BIBIANO M. VIÑA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIANA M. MARONILLA AND MANUEL MARONILLA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on Certiorari, seeking a reversal of
the Resolution, promulgated on May 3, 1974 by a Special Division of Five^[1]
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 02095-R, entitled “Juliana
M. Maronilla, et al. vs. Hon. Vicente G. Ericta, et al.” which modified the Decision of the
Regular Third Division of said Court^[2]
rendered on December 11, 1973, insofar as the Motion for Reconsideration of
respondent Republic of the Philippines (REPUBLIC, for short) was concerned, by
setting aside the Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
at Quezon City, Branch XVIII, dismissing REPUBLIC’s appeal for late filing of its Record on Appeal,
and, instead, directing said Trial Court to approve the appeal.

Although the basic issue in this
instance is limited to the timeliness of the perfection of the appeal, a brief
background is in order.

Proceedings
in the then Court

of First Instance

In Civil Case No.
Q-8095, petitioner, as plaintiff, sought to recover from the REPUBLIC and
Juliana M. Maronilla and Jose S. Maronilla
(SPOUSES, for short), the amount of P2,540,000.00 as his commission in selling
“Hacienda Bagumbong” situated at Jala-Jala, Rizal, and owned by
the SPOUSES, to the REPUBLIC.  It appears
that the SPOUSES had given petitioner a 60-day option to sell the
“hacienda” for a net price of P1,100,000.00 with the understanding
that any overprice would be petitioner’s commission.

On August 7, 1963,
within the renewed option period until August
8, 1963, petitioner succeeded in negotiating with the REPUBLIC,
through the Land Tenure Administration, a Deed of Absolute Sale and Donation by
the SPOUSES of the “hacienda” at the total price of P3,640,000.00, one-half of which was payable in cash and the
other half in negotiable land certificates. 
Payment was to be effected upon receipt by the REPUBLIC of a
certification by the proper Court that the civil case involving ownership of
the property had been settled, and upon the execution, perfection and
registration of the instrument.  It was
upon petitioner’s claim that he had earned his commission that he filed the Complaint
below.

Initially the REPUBLIC denied under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Sale and Donation alleging that the same was void for
not having been duly approved by the Land Tenure Administration Board and for
having been entered into without a previous certification of availability of
funds from the Auditor General as required by law.

In the meantime, the Land Tenure Administration was abolished by
Republic Act 3844 and all its assets, powers and functions were taken over by
the Land Authority.

For their part, the SPOUSES contended that petitioner had failed
to consummate the sale as he did not obtain the purchase price from the
REPUBLIC within the stipulated period so that he was not entitled to any
commission.

On August 3, 1970, the REPUBLIC, to the end that the land reform
program could be implemented, filed a Motion and/or Manifestation, reversing
its position, waiving the defects of the Deed of Sale and Donation and
ratifying the contract as of its date of execution on August 7, 1963, subject
to the condition that petitioner would waive his claim for damages in the sum
of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P100,000.00,
which petitioner did.  The Trial Court
eventually construed said REPUBLIC’s manifestation as
a confession of judgment.

The SPOUSES moved to strike out the REPUBLIC’s
Motion and Manifestation, which the Trial Court initially granted, but
thereafter deferred resolution of the reconsideration sought by REPUBLIC until
after trial on the merits.

On May 26, 1972,
the Trial Court rendered judgment, with the following decretal
portion:

“WHEREFORE,
JUDGMENT IS RENDERED:

I.     On the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and on
the Republic’s Confession of Judgment:  –

1.    Declaring valid and
perfected the ‘Deed of Absolute Sale and Donation’ marked as Annex ‘C’ of the
amended complaint and also marked as Exhibit ‘G’;

2.    Ordering the Republic to pay the purchase
price in the amount of P3,640,000.00, one-half (½) of which shall be in cash
and the other half, either in negotiable land certificates or in cash, with
legal interest from August 7, 1963 when the Maronillas
were deprived of possession, to be distributed in the following manner, to wit:

a)   P2,540,000.00 with
corresponding legal interest shall be paid to the plaintiff Viña;
and

b)   P1,100,000.00 with
corresponding legal interest shall be paid to defendant Maronillas.

3.    Ordering the Republic to make judicial
consignation of the amount of P3,640,000.00 with legal
interest aforesaid up to the date the judicial consignation is made.

4.    Ordering plaintiff Viña
to pay and settle out of his share of P2,540,000.00, the mortgage debt
including interest and other charges, of the Maronillas
in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines incurred before August 7,
1963; and

5.    Ordering the defendant Maronilla
spouses to pay plaintiff Bibiano Viña
the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

II.    On the Republic’s
Cross-claim:  –

1.    Declaring as valid and perfected the ‘Deed of
Absolute Sale and Donation’ executed by defendant Maronillas
in favor of the Republic marked as Annex ‘C’;

2.    Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 529 in
the name of the spouses Juliana Maronilla and Manuel Maronilla and also the subsequent derivative titles still
in the name of said spouses, particularly including, but not limited to,
Transfer Certificates of Title Numbers 164410 to 164420, inclusive; Transfer
Certificates of Title Numbers 164425 to 164432, inclusive; and Transfer
Certificates of Title Numbers 251847 to 251854, inclusive and further ordering
said Register of Deeds to issue new titles for all the aforesaid properties in
the name of the Republic.

III.   On the Cross-Claim of the Maronilla
spouses:

1.    Ordering the dismissal of the supplementary
counter-claim and/or cross-claim of the defendant Maronilla
spouses.

IT IS ORDERED.”^[3]

The REPUBLIC moved to reconsider and set aside certain aspects of
the Decision for not being part of the confession judgment.  Petitioner also sought reconsideration on the
ground that the purchase price had to be readjusted due to a de facto
devaluation.  Petitioner thereafter moved
for execution, which the REPUBLIC and the SPOUSES opposed.

On June 9, 1972,
the SPOUSES filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond, and on June 27, 1972, their Record on
Appeal.  REPUBLIC opposed the Record on
the ground that it did not include certain pleadings that it had filed.

On July 25, 1972, the Trial Court issued an Order requiring the
amendment of the SPOUSES’ Record on Appeal; denying the motion for readjustment
of the purchase price filed by petitioner; denying the REPUBLIC’s
Motion for Reconsideration; and, acting on petitioner’s supplemental Motion for
partial execution on the ground that the Decision had become final and executory, ordered the REPUBLIC to make a judicial
consignation, within two months from notice, of the amount of P2,540,000.00
corresponding to petitioner’s share, payable one-half in cash, and one-half in
negotiable land certificates.

On August 1, 1972,
petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint praying for a revaluation of the
purchase price, which the Trial Court admitted in the interest of justice over
the objection of the REPUBLIC and the SPOUSES.

On August 10, 1972,
REPUBLIC filed a notice of appeal from the Trial Court Decision of May 26, 1972 as well as from the
Order of July 25, 1972.  On August
18, 1972, REPUBLIC moved for extension of 30 days from August 20, 1972 within which to file
its Record on Appeal, or in the alternative, until such time as the SPOUSES’
Record on Appeal is approved by the Court. 
The SPOUSES also filed on August
22, 1972 their own Motion for extension of 20 days from receipt of
the last Order or pleading with in which to file their Amended Record on
Appeal.  Both Motions were granted.

On August 25, 1972,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss REFUBLIC’s
Appeal on the ground that the Decision as well as the Order of July 25, 1972 were
not appealable inasmuch as the Manifestation and Motion
filed by the REPUBLIC on August 3, 1970
partook of the nature of confession of judgment so that the judgment had become
final.

On September 15, 1972,
REPUBLIC sought another extension of 30 days from September 19, 1972 within which to file its Record on
Appeal.

On September 29, 1972,
the Trial Court issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion to dismiss REPUBLIC’s appeal, and granting the REPUBLIC up to October 30, 1972 within which to
file its Record on Appeal or at any time after the approval of the SPOUSES’
Record on Appeal but in no case more than 15 days after said approval.

On September 29, 1972,
REPUBLIC filed another Manifestation and Motion assailing the Order of the
Trial Court, dated July 25, 1972,
granting partial execution of the Decision.

On October 24, 1972, REPUBLIC further manifested that
Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaiming the entire country as a land reform area,
and Presidential Decree No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of the tenants from
the bondage of the soil, were applicable to the case and prayed for the
suspension of the proceedings to await the promulgation of rules implementing
P.D. No. 27.

In conjunction therewith, REPUBLIC, on October 27, 1972, filed a Motion for suspension
of the running of the period to file its Record on Appeal until the Trial Court
resolved its October 24, 1972
Motion to suspend proceedings.  The
tolling of the period of appeal was granted. 
However, the Motion for suspension of the proceedings was denied in the
Order dated December 27, 1972.  On the same date, the Trial Court rendered a
Supplemental Decision with the following dispositive
portion:

“WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment adopting in toto its findings of facts and of law in its
decision dated May 26, 1972 and, in addition thereto, hereby also renders judgment
denying all the reliefs prayed for in the plaintiff’s
supplemental complaint dated July 31, 1972.

Finally, the Court warns all the parties to perfect their appeal
within the reglementary period counted from receipt
of a copy of the supplemental decision embodied in this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”^[4]

On January 15, 1973,
REPUBLIC sought reconsideration of the two Orders, both dated December 27, 1972, which the Trial
Court denied.  REPUBLIC received the
Order of denial on March 16, 1973.

Meanwhile, on January
23, 1973, petitioner had filed a notice of appeal from the Order of
December 27, 1972 denying
the reliefs he had prayed for in his Supplemental
Complaint.  On March 8, 1973, petitioner’s Record on Appeal was
approved.

On March 9, 1973, petitioner moved for execution of the Decision
reiterating that it had become final and executory
since the REPUBLIC had confessed judgment and the Order of September 29, 1972
had granted it up to October 30, 1972, or 15 days after approval of the SPOUSES’
Record on Appeal within which to file its Record on Appeal but that it failed
to do so, and that the SPOUSES had failed to file their Amended Record on
Appeal by January 31, 1973.  The Trial
Court denied execution.

On March 23, 1973,
REPUBLIC filed its Record on Appeal, while that of the SPOUSES was submitted on
March 29, 1973.

On April 30, 1973, the Trial Court dismissed the appeals of
both the REPUBLIC and the SPOUSES for having been filed long after the period
granted them by the Court in its Order of December 27, 1972. 
In the same Order, the Trial Court granted the reconsideration prayed
for by petitioner and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution with respect
to the Decision dated May 26, 1972.  The Writ was actually issued on May 8, 1973.  The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
REPUBLIC was denied on June 18, 1973.

Proceedings
in the then

Court
of Appeals

On June 4, 1973, the SPOUSES commenced
in the former Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus (CA-G.R. No. 02095), praying for a Restraining Order to
enjoin the Trial Court from enforcing its Order of April 30, 1973 dismissing
the appeals, and the Writ of Execution of May 8, 1973.  The Petition was given due course.

On July 23, 1973,
the REPUBLIC was allowed to file a Complaint in Intervention.

Respondents therein answered, interposing the affirmative
defenses that REPUBLIC’s filing of its Motion for
Reconsideration, dated January 10, 1973, did not suspend the running of the
period to perfect an appeal, which allegedly expired on February 5, 1973, and
that the filing of REPUBLIC’s Record on Appeal only
on March 23, 1973 was forty-six days late.

On December 11, 1973,
the Regular Third Division of respondent Appellate Court sustained the
questioned Trial Court Order of April
30, 1973 dismissing the appeals of both the REPUBLIC and the
SPOUSES, and that of June 18, 1973
denying reconsideration.

Both the REPUBLIC and the SPOUSES moved for reconsideration.  Resolving the Motions, respondent Court’s
Special Division of Five voted to grant REPUBLIC’s
Motion for Reconsideration on two grounds:

“(1)   upon its intrinsic
merit, i.e. its record on appeal was filed seasonably; and (2) on a policy
consideration, i.e. that it would be better, applying the balance-of-interest-principle,
to afford Republic an opportunity to appeal rather than not”^[5]

The dispositive portion of that
Resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, Republic’s motion for reconsideration is hereby
granted and the orders of April 30, 1973 dismissing the appeal with respect to
Republic as well as the writ of execution dated May 3, 1973 are hereby SET
ASIDE and respondent Judge is directed to approve and give due course to
Republic’s record on appeal.  However,
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[6]

Reconsideration thereof separately sought by petitioner and the
SPOUSES was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner then filed this Certiorari petition on November 4, 1974.  The SPOUSES also filed, on November 14, 1974 a separate
Petition (G. R. No. L-39495 entitled “Juliana M. Maronilla,
et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al.”) for
reinstatement of the dismissed appeal. 
In a Resolution dated March 19,
1974, however, this Court denied the SPOUSES’ Petition for lack of
merit, but gave due course to this suit.

 The focal issue is whether
or not the REPUBLIC’s Record on Appeal was seasonably
filed and its appeal perfected within the reglementary
period.

Petitioner contends that respondent Appellate Court erred:

“1.    x x x in holding that the motion for reconsideration of
respondent Republic, dated January 10, 1973, had the effect of suspending the
running of the period granted by the trial Court within which to file its
record on appeal.

“2.    x x x in not holding that respondent Republic’s motion for
reconsideration, of January 10, 1973, is pro forma, and, as such,
did not toll the running of the period of appeal.

“3.    x x x in applying the principle of
‘balancing of interest’.”^[7]

We reject those contentions upon the pertinent data recapitulated
below:

On August 10, 1972,
REPUBLIC filed its Notice of Appeal from the Trial Court Decision of May 26, 1972 and Order of July 25, 1973.

On August 18, 1972,
REPUBLIC moved for extension of 30 days from August 20, 1972 within which to file its Record on Appeal,
or in the alternative, until such time as the SPOUSES’ Record on Appeal is
approved.  The Motion was granted.  Upon another request for extension, REPUBLIC
was granted up to October 30, 1972
within which to file its Record on Appeal, or in the alternative, to file it at
any time after the approval of the Record on Appeal of the SPOUSES but in no
case more than fifteen (15) days after said approval.

In the meantime, REPUBLIC filed on October 24, 1972 a Motion for suspension of proceedings
in view of the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 2 and 27, allegedly applicable to the
case.  On October 27, 1972, REPUBLIC filed a Motion to suspend the
running of the period to file its Record on Appeal until the Court resolved its
Motion suspend proceedings.  On October 28, 1972, the Trial Court
granted the Motion to suspend the running of the period to file REPUBLIC’s Record on Appeal.  On December 27, 1972, the Court issued two
(2) Orders, one, denying REPUBLIC’s Motion to suspend
proceedings and, two, a Supplemental Decision, with a warning to all parties to
perfect their appeal within the reglementary period
counted from receipt of the Supplemental Decision.

Obviously, the warning was intended to amend and supersede all
previous Orders regarding the perfection of the appeal.

Ordinarily, since the REPUBLIC received on January 5, 1973 a copy each of the Orders dated December 27, 1972, it would have had
until February 4, 1973
within which to submit its Record on Appeal. 
However, on January 10, 1973,
it filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying suspension of
proceedings which was denied by the Trial Court on February 10, 1973.  REPUBLIC received copy of said Order on March 16, 1973.  REPUBLIC then filed its Record on Appeal on March 23, 1973.  As respondent Appellate Court had found:

“x x x
Republic’s record on appeal, which it filed on March 23, 1973, was well within
the period granted it to perfect its appeal considering that the order of
December 27, 1972 giving Republic thirty (30) days within which to perfect its
appeal was received by it on January 5, 1973; it then filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order on January 10, 1973 and copy of the order denying
said motion for reconsideration was received by it on March 16, 1973.  It thus appears that the Republic has
consumed only twelve (12) days of the thirty (30) days granted it to perfect
its appeal.”^[8]

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, REPUBLIC’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated January
10, 1973 was not pro forma, even if we were to
concede that it was a reiteration of its previous Motion for suspension of the
proceedings.

“x x x
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is
precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper,
contrary to the law or the evidence (Rule 37, Section 1, subsection [c]); and
in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity
upon the issues passed upon by the court. 
If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence
would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would confined to
filing only motions for reopening and new trial.  We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for
ruling to that effect, a ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (c)
of Section 1 of Rule 37″.^[9]

It is also worth noting that the said Motion for Reconsideration
specifically pointed out the erroneous conclusions of fact and law upon which
the two subject orders of the Trial Court were based, and explained in detail
why they were so.^[10]
This circumstance further refutes petitioner’s contention that said Motion for
Reconsideration was pro forma.

“The motion for reconsideration of herein petitioner, while
substantially based on the same grounds he invoked in his memorandum after the
case was submitted for decision, is not pro forma as it points
out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment which he claims
are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law”^[11],
aside from stating additional specific reasons for the said grounds”.^[12]

The conclusion follows that not being pro forma, REPUBLIC’s Motion for Reconsideration, dated January 10, 1973, suspended the
running of the period within which to file its Record on Appeal.^[13]

There is another consideration equally as compelling.  The merits of the intended appeal persuade us
to give REPUBLIC a chance to seek a review by an Appellate Court of the
judgment adversely affecting its interests. 
In the language of then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Guillermo S. Santos:

“In the second place, the case which involves a substantial
amount, over three (3) million pesos, raises several transcendental issues of
fact and law or of law alone, which can only be resolved on their merits by an
appeal.  It would thus not only be unwise
but also unfair to foreclose Republic’s recourse to an appeal.  It should be noted, and this is a matter of
record, that the Republic — and this can be said of the Maronillas
— has seasonably taken steps to appeal them the filing of their notice of
appeal and appeal bond, in the case of Maronilla,
within the reglementary period — and the only issue
is whether the Maronillas and Republic filed their records
on appeal within the extension granted them or not.  On the principle of a balancing of interests
between two competing alternatives, it would seem that it would be better to
afford Republic the opportunity to appeal and to settle once and for all the
issues it desires to raise — i.e., inter alia,
whether or not the case has become academic in the light of the Presidential
Decrees, and whether or not the amicable settlement is legal and could have
been approved as a basis for judgment, or not — in this instance.”^[14]

In respect of the principle of “balancing of
interests”, its invocation is not really out of place considering that it
is always incumbent upon the Judiciary to undertake the process of
harmonization and balancing.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby denied, and the Resolutions of respondent Appellate Court dated May 3, 1974 and October 8, 1974, respectively, hereby
affirmed.  Let the records of the case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court to which this case has been assigned,
which Court is hereby ordered to give due course to the appeal of respondent
Republic of the Philippines.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Composed of J. Guillermo S. Santos, ponente;
concurred in by JJ. Lourdes P. San Diego and Ricardo C. Puno; with JJ. Magno S. Gatmaitan and Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr., dissenting.

^[2]
Composed of J. Magno S. Gatmaitan,
ponente; concurred in by JJ. Guillermo S. Santos and Ricardo C. Puno.

^[3] pp. 87-88, Rollo.

^[4] p. 143, ibid.

^[5] p. 265, ibid.

^[6] p. 272, ibid.

^[7] p. 11, ibid.

^[8] p. 269, ibid.

^[9]
Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,
32 SCRA 317 (1970).

^[10] p. 144, Rollo.

^[11] Maturan vs. Araula, 111
SCRA 615 (1982), citing the case of City of Cebu vs. Mendoza, 62 SCRA
440, 446 (1975).

^[12] Maturan vs. Araula, supra.; City of Cebu vs. Mendoza,
supra; Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246, 254 (1973); Carbonel
vs. Padilla, 75 Phil. 95, 101 (1945).

^[13] Loria vs.
Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 1067 (1962).

^[14] pp. 269-270, Rollo.