IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION TO BECOME A NATURALIZED FILIPINO CITIZEN.  LI SIU LIAT ALIAS PERFECTO ALIAS NG SE LIAT, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSIT…

In the present appeal, we are asked by the State’s counsel to
strike down the order of Judge Emigdio V. Nietes dated October 15, 1965 in a naturalization case,^[1] reconsidering the order of
denaturalization and confirming an order of naturalization previous thereto.

The dossier of this case yields the following facts:

On July 14, 1956, petitioner was declared a naturalized citizen of the Philippines in an
order issued by Judge Rafael Amparo, then of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.  On July 19, 1958, following the
lapse of the two-year statutory period, three things happened:  first, hearing on petitioner’s oath-taking
was had; second, after hearing, petitioner subscribed to an oath of allegiance
before Judge Amparo; and third, Certificate of Naturalization No. 2414 was
issued to petitioner by the Clerk
of Court.

On July 2, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition
to declare null and void Judge Amparo’s decision for lack of jurisdiction
because the petition was published only once in the Official Gazette; and,
likewise, to strip petitioner of Philippine citizenship because, amongst
others, his naturalization was obtained through fraud and falsification in that
he suppressed the fact that he had a common-law wife Mary Go alias Go
Ting Ty, with whom he had several children. 
On July 26, 1965, upon this petition, the opposition and supplemental
opposi­tion thereto, the reply to both, and after a hearing at which evidence was adduced, the court,
this time presided by Judge Jesus Y. Perez ^[2]
(now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) issued an order cancelling the
naturalization certificate issued to petitioner.

On petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the opposition
thereto, reply to opposition, and memoranda filed by petitioner, another judge
on temporary assignment, Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued the order of October
15, 1965 – now the subject of review – reversing the order of Judge Perez of
July 26, 1965, and confirming Judge Amparo’s order of naturalization.  Hence, this appeal by the State.

The authority of Judge
Emigdio V. Nietes to resolve the motion for reconsideration, challenged herein,
stems from facts following:  Judge Nietes
was the district judge of Iloilo and Iloilo City, Branch I.  Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 243 of
the Secretary of justice dated July 28, 1965, Judge Nietes was detailed to the
Court of First Instance of Manila “to take cognizance of all cases
pertaining to the Third Branch thereof, effective immediately and until further
orders” from the Department of Justice. 
This administrative order was approved by the Supreme Court in a
resolution dated August 10, 1965.

On October 11, 1965, the
President of the Philippines appointed, ad interim, Honorable
Placido C. Ramos, District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, “to
preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III.”  On October 12, 1965, Judge Placido C. Ramos
took his oath of office before Acting Secretary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin.  He assumed his office on that same day.

The questioned order
(dated October 15, 1965) of Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, temporarily assigned to
Branch III, was therefore issued three (3) days after Judge Placido C. Ramos
had entered into the performance of his duties as Judge of the same Branch III.

The question then is
this:  Did the appointment of and
assumption of office by Judge Ramos ipso facto terminate the authority of Judge Nietes to act in the present case?

The controlling legal
provision is Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which reads:

“SEC. 51.  Detail
of judge to another district or province. – Whenever a judge stationed in any province or branch of a
court in a province shall certify to the Secretary of Justice that the
condition of the docket in his court is such as to require the assistance of an
additional judge, or when there is any vacancy in
any court, or branch of a court
in a province, the Secretary of Justice may, in the
interest of justice, with
the approval of the Supreme Court
and for a period of not more than
three months for each time, assign any
judge of any court or province whose
docket permits his temporary absence from
said court, to hold sessions  in the court needing
such assistance or where such vacancy exists.  No judge so detailed shall take cognizance of
any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the objection is sustained
by the Supreme Court.

Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or
branch of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a case
totally heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity given
for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to
prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines and
send the same by registered mail to the clerk of Court, to be filed in the
court as of the date when the same was
received by the clerk, in the same manner as if the judge had been present in
the court to direct the filing of the judgment: 
Provided, however, That if a case has been heard only in part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of
any of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the respective
district judge, may also authorize the judge who has partly heard the case to
continue hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or
appointment to another court of equal juris­diction.” ^[3]

Complementary thereto is
Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, thus:

“SEC. 9.  Signing judgments
out of province. – Whenever a judge appointed or assigned
in any province or branch of a Court of First Instance in a province
shall leave the province by transfer or assignment to another court of equal
jurisdiction, or by expiration of his temporary assignment, without having decided a case totally
heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their
counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in
said case anywhere within the Philippines. 
He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court
where the case was heard or argued to be filed therein as of the date when the
same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if he had been present in
court to direct the filing of the judgment. 
If a case has been heard only in part, the Supreme Court, upon petition
of any of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the respective
district judge, may also authorize the judge who has partly heard the case, if
no other judge had heard the case in part, to continue hearing and to decide
said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal
jurisdiction.” ^[4]

It is pertinent to state
here that on July 27, 1965, i.e., one day prior to July 28, 1965 (date of
Administrative Order 243), Judge Jesus Y. Perez was elevated to the Court of
Appeals.^[5] Judge Perez could not thus act on
petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of his order of July 26, 1965,
which was filed on September 1, 1965. 
And, the posi­tion of Judge of Branch III became vacant.

1. First to be assessed
is the reach of Administrative Order No. 243 aforesaid.  By the terms thereof, authority therefor
emanated from Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.  Accordingly, the power of Judge Nietes to
take cognizance of all cases pertaining to Branch III of the Manila court must
be circumscribed within the bounda­ries set forth in that statutory
provision.  There is no question in our
mind that for as long as Branch III remained vacant, so long did Judge Nietes
have authority to act on any and all cases assigned thereto within the
three-month limit fixed in Section 51.

2. Could Judge Nietes
still act in a case like the present at a time when there is already a regular
judge?  The assignment of Judge Nietes is
specific, namely, to take cognizance of all cases pertaining to the Third
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was then vacant.  Since a judge for that branch had been
appointed and qualified, the reason for the assignment no longer existed.  Therefore, the author­ity of Judge Nietes to
continue acting as judge of Branch III terminated as of October 12, 1965 when
Judge Ramos took his oath of office and started his duties as Judge thereof;
and, the authority of Judge Ramos to act on this case began.

3. The view we take of
this case is not without reason. Firstly, except under
special circumstances by law specified, two judges cannot sit in the same
branch of the court.  Secondly, one
temporarily assigned to a branch of a court of first instance because of an
existing vacancy thereof should not intrude into the functions of the regularly
appointed judge who has qualified to fill that vacancy.  Because, confusion may arise as to the
assignment of cases amongst the two judges of equal rank; delineation of work
between them may result in lack of harmony; disputes between the two may crop
up; the machinery of justice may not run smoothly.

 As early as 1906, this Court, in a decision
penned by Chief Justice Arellano, declared that “[t]he certification and
signing of a bill of ex­ceptions [now record on appeal] are jurisdictional acts
which can not be executed by one who has no jurisdiction over the matter on
account of his having ceased to be the judge of the court in which the case was
tried by him as such judge.”  Chief
Justice Arellano added:  “He has no
right to exercise any jurisdiction in a court of which he has ceased to
be the judge.”^[6] As valid then is the precept that the act of
reversing a decision penned by one judge of a given court, is jurisdictional,
and cannot be done by another temporarily assigned thereto who has ceased to be
a judge thereof.  Appropriately had it
been said that:  “A judge in one
district may preside in another district in place of the judge of the latter
district.  But this does not authorize
two judges to hold separate courts in the same district at the same time.  Therefore an order made by a judge presiding
out of his district, at a time when the judge of the district where the order
is made is also holding court therein, is void; and no one can be
punished for contempt of court in disobeying such order.”^[7]

4. The case of the
disputed order does not come within the exception written in Section 9 of Rule
135 of the Rules of Court and the second paragraph of Section 51 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. This is because the case was not
heard totally, or for that matter, partially, by Judge Nietes.  In fact, no evidence was taken before
him.  Evidence on the State’s petition to
cancel naturalization was taken before the then Judge Perez.  It was not, therefore, lawful for Judge
Nietes to issue the controverted order of October 15, 1965 reversing
Judge Perez’ order of cancellation of July 26, 1965.

5. But on top of all these is the fact that at the time Judge
Emigdio V. Nietes handed down the order of October 15, 1965, he was neither a
judge de jure nor a judge de facto.  Not a de jure judge, because
there was an incumbent de jure judge actually discharging the
duties of office; not a de facto, because there was a de jure
judge.^[8]
Indeed, to rise to the level of a de facto judge, one must be acting under some
color of right.  No color of right here
existed as the vacancy in the office which Judge Nietes was temporarily
occupying had been filled up.^[9] The result is the same.  The order of Judge Nietes is null and void.

6. The nullity of Judge Nietes’ order of October 15, 1965 poses
the problem of whether we are to remand the case to the lower court to resolve petitioner’s
motion to reconsider Judge Perez’ order of July 26, 1965, or, to pass upon the
merits of the said motion.  We opt for
the second.  There is no necessity for the lower court
to take evidence. For, both the order of Judge Perez and that of Judge Nietes
were based on the evidence already presented. 
The soundness of Judge Nietes’ resolution on the issues of fact and of law is thoroughly
discussed in the briefs of the parties. 
Nothing more is to be
done except to grant or to deny the motion for reconsideration on the basis of
the evidence of record and the law applicable. 
Were the case to be remanded just for the lower court to resolve said
motion for reconsideration, nothing substantial will be accomplished.  If the motion be granted, surely enough, the
State will appeal, as it did in the present case.  If denied, the probability is that petitioner
will also appeal.  So, we have here a
case which may be bouncing back and forth from the lower court to the upper
court.  Multiple appeals are not favored.  Sound practice seeks to accommodate the
theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and
the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case.^[10]
A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of
justice so demand – as in the present case – the final court, the Supreme
Court, should act, and act with finality. 
And this we read from the following culled from Samal vs. Court
of Appeals, 99 Phil. 230, 233 [underscoring supplied], which is
illuminating:

“Now, as regards the question of procedure, as already said,
the trial court in a decision dismissed the complaint without prejudice to
filing a new suit against the administrator of the estate of Pascual
Libudan.  In reversing said decision, the
Court of Appeals held that there was no need of filing an action against said
adminis­trator because at the commencement of the present action in 1950, the
estate of Pascual Libudan no longer had any right or interest in the
property.  Ordinarily, when an order of
dismissal issued by the trial court is reversed on appeal, the case is remanded
to said trial court for further proceedings, particularly for the reception of
evidence.  In the present case, however, the
trial court had already received all the
evidence presented by both parties,
consequently, the Court of Appeals was in a position to pass upon as it did said evidence and decide the case on its merits,
and there was no necessity for remanding the
case.“^[11]

7. The procedural question out of the way, we turn first to the
merits of the State’s charge that petitioner obtained his citizenship thru
fraud and falsification because “he suppressed and did not disclose the
truth which is that at the time he filed the petition and during the hearing
and his oath-taking he had a common-law wife, Mary Go, with whom he has several
children and he further alleged and testified during the trial that these
children were also the children of his real wife Go Koa when the truth is that
they are the children of his paramour, Mary Go.”

Petitioner, in his petition for naturalization, alleges that
“he is of good moral character.” 
The State offered evidence in support of denaturalization motion that
petitioner had been living with and begot least four illegitimate children with
his common-law wife, Mary Go, alias Go Ting Ty. 
The fact of illegitimate relationship between Go Ty and petitioner herein
is confirmed by the execution by both petitioner and Go Ting Ty
on August 6, 1959 of an affidavit labeled “Affidavit to be Accomplished in
case of an Illegitimate Child” (Exhibit F-1-Denaturalization),
acknowledging the illegitimate status of Ernesto Go, who was born on June 10,
1959 and whose certificate of live birth (Exhibit F-Denaturalization) is the
basis of the affidavit, Exhibit F-1.^[12]

 The extramarital
relationship between petitioner and Mary Go, alias Go Ting Ty, finds support
elsewhere in the record.  A recital of
the evidence as to Mariano Li – without taking into account the other children
allegedly begotten by petitioner with Mary Go, alias Go Ting Ty – suffices for
the purpose.  Petitioner testified at the
original hearing of his petition for naturalization that in addition to the
two children, namely, Aida.  Li and
Ricardo Li mentioned in his said application, another child, Mariano Li, born
on February 23, 1954, was begotten by him with his wife, Go Koa.  He presented Mariano Li’s birth certificate,
Exhibit P-2, and the latter’s Alien Certificate of Registration, Exhibit O-2.^[13]

However, according to Drs. Mercedes Villalobos and Servando
Arellano,^[14] who attended to the birth of Mariano
Li, the mother of said child is the woman whose pictures are Exhibits M-2, N-1 and
O-1-Denaturalization, and who is Mary Go whose true name is Go Ting Ty, and not
the person whose picture is Exhibits B-1 and B-2-Denaturalization, who is Go
Koa, the legitimate wife of herein petitioner.^[15]
The following from the findings of Judge Jesus Y. Perez, to which we fully
subscribe, constitute circumstantial evidence of the fact just mentioned:

“x x x There could not have been any
mistake on the part of Drs. Servando Arellano and Mercedes Villalobos as to the
identity of the woman known as Mary Go whose alien certi­ficate of registration
is exhibit ‘M-denaturalization’ because the said doctors had assisted to the
four deliveries of said Mary Go whose pictures are marked as Exhibits ‘M-2-
denaturalization’, ‘N-1-denaturalization’
and:  ‘O-1-denaturali­zation’.  Besides, her unusual bulk of about 275 pounds
^[16] could not
but leave a lasting impression as to her identity to Drs. AreIlano and
Villalobos whereas, Go Koa, the peti­tioner’s wife, whose picture is Exhibit
‘B-1-denaturalization’ appears to be lean.

According to Dr. Servando Arellano, the birth certi­ficate exhibit
‘A-denaturalization’^[17] does not reflect the truth that the
child referred to in said certificate of birth, is the third child of Mary Go
because according to said doctor, the physical examination of the mother who
gave birth to the child mentioned in exhibit ‘A-denaturalization’ showed that
it was the
first child of that woman.”^[18]

If Mariano Li was the
first child of Mary Go, alias Go Ting Ty said Mariano Li could not have been the third child of petitioner’s
legitimate wife, Go Koa.  To further bolster
the foregoing findings, Judge Perez added:

“Another circumstance showing that Go Koa, the petitioner’s
wife, is not the mother of the child Mariano Li is that in the birth
certificate of said child exhibit ‘A-denaturalization’, the mother is recorded
as only being 23 years old when the child Mariano Li was born on February 23,
1954.  But, since according to the alien
certificate of registration exhibit ‘B-denaturalization’ of Go Koa, she was
born on April 5, 1914 she was therefore
already 40 years old and not 23 years when Mariano Li was born.  On the other hand, Mary Go or Go Ting Ty must
be 23 years old when Mariano Li was born because according to her alien
certificate of registration exhibit ‘M-2-denaturalization’, she was born on May
10, 1931.  The age of 23 years of the
mother of Mariano Li appearing in the latter’s birth certificate corresponds to
the age of Mary Go alias Go Ting Ty and not Go Koa who was already 40 years of
age at the time of Mariano’s birth.”^[19]

We find, as did judge
Perez, that petitioner was guilty of fraud in presenting proof during the
course of the hearing of his petition for naturalization that Mariano Li is his
child with his lawful wife, Go Koa. He is not entitled to citizenship because
he did not conduct himself “in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
period of his residence in the Philippines” required in Section 2 of the
Naturalization Law.

8. And another yet.  Petitioner’s application for naturalization
states only 300 Sto. Cristo, Manila, and 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, as his former places of residence.  In support of his said application, how­ever,
petitioner testified:

“Q – What were you doing during the Japanese occupation?

 A – I stayed in the
province.

Q – Where?

A.- Province of Rizal.

Q – You were there for 3 or 4 years?

A – Yes, sir.”^[20]

Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law exacts that a petition for naturalization state petitioner’s
“present and former places of residence.” The residence contemplated in Section 7 encompasses all places where
petitioner actually and physically resided. 
Certainly, the particular place or places in the Province of Rizal where
he was residing for three or four years come within the purview of the term
“residence.” The reason for this is that “information regarding
petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in
his actual, physical surrounding.”^[21] Failure to allege a former place of residence
is fatal.^[22]

With all the foregoing,
we need not reach the other questions raised on appeal.

For the reasons given, the order of Judge Emigdio V. Nietes of
October 15, 1965, which reconsiders the order of denaturalization and confirms
the order of naturalization, is hereby reversed and set aside and declared null
and void; and the order issued by Judge Jesus Y, Perez on July 26, 1965
cancelling the naturalization certificate issued to peti­tioner, is hereby
affirmed.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and
Reyes, J., on leave.

Dizon, J., concurs in the result.

^[1]
In the Matter of a Petition to Become a Naturalized Filipino Citizen, Li Siu
Liat alias Perfecto alias Ng Se Liat, petitioner, Civil Case No. 21125, Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, the case below.

^[2]
Judge Amparo was then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, having been
appointed and qualified as such on October
3, 1958.

^[3]
Emphasis supplied.

^[4]
Emphasis supplied.

^[5]
Judge Jesus Y. Perez was appointed to the Court of Appeals on July 27, 1965 and
took his oath of office on the same day.

^[6]
Santos vs. Johnson, 6 Phil. 473, 474-475, citing Enriquez vs.
Watson, 3 Phil. 279; Ricamora vs.
Trent, 3 Phil. 137; and Osmeña vs. Gorordo,
5 Phil. 37.  See also:  People vs. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil.
786, 788-789.

^[7]
I Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., pp. 653-654, citing People vs.
O’Neil, 47 Cal.
109; emphasis supplied.  See also:  People vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

^[8]
Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675, 677-678, citing authorities.

^[9]
30-A Am. Jur., p. 120.

^[10]
Cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597.

^[11]
“When the case is regularly submitted to this Court on appeal, if it be one
originating in the Court of First Instance, this Court proceeds to review the
record and in the event that for any reason it cannot affirm the judgment
entered in the court below, it may then retry the case upon the
record, determining both questions
of law and fact, and on the findings
of fact thus made, modify or reverse the judgment
accordingly, thereby entering
a new judgment convicting or acquitting the
appellant as the case may be, or it may reopen the trial, as provided in sec. 42
of General Orders No. 58, and grant a new hearing.  The new hearing has shall take place in the
court of original jurisdiction.  This
Court also may also order a new trial in case the record or any material part
of it has been lost or destroyed through no fault on the part of the officers
of the Government.”  United States vs.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74, 77-78; underscoring supplied.

^[12]
Compare the date of birth of Go Ting Ty, the common-law wife, May 10, 1931, Exhibit
M-Denaturalization, and the date of birth of the real wife, Go Koa, Exhibit
B-2-Denaturalization, which shows that her date of birth was April 5, 1914.

^[13]
Transcript, p. 9, December 28, 1955.

^[14]
Transcript, pp. 16, 29, September 29, 1964; and pp. 11-14, July 9, 1964.  See: 
Exhibit C-Denaturalization.

^[15]
Transcript, pp. 8-9, July 9, 1964.

^[16]
Transcript, pp. 40-42, December 16, 1964.

^[17]
Birth certificate of Mariano Li.

^[18]
Record on appeal, pp. 72-73.

^[19]
Record on Appeal, pp. 74-75.

^[20]
Transcript, p. 20, December 28, 1955.

^[21]
Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964, cited in Tan vs.
Republic, L-22207, May 30, 1966.

^[22]
Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing, Chang vs.
Republic, L-20713, April 29, 1966,
Chan Kiat Huat vs. Republic, L-19579, February 28, 1966, Republic vs. Reyes, et al.,
L-20602, December 24, 1965,
citing cases.