G.R. No. L-10774. February 16, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. OSCAR CASTELO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
BARRERA, J.:
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Pasay City) in Criminal Case No.
3023-P for murder”, which case is now pending review by this Court,
filed a “Motion for Urgent Disposition of Petition for New Trial and
Bail”, dated January 9, 1961, based mainly on the ground that the
stenographic notes containing the testimonies of Edgar Bond (now
deceased), Mariano Almeda, Raymundo Tal Villareal, Matias Soriano, and
Francisco Espiritu are already definitely lost; that said testimonial
evidence is vital to the disposition of the case on the merits; that
the aforementioned loss of the notes would delay the filing of
appellee’s brief and, consequently, the termination of the appeal, for
an indefinite period of time; that to allow, the continued detention of
movant during the pendency of the appeal for such an uncertain or
indefinite period is violative of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. Thus, it is prayed that the case be set for new trial, and in
the meantime, defendant-appellant Oscar Castelo be released on bail.
This argument was also the basis of the petitions previously filed by
the same appellant on May 31, 1957 (Petition for New Trial and Bail),
December 18, 1959 (Urgent Motion for Bail); November 14, 1960 (Motion
for Release on Bail); and January 3, 1961 (Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus).
Except for the missing transcript of the
stenographic notes containing the testimonies of the five witnesses
mentioned heretofore, we find the record of this case complete, with
the other evidence and the original decision of the trial court intact.
It has been suggested however, that under the circumstances, the only
remedy left to the Court is to set aside the decision of the trial
court and order a new trial under the provisions of Rule 117, Section
2, on the alleged ground that the loss of the stenographic notes in
question constitutes an irregularity that has been committed during the
trial prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. We do not
think so. The irregularity that justifies a new trial under this Rule
is, as the rule itself prescribes, one that has been committed during the trial. There is no pretense that an actual irregularity has been committed during the trial.
The proceedings have been all in accordance with law and a decision on
the merits has been duly rendered and promulgated. This present
appellant has already filed his brief and no reference to any
irregularity has been made therein. All that he assails is the
correctness of the decision on the merits.
We rather believe that the remedy is the reconstitution of the missing evidence as provided in Sections 14 and 15 of Act 3110,[1] dealing with pending criminal cases, which read:
“Sec.
14. The testimony of witnesses, if any has already been taken, shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy there of or by a new
transcript of the stenographic notes; but if it is impossible to obtain
an authentic copy of the evidence and if the stenographic notes have
been destroyed, the case shall be heard anew as if it had never been
tried.”Sec. 15. If the case has already been decided, the
decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy. If an
authentic copy is not obtainable, the case shall be decided anew, as if
it had never been decided.”
Under these
legal provisions, the original decision, which is, as already stated,
extant upon the records, need not be set aside as no new judgment can
be rendered. It is only when the decision itself has been lost and no
authentic copy thereof is obtainable that the case be decided anew as
if it had never been decided. This Court has had an occasion to
interpret Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3110, the counterpart in civil cases
of Sections 14 and 15 above quoted, in the case of Benigno Madalang vs. Court of First Instance of Romblon, et al., 49 Phil. 487, 490. There, in a unanimous decision, this Court said:
“The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3110 are contained in the following sections:
‘Sec. 6. Testimony of witnesses taken in civil cases shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy thereof or a new transcript
of the stenographic notes. If no authentic copy can be obtained and the
stenographic notes have also been destroyed, the cases shall be tried de novo as if called for trial for the first time.Sec. 7. If a civil case has already been decided, the decision shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy. In case an authentic copy
cannot be found, the court shall make a new decision, as if the case
had never been decided.’“It appears from section 7 above quoted that a new judgment can be rendered, as if the case had never been decided, only when the original decision cannot be reconstructed by means of an authentic copy.
So that if an authentic copy of the original decision exist, the latter
must be reconstructed by means thereof. If this is so, the
reconstruction of the oral evidence introduced at the original trial of
civil cases, when no authentic copy thereof exists, or when the
stenographic notes have been destroyed and it is impossible to secure
another transcript of the same, the testimony of the witnesses who
testified at the original trial shall be taken again; because, as
the original decision is reconstructed by means of an authentic copy of
the same, it is not necessary to render a new one, and the
reconstruction of the oral evidence is only for the purpose of
permitting the court of appeal to review it and determine whether the
appealed decision is in accordance therewith.“Consequently, Act 3110 in providing in its section 7 that if an
authentic copy exists the decision shall be reconstructed by means
thereof, it was the intention that in the reconstruction of the oral
evidence, provided in section 6, only the testimony of the same
witnesses who testified at the original trial must be taken again and
not the testimony of additional witnesses, because neither the literal
meaning of the verb ‘reconstitute’ used in said law, not the spirit,
nor the object of the same warrants a different interpretation.”
This doctrine was later ratified and amplified in the case of Almario vs.
Ibañez (81 Phil. 592, 600) where this Court held that in case one of
the principal witnesses who testified in the original trial and whose
testimony has been lost, is no longer available because he has
disappeared, as in the Almario-Ibañez case, or has died, as in the
present case of witness Edgar Bond, the party presenting the
unavailable original witness may substitute his testimony with that of
another witness or witnesses who may have knowledge of the same facts
to which the first witness testified in the original trial.
While the Madalang and Almario cases were civil actions, there is no
reason of law or justice why the same principles should not apply in
criminal cases. In fact, the legal provisions concerning the
reconstitution of pending criminal cases are identical in terminology mutatis mutandi
to those referring to pending civil cases. And, since the law in both
cases is procedural or adjective and is only a means to an end—an aid
to substantive law—it should be interpreted and applied to accomplish
that end.
Following these precedents and in the exercise of
its inherent power to restore and supply deficiencies in its records
and proceedings[2] and of its
discretion to adopt, in the absence of specific procedure provided in
the Rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears
most conformable to the spirit of said Rules,[3]
this Court, pursuant to Section 64 of Act 3110, resolves to remand this
case to the court of origin solely for the purpose of reconstructing
the testimony of the witnesses the stenographic notes of whose original
testimony had been lost, by retaking the testimony of those original
witnesses still available and, if desired and necessary, of some other
witness who had personal knowledge of the facts testified to by the
first witness who had already died.
In connection with
appellant’s petition for bail upon the ground of the subsequent further
delay in the final dispositior of this case, the records show that upon
being informed of the loss of the stenographic notes taken by
stenographer Claro Leuterio, of the testimonies of the five witnesses
in question, this Court took the necessary steps to determine whether
said notes had actually been lost, ordering, for the purpose of
compelling the stenographer to transcribe his notes, his confinement in
the Supreme Court premises until he shall have filed said transcript or
proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the same can not be done.
The stenographer concerned was given opportunity to go, under custody,
to Cebu City where he claimed to have entrusted his notes to a certain
individual. Upon his return to Manila, he reported that he was unable
to locate the same. Then later, upon the Court’s requiring the
Solicitor General to state whether he could present his brief based on
the evidence existing on the record (appellant Oscar Castelo having
filed his brief notwithstanding the absence of the testimonies of said
five witnesses), the Solicitor General informed the Court that another
stenographer who was engaged privately by appellant Oscar Castelo
during the trial might be able to reproduce the testimonies of these
witnesses. Upon further inquiry, however, said other stenographer
manifested that he took down no notes of the testimonies in question
inasmuch as he was not present during the time they were given in
court. Confronted with this situation, the Court ordered the release
from detention of stenographer Claro Leuterio, at the same time
requesting the Secretary of Justice to have the loss of these official
records investigated with a view to prosecuting, if warranted,
stenographer Leuterio for infidelity in the custody of official
documents.
The Government can not, therefore, be blamed for
the resulting1 delay in the final termination of this case. In this
connection, we quote the following from the decision of this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, in the case of People vs. Dagatan, 90 Phil., 294:
“In
the present case, there might have been a delay that has worked
hardship or disadvantage on the accused, but the same cannot be
attributed solely to the Government, since reconstitution is as much
the duty of the prosecution as of the defense (Gunabe vs. Director of
Prisons, 77 Phil. 993; 44 Off. Gaz., 1244).* * *
“The following passage from the decision of this Court in U. S. vs.
Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, 540, has full application to the case now before
us: Every person who finds himself in a court of justice, in whatever
capacity, must hold himself while there subject to those unforeseen
events which suddenly and unavoidably intervene and change the whole
aspect of things. The sickness or death of the judge, or of counsel for
the prosecution, the destruction by fire or flood of the court-house
and all the records and evidence of the pending trial—any of these
things are sufficient to interrupt the course of the proceedings and to
require that they be begun anew. Such their occurrence, so no one can
legally lose or profit by their events weigh equally against all. As no
one can be charged with results. While the law protects persons charged
with crime from the unjust and arbitrary acts of man, there is no
shield which may be interposed against the tyranny of unforseen events.
Until the proceedings which, under the system which the law provides,
constitute his trial are terminated, the happening of an unforeseen
event which renders the continuance of his trial for the time
impossible, as it can not be used for his conviction, can not be urged
for his absolution.”
Wherefore, the
petition for bail presented by accused-appellant Castelo are hereby
denied, and this case is remanded to the court of origin with
directions to reconstruct, in the manner indicated above, the testimony
of the witnesses, the stenographic notes of whose original testimony
have been lost, within sixty (60) days from the receipt of this
Resolution, and to elevate the same to this Court within ten (10) days
after the same has been retaken. The stenographer or stenographers who
will assist during the re-hearing shall immediately transcribe their
notes and shall file their transcripts with this Court within thirty
(30) days after the conclusion of the retrial. So ordered.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] Approved March 19, 1923.
[2] Sec. 5(h), Rule 124.
[3] Sec. 6, Rule 124.
PARAS, C. J., dissenting:
In my opinion, Rule 117, Section 2 and Section 5 are applicable. Even
Act No. 3110, Section 6, can be made applicable. See also U. S. vs. Tan, 4 Phil., 626-627 and U. S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil., 537.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to that part of the majority opinion concerning the
reconstruction of the lost stenographic notes of the testimony of
witnesses taken at the trial of the appellant in the Court below, but
disagree to that part thereof which denies the appellant’s petition for
bail, the disposition of his appeal having been long delayed due to the
fault or negligence of the stenographer who took down the notes of the
testimony of some witnesses and lost them. In this circumstance,
although the appellant was sentenced to death, his release on bail may
be granted under such terms and conditions as would insure his
availability or personal appearance and surrender of his person to the
Court when the reading and execution of the final judgment rendered in
the case be set by the trial court.