FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, PETITIONER, VS. PRISCILA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS; FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, PETITIONER, VS. SIMPLICIA VILLAPANDO AND THE COURT …

In G. R. No. L-5984, respondents Priscila Garcia and Rosario Garcia
are the children of Antero Garcia, who died on August 14, 1936. Antero
Garcia obtained Homestead Patent No. 8840 to a parcel of land in
Unisan, Quezon on February 20, 1926, and Original Certificate of Title
No. 1279 therefor on March 17, 1927. Upon the death of Antero Garcia,
respondents inherited said land. On June 19, 1944 they sold and
conveyed this land to the petitioner Francisco Segovia for P10,000,
occupation currency, and by virtue thereof the petitioner now holds
Transfer Certificate No. 19396, dated June 23, 1944.

In G. R. No. L-5985, respondent Simplicia Villapando is the widow of
Angel F. Villegas, deceased, who died in December, 1944. During his
lifetime, Villegas was the owner of a homestead also in Unisan, Quezon,
for which he was issued Homestead Patent No. 24518 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 4090, dated November 14, 1933 and December 2,
1933, respectively. On June 19, 1944, Villegas sold the homestead to
the petitioner Segovia for P10,000, occupation money, and on June 23,
1944 the original certificate of title issued in his name was canceled
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19384 issued in favor of
petitioner Francisco Segovia.

Shortly after liberation, respondents Priscila Garcia and Rosario
Garcia in G. R. No. L-5894, and respondent Simplicia Villapando in G.
R. No. L-5895, widow of the late Angel Villegas, sought to repurchase
from petitioner herein, Francisco Segovia, the parcels of land above
mentioned. In both cases, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner has
no right to refuse to allow the repurchase in view of the provisions of
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Against these decisions, these
appeals have been taken by certiorari, and the same have been allowed
that the Court may have the opportunity to re-examine the provision of
law upon which the judgments are based (Sec.119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141) and the decision of this Court in the case of Isaac, et al.,
vs. Tan Chuan Leong, et al.^[*] G. R. No.
L-3324, promulgated on May 23, 1951. The provisions which may have
bearing on the question now under consideration are sections 116 and
117 of Act 2874, both in force at the time of the issuance of the
homestead patents of the parcels of land subject of the action, which
are as follows:

“SEC. 116.—Lands acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation
from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
norshall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops
on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.”

“SEC. 117. Every conveyance
of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance.”

Section 116 of Act 2874 became Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, promulgated on November 7, 1936, and was amended on June 8, 1939
by Commonwealth Act No. 456 by the addition of the following paragraph:

“No alienation, transfer or conveyance of any
homestead after five years and before twenty five years after issuance
of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, which aproval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds.”

Section 117 of Act 2874 has become Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

The first question raised in these appeals concerns the meaning of
the term “applicant” used in section 117 of Act 2874, or Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Claim is made that said term means one who
has applied for a homestead or a free patent, but who has not as yet
been granted a patentee. The argument that had the
Legislature intended to extend the right to repurchase to a patentee,
the word patentee would have been used in the law instead of applicant,
is a plausible one. Were we to accept it, however, section 117 of Act
2874 would become dead letter, as it would have no possible application
at all. Under the preceding section (Sec. 116 of Act 2874) no conveyance can
be made “from the date of the approval of the application and for a
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant.” Hence, a mere applicant, without patent, may not sell the land
applied for before the patent is issued. How can he (applicant),
therefore, repurchase a property he may not sell? Clearly, the term
“applicant” can mean no other person than a patentee, because only a
patentee has the right to make a conveyance and only a vendor can have
the right to make a repurchase. This conclusion is reinforced by the
use of the clause “when proper” in said section 117, under which
conveyance is proper only after, not before, the expiration of five
years from the issuance of the patent. The additional argument that the
law has no reason to protect a patentee, as it has the interest of a
mere applicant without a patent, has long ago been rejected by us in
the case of Abendaiio vs. Hao Su Ton, 47 Off. Gaz., 6359, where we said:

“The contention that under the terms of section 119
of Commonwealth Act 141, a patentee or grantee of homestead land has no
right to repurchase, because such right is granted only to the
‘applicant’, is untenable because the section clearly speaks of
‘conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead, ‘and it is
obvious that before issuance of the patent (or at least before final
proof), the applicant has not acquired the land. The term ‘applicant’
in the section involved is evidently descriptive and purports to
identify the one in whose name the patent was issued. The plain intent
of the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that the State granted him
as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it; and this
purpose would be defeated by the construction proposed by the
applicant. (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil., 792.)”

In consonance with the above, we decide and hold that the term
“applicant” as used in Section 117 of Act 2874, now Section 119 of the
Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, should be interpreted to
mean the holder of a patent, whether a homestead patent or a free
patent.

In connection with the case of Isaac, et al. vs. Tan Chuan Leong, et al., supra,
it appears that the homestead involved therein was patented on
September 13, 1917, and original certificate of title thereto issued on
October 1, 1917. At the time of the issuance of the patent and the
title, there was yet no provision of law in force, similar to section
117 of Act 2874, or section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
allow repurchase by an applicant within five years from the date of
conveyance. The facts of the cases at bar are entirely different,
because the patents and titles were issued in the years 1926 and 1927,
when section 117 of Act 2874 was already in force. It is not true that
there was no law in force granting the right to repurchase when the
titles in question were issued. The provision as to the right to
repurchase was in existence since 1919, the date when Act 2874 was
passed. There can, therefore, be no question of the violation of a
vested right of a patentee, as expounded in the case of Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil., 498, or the possibility of the application of the
constitutional provision against the infringement of the obligation of
contracts, as considered in the case of Isaac, et al. vs. Tan Chuan
Leong, et al.

The question of the conversion of the purchase price of the lands in
question into Philippine currency, in accordance with the Ballantyne
scale, is correctly decided by the Court of Appeals. As the repurchase
could be effected before liberation, in accordance with the law (Sec.
119, Public Land Act), and, therefore, with occupation currency, it is
evident that the parties, could not speculate or agree on the
continuation or cessation of the war as the time of the repurchase and
the Ballantyne scale is applicable (Hilado vs. De la Costa,^[*] 46 Off. Gaz., 5472).

In view of the foregoing considerations, we find no error in the
judgments appealed from, and the decisions should be, as they are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

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^[*] 89 Phil., 24.

^[*] 83 Phil., 47.