PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO COMELET Y MARIO ALIAS “UKA”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
GARCIA-FERNANDEZ, J.:
On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant and Crispin Longey were charged with murder for the death of William Lapaan y Paleyan.[1] Upon arrest, Crispin Longey filed a motion to suspend proceedings and to remand case for preliminary investigation, which was granted by the RTC based on the order dated January 17, 2006.[2] On February 27, 2006, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of La Trinidad, Benguet issued a resolution dismissing the case against Crispin Longey without prejudice to further investigation if additional evidence is presented.[3] On February 27, 2006, an Amended Information was filed charging accused-appellant as follows:
“That on or about the 15th day of October 2005, at Ataki, Camp 4, Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with TREACHERY and EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and inflict fatal wounds in the vital parts in the body of one WILLIAM LAPA-AN(sic) y PALIYAN causing his death immediately thereafter.
Contrary to law.”[4]
On October 21, 2008, accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge.[5] During the pre-trial on November 11, 2008, the prosecution and defense stipulated that:
1) The identity of the accused, Pedro Comelet, who was charged and arraigned is the same as the accused in the above-entitled case;
2) The accused Pedro Comelet was arrested on May 12, 2008 at Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province;
3) The accused Pedro Comelet is an employee or laborer of a certain Mr. Dacyon; and,
4) Among the laborers of Mr. Dacyon is Crispin Longey.[6]
The prosecution presented Herminia Lapaan, David Calisog, Crispin Longey, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, PO3 Andres Calaowa, PO3 Espina Reyes and Jesus Dacyon as witnesses. The prosecution’s version of the facts is summarized as follows:
Victim William Lapaan, an amputee, was a resident of San Vicente, Baguio City and operated a fishpond at Ataki, Camp 4, Tuba, Benguet. He lived in a cabin and maintained a sari-sari store adjacent to the fishpond just beside Kenon Road. Across the cabin of Lapaan, was a newly renovated house owned by one Johnny Dacyon, who employed Crispin Longey as caretaker and accused-appellant as handyman. Beside the Dacyon house was also the house of David Calisog.[7]
On Saturday afternoon of October 15, 2005, Johnny Dacyon brought his father Jesus Dacyon to his house in preparation for the moving in rites of the Dacyon family under their tribal custom in Sabangan, Mountain Province. Prior to the said date, Crispin Longey and accused-appellant worked on the finishing of the house and butchered a pig for the rites the following day. On the evening of the same day, Johnny Dacyon left while Jesus Dacyon, Crispin Longey and accused-appellant shared a bottle of gin before going to bed.[8] Meanwhile, neighbor David Calisog and victim William Lapaan were also drinking Red Horse beer in front of the latter’s house and at around 10 p.m., the former left for his house across the road.[9]
On October 16, 2005, David Calisog woke up around 6 or 7 am and decided to buy cigarettes at William Lapaan’s sari-sari store. He looked for Lapaan in the cabin and at the fishpond but could not find him. Calisog observed that Lapaan’s things were scattered in front of the house; that he noticed blood along the pathway, broken glass and bottles in the cabin, one pair of Lapaan’s crutches on the porch while the other pair was near the fishpond, and a blue slipper among the litter in front of the cabin. When Calisog failed to find Lapaan in the house, he went to look for Crispin Longey to ask for assistance in finding him. Thereafter, he decided to report the matter to the police in Tuba Police Station in Camp 6 and inform Lapaan’s family of the incident in San Vicente, Baguio city.[10]
At 10:00 a.m. of the same day, SPO1 Espina Reves together with PO3 Andres Calawa and PO1 Voltaire Away arrived at Lapaan’s cabin where Lapaan’s neighbors and relatives had already gathered. They found Lapaan’s body a few meters from the cabin submerged in the river in between two (2) boulders with the right foot sticking out of the water. They fished out the body and carried it to the cabin. SPO1 Reves interviewed the victim’s neighbor David Calisog at the crime scene. One of the relatives of the victim turned over a piece of Island slipper to SPO1 Reves, who in turn brought it to the police station and turned it over to evidence custodian SPO4 Rodrigo Kitongan.[11]
At 3:30 p.m., Dr. Ronald Bandonillo of the Medico-Legal Division, National Bureau of Investigation, Baguio conducted a post mortem examination and issued a report stating that the victim sustained multiple injuries, i.e., 7 abrasions, 2 contusions, 7 lacerations, 4 hematomas, massive and generalized hemorrhage; that the cause of death was massive intracranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple traumatic head injuries caused by a hard blunt instrument; and that the estimated time of death was about 3:00 a.m. of October 16, 2005.[12] Dr. Bandonillo testified that about 20 blows were inflicted on the different parts of the victim’s body, 15 of which were blows on the head; that the injuries were inflicted simultaneously or almost at the same time or within one (1) minute apart, probably by more than one (1) assailant.[13]
David Calisog testified that prior to the incident, he went to the Dacyon house on Thursday, October 13, 2005 and found Crispin Longey and accused-appellant drinking and chatting; and that he heard Crispin Longey say, “Man ayak sas ipogaw. Patenga en tayon dayta.” (Translation: “That person practices witchcraft. Let’s kill him.”); and that the person Longey was referring to was the victim.[14]
The victim’s widow Herminia Lapaan testified that she buried her husband on October 17, 2005 according to their tribe’s burial customs; that she incurred a total amount of P286,000.00 as burial expenses; and that she had no idea who killed her husband and relied on the police to investigate the crime.[15]
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, thru counsel, filed a motion on September 24, 2009, for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence, however, the trial court denied the motion in its order dated September 29, 2009 on the ground that the motion was filed two (2) days late, contrary to Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which prescribes a non-extendible period of 5 days after the prosecution rests its case.[16] On January 6, 2010, the trial court issued a resolution reiterating the denial of the demurrer to evidence and directed the defense to present its evidence.[17] On February 2, 2010, accused-appellant thru counsel manifested in open court that he was waiving his right to present evidence, thus, the trial court submitted the case for decision.[18]
On February 23, 2011, the RTC rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of William Lapaan the amounts of P30,000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. In convicting accused-appellant, the RTC held as follows:
“xxx Combining these sources, this court finds that the following circumstances have been established by the prosecution:
• Crispin Longey made a comment to the accused Pedro Comelet heard by David Calisog regarding the alleged witchcraft practiced by the victim William Lapaan (sic) and they had idle talk about putting an end to the latter’s life on October 13 two or three days before his death;
• Pedro Comelet had easy access to the victim as he stayed in a house 30 meters away;
• In the evening of October 15, 2005, Pedro Comelet had no face injury but had a blackeye and a gash on his right eyebrow the following morning. When asked by the police investigations he told them he got them from a boxing bout due to a head butt at San Carlos, Baguio City and declined to have his injuries examined by a physician at the suggestion of the police;
• He gave another lame explanation to Crispin Longey and Jesus Dacyon for his injuries: he fell down the stairs before he went to bed the evening of October 15, 2005 and was nursing the same that morning of October 16, 2005 when the victim was found dead in the river;
• The pair of blue “Islander” slippers (Exhibit “G”) found at the scene of the crime had blood stains. One piece was noticed by David Calisog at the front of the cabin and the other was found floating in the river where the body was found. Crispin Longey stated that he saw Pedro Comelet wearing those slippers on October 14 and 15. The police investigators asked him to wear the same as the size seems to fit him but he refused. He was then wearing a pair that seemed much larger than his feet. In effect the police was accusing him as a suspect in the killing of Lapaan. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that reads: “Admission by silence. – – An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.”
• He left the Dacyon house in Ataki, Tuba, Benguet right after the police asked him to shed light on the incident and disappeared. Despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest on December 14, 2005, he eluded arrest until the police captured him on May 12, 2008 in Sabangan, Mountain Province. Verily here, flight is an indication of guilt;
• Crispin Longey in his sworn statement (Exhibit “C-2” on page 390, records) given to the police on October 25, 2005 on paragraph 4 averred: “I personally know that one of the perpetrators who killed Mr. William Lapaan was Pedro Comelet y Mario alias “Uka;”
xxx xxx xxx
For the guidance of bar and bench, the standard postulated in appreciating circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday: “No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationally hypothesis except that of guilty.”
In short, it is the quality of the circumstances, rather than the quantity, that will draw the line on whether the circumstances presented, consist of an unbroken chain that will inevitably lead to the conclusion that he appellant is guilty without an iota of doubt. In assessing the circumstances with the end in view of a conviction, it is, however, important to note that to preclude the possibility of any error is unattainable. Moral certainty is sufficient or that certainty which produces conviction is an unprejudiced mind.
Applying the above “guidance” to the mind of this court, the prosecution in this instant case has overcome the accused’s constitutional right to presumption of innocence and has proven the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Pedro Comelet with the above-enumerated circumstantial evidence.
As to Damages
Herminia Lapaan, the widow of William Lapaan, testified that she spent the amount of P286,000.00 for burial expenses and food for the hundreds of people who attended the burial ceremony of her deceased husband. Aside from uncertified photocopies of receipts for the coffin and embalming services (Exhibit “H” and “H-1”), no other written official receipts were submitted however to support her claim for actual damages required under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 may be recovered as it has been shown that the victim’s family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. An award of P30,000.00 by way of temperate damages is awarded.
The heirs of the victim William Lapaan are entitled to an indemnity ex delito of P50,000.00 which is awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim.
Lastly, it has been proven by the prosecution that the widow of the victim suffered mental anguish to justify moral damages that current jurisprudence has set the amount at P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Pedro Comelet guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heir of William Lapaan the amount of P30,000.00 as temperate damages, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delito, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
On March 1, 2011, accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was given due course by the RTC.[20] Pending resolution of this appeal, accused-appellant’s counsel on October 14, 2014, filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal stating that due to accused-appellant’s medical condition, i.e., he suffered a stroke on April 17, 2014, he was incapable of affixing his conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal, but accused-appellant’s sibling Romulo Comelet had already given his conformity.[21] However, this Court deems the said notice to withdraw the appeal ineffectual considering that it does not bear the conformity of accused-appellant himself.[22] In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court:
I.
The Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder; and,
II.
The Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet erred in ruling that the accused-appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.[23]
Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of PO3 Espina Reves was hearsay and cannot be considered competent and credible evidence; that there was no physical evidence directly pointing to him as the perpetrator of the crime; and that the trial court erred in convicting him based on circumstantial evidence.
Doctrinally, an accused is presumed innocent. This presumption prevails unless overturned by competent and credible proof. To sustain a conviction, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt must be considered in his favor. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction.[24] In this case, the trial court convicted accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the guilt of the accused, and inconsistent with his innocence.[25]
This Court finds that the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to evoke moral certainty that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. First, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. He need not prove what is legally presumed. If he so desires he may present evidence on his behalf, but no matter how weak it is, he still deserves an acquittal. This is because the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the defense but on the strength of its own evidence. Unless the prosecution has successfully overturned the presumption of innocence, acquittal is inevitable. Second, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The conviction of accused-appellant having been based on very tenuous grounds, the Court’s judicial conscience cannot rest easy in sustaining his conviction by the court below. Third, mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor. It must be emphasized that the elements constituting the crime must be clearly shown.[26] The invocation of circumstantial evidence in this case is misplaced. The trial court gave probative weight to the testimony of David Calisog stating that on October 13, 2005 or two days prior to the death of the victim, he heard Crispin Longey make a comment to accused-appellant about putting an end to the victim’s life because the latter practiced witchcraft. Notably, no other evidence was presented to corroborate these statements. The trial court also relied on the sworn statement issued by Crispin Longey on October 25, 2005 stating among others that: “I personally know that one of the perpetrators who killed Mr. William Lapaan was Pedro Comelet y Mario alias “Uka”. However, during the proceedings, Longey’s testimony was not only full of inconsistencies but he also categorically denied having said that statement. Longey testified as follows:[27]
Atty. Palsiw: Mr. witness, when you were invited by these police officers to the police station, you were not actually suspected by these police officers? A: I was already a suspect sir. Q: The truth, Mr. Witness is, they called you to the Tuba Police Station so that you will shed light of what actually happened? A: Yes sir. Xxx xxx Atty. Palsiw: Another reason why the police officers callered you is for you to explain why you uttered the words “man ayak sas ipogaw, patenga en tayon dayta”, is that correct? A: I never uttered those words, sir. Court: Were those words contained in the question and answer statement? Atty. Balba: There is none, You Honor. Atty. Palsiw: It is contained in the counter affidavit of this witness, your Honor, which we marked as Exhibit “C”. Court: And this counter affidavit was prepared by the Public Attorney’s Office? Atty. Palsiw: I believe so, Your Honor. That was the basis of his discharge, Your Honor. Atty. Balba: This was actually prepared by Atty. Paredes, your Honor. Court: Was he confronted with that affidavit already? Atty. Balba: He was not, your Honor, because he was already discharged and besides that is not the issue, your Honor. Xxx xxx Court: Atty. Palsiw: I think we are through with the witness, Your Honor. Court: Atty. Balba: You Honor, I believe it was explained in the counter affidavit. Court: That is why I want to call the public prosecutor. You call Fiscal Maranes.
Atty. Balba: Mr. Witness, how many times exactly were you invited by the police officers at the Tuba Police Station?A: Maybe three times sir. Q: Now, Mr. witness, when this affidavit that was identified yesterday, was this affidavit signed when you first went to the police station at Tuba, or the second time or the third time? A: I recall that I signed that document the first time I went to the police station, sir. Atty. Balba: Your honor, please, there is no statement that he would tell what he knows at the proper forum. Atty. Palsiw: In Question No. 5. Atty. Balba: A: I never said that Pedro Comelet was the one who killed the victim or the perpetrator Q: Now, Mr. witness, how do you understand this phrase, “I will only answer the question at the proper forum.”? A: Because I got tired of being questioned so I answer that, sir. Q: And why do you say that you were tired of being questioned? Xxx Xxx xxx Court: Just to clarify. Are you in anyway related to the accused? A: He is my brother-in-law, your Honor. Xxx Xxx xxx Q: So the question propounded to you by the policemen when they got your statement, were these questions really asked of you? A: Yes sir. Q: And some answers you said were not the answers you gave but they made it up? A: Yes sir. Q: Would you know of any reason why they would do that? A: None, sir. Q: Were you bodily hurt by the police when you were questioned that time? A: Yes sir. They even got me drunk sir. Q: Did you drink with them or you alone? A: Yes sir. Q: They forced you to drink? A: We were then enjoying, sir Q: So you were having conversation. Did they force you to drink” A: No, sir. Court: You are excused.
After a thorough evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that only the following circumstances surrounding the crime were established by the prosecution: 1) On October 15, 2005 at about 7 p.m., accused-appellant together with Crispin Longey and Jesus Dacyon were drinking in the Dacyon house, which was about 30 meters from the victim’s cabin; 2) After the drinking session ended, accused-appellant, Crispin Longey and Jesus Dacyon slept in the said house; 3) On or around the same time until 10:00 p.m., the victim and David Calisog were also having their own drinking session in the former’s cabin; 4) The following day, the body of the victim, which sustained several stab wounds and contusions, was recovered at a nearby river. There is absolutely no evidence of what transpired between the time when the drinking sessions ended and the following morning when the victim’s body was found. The trial court convicted the accused-appellant based on the surmise that he must have killed the victim during such interregnum. Conjectures, surmises and suspicions cannot take the place of evidence. As already adverted to, for circumstantial evidence to be validly invoked there must be more than one circumstance, from which this Court can decipher a pattern to support the conclusion that it was accused-appellant who killed victim. From the foregoing, it is difficult to draw such a conclusion given that the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of the victim.
Anent the fact of flight by accused-appellant, it has been ruled that flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. In this case, accused-appellant’s flight could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.[28]
In People vs. Masalihit, it was held that: “Before we condemn . . . the crime must first be positively established and that the accused is guilty sans any scintilla of doubt. This is elementary and fundamental in our criminal justice system. Any suspicion or belief that that accused is guilty — no matter how strong — cannot substitute for the quantum of evidence that is required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” Accused-appellant should not be punished for the failure of the prosecution to dispose of its burden to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[29]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed judgment dated February 23, 2011 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Pedro Comelet y Mario alias “Uka” is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and he has not incurred civil liability in this case. His RELEASE from confinement is immediately ORDERED, unless he is detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
Tijam, N.G., Chairperson and Lopez, M.V., JJ., concur.
[1] Record, pp. 1-2; pp. 3-4.
[2] Id. at pp. 19-22; p. 29.
[3] Id. at pp. 32-33.
[4] Record, p. 34.
[5] Id. at p. 97.
[6] Id. at pp. 113-117.
[7] TSN, May 1, 2009, pp. 80-82; pp. 84; 87-88;
[8] TSN, August 25, 2009, pp. 116-134; September 8, 2009, pp. 152-160; Exhibit “J”, Record, p. 47.
[9] TSN, May 1, 2009, pp. 84-88.
[10] TSN, May 1, 2009, pp. 88-93. June 2, 2009, pp. 100-102.
[11] TSN, April 13, 2009, pp. 41-44; April 27, 2009, pp. 61-64; May 1, 2009, pp. 74-76.
[12] Exhibit “E”, Record, p. 10.
[13] TSN, April 13, 2009, pp. 35-36.
[14] TSN, May 1, 2009, pp. 95; TSN, June 2, 2009, pp. 98-99; Exhibit “B”, Record, p. 9.
[15] TSN, March 16, 2009, pp. 8-10; March 25, 2009, pp. 18-29.
[16] Record, pp. 407-409.
[17] Id. at p. 427.
[18] Id. at p. 430.
[19] Id. at pp. 461-466.
[20] Id. at pp. 469-470; p. 471.
[21] Please see attached pleading.
[22] Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. vs. De Dios Transportation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 147010, July 18, 2003.
[23] Rollo, p. 41.
[24] People of the Philippines vs. Comesario, G.R. No. 127811, April 29, 1999.
[25] Atienza vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014.
[26] Note 24.
[27] TSN, August 26, 2009, pp. 145-149.
[28] People of the Philippines vs. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013.
[29] G.R. No. 124329, 14 December 1998.