CONCEPCION FONACIER-ABAÑO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE CONSTANTE A. ANCHETA, RESPONDENT.

Without prejudice to the filing of extended opinions, the Court has
Resolved to order the separation from the service of
respondent Judge Constante A. Ancheta,
presiding judge of Branch III at Daet of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte effective
immediately.

The extensive 47-page single space Report of the Honorable
Investigator Associate Justice Oscar R. Victoriano of
the Court of Appeals submitted the following findings:

“(1) While Charge No. I on consorting
with litigants and receiving gifts and favors as a whole was not made out, still there is credible evidence that he had been seen
in public with litigants Ong and Legarto.  Telesforo Mendoza
saw respondent in the cockpit of Vinzons in the
afternoon of September 28, 1978
with Gil Ramores and Tony Salamat.  This investigator does not believe the claim
that respondent publicly asked Ong for P200.00; but
respondent admitted his presence in the cockpit on this occasion, and this is
confirmed by Dr. Perfecto Pajarillo.  The presence of litigant Ong
could not have been coincidental. 
Complainant also saw respondent going to Sonia’s place on one occasion
with Ong. 
Strangely, respondent did not bother to present Ong
to refute this particular charge.

Respondent also admits his presence at the Millionaire’s Club in Daet allegedly upon invitation of Atty. Santiago Turingan whose guest was a lawyer from the Meat Inspection
Commission in Manila.  He admits Legarto
was in the group.

Although these isolated instances of having been seen in public
with litigants Legarto and Ong
shown by the evidence may not amount to consorting, which implies
frequent association or sharing of interests, still as a Judge before whom Legarto and Ong had pending cases
he should have scrupulously avoided their company in public to avoid
unwarranted misconceptions or erroneous impressions in the public mind,
particularly in that of the adverse parties. 
Similarly, in the case of Legarto, it is
obvious that respondent’s Court Interpreter Ernesto Pajares, had taken it upon
himself to fill respondent’s order for pork to buy it from Legarto
in the hope of obtaining a discounted price. 
But considering that Legarto was a litigant in
his Sala, it was most improper, to say the least, to
have allowed Pajares to get the supply from him.  There is likelihood that respondent knew or
was chargeable with knowledge that the pork came from Legarto.  There is no showing that when res­pondent subsequently learned that Pajares
got the pork from Legarto, Pajares
was reprimanded or his attention called with injunction to avoid repetition of
the same act.

x                   x                  x

(2) The ancillary charge of threatening a female court employee
whom he had suspected of gossiping about his alleged acts of immorality under
main Charge No. IV is established by the evidence.

(3) Charge No. V-A on having caused his deputy clerk to issue a
certification that he had deposited with the Court a box containing a wine
decanter falsely alleged to have been given as a gift also appears established
by the evidence.” (Rollo, at pages 1026-1027)

The details of the proven charge of respondent’s having
threatened a female court employee are thus stated in the Investigator’s
Report:

“Regarding the charge of having threatened a female Court
employee, Edisa Vasquez, employed as stitcher in Branch II, CFI, Camarines
Norte, testified that once respondent seeing her in branch III, presided over
by Judge Isidro Vera, asked why she was there. 
When she replied that she was looking for someone, he asked, ‘Why are
you talking things against me?  (Bakit mo ako chinichis­mis?).’ She asked, ‘What is that?‘.  Respondent then
went inside his room and she followed. 
While standing in front of his table while she sat on the chair, res­pondent
asked her again, ‘Why are you making chismis
(gossiping)?‘. 
When she asked what kind of gossip was that, respondent opened the
drawer of his table, pulled out a gun and said, ‘Putang
ina mo, I will kill
you’.  She thought at first he was merely
joking but when she realized he was serious, she felt like urinating (naihi ako) proceeding to the
comfort room for personal necessity.  As
she went out, she told respondent, ‘Judge, I think we cannot understand each
other because you are drunk, so I better leave.’

This witness admits she never had, before this time, any untoward
incident with respondent whom she considered as good.  While she never complained formally, she mentioned
it to her boss, Judge Isidro Vera, and when Fiscal Adanzo asked her about it
she told him not to mind the incident any further.

Respondent merely denied this charge, claiming he had no reason to
threaten her as she was close to him. 
She used to frequent his office and ask his help, and he claims that
complainant practically offered her money to testify.  Apparently, this witness had no motive to
falsely testify against respondent who could easily have refuted her assertions
by presenting Judge Vera on rebuttal. 
This he failed to do.  And if she is admittedly close to him and he
had no reason to threaten her with a gun, this precisely serves to confirm her
testimony that respondent must have been under the influence of liquor at the
time.  This particular charge is deemed
duly proved.” (Rollo, at page 1002)

The proven charge of respondent’s having resorted to fabrication
of evidence with his branch clerk of court for use in his defense in the
investigation of this very case is thus related in the Investigator’s Report:

“B.  Fabrication
of Evidence – Respondent Caused His Deputy Clerk of Court to Issue
Certification that He had
Deposited with the Court a Box Containing a Musical Wine Decanter Alleged to
Have Been Given Him by Complainant as a Gift.

Respondent in his Answer dated August 21, 1978 alleged that complainant had given him a
wine decanter which he caused to be deposited in court.  He testified that some­time after December
22, 1977 Atty. De Lara, Complainant’s counsel, called him up in his house,
saying, ‘Judge, I have something for you from my client, Mrs. Abaño‘.  He told
Atty. De Lara not to bother as his client had a pending case.  But Atty. De Lara replied that it was
nothing, just a sort of Christmas gift. 
On his arrival in Manila sometime on January 13 or 14, 1978 he was
informed by his daughter that Vivencio Abaño, driving a white Volkswagen car, came and delivered a
box (Exh. 5) containing a wine decanter (Exh. 5-B), with a calling card (Exh.
5-A) attached to the box.  He brought it
to Daet with the intention to return it.  Upon advice, however, of Executive Judge
Vera, he desisted, as complainant was reputedly fond of insulting when
displeased.  The calling card appears
torn because before he deposited the box with the Deputy Clerk of Court it was
left in his chamber without any cover and it may have been eaten by
cockroaches.  As a way of disposing of
the gift with­out insulting complainant but at the same time avoiding liability
for accepting gifts in violation of an existing presidential decree, he decided
to deposit it with his Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Norberto Dating, on February 1, 1978 who issued the
certification of even date reading:

‘This is to certify that on this date, Feb. 1, 1978, Judge Constante A. Ancheta delivered to
the undersigned for deposit and safekeeping a box containing musical wine
decanter, appearing to have come from Concepcion F. Abaño.’

Complainant denies having given the wine decanter as a gift to
respondent, branding it as fabricated evidence. 
The circumstances on record would seem to sustain the claim of
complainant.

If it is true that after December 22 Atty. De Lara called
respondent to inform him of his client’s intention to give him a gift and he
expressed unwillingness to receive it because the giver had a pending case
before him, in all likelihood Atty. De Lara would have communicated to his
client about respondent’s reaction, in which case ordinarily complainant would
have desisted from her original intent to send the gift.  It seems therefore difficult to believe that
complainant should have still caused her son, Vivencio,
to deliver the box containing the wine decanter to respondent’s Quezon City residence.  Besides, this is roundly denied by Vivencio Abaño who proved through
fotographs (Exhs. VVV and VVV-1) and cer­tificate of registration (Exh. VVV-2) that his car from 1972 to 1978 had been
a blue Volkswagen beetle, not colored white as
declared by respondent.

The calling card (Exh. 5-A) bearing the
printed name “Concepcion F. Abaño”
as director of the Commercial
Credit Corporation of Bicol is not signed, and, as
com­plainant testified, she used to give out these calling cards to accompany Philamlife diaries. 
But the cards were in good shape, not torn and mutilated.  Indeed, Exh. 5-A
shows it is mutilated on the left lower part and right upper corner, indicating
it might have been detached from another object to which it was attached or
pasted.  Respondent’s explanation that it
might have been eaten by cockroaches when he left the box open in his chamber
is possible, although improbable, since only the calling card and no part of
the cardboard box appears to have been affected.

Then, too, notwithstanding Judge Vera’s advice, respondent could
have had the gift returned to complain­ant upon his return to Daet, considering his instruction to his interpreter,
Ernesto Pajares, not to accept any gifts.  The deposit would not have served any purpose
since complainant was not even informed or notified of it until later after the
charges were filed.  Respondent could
have asked Judge Vera to corroborate his testimony that he had sought his
advice as Executive Judge concerning the alleged gift, but strangely he failed
to do this.

But a far more significant consideration which serves to detract
from respondent’s claim is complainant’s submission that when respondent denied
complainant and her co-plaintiffs’ motion for disqualification filed in Civil
Case No. 2825 dated April 10, 1978 in his Order of April 17, 1978 (Exh. TT-2) he merely denied having received favors or gifts
from Ong; he never mentioned in said order that it
was complainant instead who had given him a wine decanter, a circumstance which
would have bolstered all the more the order of denial.  Finally, if Complainant had in fact given the
wine decanter as a gift in January, 1978 to respondent and insofar as
complainant was concerned the same was accepted by respondent because complainant
did not learn of the court deposit until after the present charges were filed,
said complainant would not have felt a compelling necessity to ask for
respondent’s inhibition.

It is pertinent to emphasize in connection with this charge that
the Certification (Exh. 8) which respondent caused
his branch Clerk of Court to
issue was not completely false as it certified correctly that respondent on the
date therein deposited with him the wine decanter.  What appears false is the allegation that the
decanter was given as a gift by complainant in an attempt to corrupt him,
testified to as part of his defense to belie the charge of accepting gifts and
favors from litigants.” (Rollo, at pages
1007-1008)

The Investigator in his Report recommended that light penalties of
“admonition” and
“fine and/or brief suspension” be imposed upon respondent.  The
Court has taken a more serious view in the light of respondent’s grave transgressions upon the established norms of
judicial behavior as established by the record of the case.

As we stressed in De la
Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, “the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice.  From him, the people draw their
will and awareness to obey the law.  They
see in him as intermediary of justice between two con­flicting interest, x x x.  Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow.  He should be studiously careful
to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.”

What we said there is fully applicable here, mutatis mutandis:
‘But, here is a judge who stands across the path of the law.  Unperturbed by judicial conscience, he
breached the very law he was sworn to uphold. 
Perhaps in a misplaced
display of the influence of his office, he unrestrainedly and openly
intoxicated himself in a public place, caused disturbance and alarm, and poked
his gun at an innocent man.  He wilfully moved away from the behavioural
injunctions of his office and let himself caught by the reaches of misconduct
and misdeeds.  Such conduct need be
sanctioned and must, therefore, be drawn to a close.  It throws an indelible stain on the
judiciary.”

Prescinding from the foregoing,
although not necessary for the disposition of the present case, the Court takes
judicial notice that complainant’s charge that respondent judge had rendered in
a simple ejectment case exorbitant damages against her
corporation, notwithstanding its being the aggrieved party (of P10,830.00 for
expenses of litigation, P75,000.00 for attorney’s fees, P75,000.00 for moral
damages and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and costs) in favor of Nelson Ong the defaulting lessee whom she had charged with unduly
consorting with respondent and
then arbitrarily tried to close all avenues of appeal by wrongfully declaring
complainant’s appeal as having been filed out of time.  The Court at the time did not give due course
to the charge, since respondent judge’s wrongful action in the case was then
the subject of complainant’s
pending recourse of mandamus filed with the Court of Appeals. 
The charge has now been borne out by the outcome of complainants corporation’s case with the Court of
Appeals, and being based on matters of record require no further
investigation.  The
Court of Appeals in its decision of January 4, 1980
in the case, CA-G.R. No. SP-08942-R entitled “Abaño
Realty Development Corp. et al. vs. Hon. C. Ancheta,
et al.”, long final and executory, did find that
respondent judge acted capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion, as
follows:

“Thus, it is evident that petitioners’ motion dated September 5, 1978 adopting private
respondents’ record on appeal was timely filed within the 10-day period required
by the order of August 2, 1978
for the petition­ers to complete their record on appeal.

But, even assuming that said motion was filed out of time, the mere
non-inclusion of the above-mentioned pleadings in the petitioners’ original
record on appeal does not prove fatal to petitioners’ appeal.  Neither will the same justify the dismissal
of their appeal.  It is noted that the
annexes to private respondents’ ‘Answer with Counterclaim’ form part of the
exhibits presented by the parties during the trial, aside from the fact that
same were already incorporated in private respondents’ record on appeal.  With respect to the order dated July 29, 1977 cancelling
the hearing of August 15, 1977,
and the motion for extension dated April
3, 1978, their inclusion is not really indispensable for same has
no bearing to the issue involved therein. 
Under the Rules, only such pleadings, motions and interlocutory orders
as are related to the appealed judgment and necessary for the proper
understanding of the issue involved, need to appear in the Record on Appeal
(Section 6, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court). 
As regards private respondents’ “counter-manifestation” dated June 30, 1978 in connection with
petitioners’ motion for inhibition, it observed that the same was not yet in
existence when peti­tioners filed their original record on appeal.  Clearly, therefore, said omissions in
petitioners’ record on appeal cannot be considered as such serious infractions
of the Rules as to deprive petitioners of their right to elevate their case to
the appellate court.  If at all, the
matters would properly draw an opposite order from the respondent court, after
hearing, for further amendment of the record on appeal, but certainly not for
the disapproval thereof which amounts to total disallowance of petitioners’
appeal (Section 7, Rule 41, Rules of Court), unless it can be shown that such
omissions were purposely sought to delay the early termination of the
proceedings which has not been done by the respondents in this case (Francisco
vs. Muñoz-Palma, 37 SCRA 753).  At any rate, the amended record on appeal
submitted by the petitioners fully incorporate the omitted pleadings.  While this was filed later, it is deemed to
have been filed on presentation of the original record on appeal which was done
within the reglementary period (Vda.
de Oyzon vs. Vinzon,
L-19360, July 26, 1963).  The Supreme
Court has explained that ‘amendment presupposes the existence of something to
be amended, and, therefore, the tolling of the period should relate back to the
filing of the pleading sought to be amended’ (Phil. Independent Church vs.
Juana Mateo, et al., L-37229, Oct. 21, 1975). 
Indeed, the trend of the rulings of the Supreme Court is to afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated December 12, 1978 and
January 26, 1979 are hereby set aside and the respondent judge or his successor
is directed to approve the amended record on appeal and give due course to
petitioners’ appeal.”

The record further shows that there were concerted attempts on
the part of therein private respondent Nelson Ong and
respondent judge to execute the said judgment of exorbitant damages against
complainant’s corporation during the pendency of the
case in the Court of Appeals, so much so that in the course of the proceedings
this Court had to issue its resolution of September 25, 1979 disqualifying respondent judge from acting in any way in the
said case.  All these background facts
manifest the existence of willful malice in respondent judges wrongful orders
and actions in the case, which cannot be defended as mere errors of judgment,
and warrant his separation from the service.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is found guilty of the
charges of serious misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary and the public
interest and is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and pay and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities.  This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Barrredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., vote for six months suspension.

Abad Santos, J., on official leave.