SPS. ARISTOTLE MENDOZA AND MARIE LIZA MENDOZA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. ROLANDO REX S. REYES AND LEONORA R. REYES AND HON. LORENZA R. BORDIOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT…
INTING, S.B., J.:
THE FACTS
This case stemmed from an action for Consolidation of Ownership filed by spouses Aristotle M. Mendoza and Marie Liza S. Mendoza [petitioners] against spouses Rolando Rex S. Reyes and Leonora S. Reyes [private respondents].
Petitioners and private respondents allegedly executed two (2) Deeds of Sale under Pacto De Retro whereby private respondents sold with right of repurchase two (2) real properties covered by TCT No. C-323700 and TCT No. C-323701 respectively to petitioners in the amount of One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,700,000,00) or P850,000.00 each.
When the agreed periods to repurchase the properties had lapsed, petitioners filed the case for Consolidation of Ownership.
In the said complaint, petitioners indicated that private respondents may be sent their summons at No. 15 Katuparan St., Gao, Quezon City. However, personal service of private respondents’ summons issued by the court on 10 June 2008 failed as per certification[4] of Sheriff Nicolas C. Ramos dated 26 June 2008 indicating that the given address was demolished by the City Government of Quezon City on May 2008. Thus, the summons was unserved.
On 17 July 2008 petitioners then filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the Process Server to Serve Summons Anew Atty. Ruben Talampas, Jr. [private respondents’ lawyer as indicated in the latter’s letter to petitioners]. However, it was denied for lack of merit.
Later, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication which was granted by the court on 29 October 2008. The publication indicated the same address stated above as the last known address of private respondents. After publication, trial ensued and the case was submitted for resolution.
On 26 June 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126, issued a decision[5], the dispositive portion of which states:
“Foregoing considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Let the consolidation of ownership of the subject properties in plaintiffs’ name be recorded in the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. The latter is likewise ordered to issue Transfer Certificates of Title in favor of plaintiffs SPOUSES ARISTOTLE M. MENDOZA and MARIE LIZA S. MENDOZA cancelling TCT Nos. C-323700 and C-323701 in the name of the defendants.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners then filed an Ex-parte Motion to Serve Decision by Publication which was granted by the court a quo.
Later, private respondents filed a Petition for Relief from the judgment rendered by the court a quo 26 June 2009 in Civil Case No. C-22078 on the ground of fraud committed by petitioners in securing the same.
On 10 June 2011 the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126, Caloocan City, issued its Order[7], the pertinent portion of which reads:
“Verily, defendants/petitioners Reyes were deprived of their right to present their evidence, thus, the assailed decision is set aside. With this ruling, all other pending incidents become moot and academic. Let Summons be served to defendants Spouses Rolando Rex S. Reyes and Leonora R. Reyes ar Lot 30, Block 1, Phase 3, Saint Matthew St., Sacred Heart Village, Caloocan City.
SO ORDERED.”[8]
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of said order.
On 1 February 2011 the court a quo issued an Order[9] which provides:
“There being no cogent reason to set aside the assailed Order, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.”[10]
Hence, this petition.
THE PETITION
Petitioners anchored their petition on these grounds:
“I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS AS GUILTY OF FRAUD DESPITE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH FINDING
II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DICRETION IN IGNORING UNCONTROVERTED FACTS WARRANTING A CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND IN FULL TRANSPARENCY”[11]
Petitioners ascribed abuse of discretion to the court a quo. Petitioners maintained that they should not be faulted in relying on the address provided by private respondents in their Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro as they have no obligation to inform the court of their correct address and to determine private respondents’ correct address. They contended that private respondents were negligent and acted deliberately in not participating in the case filed against them.
Petitioners claimed that their effort of good faith and full transparency was shown when they filed a motion before the court that summons be served through Atty. Ruben Talampas, Jr., private respondents’ former counsel. However, this was denied by the court a quo.
THIS COURT’S RULING
Here, the crux of the controversy is whether the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting respondents’ petition for relief from judgment and in denying reconsideration of the grant of the same.
The petition is bereft of any merit.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing that a judge has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly sets forth when a petition for certiorari can be used as a proper remedy:
“SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.”
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”[12] The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”[13] Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.”[14] From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.[15]
A direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, the Supreme Court cited the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial justice”;[16] the promotion of public welfare and public policy;[17] cases that “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof”;[18] or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.[19]
This is not the case here. Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion – the Orders of the court a quo in granting respondents’ petition for relief from judgment and in denying reconsideration of the grant of the same––were patent and gross or that there is a compelling reason that would warrant striking down those acts through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.
At the very least, petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the RTC Orders were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.[20] This, however, has not been shown in the petition.
Petitioners anchored their petition on the court a quo‘s alleged lack of evidence to support its finding and lack of appreciation of their good faith and full transparency.
On the other hand, private respondents stated that they filed their petition for relief from the trial court’s judgment dated 26 June 2009 as the same was obtained through petitioners’ fraud because the latter indicated a wrong address of the private respondents in the published summonses and which convinced the court to declare private respondents in default and deprived them of due process.
It is noteworthy that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”[21]
Here, there was no valid service of summons and so the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the private respondents. They were deprived of their right to defend their title to the properties involved and to present their evidence. They were deprived of due process. Hence, the judgment dated 26 June 2009 is null and void.
It is incorrect to theorize that petitioners have no obligation to indicate the correct address of the private respondents after commencing an action against them. When an action or proceeding has been commenced, jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court’s authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that the court takes on the burden to determine the correct address of the private respondents in this case.
The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object thereof.[22]
A meticulous scrutiny of the record reveals that there was neither serious effort on the part of the petitioners nor the Sheriff of the court a quo to locate private respondents’ whereabouts. Thus, this court may not uphold the validity of the publication of summons against private respondents especially so that the residence or house address of private respondents is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.
Worse, the records show that as early as November 21, 2008 petitioners had knowledge of herein respondents’ correct address in view of the criminal case for Estafa/Swindling filed by private respondents against Marie Liza Mendoza and Dinah Pilonggo indicating their correct address which is Lot 30 Block 1 Phase 3, Saint Matthew St., Sacred Heart Village, Caloocan City. Said criminal case involves the two certificates of title in the possession of petitioners which are also the subject of the petition filed by petitioners before the court a quo. However, despite having knowledge of the private respondents’ correct address petitioners still pushed through with the publication of private respondents’ summonses on January 6 and 13, 2009 using the alleged private respondents’ last known address. Petitioners manifested said publication in court on 17 April 2009 and were able to present their evidence ex-parte as the private respondents were not able to file their answer.
Based on the foregoing, this Court does not perceive any justifiable reason for petitioners’ chosen mode of action which betrays bad faith on their part. Absent any hint of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the court a quo‘s exercise of its jurisdiction.
All told, the court a quo did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its assailed orders. Thus, the court a quo may not be properly subjected to this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. The challenged orders dated 10 June 2011 and 12 December 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126, Caloocan City STAND. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., (Chairperson) and Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 28-31.
[3] Rollo, p. 25-27A.
[4] Rollo, p. 47.
[5] Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[6] Rollo, p. 59.
[7] Supra, note 2.
[8] Rollo, p. 31.
[9] Supra, note 3.
[10] Rollo, p. 27-A.
[11] Rollo, p. 10.
[12] Beluso v. Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 450 [2010]; citing De Vera v. De Vera, 584 SCRA 506 [2009]; Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, 570 SCRA 156 [2008].
[13] Ibid.; 2 Jose Y. Feria & Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 463 [2001].
[14] J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 24 [2000].
[15] Supra, note 15.
[16] Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214, 313.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Santos v. People, 563 SCRA 341 [2008].
[19] Ibid., citing Mead v. Hon. Argel, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 650, 656 (1982); Yap v. Lutero, 105 Phil. 1307, 1308 (1959); and Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co. v. Bartolome, et al., 95 Phil. 930, 937 (1954) which cited People v. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752, 756 (1951).
[20] Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, 481 SCRA 672 [2006].
[21] Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 663, 677, citing Lam v. Rosillosa, G.R. No. L-3595, May 22, 1950, 86 Phil. 447.
[22] Davao Light & Power Co. vs. Court of Appeals 204 SCRA 343 [1991].