JOSE B. ROXAS AND VENANCIA B. ROXAS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. PEDRO BERMUDEZ, DOMINGA MARTIN AND MR. & MRS. LORETA BERMUDEZ, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

On appeal on purely questions of law from a decision of the trial
court declaring, inter alia, that the
decision rendered in a prior civil case No. 34498 between the same parties is res judicata to the
present case, and in denying the admission of the third-party complaint filed by
one of the defendants.

The facts pertinent to the instant appeal,
are as follows:

On December 4, 1957,
Pedro Bermudez and his sister Loreta Bermudez, filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 34498, against the spouses Joaquin
Andrade and Estela Martinez Andrade, the spouses Jose
B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas, and Atty. Mariano Z. Suñga.  As amended on July 14,1958, the complaint
alleged that plaintiffs are the children of Apolonio
Bermudez who died on March 6, 1943, leaving a parcel of land (described as Lot
13, Block 16-A on subdivision plan Psd-3231) covered by Transfer Certifi­cate
of Title No. 36734, issued under his name, “Apolo­nio
Bermudez, widower”, by the Register of Deeds of Manila; that on May 23,
1950, defendant Estela Martinez Andrade – by means of
fraud, deceit and misrepresenta­tion, and taking advantage of the ignorance of
their mother, Dominga Martin – secured the signature
of the latter on an Affidavit of Adjudication of the land pre­pared by said
defendant with the aid of a lawyer, by virtue of which the land was later
registered in the name alone of said Dominga Martin;
that on November 11, 1951, defendants Andrade spouses, employing the same
deceit and misrepresentation on Dominga Martin,
obtained the signature of the latter once again on a deed of absolute sale,
wherein Dominga Martin purportedly sold the land to
Joaquin Andrade; that on 30 January, 1954, Joaquin Andrade then sold the land
to the spouses Jose Roxas and Venancia Roxas; and that by reason of such fraudulent acts of the Andrades, plaintiffs were deprived of their rights to the
property resulting in damage and prejudice to them in the sum of P6,000.00, the
equivalent value of the land for relief, plain­tiffs prayed that the defendants
be sentenced to pay damages in the said amount of P6,000.00, plus P2,000.00 by
way of attorney’s fees.

With prior leave of court, Dominga
Martin filed on January 5, 1959,
a complaint in intervention which was amended on July 8, 1959,
wherein she made a common cause with the plaintiffs and reproduced the allega­tions
of plaintiffs’ complaint against the defendants.  For her own relief, she prayed that
defendants be sen­tenced to pay her P5,000.00 as
actual damages, P3,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,000.00
as attorney’s fees.

Defendants Andrade spouses filed their answer traversing the
allegations in the complaint.  As spe­cial
defenses, they alleged that the deed of sale executed by plaintiff-in-intervention,
Dominga Martin in favor of Joaquin Andrade, was “with
the former’s full knowledge and realization of the contents
thereof”; and that said vendor received valuable consideration therefor from the buyer. 
And by way of counterclaim, said answering defendants prayed for
he sum of P3,000.00 as damages for malicious
prosecution of the action.

Defendants Roxas spouses
also answered, alleging as a
special defense, that they have acquired the land in question in good faith and for
a valuable consideration;
and that their title thereto is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 35655 issued in their
names by the Register of Deeds of Manila on February 13, 1954.  They prayed for damages against the
plaintiffs by way of counterclaim.

Likewise, defendant attorney, Mariano Z. Suñga,
filed his answer denying the material allegations of the complaint, with
counterclaim for damages.

After a protracted trial on the merits of the case, decision was
rendered on June 1, 1962,
dismissing the amended complaint and the complaint in intervention, as well as
the counterclaim of all the defendants. 
The motion for reconsideration of the decision filed by the plaintiffs
and the intervenor having been denied, said parties interposed
appeal from the
said decision to the Court of Appeals. 
The appeal was dismissed, however, upon their failure to pay the docket
fees and the estimated cost for the printing of the record on appeal.  Consequently, the corresponding entry of
final judgment was made on February
19, 1963.

Not long thereafter, spouses Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas filed a complaint,
docketed as
Civil Case No. 53732, in the same Court of First Instance of Manila, to
recover possession of the very land involved in the former litigation, from Pedro
Bermudez, Loreta Bermudez, and Dominga
Martin – plaintiffs and intervenor in the
former case No. 34498 – alleging that they (spouses Jose B. Roxas
and Venancia Roxas) are the
own­ers of the land in question which is occupied by Pedro Bermudez, Loreta
Bermudez and Dominga Martin; and that notwithstanding
demands on said defendants to vacate the said property, they have refused and failed
to do so.  Plaintiffs therefore prayed
that defendants be ordered to vacate the land, and to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P10.00 a month as rent for the use and occupation of the land from February 1, 1954, plus damages and attorney’s
fees.

The defendants answered the complaint, with counterclaim.  They also sought prior leave of the court to
file a third party complaint against Estela
Martinez Andrade, Joaquin Andrade and Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga
– former defendants in Civil Case No. 34498. 
Plaintiffs spouses Jose B. Roxas
and Venancia Roxas –
defendants also in the former case – opposed the admission of the third party complaint against their former co-defendants;
and the said third party complaint was then disallowed by the trial court.

In their answer, defendants Bermudez and Dominga
Martin traversed the allegations in the complaint, alleging by way of special
defenses, the same allega­tions in their complaint in the former case, viz:  that Estela Martinez Andrade, Joaquin Andrade and Atty. Mariano
Z. Suñga, by means of deceit, fraud, misrepre­sentation,
and falsification, and by taking undue advan­tage of the ignorance and age of
the defendants and the pledge then prevailing over the land in question between
Dominga Martin and Estela
Martinez Andrade, were able to secure 
the signature of said Dominga Martin on an
Affi­davit of Adjudication in her favor, then on an absolute deed of sale of
the land in favor of Joaquin Andrade, thereby obtaining torrens
title in the name of the lat­ter; that said transaction was without
consideration; that the plaintiffs “knew very Well the aforesaid fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and falsification, together with the fact that the
sale of the land by Joaquin Andrade to Venancia Roxas was simulated, as shown, among other things, by the
inadequacy of the price in the sup­posed sale”.  And they now pray, by way of counter­claim,
that the sale executed by Dominga Martin in favor of
Joaquin Andrade, and the subsequent sale executed by the latter in favor of Venancia Roxas, be declared null
and void; and that plaintiffs together with their co­defendants in the former
case (No. 34498) be sentenced to pay moral and exemplary damages.

After trial, decision was rendered by the court below, holding
that plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the land in question, their title
thereto being evi­denced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35655,
issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila on February 14, 1954; that the allegation of the defendants that they
cannot be ejected from the land involved because they are the owners
thereof, is absolutely without merit, for, being parties in said Civil Case No.
34498, they are necessarily bound by
the decision rendered by this Court, which decision is already final and
constitutes res
judicata. 
Accordingly, the court
ordered the de­fendants and all other persons living with them “to vacate the land therein described, and to pay, jointly
and severally, to the plaintiffs the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P10.00 a month from September 26, 1957, until they vacate the premises, and the fur­ther
sum of P200.00 as attorney’s
fees.”

Defendants have appealed
from the decision to the Court of Appeals
which, in a resolution dated July 15, 1965, elevated the case to this Court, it appearing from the briefs of the parties that only questions of
law are raised therein.

Two main questions of law
are posed by the appellants, to wit:  (1)
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the decision in Civil Case No. 34498 constitutes res judicata to the
present case;
and (2) whether or not the trial court erred in denying
admission of the third party complaint.

In relation to the first proposition,
there can be no debate that the
court which had tried and decided he
case No. 34498, had jurisdiction over the parties aid the subject-matter, the
decision rendered therein was on the
merits, and the same has become final. Neither can it he disputed that the RES
in said case No. 34498 is the same
parcel of land involved in the case at bar.

It is the contention of
the appellants, however, that the cause of action in said case No. 34498, which
was for recovery of damages, representing the equiva­lent value of the
land which the Bermudez and Martin claimed to have been deprived through
deceit, fraud and misrepresentation,
is not the same or identical
cause of action involved in the present case, which is for the recovery of
possession of the same land.

Although, primarily, the
cause of action in said case No. 34498, was for recovery of damages, represent­ing
the equivalent value of the land which the plain­tiffs therein, now appellants
herein, have lost through the alleged fraud, deceit and misrepresentation prac­ticed
on Dominga
Martin by the Andrades, nevertheless, it is a fact,
that the issue of ownership of
the land which was clained by the defendants Roxas spouses was intricately involved in the case, such that the claim for damages could not be awarded without proof that
the party claiming them had a right to the land.  Proof of ownership
of or right to the land is as essential and necessary was that
needed to recover damages.  In the
inter-relation of issues, the resulting damages was
the effect, and the loss of the land through deceit and fraud was the cause.

In civil case No. 34498, the defendants, the Roxas
spouses, have pleaded in their answer and special de­fense that they have
purchased the land in good faith and for value; that they are the owners
thereof; and that their title thereto is evidenced by a torrens transfer certificate of title No. 35655 of
the City of Manila.  The defendants Andrade spouses also traversed
the claim of ownership of the Bermudez and Martin, and contended that the sale
of the land by Dominga Martin to them was valid.  On the other hand, the issue posed by the plaintiffs in said case No.
34498, was that the deed of sale executed by Dominga
Martin to Joaquin An­drade, and that by the latter in favor of Venancia Roxas were secured through fraud and deceit.  Upon such adverse claim on the land by the opposing parties, the court was
called up to determine who was the owner thereof.  The court, however, found that the evidence
sustained the claim of the spouses Roxas, and, accord­ingly,
dismissed the amended complaint and the complaint­in-Intervention.  The dispositive
portion of the decision could not have any other meaning and effect than to
justify the conclusion that said dispositive portion
of the decision reflected the merits of the case.  The trial court said:

 “From the evidence of
the record, the claim of the intervenor, Dominga Martin, that she was made to sign the affidavit of
adjudication by defend­ant Estela Martinez Andrade by
means of fraud, deceit and misrepresenta­tion and taking advantage of her ignorance
in connivance with defendant Joaquin Andrade and Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, before whom said affidavit was ratified, is
absolutely unfound­ed.  From the
testimony of Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, it has clearly
been shown that on May 22, 1959, Domino Martin, accompanied by Joa­quin Andrade and Mrs. Estela Martinez Andraded, came to
see him
and inquired if she could sell the property des­cribed in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 36734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila which was
in the name of Apolonio Bermudez, widower; Atty. Sunga told her that she could not sell the property as she
was not its regis­tered owner; however, she asked if it would be possible to have
the property transferred to her name as she was a sister of Apolonio
Bermudez on the mother side and she
wanted to sell the property to the Andrades;
Atty. Suñga suggested that it was necessary to secure
an affidavit to that effect, and she left the Torrens Title in his posses­sion
and promised that she would come back the
following day; Atty. Sunga accordingly
prepared the affidavit of adjudication and when Dominga
Martin came the following day, accompanied again by the Andrades,
and after hav­ing explained to her the contents of the affidavit in Tagalog,
she readily
signed it; Atty. Sunga then filed the affidavit of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Manila for the issuance of a new title in
the name of Dominga Martin; Atty. Sunga
was able to get a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Dominga Martin which he delivered to her.  One year afterwards, Dominga
Martin came again and told
Atty. Sunga that
she would like to sell the lot to the Andrades, but
Atty. Sunga said that the property being a
Barrio Obrero lot, it was necessary for her to secure the permission of the Mayor of
Manila.  Atty. Sunga
prepared the necessary request which Dominga Martin signed, and it was filed with
the Mayor’s Office.  The re­quest was
approved by the City Mayor and Atty. Sunga prepared the correspond­ing deed of sale in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade.  Upon the signing of the deed of sale, Atty. Sunga
brought the document to the Office of
the Mayor and it was approved.  The deed
of sale was duly registered and a new title was is­sued in the name of Joaquin R. Andrade.  According to Atty. Sunga,
Dominga Martin never mentioned to her the fact that
she was the widow of the deceased, Apolonio Bermudez,
and that she had children with him.

“The evidence further shows that after Dominga
Martin had secured the transfer certificate of title of the said parcel of
land in her name, on June 11, 1950, she received
from Estela de Andrade, mother of Joaquin R. Andrade,
the sum of P500.00 as initial payment
of the pur­chase price of said lot.  On December
18, 1950, she again
received from Estela de Andrade an additional sum of
P200.00 as part payment of the consideration for the sale of said lot.  On July 24, 1951, Dominga Martin
again received from Estela de Andrade still another
sum of P1,000.00 as additional consideration for the sale.  On July 30,
1951, she sent a letter to the City Mayor of Manila, seeking permission to trans­fer
said property in favor of Joa­quin R. Andrade, should the latter be duly qualified to acquire a lot in
the said
subdivision.  On Novem­ber 7, 1951, Dominga Martin received a further sum of
P800.00 from Estela de Andrade, thereby making a total of P2,500.00
as the full considera­tion for the sale of the lot.  She then executed in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade a deed of absolute sale of said lot on November 16, 1951.  The
deed of absolute sale was duly approv­ed by the then Mayor of Manila, Ma­nuel de la Fuentes and attested by then
Secretary to the Mayor, Carmelo S. Mendoza, and was prepared by and
acknowledged before the Notary Public, Atty.
Mariano Z. Sunga. 
After the sale, the real
estate taxes
for the parcel of land question, were paid by the Andrades
from the years 1952 and 1953.  On January
30, 1954, de­fendant Joaquin Andrade sold
the same parcel of land the defendant spouses, Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas, which sale was approved by the then Mayor of the
City of Manila, Arsenio H. Lacson, attested by the then Secretary
to the Mayor, Jesus Marcos Roces.  The sale was
duly registered and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35655 was issued in
the name of the Roxas spouses.  There­after, the real estate taxes on said Lot from the
year 1955 have been paid by the Roxas spouses.

“From the evidence then, the Court is convinced that if there
was any fraud committed here, the same
was perpetrated by the intervenor, Dominga Martin, for she made it appear that she was the
sister on the mother side of the deceased, Apolonio
Bermudez, in order that the lot in question could be adjudicated in her
favor.  She con­cealed the fact that she
was the widow of the said Apolonio Bermudez and with
children with him, who are the plain­tiffs in this case.  Undoubtedly, had she revealed such facts, it
would not have been easy for her to dispose of the lot as she intended, her
claim that she only wanted to mortgage the lot instead of selling it rests
merely on her uncorroborated testimony and inasmuch as the transactions here
are all embodied in public documents, the same have in their favor the presump­tion
of regularity as to their due execution and authenticity, and to overcome such
presumption, the evidence must not be merely preponderant but must be clear,
strong, convincing and conclusive. 
Moreover, Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, the notary
public before whom Dominga Martin acknowledged the
affidavit of adjudication and the
deed of absolute sale in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade, assured the Court that Do­minga Martin fully understood the nature of the
agreements she was entering into, and his testimony is highly credible coming
as it is from a notary public who is at the same
time a lawyer, who is supposed to act in accordance with the oath of his
office.  Indeed, such testimony must be
given more credence than that of a party denying a contract acknowledged before
the same notary public.”

Upon the foregoing considerations, and it clearly appearing that
the connection between the two cases is so intimate’ and the parties and the
subject-matter of the controversy being the same in the former as well as in the present, We cannot
but conclude that the issue raised herein has really been determined by a
competent court in a prior
case.

Even taking the view that the issue of ownership of the land in
said case No. 34498, was only a second­ary question in
the proceedings before said court, nevertheless,
it cannot detract from the conclusive effect of the adjudication of the case,
it being an issue therein, whether direct
or collateral.  (Tolentino vs. Lim
Bun Hioc, L-6333, Nay 10, 1956.)

Consequently, the trial court did not err in holding that the decision in civil case No.
34498 cons­titute res judicata to the present case.

“A judgment rendered by
a court having; jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter is
conclusive and indisputable evidence as to all rights, questions or facts put in issue in
the suit and actually ad­judicated therein when the same came again into
controversy between the same parties or their privies even though according to
the deci­sion of the question, the subsequent proceedings are on a different
cause of action, since the law abhors a multiplicity of suits.

“Another statement of the rule is that any right, fact or matter in issue, and directly adjudicated on, necessarily involved in,
the determination of an action before
a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and privies whether or not the claim or demand,
purpose, or subject-matter of the two suits is the same.  (50 C.J.S. pp. 168-173.)

“On the other hand, it is equally well settled that a fact
which has been directly tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction
cannot be contested again between the same parties in the same or any other
court, and that where some controlling fact or question material to the de­termination of both actions has
been determined in a former suit, and the fact again at issue between
the same parties, its adjudication
in the first will, if properly presented, be conclusive of the ques­tion in the latter suit, without regard
to whether the cause of action is the same
or not, or whether the second suit involves the same or dif­ferent
subject-matter, or whether or not it is
the same form of proceeding.  In
such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions were based on different
grounds, or tried on differ­ent theories, or are
instituted for different purposes, and seek different relief.” (Samahan Magsasaka,
Inc. vs. Chua Cuan, G.R. No. L-7252, Feb. 25, 1955.) [Underscoring
supplied]

“The general rule common to all civilized system of
jurisprudence is that the solemn
and deliberate sen­tence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact, or state of facts,
should be re­garded as a final and
conclusive deter­mination of the question litigated, and should forever set the
controversy at rest.  Indeed, it has been
well, said that this maxim is lore than a rule of law, more even than an
important prin­ciple of public policy and that it is a fundamental concept
in the or­ganization of every jural society.” (Ponce vs. Macadaeg, 91
Phil. 410.)

The second proposition needs no elaborate discussion.  A careful perusal of the allegations of facts
constituting the cause of action
in the third party complaint reveals that they are but reiterations of the allegations in the amended complaint and the
complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 34498, and of the special defenses
pleaded by Pedro Bermudez, Loreta Bermudez and Dominga Martin in the present case, that is, that through
deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation
practiced on Domino Martin by the Andra­de spouses, they (herein
appellants) lost their lands. But as the issue of ownership of the land, as earlier
stated, has been adversely resolved by the trial court in Civil Case No. 34498, against herein defendants Pedro
Bermudez and Loreta Bermudez, and their mother Dominga Martin,
the trial court was then right when it said:

“x
x x it appearing that the allegations contained in the said third party complaint have already been decided and passed upon by this Court in
civil case No. 34498 en­titled,
Pedro Bermudez and Loreta Bermudez
vs. Joaquin Andrade et al., which decision has already become final, the admission
of the third party complaint is hereby denied.”

For, indeed, the
admission of the third party com­plaint would be superfluous under the
circumstances, con­sidering that the issues therein raised had been passed upon
by the trial court in Civil Case No. 34498.  We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not
err in denying admission of the third party complaint in this case.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from to be in
accordance with the law and the evidence, the same is affirmed with
costs against defendant-appel­lants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.