[1]
Annexes G and H of the petition.
[2]
Quoted from petition, page 6 of the record.
[3]
Quoted from the petition, page 7 of the record.
[4]
G. R. No. L-25444, Jan. 31, 1966; 16 SCRA 175.
[5]
Record, p. 42.
[6]
Resolution, Annex H, pp. 70-71 of the record.
[7]
Pendatun’s Answer before Comelec, pp. 52-57 of the record.
[8]
Record, pp. 64-65.
[9]
Annex G to petition, p. 67 of the record.
[10]
Annex H of petition, pp. 68-91 of the record.
11 “The Board to use for Prec. No. 15
the Comelec copy in accordance with the Resolution of the Commission of
December 24, 1969.”
12 “There was special election for one board member in
Cotabato.”
13 Pages 8-9 and 16-17 of Resolution, Annex
“H” to the petition, on pp. 75-76 and 83-84 of the record.
14 Annexes 1 to 22 inclusive of Pendatun’s Answer, pp.
136 to 157 of the record.
15 Annex 6 of Pendatun’s Answer, page 141 of the
record.
16 Annex 28 of Pendatun’s Answer, page 182 of the
record. See Paragraph (2) of the dispositive portion of the Resolution, Annex
H, page 88 of the record.
17 Annex 28-A of Pendatun’s Answer, page 183 of the
record.
18 Page 27 of Pendatun’s Answer, page 124 of the
record.
19 Sangki vs. Comelec, L-28359, Dec. 26, 1967,
21 SCRA 1392; Estrada vs. Comelec, L-28374, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1514;
Demafelis v. Comelec, L-28396, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1462; Alonto vs.
Comelec, L-28296, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 878; Tagoranao v. Comelec,
L-28950, March 12, 1968, 22 SCRA 978; Kibad v. Comelec, L-28469, May 7,
1968, 23 SCRA 588; Ilarde v. Comelec, L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970.
20 G. R. No. L-2849, February 28, 1968.
21 G.R. No.L-31446, January 23, 1970.
22 Underscoring supplied.
23 Annexes J to J-11, K to K-13, L to L-2, M and N;
pages 228 to 258 of the record.
24 L-28359, Dec. 26, 1967; 21 SCRA 1392.
25 Underscoring, supplied.
26 The “averments” refer to the matters
mentioned in the affidavits.
27 See Certification of the results of elections from
1953 to 1967, inclusive, in Cotabato, issued by the Chief of the Statistics and
Election Records Division of the Comelec, attached as Annex 1 of Pendatun’s
Counter-Memorandum, dated Feb. 13, 1970. (Pages 330-331 of the record)
28 Annexes J to J-11, pp. 228 to 239 of the record.
29 Annexes K to K-13, pp. 240 to 251 of the record.
30 Quoted from page 22 of the petition, on page 22 of
the record.
31 Underscoring supplied. The word “therein” is underscored
to emphasize that the word refers to the whole election return.
32 Sangki vs. Comelec, supra; Tagoranao vs.
Comelec, supra; Kibad vs. Comelec, supra; and several
others.
33 Pacis v. Comelec, L-29026, September 28,
1968, 25 SCRA 377.
34 Underscoring supplied.
35 L-28517, February 21, 1968; 22 SCRA 662.
36 L-28455, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 539. This is the first Pacis case. The second Pacis is also herein cited.
37 L-28562, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 224.
38 L-31566, February 18, 1970.
39 Pacis v. Comelec, L-29026, September 28,
1968; 25 SCRA 377.
40 Cauton v. Comelec, L-15467, April 27, 1967;
19 SCRA 911.
41 Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, December 11,
1967; 21 SCRA 1204, 1213, citing Nacionalista Party v. Comelec, 85
Phil., 149, 157-158.
42 Resolution, Annex “H”, pp. 82-83 of the
record; as corrected by Comelec resolution of January 22, 1970. (See footnote 4a on page 14 of Answer of the
Comelec, on page 211 of the record).
43 See footnotes 14 and 15, ante.
44 See cases cited in footnote 17, ante.
45 See petition, pages 33 and 34 of the record.
46 Pages 14 and 15 of Resolution of January 19, 1970,
annex “H” to the petition, found on pages 81 and 82 of the record.
47 Annex G of the petition, page 67 of the record.
48 Annex 25, Pendatun’s Answer, page 176 of the
record. See also Comelec’s Answer, pages
198, 219-222 of the record.
49 Case Resolution No. RR-692, Annex “H” of
Sinsuat’s Petition; pp. 68, 71-74 of the record. Underscoring supplied.
50 Annex “E” to Sinsuat’s Petition, page 64
of the record.
51 Annex “F” to Sinsuat’s Petition; page 66
of the record.
52 Annex “G” of Sinsuat’s Petition; page 67
of the record. See footnotes 9 and 43, ante.
53 See footnote 2 on page 22 of Case Resolution No.
RR-692, Annex “H” of Sinsuat’s Petition; page 89 of the record.
54 Citing the decisions of this Court in the cases of
Cauton v. Comelec, supra; Espino v. Zaldivar, 21
SCRA, 1204, 1215-1216; and Ong v. Comelec, 22 SCRA, 241-249.)
55 Page 13 of the record. Underscoring supplied.
56 The second Pacis case. See footnote 29, ante.
57 Underscoring supplied.
58 Annex “H” to Sinsuat’s Petition, pp. 85,
86, 89 of the record.
59 See pp. 271, 274, 275 and 282 of the record.
60 See pp. 275 and 283 of the record.
61 Page 89 of the record.
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
The lengthy, intensely searching and painstaking analysis made by
Mr. Justice Zaldivar of the eight issues involved in
this case commends itself for serious and mature consideration. It is at once a tribute to the sagacity and
industry of our esteemed colleague and constitutes another incontestible
evidence not only of his passion for seeking the truth but also of his firm
determination not to render judgment on any matter unless he is certain of the
justice of his decision. He has
thoroughly scrutinized all pertinent aspects of the case before Us and has seen
to it that all his conclusions are buttressed by all possible arguments that
can support them. Accordingly, I find no
difficulty in agreeing with and concurring in his resolution of the following
issues:
1. That the Lagumbay ruling applies
to a single office. Indeed, there is
no plausible reason why the doctrine of statistical improbability enunciated in
the Lagumbay case, if applicable to a given return,
as herein-under explained, should not be applied to a single office involved
in the election referred to in the said return.
To the very convincing arguments already advanced by Mr. Justice Zaldivar, I can only add one observation to answer the
contention of distinguished counsel that even if a return may be false or
manufactured as to the senatorial candidates, it does not necessarily follow
that it is false also as to the candidates for a single office, in this case,
for congressman.
The true concept of a manufactured return is that it is prepared
without regard to the contents of the ballots cast in the precinct. More likely than not, the votes are not
counted at all and the return is filled up without any other basis than what
the ones preparing it wish to appear therein, or even if a count has been
made, the same is completely disregarded, so that if, in fact, the number of
votes entered therein purportedly for any candidate happens to be the same as
those actually cast for him, such would be a mere coincidence and not a
deliberate recording of such votes. In
these circumstances, it is easy to see that there could be no basis for giving
any of the votes entered in such return any prima facie value
separately from the rest thereof. Besides, if the intent and purpose to falsify
are there, it is inconceivable that any degree of loyalty to truth can still be
left lingering in the minds of the malefactors, particularly when, as in this
case, the lone candidate involved belongs to the same party as the senatorial
candidates favored by the falsification.
It must be emphasized that the only reason why an election return is
accorded prima facie status as evidence of the result of the
count of the votes in a precinct is because the same is prepared by election
inspectors who are specifically entrusted by the election law with the official
duty of counting and recording or entering the number of votes received by all
the candidates, hence it is to be presumed prima facie that such
official duty has been normally complied with.
Therefore, once it is evident that in violation of such official duty,
the inspectors have prepared a return that is purely a product of their fancy
and not factual, the reason for giving such return prima facie
value ceases as to the whole of it and as to all the votes entered therein.
2. That the “excess” of votes must be great to
warrant setting aside of return. I
also agree that the number of alleged “excess” votes appearing in the
returns for Precincts 10, 16, 27, 31 and 33 of Pikit
(The return for Precinct 15 is treated elsewhere in this opinion) are not as
great as to warrant the application thereto of the Mitchell precedent. I do note that of these five precincts, it
is only in Precinct 16 that respondent Pendatun
appears credited with any vote in excess of the number of voters who voted,
and, at that, by only one (1) vote. In
Precincts 10 and 33, the excess refers to the total of the votes for the two
vice-presidential candidates, 3 votes and 1 vote, respectively. In Precinct 37, the excess 28 votes are with
reference to the total of the votes for four candidates for member of the
provincial board, whereas in Precinct 31, there are only 19 votes appearing to
be in excess of the total votes for the senatorial candidates of the two major
parties, with Palmares, Sumulong
and Tamano getting 24, 4 and 4 excess votes each,
respectively. Definitely, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
results shown by said returns are palpably false, particularly as to the votes
of respondent Pendatun. These are instances which can readily be
explained as within the area of errors of computation or recording that not
very seldom occur due to the excitement and haste that quite often attend the
preparation and signing of the returns.
They may be grounds for correction but, surely, not of complete setting
aside of the returns. This is but a
reiteration of the rulings of this Court in Alonto v.
Comelec, 22 SCRA 878 and Ilarde
v. Comelec, C. R. No. L-31446, January 23, 1970.
3. That the matters referring to certain precincts should be
subject of further action by the Comelec. I also cannot find any reason to disagree
with the way Mr. Justice Zaldivar has disposed of the
matters relating to Precincts 54 of M’lang, 4-A of Maganoy and 31 of Dinaig. In order to avoid confusion, however, it is
perhaps better to clarify that as regards Precinct 54 of M’lang,
the decision of this Court is not only to affirm the portions of Comelec Case Resolution No. RR-692 referring to said
Precinct, but also to hold that the Provincial Treasurer’s copy of the
election return for said precinct, photostatic copy
of which has been furnished this Court, be used in the canvass herein
involved. The dispositive
part of the decision should be so understood.
4. As to the use of the Comelec copy
of the return for Precinct 15 of Pikit. I am also in agreement with the majority’s
resolution of the issue regarding the return for Precinct 15 of Pikit. While there
may really be some controversy as to what actually was the exact condition of
the Comelec copy of the return for said precinct on
December 24, 1969 when it was first examined by the Chairman and members of
the Commission as well as the parties or their counsel, there can be no doubt
as to what appears on the face of said copy as it is now, which in my view is
the fact that is decisive. Indeed, it
hardly needs any evidence aliunde for it to be
demonstrated and thereby determined by this Court.
It is contended by respondent that from the start, the theory of
the petitioner has always been that said Comelec copy
is clean and untampered and, as a matter of fact, it
is of record that such was the agreement and understanding of all the parties
and the Comelec commissioners as of said date
December 24, 1969. As if to throw the
corpse to petitioner’s side of the fence, respondent argues now that it was
only after petitioner had been permitted to photograph some returns, including
the one in question, and after having taken such photographs, which must have
been done after December 24th, that petitioner raised for the first time the
present issue of alleged tampering of said copy. In other words, respondent is insinuating,
if not actually charging, that, if it is true that said return appears now to
have evidence of tampering, petitioner cannot be entirely free from suspicion
of having had something to do with such tampering. At any rate, the main point of respondent is
that inasmuch as the Comelec has found as a fact that
the Comelec copy in question was clean and untampered on December 24, 1969 and petitioner had always
been insisting that said copy should be the one used, there is no alternative
but to use said copy because petitioner is in estoppel
to pretend otherwise.
To be sure, I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Comelec copy should be used in the canvass. What needs to be clarified is, which of the
two numbers of votes for respondent both appearing legible in said copy, 250
and 700, should be considered as the legitimate one for the respondent, it
being unquestionable that although as found by the Comelec,
the said copy was clean and untampered on December
24th, as it now appears, there are erasures, alterations and superimpositions
therein, and as to which of these figures superimpose the other, the only data
from which any conclusion can be drawn are those contained in the report of the
Comelec committee created for the express purpose of
examining the same, which report is textually as follows:
“For Prec. No. 15, Pikit, Cotabato, copy for the Comelec, bearing Serial No. 47177, the following observations
are made:
“1. On Data on Voters –
“With respect to the entry on the number of voters registered
in precinct, it is noted that there are erasures made in the original entry
which with a magnifying glass could be read as 692. The words in the original entry ‘six hundred
ninety-two’ six and ninety-two have been erased. Over the word ‘six’ is written the word
‘seven’. In the total number in figures
the original entry 692 could also be discerned and over which is superimposed
the figure 700. In the entry on the
number of voters who actually voted the original entry has been erased but
which could still be read as ‘two hundred fifty’. It is observed that in the original entry in
words ‘two’ and ‘fifty’ in words, have been erased and over the word ‘two’ is
superimposed the word seven’. In the
entry on total number in figures there appears to have been a superimposition
over the original entry which could not be appreciated with certainty. The superimposed figures written in 700.
“2. On Data on Ballots –
“In the entry on data on ballots, in the space ballots
found in the compartment entry appears to have been erased and over which was
written the words ‘four hundred fifty’.
It is also observed that over the superimposed entry is written the
words ‘two hundred fifty plus’. In the
entry on total number in figures the original entry which could be read as 250
has been erased and over which is written that figure 700. In the entry for valid ballots withdrawn from
the compartment for spoiled ballots, for having been mistakenly placed therein
it appears in the entry on total number in words the word ‘none’ has been
written. However, with respect to the entry
in total number in figure the original entry which could be read as 1 appears
to have been erased and the figures 0 was written.
“3. For the Office
of Representative in the entry for the votes for candidate Salisada Pendatun the original
entry a ears to have been erased in that the r words ‘two’ and ‘fifty’ have
been erased and over the word ‘two’ is written the word ‘seven’. The original entry could be read however
and ‘two hundred fifty’ as altered reads ‘seven hundred’. In the total votes obtained in figures the
original entry which could be read as 250 has been erased and over which is
written the figure 700.
“The Committee also observes that the election return for Prec. No. 15, Pikit, Cotabato, copy for the Comelec,
contains alterations in the entries not only on the data on voters, data on ballots,
and votes for the Office of Representative as stated above but also for the
Office of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Special Election for Members
of the Provincial Board, with respect to the votes of candidates Osmeña, Lopez, Ganzon, Ilarde, Liwag, Mañalac, Padilla, Roxas, Sagun, Ziga and Buenaflor, all of which erasures or alterations are not
authenticated by any initials of any members of the Board of Inspectors. It is
observed also that both the election returns, copy for Provincial Treasurer and
for the Comelec, bear the signatures of the members
of the board of inspectors which upon comparison of both copies appears to be
similar. The same observation is made
with respect to the envelopes and seals of both election returns.”
” –Annex ‘F’, Petition, at pp. 2-4, underscoring
supplied.”
In the light of these facts which I consider to be undisputable
because they can be readily perceived in the document itself which has the
nature of real evidence, (If the Comelec had only
granted petitioner’s motion that it be re-examined, the matter now in issue
would have been settled then and there.) the real issue for the Court to
determine is t really whether or not the said Comelec
copy should be used. Rather, the
questions the Court must decide are: (1) did the Comelec
commit a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re-examine the Comelec copy in question, having in view the tendency of
the above-quoted report submitted by the committee it had created to
investigate the same, and (2) what was the number of votes for respondent Pendatun shown on said copy when the honorable
commissioners examined it on December 24th?
Was it 250 or 700? Surely, since
the Comelec is certain that the said copy was clean
and untampered with at that time, only one of these
two figures now appearing therein must have been the one there then. Which was it?
The truth is that on this particular point, there is no direct
testimonial evidence extant in the record.
I have carefully read the transcript of the proceedings below, portions
of which are quoted in the opinion of Mr. Justice Zaldivar. Nowhere therefrom
can the above question be answered.
Very importantly to be noted is that what is very clear from the remarks
of Commissioner Patajo, sanctioned seemingly by the
silence of the other two commissioners, is that when the said copy was
examined by them on December 24th, there were no alterations or erasures
thereon and that the Commissioner was most emphatic in pointing out that the
danger in allowing a re-examination of the document lay in the danger that a
bad precedent would be created whereby the door would be opened for
opportunity for parties to make alterations on documents after the Comelec has already examined them and found them to be
clean and unaltered. In other words, the
position of the Commissioners is that once they have seen a return or a copy
thereof and have found it to be clean and untampered,
particularly, when they have done so in the presence of the parties, it is
improper to ask them to reexamine the same in order to determine whether or not
it is in reality a tampered one, on the ground, as We gather it, principally,
of estoppel, albeit Mr. Justice Zaldivar
would add that it would amount to casting doubt as to the integrity and
veracity of the commissioners. What is
overlooked, however, is that what was more important does not appear to have
been done by the Comelec or by any of the parties on
December 24th and, that is, to make of record what was the “clean and untampered” number of votes of respondent shown in
the copy in question when it was examined by all of them on that momentous date
of December 24th, whether it was 250 or 700.
If this Court has to be procedurally technical, the proper thing
to do is to return this case to the Comelec for a
specific finding of fact on this point.
Even if it were possible to apply estoppel to
petitioner, which We seriously doubt can be done, considering that this is an
election case, (but We do not deem it necessary to make here any express
holding to that effect) the estoppel should be as to
number of votes of respondent which appeared on said copy on December 24th, and
that is precisely what the Comelec did not determine
when it denied the re-examination. We
opt, however, not to insist on procedural technicalities. We hold that the above quoted report of the Comelec committee furnishes enough basis for a safe
conclusion which, after all, cannot be altered even if We return this case to
the Comelec.
Besides, it is still uncertain whether or not the number of votes involved
in this question will affect the result of the election in question, and since
the result in said Precinct 15 is not the only one involved in this case, We
feel it is better that this Court resolve the point under discussion now even
without complying with such technicality.
From the above-quoted report of the Comelec
committee, the conclusion is inescapable that the original figures entered on
the Comelec copy in question before the same were
altered showed that respondent Pendatun obtained
only 250 votes. The report is definite
to the effect that the number 700 visible therein is a superimposed one. This is true, not only as to entry of the
number of votes for respondent, as already stated, but also as to the number of
registered voters, the number of voters who actually voted and the number of
ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots. And the obvious super impositions do not
appear only over figures but also over the corresponding numbers in words,
except as to the entry of the number of ballots found in the compartment for
valid ballots, as to which there was not only the superimposition of the words
“four hundred fifty” over an erasure, but there is also the detail
that the words “two hundred fifty plus” also appear written above the
superimposition. The report is also
consistent to the effect that all the erased original figures which are still
legible indicate that the respective entries read two hundred fifty in words
and in figures, not only for the votes of respondent but also for all the other
items aforementioned, except the number of registered voters which is 692.
All things considered, no other conclusion is really possible
except that the number of votes of respondent originally entered in the Comelec copy for Precinct 15 of Pikit
was 250 and that the board of canvassers should use in the canvass this
original figure and not the 700 which has been superimposed over it.
5, 6, and 7. The other issues relative to the application of
the Lagumbay decision as to pattern of manufactured
return. The rest of the issues involve in one way or another the alleged
applicability or inapplicability of what is repeatedly being referred to as the
Lagumbay doctrine regarding the pattern of voting
which denotes manufacturing.
To have a better perspective for our discussion of these issues,
it is perhaps best to start with a clarification of what is this that is being
repeatedly referred to as the Lagumbay doctrine. In truth, the real doctrine basically
involved in these issues is the one laid down in the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Comelec
wherein the case of Mitchell vs. Stevens was cited with approval. The Lagumbay
decision was only an application of the doctrine already formulated in those
previously mentioned cases.
Substantially and in essence, the doctrine may be stated as follows: Any
election return which on the basis exclusively of data found on its face
appears to be obviously and patently false is nothing but a manufactured return
which should not be accorded any prima facie value as evidence
of the result of the count and should be disregarded in the canvass. Thus, in the Mitchell case, the data appearing
in the return of a precinct showing that the votes credited to a candidate was
greatly in excess (by over 2,000) of the number of registered voters in said
precinct, as shown in the same return itself, was considered as a manufactured
return and disregarded in the canvass.
In the Lagumbay case, the 100% pattern of
voting for all the candidates of one major national party and the complete
systematic blanking of all the candidates of the other major national party,
appearing on the face of all the returns from 50 precincts, was considered as giving
rise to the presumption that said returns were false and manufactured, such a
pattern of voting being regarded by this Court as something statistically
improbable. In other words, the
conclusion of falsity in the Lagumbay case was a mere
inference drawn from the utter improbability, statistically speaking, of the
pattern of voting shown in the returns therein involved.
There can be no question as to the wisdom and timeliness of the Lagumbay decision. As the Court said, “Hence, denying prima
facie recognition to such returns on the ground that they are manifestly
fabricated or falsified, would constitute a practical approach to the Comelec’s missions to insure free and honest
election”. (See p. 28 of the main opinion) It is important to note,
however, that inspite of this characterization, this
Court has taken care not to apply the same ruling in any other case that has
come before it since then. This attitude
of the Court is evidently due to the fact that the Court is aware that an
election return is in itself only a presumptive document embodying no more
than a legal presumption of correctness in the appreciation of the ballots and
the counting and tallying of the votes made by the inspectors, for if it were
not so, and it were, on the other hand, a conclusive document, electoral
protests and electoral courts and tribunals would have no reason for
being. Hence, the Court has chosen to be
very restrictive in holding that a return is manifestly fabricated. After all, the basis of the Lagumbay doctrine is also nothing more than a presumption
arising, if inescapably, from the face of the return itself. The difference between these two presumptions
is that whereas the first presumption is a legal one, the second is only one of
fact. To set aside the legal presumption
of correctness of the count borne by an election return by means alone of a
presumption of fact is, of course, something that is obviously delicate and
extremely dangerous. From the very
nature of these two presumptions, the one of fact has to yield to the legal
one, if only because the latter is ordained by law, and this is particularly
more logical whenever any reasonable indication exists that the factual
presumption may not be altogether valid.
Applying these considerations to the case at bar, We hold that the test
of statistical improbability applied in the Lagumbay
case as basis for the presumption that the returns therein involved were
fabricated or manufactured has not been successfully hurdled in this case.
It is indeed not accurate to say that the factual setting of the
present case is on all fours with that of Lagumbay. True, the pattern of voting in both cases is
identical, but unlike in the Lagumbay case where the
Court searched in vain for any explanation of the apparent statistical
improbability of the questioned returns, here, in this case, there are
explanations which more or less justify the pattern of voting shown in the
returns herein involved. These
explanations are found not only in the affidavits presented by petitioner and
discussed in the appealed resolution but also in the information furnished the
Court during the oral argument. Whereas
in the Lagumbay case, the Court was left guessing as
to what happened to the votes of the Nacionalista
inspectors in the precincts where Lagumbay and the
other Nacionalista candidates got zero, in the case
at bar, there are affidavits of the inspectors concerned as well as of other
persons explaining why they did not vote for the Liberal candidates.. At the oral argument, circumstances were
revealed by petitioner and not sufficiently denied, in my opinion, by
respondent indicating that the results appearing in the returns are not
improbable.
Respondent suggests, of course, that this Court pay no heed to
those explanations. The majority opinion
makes a long and admirable discourse on the inadmissibility of the affidavits
relied upon by petitioner. It seems to
me, however, that respondent’s posture in this regard is off tangent. Under the doctrine of manufactured returns, as
I have already pointed out above, it is my view that it is not necessary to
inquire as to whether or not the explanation offered to destroy the presumption
of fabrication is entirely true or not.
The only question to determine is whether or not such an explanation is
such a reasonable one that if proven to be true, it would be sufficient to
offset the presumption of fraud arising from the data on the return. As long as there are indicia of evidence to
support the explanation, the better rule is to disregard the presumption of
fraud and recognize the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty informing the return and leave it to the corresponding electoral
tribunal to determine, as in any other case, whether or not the return is
indeed falsified. In other words, since
the putting up of a factual presumption against a legal presumption would
naturally leave the Court in an uncharted sea of conjectures and because this
dangerous venture does not square with the requirements of such a pragmatic
matter like the determination of who has been given the popular mandate in an
election, it is no doubt the safer course to take that whenever there is
anything in the record or from the information duly given to the Court which,
if true, can serve to explain a unique or peculiar manner of voting which
bears earmarks of presumptive fraud, the effort should not be towards
minimizing the explanation, as respondent would want this Court to do, but
rather, towards giving due regard to the explanation, if it is feasibly
demonstrable and evidence, admissible in character, is shown to be available to
prove the same. In short, resort to the
presumption of fraud should only be a last recourse.
Apropos to this discussions are the following considerations on
which this Court, thru our venerated present Chief Justice, predicated its
decision in the recent case of Rasid Lucman v. Macacuna Dimaporo, G. R. No. L-31558, May 29, 1970:
“Petitioner impugns the foregoing conclusion upon the ground
that: (1) the affidavits for Respondent are inadmissible as hearsay evidence,
because the affiants could not be cross-examined, the Commission having refused
to summon them, despite timely motions filed by Petitioner; (2) the testimony
of the election registrar is unworthy of credence; (3) the affidavits for the
Petitioner include those of some members of the PC and CNEA watchers, which
are supported by the report of the Special Action Team of the Commission, and,
hence, should be accorded much weight; (4) the presumption of regularity is
inapplicable to the case at bar; and (5) the returns for Precincts Nos. 3, 4-B
and 15 of Balabagan had been excluded by the
Commission in its canvass of the returns for senators, as obviously manufactured.
“The first ground relied upon by Petitioner is untenable, for:
“(a) The records
show that the Commission had indicated its intention to determine the case on
the basis of the affidavits and the documentary evidence introduced by the
parties and that it was with such understanding that Respondent filed
affidavits in his favor and did not object to those made for Petitioner herein.
“(b) Petitioner’s objection would be plausible if
the Commission were a court of justice or could determine and settle with
finality the issue of fact raised in connection with the returns for the municipality
of Balabagan. The Commission has no such authority. Hence, when, upon denial of Petitioner’s
motions for the issuance of subpoenae to the affiants
for Respondent herein, Petitioner instituted Case No. L-31430 of this Court –
to compel the Commission, by mandamus, to inter alia,
issue the aforementioned subpoenae – We forthwith
dismissed the petition therein and, soon thereafter, denied Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of our resolution of dismissal of the case.
“Indeed, in connection with the canvass of the returns for
the office of member of the House of Representatives for Lanao
del Sur, the functions of its Provincial Board of
Canvassers is purely ministerial in nature.
In fact, in his original petition for exclusion, filed with the Board,
petitioner quoted from Dimafiles v. Comelec (L-28396, December 29, 1967):
‘A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function – that
of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the returns transmitted
to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections: “the
canvassers are to be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns – namely,
that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that they are returns,
and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so satisfied, x x x they may not reject
any returns because of informalities in them or because of illegal and
fraudulent practices in the elections.”‘
“Equally ministerial, therefore, is the function of the
Commission, in the exercise of its supervisory power over said Board, pursuant
to our Constitution and laws. (Sec. 2,
Article X of the Constitution and section 2 of R.A. No. 180.) There being no
law vesting in either the power to decide and settle the question whether the
election returns of given precincts have been prepared without counting the
votes cast therein, their views in connection therewith, whatever they may be,
do not foreclose the subsequent determination of that question in the
corresponding election protest, if any.
So long as the election returns have been accomplished in due form, the
Board, and, on appeal therefrom, the Commission, must
include said returns in the canvass.
“(c) Lagumbay v. Comelec, supra, presented a preculiar
situation. Two (2) sets of returns were
involved therein. In the first set, ‘in
each precinct the number of registered voters equalled
the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for
each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas,
all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly
zero; and in the second set x x x all the reported votes were for candidates of the Liberal
Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes
in each precinct; x x x
whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party
were given exactly zero in all said precincts.’ As a consequence, this
Court held that said returns were ‘obviously manufactured,’ contrary to
all statistical probabilities,’ ‘utterly improbable and clearly
incredible.’ It should be noted that
this was not strictly an issue of fact.
Indeed, the main elements essential to its determination appeared on
the face of the returns themselves.
In other words, there was no dispute as regards such
elements. The dispute boiled down to the
proper conclusion to be drawn therefrom, and, hence,
it partook of the nature of a question of law. (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257, 269-27n; Cunanan v. Lazatin,
74 Phil. 719, 724; Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15.)
What is more,in the view of this Court, that
conclusion was clear, obvious, manifest, and indubitable.
“Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar. The irregularity pointed out by the
Petitioner is denied by Respondent, thereby raising a purely factual
question. Instead of settling the same,
the affidavits submitted by both parties merely stressed the contentious
nature of the issue. Moreover, the same
could not have been wiped out or even minimized by the presence and cross-
examination of the affiants for Respondent, had they appeared before the
Commission. In other words, unlike the
condition of the returns involved in the Lagumbay
case – which this Court considered incontestable – that existing as
regards the returns for Balabagan is clearly a very
controversial one, which the Commission has no power to decide with
finality.
“(d) The
Commission could not, moreover, summon the affiants for Respondent, without
granting him the same right to examine the affiants for Petitioner. This would have entailed a full-dress
elucidation of the aforementioned issue of fact, which, after all, the
Commission cannot settle authoritatively.
Worse still, it would create a situation fraught with possibilities, inimical
to the spirit of the laws establishing boards of canvassers.
“It is well settled that the same are meant, not only to
discharge purely ministerial duties, based upon returns submitted
thereto in due form, but, also, to perform this function summarily, so
that winning candidates could assume their office on the date set for the
commencement of their term. The main
role of the Commission in connection therewith is to see to it that such
objective be carried out. The theory
advanced by petitioner herein would, however, induce the candidates who are
likely to lose, on the basis of said returns, to raise questions of fact
requiring the introduction of testimonial evidence thereon. If sustained, its effect would be to delay,
far beyond the time envisaged by law, the proclamation of the winning
candidates and their assumption of office, thereby depriving the people, in the
meanwhile, of the representation they are entitled to. Again, there would be an unnecessary duplication
of the proceedings peculiar to election protests, with the consequent
possibility of having different results and the serious dangers concomitant
therewith.”
Moreover, in my opinion, the affidavits offered by petitioner
are not really as worthless as respondent pictures them to be. The fact that they are of one style or
wording is nothing unusual, since in actual practice, the words of an affidavit
are not necessarily those of the affiant and when the same matter is to be
attested to, almost invariably, the affidavits of several persons appear to be
identical mutatis mutandis, without minimizing in any significant
degrees their intrinsic worth for the purpose for which they have been
prepared) and the fact that they were taken even before this case arose only
proves that petitioner had anticipated the possibility which has in fact
materialized that the pattern of voting in the precincts concerned would be
likened to that in the Lagumbay case. It was only natural, therefore, for
petitioner to prepare the ground for the position he would take and which he
has now taken. That the affidavits seem
to be irregular because of abnormalities in the data regarding the residence
certificates of the affiants and the numbers of entries in the notarial registers of the notaries public before whom they
are supposed to have been subscribed and sworn to, and even the fact that
copies thereof were served very late upon respondent’s counsel do not really affect
their inherent veracity. As a matter of
fact, their truthfulness has not been challenged by respondent with any
counter-affidavits even up to this date.
What is vital is that those affidavits exist unrebutted.
In the Sangki case, this Court held:
“In Lagumbay, there was uncertainty
as to what happened to the vote of the Nacionalista
Party inspector in the disputed precincts, because the absence of his vote was
unexplained. Here, respondent Pendatun explained, through affidavits of a good number of
the Nacionalista Party inspectors themselves
attached to his answer, that some did not vote because they were not able to
register as voters; that two Nacionalista Party
inspectors in Pagalungan did not vote for candidates Sangki and Saludo but for the
Liberal Party candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor because they ‘are more
qualified than the former two who are foreign to our Municipality’; and that
other Nacionalista Party inspectors believed that
the Liberal Party candidates ‘are more qualified than the Nacionalista
Party candidates.’ These averments,
we are constrained to say, reduce this particular point to a question of fact“. [21 SCRA 1395-1396] (Underscoring Ours)
The real import of this last statement is
that when affidavits are offered in support of an explanation that will do away
with the presumption of fabrication, the issue becomes one of actual, and not
presumptive, fact, hence, the factual presumption must be laid aside and the
issue of fact must be resolved no longer by the board of canvassers nor by the Comelec, but by the appropriate electoral tribunal. As far as the canvassers are concerned, the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the inspectors
must prevail and the return must be read as is.
At this juncture, it is also relevant to consider that by its
very nature, the concept of statistical improbability is one that is rather
relative, depending on the circumstances of time, place and person as these are
judicially cognizable at the moment of its invocation. Before Columbus,
the idea that the world is round was almost a heresy. Even more, references to the whole earth in
the Roly scriptures, particularly the Old Testament,
may not be reconciled with what is actually known as the world today. The man on the moon was merely a poetic expression
not so long ago. Man’s conduct and
attitudes vis-a-vis his fellowmen have never been
constant. Political ideologies,
principles and parties and adherence and loyalties thereto are as variable as
the demands of the people’s welfare dictate.
Alliances among men and nations depend on changes of circumstances not
always foreseeable. The United States
and Russia were allies in the last world war, only to be apparently
irreconcilable enemies today, while Japan whom Americans compelled to surrender
as a hated militaristic totalitarian state is presently one of Uncle Sam’s
closest nephews even in the absorption, at least, apparently, of democratic
ideals. In the very area of politics
which is under discussion, President Nixon confounded dopesters
who foretold political doom for him after his defeat in the gubernatorial
elections in California in
1966. Our own President Marcos did an
unbelievable feat in winning not only a re-election but by being the first re-electionist to capture Manila,
the seat of the opposition. As Senator Tolentino once remarked to this Court, in the politics of
our country, what was improbable in 1965 may yet be the thing most probable
today. The point is that extreme care
must be taken in adopting any presumption of improbability in electoral matters
and only whenever every probable or demonstrable possibility has been discarded
must it be accepted. Come to think of
it, it would not be illogical to realize that the Lagumbay
case, adjudged as it was, and ought to be understood as it must be always, as
predicated on its own peculiar and particular circumstances, is not only the
one of its kind until now but the only one that will ever be.
I need not dwell at length on the other cases discussed by the
respondent and also in the majority opinion.
Suffice it to say at this point that, as observed by the Mr. Justice Zaldivar, in all of them, this Court refused to apply the
doctrine under discussion, for the simple reason that in all of those cases,
the statistical improbability alleged to exist had reference to excess of votes
which could not be considered really great or to patterns of voting less than
100% for one party and 100% against another.
The present case is indeed the first one wherein the pattern of voting
is identical to that in the Lagumbay case, but, as I
have pointed out earlier, the difference between the two cases lies in that
here, unlike in the Laaumbay case, there are
indications of substantial and reasonable evidence of facts which if true would
remove the props of the factual presumption of improbability.
Anent these explanations, another question that arises is as to
whether they must appear on the face of the return itself or they may be based
on evidence aliunde or on facts found outside
of the return. Of course, it must be the
latter, for if the explanation is apparent on the face of the return, then
there could not be any seeming or presumed improbability evident in the return
itself. Thus in the case of Estrada vs.
Navarro, L-28340 and L-28374, December 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1514, this Court
refused to draw the conclusion that the return therein in question was
manufactured notwithstanding that the data appearing on its face bore enough
indications of excess votes on the ground that the minutes of voting justified
a contrary conclusion. As can be
observed, the minutes of voting to which the Court referred was a document
distinct from and outside of the return.
This was the same ruling conversely stated in the case of Demafiles v. Comelec, Ts-28396,
Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1962. In that
case, this Court held that the conclusion of statistical improbability must be
drawn from data found in the return itself and not from external evidence. It is thus clear that the rejection by this
Court of evidence aliunde is not of evidence
that would prove an explanation offered to destroy the factual presumption of
fraud but of evidence that is intended to serve as basis for such factual
presumption. Naturally, this Court had
to rule that in the latter case, the evidence cannot be entertained, for the
obvious reason that the doctrine of manufactured return refers to a presumption
that arises exclusively from data on the face of the return. On the other hand, the Court has allowed
evidence aliunde to rebut the factual
presumption of fabrication, as in the Estrada case, for the reasons I have
already discussed, the most important of which is to remove the basis of the
proclamation as far as possible from speculation, and, if necessary, to use
only those presumptions which are expressly provided by law. In the Estrada case, supra, this Court
said:
“G.R. No. L-28374. This
is a petition for review of an order of the Commission on Elections involving
the election return in precinct No. 94 of San Juan,
Rizal. Petitioner applied to the Commission for an
order directing the municipal board of canvassers to reject or disregard the
said return on the ground that it was ‘clearly manufactured.’ Reliance is placed on the decision of this
Court in the case of Lagumbay vs. Commission on
Elections, G. R. No. L-25444, January
31, 1966. The return in
question shows the following data:
“Number of voters registered in precinct ………. Four hundred nine …………. 409
“Number of voters who actually voted …………. Two hundred twenty-nine …. 229
“Ballots found in compartment for valid ballots .…. Three
hundred ……………… 300
“The same election return shows the following number of votes
received by the various candidates for Mayor, to wit:
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“It is claimed by petitioner that the return is obviously
manufactured, considering that while there were only 229 voters who actually
voted 300 ballots were found in the box for valid ballots. Upon its face the claim would seem clear and
irrefutable, for it is mathematically impossible for 229 voters to cast 300
valid votes, or 298 votes in the aggregate for the four contending candidates
for the position of Municipal Mayor.
“However, a conclusion that an election return is obviously
manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass
must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most convincing
proof. The decision in the Lagumbay case speaks of ‘inherent improbability’ in the
data shown on the return. Any plausible explanation,
one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of
the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification,
with the resulting disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. In this case there is such an explanation. The minutes of voting prepared and signed by
the election inspectors in precinct No. 94 show that the total number who voted
is two hundred ninety-nine (299), in both words and figures, and that of the 30n
ballots in the box for valid ballots one (1) was found to be marked and placed
in the envelope for ‘marked ballots’.
These minutes of voting constitute an official document, accomplished
pursuant to Section 142 of the Revised Election Code. It is a fair presumption that the number of
229 entered in the election return as the number of those who actually voted is
a mere clerical error, and that the correct figure is 299 as shown in the
minutes of voting. The correctness of
this figure is supported by the other entries in the return, and by the fact
that the sum total of the votes counted for the four candidates for Municipal
Mayor is 298, with one ballot rejected and placed in the envelope for marked
ballots.
“Everything considered, we find no justifiable ground on
which the return in question may be annulled.” (Pp. 1519-1520)
Upon these considerations, it is our considered view and
conclusion that the Comelec erred or abused its discretion
in sanctioning the rejection by the board of canvassers of the returns of the
22 precincts in question. If I hold that
taking all relevant circumstances into account, particularly the explanations
offered by petition, this case may be differentiated from the Lagumbay case and so, the said 22 returns should be canvassed
as they are.
Coming now to the returns from Precinct 6 of Upi
and Precincts 13-A, 14, 19 and 23 of Datu Piang which the Comelec refused
to consider as falling within the doctrine of manufactured returns, I have a
different view, except as to 23. In the
22 precincts involved in our previous discussion, we held that the Lagumbay doctrine is not applicable because although a
pattern of presumptive fraudulent voting is discernible on the faces of the
returns therefor, petitioner has offered reasonable
and substantial explanations which, in our opinion, suffice to rebut such
presumption of fabrication. With regard
to the precincts now in question, not a single affidavit has been offered by
either of the parties. We note, however,
that in Precinct 23, according to Annexes 27 and 27-D of respondent, there was
no 100% voting for any party, so the Comelec
resolution regarding the same should stand.
The Comelec held that the Lagumbay ruling is not applicable to the said returns only
because instead of a 100% voting for all the candidates of one party as
against that of another, what appears is that two or three candidates of the Nacionalista Party or the Liberal Party, as the case may
be, received the same votes as the candidates of the opposing party, at the
sacrifice, of course, of two or three corresponding candidates of the other who
were not credited with any vote. To my
mind, this pattern of voting is even more statistically improbable than the
100% voting for one party in the Lagumbay case. I maintain that if it is well nigh
impossible to make all the voters of one precinct vote for the straight ticket
of one party, it is next to impossible to make them vote for a straight ticket
of candidates of different party affiliations, particularly if the variations
refer exactly to the same candidates.
Thus, how can it be believed, in the absence of any factually
demonstrable explanation, that each and everyone of the 221 voters who voted in
Precinct 19 of Datu Piang
had decided to vote uniformly for the presidential and vice presidential
candidates of the Liberal Party, the Nacionalista
candidate for member of the provincial board and the same six Liberal
senatorial candidates, namely, Cases, Ganzon, Liwag, Roxas, Sagun
and Ziga and abandon the same two other Liberals, Ilarde and Mañalac, in favor of
the same two Nacionalista candidates Palmares and Tamano? To top it all, this happened not only in one
precinct, but in three precincts.[1]
The voting appearing on the face of the return from Precincts 6
and 35 of Upi follow the same pattern in the reverse. In these returns, there were two Liberal
senatorial candidates joined with six Nacionalistas. The same result must follow, except that with
respect to Precinct 35, it is to be noted that the objection to the action of
the board of canvassers was not prosecuted in the Comelec,
much less in this Court.
I, therefore, vote to reverse the ruling of the respondent Comelec as to Precinct 6 of Upi
and Precincts 13-A, 14 and 19 of Datu Piang, without prejudice to the parties offering reasonably
probable and demonstrable evidence, before the canvass is finished, of any
explanation that can overthrow the factual presumption of improbability.
8. May the Comelec order the
preparation of another return?
The next question to resolve is one of the gravest
importance. Assuming that the Lagumbay doctrine applies to the 22 returns above referred
to, can the board of canvassers prepare a certificate of canvass in complete
disregard of the possible result of the election in said precincts? In other words, can the board of canvassers
omit altogether in its canvass, the votes cast in those precincts? Generalizing the question, should the votes
in a precinct be ignored in a canvass only because the return therefor has been so illegally prepared that its contents
cannot be given prima facie value or should a proper return be
ordered prepared for the purposes of the canvass? If the overall outcome of the election for
congressman herein involved cannot be affected by such possible precinct
results, it may perhaps be easy to simply say that in the interest of the
speedy announcement of the results of the election, it would not be of any
legal consequence to pay no attention to the said votes. It is a fact, however, that such result will
be very materially altered, so it is imperative that we determine the right
answer.
Respondent contends that since in the Lagumbay
case the 50 precincts involved were not included in the canvass after the
returns therefor were found to have been fabricated,
the 22 precincts herein involved should suffer the same fate, as if that
decision had established a binding precedent on the matter. The truth, however, is that it did not.
As a matter of fact,
strictly speaking, this issue was not passed upon in the Lagumbay
decision nor even discussed in it.
Respondent’s counsel himself observes that it was already in the motion
for reconsideration of the minute-without-prejudice-resolution of this Court
declaring the questioned returns invalid that Climaco’s
counsel raised for the first time the issue that instead of merely disregarding
the fabricated returns and excluding the precincts concerned from the canvass,
the corresponding boards of inspectors should be reconvened and ordered to
prepare new returns. As already
indicated, however, in the extended opinion of this Court which also denied Climaco’s motion for reconsideration, not even a passing
mention was made of this argument.
Looking back, we can only say that the Court must have felt inclined to
leave things as they were after the promulgation of the
minute-without-prejudice-resolution because at the time the motion for
reconsideration was resolved on January 31, 1966, Senator Lagumbay
had already been proclaimed, in virtue precisely of the said resolution, and
had furthermore taken the oath and assumed office, and consequently, the whole
matter of the legality of his election, including, naturally, this particular
question, had already fallen more appropriately within the competence and jurisdiction
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. How
then can it be rightly said that in this case the court has no alternative but
to follow the Lagumbay “precedent”? To attribute doctrinal value or the effect of
a binding precedent to the silence of the Court on a matter of transcendental
importance is not in keeping with the dignity and authority supposed to inform
decisions of tribunals of last resort. It is extremely improper to speculate
regarding the mind of the Court as to matters on which it has not made any
express ruling.
Indeed, under these circumstances, it would be tantamount to
judicial dereliction for this Court to hold that the door is already closed to
this Court to now rule squarely on such a grave issue of far-reaching
significance, considering specially that, to paraphrase an observation of Mr.
Chief Justice Bengzon in the Lagumbay
decision, the point is being pressed upon Us now in a more clear-cut manner,
as never before. Withal, what should
weigh heavily upon Us as a self-imposed responsibility is that by the trend of
our decisions subsequent to the Lagumbay case, this
Court has leaned towards a more practical, more expeditious and less technical
approach to the solution of electoral cases, with the end in view of striking
at the root of all controversies sans non-fundamental technicalities of
procedure, thereby effectuating as speedily as possible the apparent will of
the electorate and, as importantly, also giving flesh and bone to the necessary
power and jurisdiction of the Comelec as the body
entrusted by the constitution with the sacred duty of making elections in this
country free, peaceful and orderly, and by clear implication, genuine and not
a mockery, whenever all these can be achieved by it without encroaching into or
corroding the equally constitutionally allocated jurisdiction of the
corresponding electoral tribunals. Be it
remembered that the Lagumbay case was decided in 1965
and 1966; thereafter, We decided the case of Pacis[2]
on February 10, 1968 and hardly two weeks later, on February 21, 1968, that of Mutuc[3]. These are the cases that are really relevant
to the present issue, because in them, Our decisions picked up, as it were,
from where Lagumbay was unable to proceed because of
the jurisdictional reason already stated.
It is by the examination of these decisions, including the one lately
of Tiglao[4],
that tie can clearly see the trail We have been since pursuing. Indeed, how did this Court approach the issue
now before Us subsequent to Lagumbay?
It is to be admitted that in the second Pacis
case, there was no order for the board of inspectors of Precinct 22 to prepare
a new return notwithstanding that the return first prepared by them was found
to have been filled up at gun point. It
is obvious, however, that under the facts of that case, no new count could be
made, for the simple reason that the contents of the ballot box involved had
already been tampered with. According to
the Comelec resolution in that case, “[n]either
would it be of any help if the ballot box will be opened and we were to look
for other election documents, since the tally sheet and the tally board were
missing and the ballot box itself was left open from the morning of November
15, 1967 up to the afternoon of November 16, 1967”. Naturally, a new count would not have served
any legitimate purpose and would have been improper, even if judicially
undertaken (Resolution, Chiongbian vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L-19202, February 20, 1962).
Nevertheless, this Court already gave an emphatic indication of the
efforts that should be made when copies of the election return are found to be
unserviceable. The following words of
Mr. Justice Sanchez, speaking for the Court, should never be lost sight of,
full of wisdom, principle and practicality, as they are:
“1. Comelec’s broad power under the Constitution and the
statutes has gained judicial approval.
The rationale is that Comelec is entrusted
with the ‘enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections’ and the authority to decide ‘all administrative questions, affecting
elections’ – all of which rest upon the purpose of Comelec:
to insure free, orderly and honest elections.
(Sec. 2, Article X, Constitution).
Indeed, the diversity of election frauds and anomalies that have been
concocted by rival parties, surpassing legislative anticipation and scuttling
the prescribed manner of conducting elections, necessitate resort to Comelec’s general power of administration and supervision.
“This Court has set down the rule that when returns are
obviously manufactured or palpably irregular, the canvassing board may reject
them (Tagoranao vs. Commission on Elections, L-28590
and Cota Cornell vs. Commission on Elections,
L-28598, March 2, 1968, 1968A Phil. 806, 813; Ong vs.
Commission on Elections, L-28415, January
29, 1968, 1968A Phil. 248, 254, citing Nacionalista
Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149, 157, 158, and Lagumbay vs. Climaco, L-25444, January 31, 1966). The board’s decision is open to review by Comelec which has the power to investigate irregularities
and to act upon the propriety or legality of the canvass made by the board (Espino vs. Zaldivar, L-22325,
December 11, 1967, 1967D Phil. 670, 681, 684, and citations therein). But it is to be emphasized, this power to
reject returns must be exercised with ‘extreme caution’ (Tagoranao
vs. Commission on Elections, supra.).
Popular will must not be suppressed at the slightest cause.
“‘Clean elections’, we have said in the first Pacis case, ‘control the appropriateness of the
remedy’. This we will have to underscore
once again. Because acts of terrorism or fraud the purpose of which is to
destroy the integrity of election returns must have to be discouraged. For, they may eventually defeat the will of
the majority and, as Chief Justice Concepcion has
emphasized, would ‘undermine the foundation of our democracy’ (Ututalum vs. Commission on Elections, L-25349, December 3,
1965, cited in Janairo vs. Commission on Elections, L28315,
December 8, 1967 and Abes vs. Commission on
Elections, L-28348, December 15, 1967).
The purpose of the Election Code ‘to protect the integrity of elections
and to suppress all evils that may vitiate its purity and defeat the will of
the voters’ (Cauton vs. Commission on Elections, L25467,
April 27, 1967) gives Comelec authority to ascertain
whether the genuineness of a given election return may yet be salvaged by an
examination of the said return.
“Indeed, hindsight has long confirmed our view that the
unscrupulous finds illegal doctoring of election returns as an effective short
cut to prevent the proclamation of the true winner and leave him to the long
tedious task of an election protest – if the aggrieved party still has the
means to undergo the same. Which, as
well observed by Chief Justice Bengzon, could only
result in a pyrrhic victory (Lagumbay vs. Climaco, supra). Comelec then must strain every effort to ascertain the true
returns to be used in the proclamation, a possible alternative being that the
victor will be cheated of his victory; the seat that is justly his will be occupied
by one rejected at the polls; our democratic institutions will suffer in integrity.
“With these thoughts to guide us, we first look into Precinct
19 (Precinct 18 is no problem).
“Comelec made a thorough
investigation concerning the alleged irregularities. It even made use of the services of the NBI
to determine the original erased entry for Pacis and
the testimony of the chairman and poll clerk of the precinct. It was there ascertained that Negre obtained 73 votes, to Pacis‘
89. This is no abuse of discretion on
the part of Comelec.
If the true result of the voting in Precinct 19 could still be determined,
it is within Comelec’s power to direct that they be
used in the canvass. And this was
done.” (Pacis
vs. Comelec, L-29026, supra)
Of similar telling import are the principles stressed by Mr.
Justice Sanchez in the first Pacis case:
“The December
proclamation of Negre is open to attack from another directtion. The
board of canvassers did not include in the canvass the returns from Precincts
18, 19, 21 and 22. It is to be borne
in mind that the results of the vote-counting from these four precincts are
decisive of the election.
“It is true that in Espino
vs. Zaldivar, L-22325, December 11, 1967 citing
Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on
Elections, 85 Phil. 149, 158, We declared that the canvassing board will
not be compelled to canvass returns which are obviously manufactured. This does not mean however that the board and
Comelec, when faced with this situation, should
right away disregard the votes cast in precincts where returns were
doctored. There are four copies of
official returns. Allegedly both the
municipal treasurer’s and Comelec’s copies were
tampered. But it was the duty of the
board to report the matter to Comelec. Comelec could then
hew to the line drawn in Cauton vs.
Commission on Elections, 19676 Phild. 248, 233,
where this Court declared that, in case the election returns were tampered, ‘it
is certainly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such
order as would ascertain the existence of the genuine, authentic and untampered election returns’. Comelec could
inquire into the copies of the returns for the provincial treasurer. And if these copies are not authentic, Comelec should look into the copies of the returns in the
ballot boxes. These should have been
done. First. Because exclusion from canvass of returns
decisive of an election is an act which lends itself to misuse by the board. Second.
Sound practice seeks to accommodate every plausible theory which will
discourage if not eliminate, minimize if not curb, unlawful proclamation of,
and assumption of public trust by, the wrong man. Clean elections control the
appropriateness of the remedy.” (Pacis vs. Comelec, 22 SCRA 539,
554-555)
At this juncture, it should be considered that in elections, the
significance of a regular and proper proclamation can never be
over-emphasized. From the fact alone
that such a proclamation gives the person in whose favor it is issued the right
to possess and exercise all the prerogatives and attributes of the office in
dispute, one can easily see how important it is that every care must be taken
so that the proclamation may be as legal and complete as it is humanly possible
to make it so. True it is that in the
ultimate, the question of who has been duly elected may be decided in a
protest, but this is no reason why all controversies affecting the canvass and the
returns should immediately be shoved to the electoral tribunals. The final decision of these tribunals, no matter
how fast and how correct, cannot replace or supersede the role of a
proclamation.
Needless to say, a correct proclamation is as important, if not
more so, than the final result of the protest, particularly, from the
practical standpoint because it is not unusual for the wrong candidate to be
proclaimed and the winner of the protest to be able to serve only an
insignificant balance of the term for which he has been elected. It is
precisely because of these considerations that the election law has elaborate
provisions specifying in detail who are to make the canvass and when and how it
should be made, stating categorically that such canvass “shall
proceed” on the basis of “all the statements” (returns) and
“all the votes in the province” (Secs. 158
et seq.,-particularly Sec. 160 of the Revised Election Code). In other words, the proclamation is the first
proof, recognized by law, that a candidate has been elected, that is, that he
has garnered the required number of votes to be entitled to the office as
against his rivals. This proof cannot
have due weight unless it has been properly established; its basis is the
canvass; but if the canvass is incomplete, the proof is correspondingly
insufficient; and a canvass cannot be complete, unless the returns from all the
corresponding precincts are included therein.
The purpose of the canvass is to determine the result of the election as
shown by the official returns; necessarily, a canvass cannot be reflective of
the true vote of the electorate unless all the returns are considered and none
is omitted. The only exception to this
would be when there is no feasible and expeditious way of determining the votes
in a precinct, such as when the tally sheet appears to have also been tampered
with or manufactured in the same way as the return, or the ballots themselves
have either bee actually tampered with or there are indications that the security
and integrity of the same have been destroyed.
The validity of these propositions are self-evident.
Thus, eleven days after the first Pacis
case, on February 21, 1968,
in the Mutuc case (supra), this Court explained the
imperative need for taking all returns into account in the canvass in the following
unequivocal terms:
“It is now a settled doctrine that an incomplete canvass of
votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation (see,
e.g., Demafiles vs. Commission on Elections,
L-28396, Dec. 29, 1967; Abes v. Commission on
Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15, 1967; Abendante v. Relato, 94 Phil. 8 [1953]).
Indeed, it is the ministerial duty of a municipal canvassing body to
count the votes cast ‘in the same manner as herein-before provided for the
provincial board [of canvassers],’ (Rev. Election Code, sec. 168) which means
to say to count all the votes cast.
Thus, section 160 of the Election Code enjoins provincial boards of canvassers
as follows:
‘As soon as all the statements are before it but not later
than fifteen days next following the date of the election, the provincial
board of canvassers shall proceed to make a canvass of all the votes in
province for national, provincial and city candidates, and upon the completion
of the canvass, shall make, as the case may be, separate statements of all
the votes received by each candidate x x x’
(Italics supplied)
“A municipal board of canvassers must therefore count all
the votes cast in the election and, for this purpose, must consider all
returns presented to it by the municipal treasurer. If material defects there are in the form of
the returns, it must send them back to the corresponding boards of inspectors
for correction (Rev. Election Code, sec. 162).
If certain precincts have not sent in their returns, the board must send
for them, and the fiscal should forthwith institute criminal proceedings
against those who may be criminally responsible for the delay (Id.
sec. 161). If there is a discrepancy
between two authentic copies of an election return and the difference affects
the result of the election, the board may ask the proper court of first
instance to order a recount of the ballots (Id.
secs. 163 and 168).
“All these serve to underscore the need to count all
the votes cast in an election. Only when
the returns are palpably irregular or obviously manufactured may they be
rejected (E. g., Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections,
L-25444, Jan. 31, 1966, 16
3. Ct. Rep. Ann. 175; Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 [1949]) but even then the board must
exercise ‘extreme caution’ (Estrada v. Navarro, L-28340 & L-28374, Dec. 29,
1967). And where a return is falsified,
the board may apply to the Comelec for authority to
use another copy which is genuine and authentic (Ong
v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29, 1968; Espino
v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967). Why must all the votes be counted when there
is a need to finish the canvass on time so that proclamation can be made before
the beginning of the term of office?
Because to disregard returns is in effect to disenfranchise the voters
(Estrada, v. Navarro, supra, note 8).
The Comelec was, under the circumstances,
bereft of power to order the board of canvassers of Makati to disregard the return
from precinct 124, even if it noted from its copy (which was likewise blank or
incomplete) that the number of votes cast in the precinct (263) was too small
to be of any significance to any candidate.
This, because the Comelec has no power to
decide questions involving the right to vote, (Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 7) as to disregard a return is in
effect to deny the voters their votes.”
The above considerations, particularly, this Court’s
rationalization in the cases of Pacis and Mutuc should suffice to answer the argument that there is
neither law nor jurisprudence supporting the proposition that there should be a
new count. The import and implications
of this Court’s opinions in those cases are so logical and so effectuative of the principles underlying the popular
suffrage and electoral processes that one is left to wonder how anyone can
ever conceive that the law could be so inadequate as not to provide directly or
by necessary implication what should be done with votes that would otherwise be
left uncounted and ineffective merely because an attempt intended precise to
thwart the correct reporting of the genuine result of the election has been
made. It would be tragic to say the
least, if the broad powers of the Comelec specially
designed in the constitution to prevent, as far as it is humanly possible to
do so, any repetition of previous experiences regarding conceivable tricks,
artifices and fraudulent practices in elections, were to be construed as short
of enabling that body to ascertain by reasonable means the result of the count
of votes, if only for purposes of a complete canvass, only because it has been
found that, in violation of the particular provisions of the election law and
the commission’s circulars and regulations, something has been done with all
the copies of the return in a given precinct to make them completely
unserviceable. Stated differently, to
sustain the view that because the return for a precinct has been found to be
fabricated or manufactured, the result of the election in it should not be
included in the canvass, is the best encouragement to the perpetration of a new
“grab-the-proclamation” scheme, namely, manufacture the return and
thereby render useless the votes of the opponent in said precinct sufficient to
overturn the result: in which eventually, what this Court intended to achieve
in the Lagumbay case would be defeated and the remedy
thereby conceived and enunciated would turn out to be worse than the malady.
Indeed, the consequent disenfranchisement of electors by nullifying their votes
is worse than not allowing them to vote at all, because in the latter case, it
is yet uncertain who would have the palm of victory, whereas in annulment, the
votes they have actually cast to give their candidate the majority he has
obtained are set aside, at least, until after a long, cumbersome and expensive
protest and after the truly losing candidate has already enjoyed the Office for
sometime.
With these considerations in mind, the challenges that confront
Us are clear and ineludible. Are We to
pursue the trend of the above decisions or are We going to backtrack? Are We going to capitalize on the trifling
distinction that in the Mutuc case, the return was
merely blank, while in the present case the returns in question are being held
to be manufactured and false? Are We
opting to disenfranchise the voters in the 22 precincts in question whose
votes can be decisive of the election involved in this case, for no obvious
reason of logic or policy at all, and only because nothing of the sort has been
done before?
It is alleged that in the Mutuc case,
this court held that all that can be done with ‘palpably irregular or obviously
manufactured” returns is that “they may be rejected”, albeit
with “extreme caution”, and no votes should be counted for the
precinct concerned. That is not
true. The whole text of the discussion
in the Mutuc case above-quoted clearly points towards
a single direction, namely, that all efforts must be strained to determine
the results of the election in every precinct “because the Comelec has no power to decide the questions involving the
right to vote (as) and to disregard a return (or the result in any precinct)
is in effect to deny the voters their votes.” To rely barely on the statement “Only
when returns are palpably irregular or obviously manufactured may they be
rejected but even then the board must exercise extreme caution” for the
conclusion that no recount can be ordered is to read said statement out of
context. It is evident that said statement
taken together with the other portions of the opinion does not convey the
import that respondent wants to give it – namely, that the only thing that can
be legally done is to disregard the questioned return and not to count any
votes in the precinct involved.
Then again, in the also recent case of Tiglao
v. Comelec, G. R. No. L-31566, February 18, 1970,
wherein the name of one candidate was completely omitted in the returns from
Precincts 35-A and 36 of Apalit, Pampanga,
this Court ordered that “the Comelec should have
ordered the boards of inspectors of Precincts 35-A and 36, Apalit,
to open the ballot boxes, count the votes for petitioner Tiglao,
if any, and make new returns.”
Comes now the majority and in a vain effort to evade the
necessary consequence of these doctrines rationalizes that while the case of Mutuc involved a return which was blank and in the Tiglao case the questioned returns omitted the name of the
candidate Tiglao, the situation in the case at bar
is different because here there are returns which are neither blank nor faulted
with omission; the returns herein involved are obviously manufactured ones,
hence, foregoing precedents do not apply.
I must say, with no little disappointment, that this Court has never
done this before – try to draw distinctions where none exist. Undeniably, the returns here in question are
not identical in form with those in Mutuc and Tiglao, but since when has this Supreme Court ever bothered
about dissimilarities in form when the applicability of the same principle is
as apparent as logic and morality can ever make it? Never!
Indeed, I am fully convinced that the fundamental considerations that
propelled the holdings of this Court in Pacis, Mutuc and Tiglao make it imperative
and inevitable that We hold that blank returns or ones showing omissions of
names of candidates, returns made at gun-point and obviously manufactured or
fabricated returns all belong to the same legal category. In all of these instances, it is as if no
return at all has been prepared. Consequently,
the rule that applies to the first two should also apply to the last two.
The clear implication of the ruling of the majority, as I see it,
is that the requirement of Section 160, which, according to this Supreme Court
in Mutuc, means that all the returns or the
returns from all precincts must imperatively be canvassed, as,
otherwise, disenfranchisement of the corresponding voters would result, should
be considered as legally complied with as long as all such returns are
before the canvassers, even if, as in this case, some of the said returns are
palpably unserviceable by standards laid down by this Court itself, such as,
“obviously manufactured” and “gun-point” returns and
returns all the copies of which appear to have been so erased, altered or
forged beyond recognition that none of them can be utilized. In other words, under the majority’s theory,
where the law speaks of “all” the returns, it contemplates any kind
of return, so long as it is fully filled up as to the number of votes of all
the candidates, no matter if as so filled up, it is palpably illegal and
unserviceable by this Court’s own standards.
Worse, the only alternative that the majority suggests in such a
contingency is to disregard the defective return and count no votes for the
precinct concerned. In good conscience,
I find it extremely difficult to agree with such a view. I cannot admit that the existing electoral
laws and the pertinent constitutional provisions are that bad. My legal knowledge and experience, humble as
they are, revolt against the idea that “there is no law or
jurisprudence” authorizing any alternative other than to disregard the
returns here in question and count no votes – virtually hold there was no
election, which only the electoral tribunals can do – in the 22 precincts here
involved. That the present laws and
constitution have left such an alleged void in the electoral scheme of this
country is, to me, a conclusion that is impossible of acceptance. True, Section 163 specifically allows a judicial
recount in cases of irreconcilable conflict between copies of the same returns
and there is no other provision in the revised Election Code authorizing such a
recount, but who is advocating a judicial recount in the present case? It is clear to me that the fact that Section
163 sanctions a judicial recount in its premises, cannot be considered as
indicative of any legislative intent to preclude the obligation of the
inspectors to prepare another return in substitution of one found to be
unserviceable by the Comelec. To start with, the preparation of an
appropriate return 14 such a case does not necessarily entail a re-reading of
the ballots. The truth is that in the
actual working out of the electoral procedure, the inspectors do not prepare
the returns on the basis directly of the ballots; the returns are filled up by
reading the result found in the tally sheets.
What is wrong then with making the inspectors prepare a new return on
the basis of tally sheets? The answer of
the majority is that the tally sheets may be as defective as the returns. Definitely, there is no evidence, much less
proof to that effect. Why must We decide
this case on the basis of conjectures?
Is it not Our own ruling that every effort must be strained to determine
the true result of the count of votes?
Why does not the majority want to strain efforts further in this
case? In the event the tally sheets in
the precincts here in question turn out to be as faulty as the returns, what
would be wrong anyway with requiring the inspectors to re-read the
ballots? Now, if the integrity of the
ballots themselves happen to be questionable, then, perhaps, there would be no
other recourse but leave out the corresponding precinct in the canvass. In such
a case, I would say that even if the wrong candidate is proclaimed, it would
not matter very much because no one is expected to do something that is
physically and legally impossible. In
conclusion on the point under discussion, I submit that the absence of any
provision expressly authorizing a recount of votes when all the copies of the
returns are unserviceable is simply explained by the fact that such a remedy is
too obviously implicit in the existing laws to require further specific
legislation.
It is further argued that in the Lagumbay
case, after holding that the fifty returns in question were fabricated, this
Court ruled that “fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts
(therein involved), may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal x x x All we hold now is
that x x x the returns x x x do not reflect
true and valid reports of regular voting.
The contrary may be shown x x x in the corresponding election protest”,
hence, the same procedure should be followed here by leaving the results in the
22 precincts herein involved to the House Electoral Tribunal in an appropriate
election protest. I have already
explained that the supposed ruling thus referred to must have been due to the
fact that at the time the decision was rendered, the Lagumbay
case was already within the orbit of the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s
jurisdiction inasmuch as at that time, Senator Lagumbay
had already been proclaimed as a consequence of the minute-without-prejudice
resolution of this Court, taken the oath and assumed office. Be that as it may, the above-quoted
statements of this Court in the Lagumbay decision had
no specific reference to the argument that there should be a recount.
Besides, it is in the very nature of the electoral process that
the same matters affecting the election returns may be decided or passed upon
at different stages, from different points of view, for different purposes and
by different bodies or offices. In the ordinary scheme of this electoral
process there are three stages in determining the legitimate result of an
election, namely, first, the counting of the votes by the inspectors; second,
the canvassing of the returns by the board of canvassers and lastly, in the
event of controversy as to the legality and regularity of the elections, the
electoral protest. The proper
preparation of the returns is undertaken by the board of inspectors and only
said board has the power to decide questions regarding what the returns should
contain, subject to control of the Comelec and
ultimately of this Court, but whatever be the rulings of the board, they have
no bearing on the final determination of the true and legal result of the
election, said rulings being good only for purposes of preparing the returns
for submission to the corresponding officers so that the same may be submitted,
in turn, to the board of canvassers.
Likewise, as to the canvass, it is the board of canvassers, subject
again to supervision and control of the Comelec and
the final appellate authority of this Court, that has the exclusive authority
to pass on the authenticity of the returns, but part and parcel of the duties
of the said board is the obligation to see to it that all the corresponding
returns are before it; not before then does its power to canvass exist. After the canvass and proclamation have been
legally made, the board of canvassers’ and the Comelec’s
functions in regard to canvassing become functus
oficio and the jurisdiction of the electoral
tribunal ensues, only then but not earlier.
Again, all rulings of the Board of Canvassers and the Comelec and this Court at this stage are binding only in so
far as the canvass and the proclamation are concerned and have no compulsive
bearing on the issue of over-all legality of the election which is left to be determined,
in case there is a protest, by the electoral tribunals. Thus, the constitutional conferment upon the
House Electoral Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction as “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the (irrespective)
members” of the House of Representatives, should not preclude the board of
canvassers and the Comelec from doing and performing
all their duties to see to it that a complete and regular canvass is made. In other words, in the scheme of the
electoral process, the boards of inspectors, the boards of canvassers and the Comelec as well as the electoral tribunals have their own
designated times to deal even on the same matter without any conflict of
jurisdiction, each deciding and resolving the matter for specific and distinct
purposes.
In the case at bar, there is no issue of legality or irregularity
of the voting nor any question of appreciation of ballots. Nobody is claiming
that there was no election or that the election in the 22 precincts in question
should be annulled. The sole issue here
involved refers to the contents of the returns for purposes of canvassing –
that is, whether or not they are authentic and can be given prima facie
value. This question is not likely to be
taken up in any ensuing election contest, since there the issue will go beyond
the returns to the ballots or votes themselves.
Clearly, this matter, by its very nature, belongs to the jurisdiction of
the Comelec.
There is no reason to waive that jurisdiction. It is insisted, however, that, after all, the
ballots may be duly counted by the electoral tribunal and the true results
known thereafter. Would that not be too late for the candidate who should have
been proclaimed, if the counting were made earlier?
It is suggested that adopting the rule that when there is a
manufactured return, the votes in the corresponding precinct should be
disregarded would be giving the one who caused the illegality his just
desserts. At first glance, this argument
does appear to administer poetic justice, but on deeper reflection, one will
realize that, as earlier explained, the “manufacturing” may also be
done by the other party who would benefit by the complete disregard of the
votes in the precinct and not necessarily by the candidate or party that
appears favored on the face of the return.
Under these circumstances, there is indeed no substitute for what is
most normal, logical and legal, which is none other than to have the inspectors
prepare a new return, on the basis of the tally sheet, if found to be regular,
otherwise, on a recount of the ballots, unless the latter are themselves
unserviceable.
Fear is expressed that if the Comelec
is to be recognized to have the power suggested by petitioner, the likelihood
is that many proclamations will be held up because of the necessity of
recounting the votes in many precincts in which the returns are unserviceable
and thus, greater injury will be caused to public interest by the failure of
many elective officials to assume office at the inception of their terms. I believe that such apprehension has very
little reason for being. The very fact
alone that all concerned are precisely being made aware by Our decisions that
this Court will never countenance the unnecessary delay of a proclamation and
the unwarranted disregard of the results of the election in any precinct and,
further, that We will not hesitate to order the prosecution of the guilty
parties, will have the effect of discouraging further ill-conceived schemes to
defeat the true vote of the people. Moreover, the proper procedure is really
more simple than it is imagined to be.
After a return is declared unserviceable for any reason in the law, all
that has to be done is for the board of inspectors of the corresponding precinct
to meet and prepare a new return, on the basis, as already stated, of either
the tally sheet, if it appears to be regular, otherwise, the ballots
themselves, a procedure which need not take more than a day or two. Surely, this slight delay is more than made
up for by the clear advantages I have already discussed. Given Comelec
officials who are properly, imbued with the necessary loyalty to truth, the
laws, the constitution and the country, and with this Court clarifying every
doubt in the statutes and past jurisprudence, as it should have done here, to
the end that the electoral process may be as simple and as fool-proof as human
genius can make it within the boundaries laid down by the laws and the
Constitution, we can be certain that, even if our burden of work be heavier for
sometime or some proclamations may suffer a little delay, earlier is this
country going to have more honest and free elections. Withal, even granting that the imagined fear
may indeed materialize, I cannot compromise with the pose that this Court must
adopt the interpretation that would avoid it, even if it is clear that a
construction more in consonance with the intent and spirit of the law is undisputably feasible.
We all know that if ever there should be more instances hereafter of
unserviceable returns that would necessitate the consequence I advocate, it
will be because attempts may be made precisely to defeat the ends vie intend to
achieve by adopting the interpretation I propose. Is it proper for Us to hold that our
construction should yield to such evil design?
The ideal to approach is that every man’s vote must count for all
purposes for which it is cast, principally, the proclamation and the final
outcome of the election; hence, any ruling to the effect that the votes in any
precinct should not be counted, even if only for the purposes of the canvass
and proclamation, when it is obvious that the alternative to avoid it is still
legally open, should be farthest from the mind of this Court, for the simple
reason that it will cause irreparable injury to the popular will. To the great comfort of our people, the trend
of Our decisions in electoral cases has thrown electoral malefactors into
confusion and given the citizenry a well-grounded hope that under the able
supervision of the Comelec, proclamations made by
boards of canvassers are presently as proximate as human capability can make it
to the best determined presumptive results of the elections. It is truly unfortunate and regretable, that after this Court has advanced so far, the
majority cannot now see its way onward, to the great impairment, I believe, of
the cause of clean and honest elections and the consequent disenchantment, let
Us hope not, of those who only recently had reason to feel that this Court had
already traced in Lagumbay, Pacis,
Mutuc, Tiglao, and all its
other decisions of similar tendencies, an irreversible course towards the
most expeditious determination of the question of who should be proclaimed as
winner in an election, thereby eliminating as much as possible the chances of
error and even mischief in this respect.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to reverse the two Comelec
resolutions now before Us in all respects that they are inconsistent with the
foregoing opinion.
[1]
In Tagoranao vs. Comelec,
only one precinct was involved.
[2]
This is the first Pacis case: Pacis
vs. Comelec, et al., L-28455, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 539; the
second is Pacis vs. Comelec,
et al., L-29026, September 28, 1968,
25 SCRA 377.
[3] Mutuc, et al. vs. Comelec,
et al., L-28517, February 21, 1968,
22 SCRA 662.
[4] Tiglao vs. Comelec,
L-31566, February 18, 1970.
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DISSENTING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I concur with the extensive concurring and dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Barredo, and wish to add the following
brief comments on the inapplicability of the Lagumbay
case:
1. To my mind, the
application by the majority of the Lagumbay dictum
does not square with the consistent pronouncements of the Court in all
subsequently decided cases admonishing boards of canvassers to proceed with
extreme caution in rejecting returns as “obviously manufactured”
because of statistical improbability and to view the doctrine restrictively so
as not to result in the disenfranchisement of innocent voters.
The Court reiterated this restrictive view in two cases decided
this year.
In Ilarde vs. Comelec[1]
it pointed out that “(T)he thrust of all the subsequent cases is to
restrict the doctrine of the Lagumbay case to the
unique uniformity of tally in favor of candidates belonging to one party and
the systematic blanking of the opposing candidates in the same locality, such
as to make the fraud ‘palpable from the return itself .. (and) there is no
reason to accept it and give it prima facie value, and leading to no other
reasonable conclusion than that the returns were obviously manufactured
because they were as ‘utterly improbable and clearly incredible’ as to win the
sweepstakes ten times.'” In Lucman
vs. Dimaporo[2]
the Court cited the “peculiar situation” of the fifty returns ordered
excluded from the canvass in Lagumbay as
“utterly improbable and clearly incredible.” It should be noted that this was not strictly
an issue of fact. Indeed, the main
elements essential to its determination appeared on the face of the returns
themselves. The dispute boiled down
to the proper conclusion to be drawn therefrom, and,
hence, it partook of the nature of a question of law (cases cited). What is more, in the view of this Court, that
conclusion was “clear, obvious, manifest and indubitable.
” The Court further explicitly ruled, in not applying therein the Lagumbay doctrine, that “unlike the condition of the
returns involved in the Lagumbay case — which this
Court considered incontestable — that existing as regards the returns
for Balabagan is clearly a very controversial
one, which the Commission has no power to decide with finality.”
2. In Sangki vs. Comelec,[3]
the Court held that “a no-vote for a particular candidate in election
returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that those
election returns are ‘obviously manufactured.’
In Lagumbay, that circumstantial
evidence was overwhelming.” There,
the Court declined to reject the returns from 18 precincts of Pagalungan and 11 precincts of Pikit,
both of Northern Cotabato, showing that all the votes
counted were in favor of Salipada K, Pendatun (then a candidate for governor) while reporting
zero votes for his opponent, because inter alia,
affidavits of the opposing party’s inspectors explaining why they did not vote
for their party’s candidate were submitted by Pendatun. The Court ruled that the averments of the
inspectors’ affidavits “reduced this particular point to a question of
fact”, which could only be resolved by the corresponding protest in the
proper forum.
3. In the case at bar, affidavits of respondent Pendatun’s party inspectors and of the poll chairman and
clerks explaining the zero vote for Pendatun as
against 4,346 votes for petitioner Sinsuat in the
questioned precincts, principally of Upi, his hometown,[4]
which stand unrebutted, were this time presented by
his opponent, petitioner herein. This
must be counter-balanced as against the fact of respondent Pendatun
having received all the 5,809 votes cast in the 35 precincts of Pagalungan, his hometown, as against zero vote for
petitioner[5]
(in the same manner that he garnered all the votes therein against zero vote
for his opponents in the 1961, 1965 and 1967 elections).[6] The point is that against such a factual
background dealing with hometown votes, any conclusion of statistical improbability
on the basis of the Lagumbay doctrine becomes
clearly inapt, because the results shown by the returns cannot be said to be
‘utterly improbable and clearly incredible” and a conclusion of their
being “obviously manufactured” because of statistical improbability
cannot be considered “indubitable and incontestable.” Whether by design or otherwise, the other candidates
of the opponent’s ticket are systematically blanked or given a few stray votes
becomes of no legal significance for purposes of the Lagumbay
dictum, because the issue becomes a very controversial one of fact, which
rules out the summary employment of statistical improbabilities and which is
beyond the Comelec’s power to decide with finality.
As held by the Court in Estrada vs. Navarro,[7]
in canvass proceedings, “(A)ny plausible
explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experence and of the probabilities of the situation, should
suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the resulting disfranchisement of
those who exercised their right of suffrage.”
[1]
L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970,
emphasis supplied.
[2]
L-31558, May 29, 1970,
emphasis copied.
[3]
L-28359, Dec. 26, 1967, 21
SCRA 1392.
[4] Comelec Resolution, Annex H, p. 9.
[5]
Annex E, Memorandum of Data.
[6] Annex
I, respondent’s Counter-Memorandum.
[7]
L-28340 and L-28374, Dec. 29, 1967; 21 SCRA 1514.