DOMINGO N. SARCOS, AS MAYOR OF BAROBO, SURIGAO DEL SUR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RECAREDO CASTILLO, AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, AND THE HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SURIG…

Sarcos versus Castillo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition brought by Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, against Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur, and the Provincial Board of that province. The Mayor asks the Supreme Court to annul the preventive suspension order issued against him by the Governor and to prohibit its enforcement. The case matters because it fixes, as a matter of statutory construction, where the power of preventive suspension over elective municipal officials lies after the Decentralization Act of 1967 — a question of first impression, as the Court itself calls it novel, and one that turns on the classic rule that public officials possess powers, not rights.

Procedural History

The Mayor went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and prohibition, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Governor for ordering the preventive suspension. There were no intermediate proceedings in a trial court or in the Court of Appeals; the question raised was purely one of law — whether the Governor had any authority at all under the new statute. The respondents answered, admitting the filing of the administrative complaint and the issuance of the suspension order, but justifying both under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967. The Supreme Court thus resolved the matter in the first instance.

Facts

Domingo N. Sarcos was elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, in the November 14, 1967 election. He ran as an independent candidate and won. On April 18, 1968, the Municipal Council of Barobo filed a charge under oath against him for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing violations of the forestry laws. By an order dated May 21, 1968, the Governor gave him seventy-two hours to answer and explain. The Mayor explained that the logs he had caused to be hauled in January 1968 were the same logs cut and tumbled by certain persons within the communal forest, which had been seized by his patrolmen, and that the logs were sold to raise funds for police uniforms and arms.

On October 4, 1968, Governor Castillo filed an administrative complaint for misconduct and dishonesty in office against the Mayor before the Provincial Board. The act charged was that the Mayor connived with private individuals to cut and fell timber and sold the logs for their own benefit within the communal forest reserve of Barobo, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government.

On the basis of that complaint, the Governor issued an administrative order immediately suspending the Mayor from office and designating Vice-Mayor Brigido L. Mercader as Acting Mayor. The Governor justified the suspension on the ground that the acts charged affected the Mayor's official integrity and that there was urgent necessity for preventive suspension under Section 5 of Republic Act Number 5185, the Decentralization Act of 1967, which took effect on September 12, 1967.

Issues

• Whether or not the provincial governor retains the power to order the preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom charges have been filed, under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967.
• Whether or not the preventive suspension order issued by Governor Castillo is valid and may be enforced.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 provides:

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this Section.

This clause is decisive: it makes Section 5 the exclusive charter for suspension and removal, displacing the former authority of the provincial governor.

The same Section 5 provides on the venue of charges:

Written subscribed and sworn charges against any elective provincial and city official shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or city mayor or the municipal or city secretary concerned.

This paragraph tells us where charges are filed, but not who may suspend — a distinction the Court draws sharply.

Section 5 further provides on preventive suspension:

The preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended officer shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.

This paragraph, read with the hearing clause vesting the power to hear and investigate in the Provincial Board, locates the suspending authority in the Board, not in the Governor.

By contrast, Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the former law, provided:

The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.

That section allowed the governor to suspend where the charge affected the officer's official integrity; the Decentralization Act repealed it, and with it the governor's power.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court answered in the negative. Under the former law the provincial governor could preventively suspend a municipal official whose charge affected his official integrity. But the Decentralization Act changed the law. Section 5 declares that suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by its provisions, and the paragraph on preventive suspension grants that power to the Provincial Board. The Court applied the rule that the deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act indicates that a change in the law was intended.

The Court reinforced this with the fundamental postulate of constitutional law: public officials possess powers, not rights. There must be a grant of authority, express or implied, to justify any action taken by a public official; absent such a grant, the act lacks validity and must be set aside. No such authority is vested in the provincial governor.

The Court also invoked the purpose of the statute. Once the policy or purpose of the law is ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. The declared policy of the Decentralization Act is to transform local governments into effective instruments of self-government and to grant them greater freedom and ampler means. Full autonomy for local units implies that the people's choice of officials must be respected and that those elected must serve out their term. The Court cited the rule that strict construction of laws relating to suspension and removal is the universal rule, and that when dealing with elective posts the necessity for restricted construction is greater.

Finally, the Court noted the undesirable consequences of a contrary ruling. The Mayor, an independent candidate of a different political persuasion, appeared to have been placed at a disadvantage, and there is an ever-present temptation for provincial governors to favor their own party. Vesting the power in the Provincial Board, a collective body, provides a safeguard against partisan use.

On the second issue, since the Governor had no authority, the suspension order could not be validated by any alleged justification. To hold otherwise would negate the rule of law.

Doctrine

Under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, the power of preventive suspension over elective municipal officials is lodged in the Provincial Board, not in the provincial governor. The governor may receive charges, but he may not suspend. The rule rests on three pillars: the express language of Section 5, which governs suspension and removal exclusively; the principle that public officials possess powers, not rights, so that any act without a grant of authority is void; and the policy of local autonomy, which demands strict construction of laws on suspension and removal of elective officials. A Bar answer should state the rule as a proposition of statutory construction: where a later statute deliberately uses language different from the earlier one, the change in the law is intended, and the former power is deemed withdrawn.

Disposition

The writs prayed for were granted; the preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos was annulled and set aside, and his immediate reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Barobo was ordered, without prejudice to further proceedings by the Provincial Board on the charge of misconduct and dishonesty, which was enjoined to act strictly in accordance with law.

Remember This

Memorize the line: under the Decentralization Act of 1967, the power of preventive suspension of elective municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Board, not the provincial governor, because public officials possess powers, not rights. Examiners use this case to test statutory construction — the change-of-language rule and the purpose-of-the-law rule — and the constitutional principle that local autonomy requires strict construction of suspension and removal laws.