HEIRS OF MAMERTO INGJUG, PETITIONERS, VS. AMPARO PALALAY, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL OF SUBA-BASBAS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND CARMELITA DULANGON IN HER CAPACITY AS LAPU…

Heirs of Mamerto Ingjug versus Palalay

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the heirs of the late Mamerto Ingjug against Amparo Palalay, in her capacity as school principal of Suba-Basbas Elementary School, and Carmelita Dulangon, in her capacity as the Lapu-Lapu City Schools Superintendent of the Department of Education. The heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, asking the court to order the removal of a fence enclosing a portion of their claimed land so that they could enter it. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the boundaries of an ejectment suit: it shows that a claim of ownership, however well documented, cannot by itself convert an occupation into unlawful detainer, and it shows that tolerance, to count, must have existed from the very beginning of possession.

Procedural History

The complaint for unlawful detainer was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lapu-Lapu City. That court dismissed the complaint, holding that the principle of res judicata applied by reason of an earlier final judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lapu-Lapu City, in a case for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, back rentals and damages, and that the school officials had the better right to the material and physical possession of the entire lot.

The heirs appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, which affirmed the dismissal in full. It held that the complaint merely alleged ownership, and did not allege that the possession of the school officials was initially legal by virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor any overt act of permission or tolerance. It concluded that the heirs had no cause of action. The heirs moved for reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed this petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and the case reached the Supreme Court.

Facts

Mamerto Ingjug was the registered owner of Lot 3116, covered by an original certificate of title. During his lifetime, on June 25, 1929, he donated a portion of the lot, consisting of 612 square meters, to the then Opon government, now the City of Lapu-Lapu, by a deed of donation. The lot was later subdivided, with Lot 3116-A retained by Mamerto Ingjug and Lot 3116-B going to the government. Mamerto Ingjug died intestate in 1939. In 1992, his grandchildren, the petitioners, declared themselves as his lawful heirs, adjudicated the lot among themselves, and paid the real estate taxes due on it. A transfer certificate of title was later issued in their names.

Suba-Basbas Elementary School was erected on the adjacent lot, and its principal extended the construction of a new building onto the undonated portion of Lot 3116. The school used the vacant area as a children's playground and fenced it with galvanized iron sheets, making it inaccessible to the heirs. Since 1929, when the property was donated, the school had been in possession of the subject land and had begun constructing improvements thereon starting in 1964, and there was no opposition from the supposed heirs until 2007, when the fencing prevented them from entering their property.

On April 18, 2008, the heirs wrote a demand letter to the School Superintendent of Lapu-Lapu City, calling attention to the premises occupied by tolerance and asking the school to vacate. When the school did not, the heirs filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, alleging that the respondents used the undonated portion with their tolerance. The respondents answered that the lot was an integral part of the school, that ownership of the entire lot had already been judicially adjudicated in favor of the city government, and that the fence had existed before the case was filed.

Issues

• Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer, given that the alleged tolerance was not present at the beginning of the respondents' possession.
• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in relying on the Melchor case, which the petitioners say is a forcible entry case and not applicable to unlawful detainer.
• Whether or not the only issue in an ejectment suit is possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership.
• Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata was correct.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

This is the provision that defines unlawful detainer, and the Court uses it to show that the action presupposes a right to hold possession that has expired or been terminated under a contract, express or implied.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no cause of action for unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, because it was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract, and it becomes illegal only when the plaintiff demands that the defendant vacate after the expiration or termination of the right to possess, and the defendant refuses. Here, the complaint and the position paper did not show that there was tolerance on the part of the predecessors-in-interest in the respondents' occupation. There was no evidence that the respondents unlawfully detained any portion of the lot, and their right to possess was not terminated by any contract or agreement, nor was any tolerance withdrawn. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. Since the tolerance alleged was not present from the start, the action must fail, and even if treated as one for forcible entry, it would still be dismissed for failure to allege prior possession and the manner of entry.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that the Melchor case was inapplicable. The Regional Trial Court cited Melchor to support the ruling that there is no cause of action for unlawful detainer, not forcible entry. The Regional Trial Court did not say that possession must be legal from the beginning, but that the tolerance of the respondents' occupation must be present from the start.

On the third issue, the Court held that the only issue in an action for ejectment is possession de facto, or physical possession, independent of any claim of ownership. It quoted its ruling that in an ejectment suit the only issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession and not possession de jure, and that any determination of ownership is merely provisional and does not bind the title. Here, the question of who has the better right of possession could be resolved without delving into ownership, without passing on the validity of the certificate of title, and without determining the validity of any contract or memorandum of agreement.

On the fourth issue, the Court found merit in the petitioners' submission. Res judicata requires identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and identity in such particulars that any judgment would amount to res judicata in the other action. The earlier case was one for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, back rentals and damages, while this case is one for unlawful detainer. The two cases are separate causes of action, so res judicata does not apply. The Court distinguished the summary action of ejectment from the plenary action to recover the right of possession and the action to recover ownership.

Doctrine

First, unlawful detainer under Section 1 of Rule 70 requires that the defendant's possession was originally legal by virtue of an express or implied contract, and that it became illegal only upon demand and refusal after the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Second, the tolerance that justifies unlawful detainer must be present from the very beginning of the possession sought to be recovered; if the possession was unlawful from the start, unlawful detainer is the wrong remedy. Third, the only issue in an ejectment suit is possession de facto, not possession de jure; ownership may be passed upon only provisionally, to shed light on possession, and such determination is not conclusive. Fourth, res judicata does not bar a subsequent ejectment suit where the earlier case was a plenary action for recovery of ownership and possession, because the two are distinct causes of action.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer was sustained, with the school officials prevailing.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: tolerance must be present from the start of possession, or there is no unlawful detainer. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between possession de facto and possession de jure, and to test whether res judicata bars a later ejectment suit after a plenary action for ownership.