MELCHOR ALCANTARA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SEVERINO BONEO, FELICISIMA BONEO AND JESUS MEJIS, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This case was certified to Us by the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 17(4) of Republic Act No. 296 since it
involves only questions of law.

The pertinent facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as
follows:

On March 4, 1970,
plaintiff-appellee Melchor Alcantara filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Calauag Branch, for recovery of possession with damages
against defendants-appellants Severino Boneo, Felicisima T. Boneo, and Jesus Mejis.  He alleged therein the following:  that he is
the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land situated in the
barrio of Cadlit, Buenavista,
Quezon covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-56897; that he had been in continuous, peaceful, adverse physical possession
thereof, enjoying its fruits, from April 12, 1964 until February, 1966 when spouses Boneo
occupied a portion of said land with an
area of approximately four (4)
hectares, and later placed Jesus Mejis as tenant
thereon; that his predecessors-in-­interest had been in peaceful, adverse, and
continuous possession thereof, in the concept of owners, since time immemorial
until April 12, 1964, when they sold the land to him; and that
defendants-appellants are unlawfully withholding the possession of the land
since February, 1966 up to the present (pp. 19-22, Rollo).

In their answer dated March 20, 1970, defendants-appellants
asserted the following:  that they are
the owners of a parcel of land in the same barrio of Cadlit,
Buenavista, Quezon, covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 6870; that they have been in open,
peaceful, public, continuous and adverse possession thereof since 1924 when
they filed Homestead Application No. 106209 (E-66647); and that they have been
paying taxes thereon from the time a homestead patent was issued to them up to the
present (pp. 22-26, Rollo).

In the hearing held on August
4, 1970, the counsel of both parties stated that “in order to
abbreviate the proceedings to save time and efforts of the Court and the
parties, it would seem to be better part of prudence that the property be
relocated” (p. 28, Rollo).  Consequently,
Geodetic Engineer Pedro L. Barras
was appointed by the trial court to conduct the relocation survey and
thereafter, to submit a plan with the corresponding technical descriptions as
well as his reports.

On February
11, 1971, in order
to expedite the resolution of differences among the parties, the trial court
ordered their counsel to submit pre-trial memoranda with copies of documents in their possession (pp. 29-30, Rollo).  On February 22, 1971, considering the manifestation of the counsel of
plaintiff-appellee that a pre-trial can be dispensed
with on the ground that the only legal issue involved is, which of the title of the parties over the questioned land
shall prevail, and that a plan and a commissioner’s report have already been
submitted, the trial court agreed to the suggestion of said counsel to
submit the case for summary judgment
and thus instructed both counsel to submit their memoranda simultaneously not
later than March 15, 1971 attaching therewith certified copies of documentary
evidence in their possession after which, the case shall be deemed submitted
for decision based on the pleadings (pp. 30-31, Rollo).  Acting on the ex-parte
motion to render judgment filed by the counsel of plaintiff-appellee, it appearing that
defendants-appellants have not filed their memorandum within the period,
the case was submitted for decision on March
30, 1971 (p. 31, Rollo).

On April
11, 1971,
defendants-appellants filed a petition for reconsideration of the March
30, 1971 order (pp.
32-37, Rollo), which was opposed by plaintiff-appellee
(pp. 37-39, Rollo).  On April 21, 1971, the trial court, in
resolving the petition for reconsideration and the opposition thereto, directed
defendants-appellants to submit their memorandum and documentary evidence
within twenty (20) days upon receipt of the copy of the order; and if the same
may enable the trial court to render judgment, the case shall be ordered
submitted for decision, otherwise, it will direct the presentation of parol evidence (pp. 39- 40, Rollo).  On May
26, 1971, defendants-appellants filed their pre-trial memorandum
(pp. 40-41, Rollo).

On September 13, 1971,
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee,
the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 50, Rollo):

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring plaintiff MELCHOR ALCANTARA as the sole and absolute owner of the
whole property covered by T.C.T. No. T-56897, entitled to the full possession and enjoyment
thereof; ordering defendants Severino Boneo, Felicisima T. Boneo and Jesus Mejis to vacate
the four (4) hectares portion of the land covered by the above title and
immediately restore the possession thereof to plaintiff, with costs against
defendants.

“SO ORDERED.”

The petition for reconsideration filed by
defendants-appellants was denied for lack of merit on March 13, 1972 (pp. 76-82, Rollo).

On March 18, 1972,
defendants-appellants filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (pp. 82-83, Rollo).  On October 28, 1974, the appellate
court resolved to certify the case to this Court.

The assignment of errors made by defendants-appellants may be
limited to the following:

1) the trial court erred in granting
a motion for summary judgment which was not in accordance with Sections 1, 2
and 3 of Rule 34; and

2) the
trial court erred in rendering a summary judgment in spite of the fact that all
the issues are controverted.

In their brief, defendants-appellants contend that the motion for
summary judgment was not supported by affidavits (as required by Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 34), depositions or admissions (as enunciated in Motor Service Co.,
Inc. v. Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
L-7063, March 29, 1955, 51 O.G. 1849).  It was
verbal, not under oath or based on matters deemed admitted.  The motion was interposed only during a
scheduled pre-trial and in the absence of the counsel of defendants-appellants.  Additionally, a perusal of their
(defendants-appellants) answer show that only the personal circumstances of
plaintiff-appellee were admitted by them. 
All other allegations in the complaint were specifically
denied and affirmative defenses were alleged by them which raised issues that could
be resolved only in a trial (pp. 101-116, Rollo).

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee
avers in his brief that defendants-appellants are deemed to have assented to
the rendition of summary judgment for their failure to raise any objections to
the February 22, 1971 and April 21, 1971 orders of the trial court.  The trial court, as can be gleaned from the details of the decision
and the order denying the motion for reconsideration, took considerable pains in evaluating the facts on which it based its judgment thereby
indicating that it was the product of serious deliberation.  Furthermore, defendants-appellants did not
specifically deny in their answer the material allegations of the complaint but
merely pleaded ignorance thereof (p. 126, Rollo).

The appeal lacks merit.  We
shall dispose of the first assignment of error by quoting the relevant portions
of the trial court’s order dated March
13, 1972, to wit (pp. 78-80, Rollo):

“x x x.  Without
necessarily judging, indulging to proxility (sic),
the Court desires to trace how the present case was deemed submitted for
decision, from the first time it was set for pre-trial on April 14, 1970 which
was prayed postponed by defendants’ counsel, as well as the subsequent hearing
on September 22, 1970, November 16, 1970, January 19 and February 22, 1971
which were also ordered reset upon his own behest, not to mention that instance
when he just failed to come with no notice to the Court at all.  On February
22, 1971, plaintiff’s counsel, while he
did not object to another postponement by counsel for defendants, prayed that
the case be deemed submitted for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 30 (sic) of
the New Rules of Court, on the manifestation that the only legal issue involved
is, which of the title of the adverse parties over the disputed portion shall
prevail. The Court found said suggestion meritorious considering that a plan
and commissioner’s report have already been submitted pursuant to an Order on
August 8, 1970 (sic) ordering the relocation of the litigated property so that
both counsel were thereafter instructed to submit their memoranda
simultaneously attaching therewith certified copies of their documentary
evidence, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.  As borne out by the records, the aforesaid
order (dated February 22, 1971) was received by defendants’ counsel on February
26, 1971 who, by his failure to move for
its reconsideration is deemed to have
raised no objection thereto.  Consequently, upon ex-parte
motion to render judgment, the case was finally deemed submitted for decision on March 30, 1971. 
Defendants’ counsel moved to reconsider the aforesaid order by the Court
from an examination of the
arguments of both parties (sic)
noted that plaintiff condescended to the desire of defendants that, after the
filing of the parties (sic) memoranda and the Court dins (sic) the same
insufficient to render judgment, parol evidence
should be admitted so that defendants on April 21, 1971 were directed to submit
their memoranda and documentary evidence, which is fufficient
(sic), the case shall be ordered submitted for decision otherwise the Court
will submit (sic) the presentation of oral evidence.  Apparently, defendants’ counsel
acquisced (sic) to said Order, raised no further opposition
thereto and in compliance with (sic) filed his pre-trial memorandum on May 26, 1971 alleging only the following facts, to wit:

‘They are the owners in fee simple of the
property covered by, and described in, Original Certificate of Title No. 6870 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon Province; the
property was surveyed
for them and in their name as far back as May 10-11, 1939; they have been in
the open, peaceful, public, adverse and continuous possession of their property
as far back as 1924 and up to the
present date; they introduced permanent improvements thereon worth thousands of
pesos; and they have been religiously paying
taxes thereon for a period of more than thirty (30) years
now.

‘2. That plaintiff knows the defendants
have occupied and possessed in good faith the property in litigation and they
introduced permanent improvements on the said
property worth not less than P30,000.00 in 1963 and may now be valued triple or quadruple that amount.

‘City of Lucena, May 26, 1971.

Respectfully submitted:

PARENTELA &
PARENTELA

BY:

JOSE P. PARENTELA

Attorney For The Defendants

City of Lucena’

without however
substantiating it with documentary proofs, x x x.” (underscoring supplied)

Verily, since defendants-appellants failed to object at the
opportune time or move for the reconsideration of the February 22, 1971 and April 21, 1971 orders, they cannot now be allowed
to question said orders.  Estoppel has set in. 
Their allegation that they filed a one (1) page memorandum only without
any documentary evidence, in order not to have a summary judgment, is a virtual
admission of ignorance of the rules on summary judgment.

Neither are We in conformity with the
view of defendants-appellants that all the issues before the trial court were controverted.  Where
the motion for summary judgment is made by a claimant (plaintiff), the
defendant must show that he has a plausible ground of defense, something fairly
arguable and of a substantial character (3 Moore’s Federal Practice, pp. 3184,
3185 cited in The Revised Rules of Court by Vicente J. Francisco, Vol. II, p.
421).  In this case, an examination of
the pleadings and the documents on file show the non-existence of
defendants-appellants’ claims and defenses. 
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact.  Under the circumstances, the trial court
committed no error in rendering a summary judgment on the merits of the case
(see De Leon v.
Faustino, 110 Phil. 249).  As the trial
court said in its decision dated September
13, 1971:

“Unfortunately, other than defendants’ averment of ownership
in fee simple of the property covered by and described in OCT No. 6870 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon, they did not bother to
substantiate it with concrete evidence, thus rendering their defense open to
discredit.  x x x.  (p. 47, Rollo)

“x x x.

“The plaintiff meticulously traced his right to the property
from the original registered owner to his immediate predecessor-in-interest Jovencio Capal (Annex ‘C,’) ‘D,’
’E,’ and ‘F’) and also submitted the tax receipts evidencing religious payment
of the land taxes thereof (Annex I to G) inclusive.  All these, taken in conjunction with the other
documentary exhibits heretofore discussed, is evidenced against
defendants of a nature, more than merely preponderant.” (p. 50, Rollo)

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is hereby DENIED.  The decision of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon dated September 13, 1971 and its order dated March
13, 1972 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa,
(Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.