G.R. No. L-54554. March 30, 1981
EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, JUDGE OF THE CFI OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXXIII AND HONORATO G. MACKAY, ACTING HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE…
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for “Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition”, seeking the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-7770 below, we
have, as factual background, the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan
City. Private respondent, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay, was the Resident Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital became vacant upon the
resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City
Mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently
appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator, private respondent Dr. Mackay,
a Resident Physician in said hospital.
Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr., protested Dr. Mackay’s designation and subsequent appointment alleging
among others that, as Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla)
was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who succeeded former Mayor, now
Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay’s appointment stating:
“x x x as of April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato
G. Mackay was promoted to Assistant Hospital Administrator from his previous
position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position
by reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the Certificate
in Hospital Administration x x x
contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.”
“x x x x x x x”
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission
on appeal. On December 29, 1978, the
Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla’s appeal and revoking Mackay’s
appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. The pertinent portion of the afore-stated
Resolution reads:
“A perusal of the records shows that appellant Medalla is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan
City General Hospital; he is a holder of the Degree of Doctor of Medicine; he
has completed the requirements in Hospital Administration and is recommended
for the title of Certificate in Hospital Administration; he is also a
candidate of a Masters degree in Hospital Administration. He possesses the First Grade eligibility (BA
1080) and had undergone relevant training in Hospital Administration. His performance rating is ‘Very
Satisfactory’.
“On the other hand, appellee Mackay
had been a Resident Physician, the position he held prior to his promotion to
the contested position. He is a holder
of the degree of Doctor of Medicine and is a First Grade eligible (BA 1080-Medical
Board). He is a graduate student in
Hospital Administration and as of September 18, 1978 he has completed all
academic requirements for a certificate in Hospital Administration. His performance rating is ‘Very
Satisfactory’.
“A perusal of the organizational chart of the Ospital ng Caloocan
approved by the Hospital, Administrator would show that the Chief of Clinics is
the next lower position to the Assistant Hospital Administrator. The Resident Physician is not a next lower
position to the Assistant Hospital Administrator. Therefore, Medalla
and not Mackay is the person next in rank who may be promoted to the position
involved.
“Moreover, even on the basis of competence and qualifications
to perform the duties of the position, the records show that Dr. Medalla is more competent and qualified than Dr.
Mackay. The qualification relied upon by
the Acting City Mayor in justifying the appointment of Dr. Mackay which is his
having completed the academic requirements for the Certificate in Hospital Administration
does not give Dr. Mackay the advantage inasmuch as Dr. Medalla
has also completed all the academic requirements for a certificate in Hospital
Administration and is recommended for a title of Certificate in Hospital
Administration apart from being also a candidate for a Masters degree in
Hospital Administration.”[1]
“x x x x”1
Upon automatic review by
the Office of the President, pursuant to section 19(6), PD No. 807, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo
C. Clave rendered a Decision on April 24, 1979 declaring that:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by Civil
Service Commission, the appointment of Dr. Honorato
G. Mackay as Assistant Hospital Administrator in the Caloocan
City General Hospital is hereby revoked
and the position awarded in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio
M. Medalla.”[2]
The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for
reconsideration.
On May 7, 1979, totally disregarding the Decision of the Office
of the President, the same Acting City Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as
Hospital Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco
as his Assistant, thereby again completely by-passing Medalla. Mackay took his oath of office on May 7,
1979.
On June 27, 1979, however, the Civil Service Commission, acting on
Medalla’s protest, and besides calling attention to
the penal provision of P.D. No. 807, disapproved Mackay’s
appointment as follows:
“Wherefore, premises considered and finding the protest of Dr.
Medalla in order, the appointment of Dr. Mackay as
Hospital Administrator at P26,388 per annum effective May 7, 1979 is hereby
disapproved. It is hereby ordered that
Dr. Medalla be appointed to the position of Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City General
Hospital.”[3]
On July 20, 1979, Mackay moved for reconsideration asserting 1)
denial of due process of law inasmuch as the contested Resolution/Decisions
were issued ex-parte, and 2) that the Civil Service
Commission can not ignore nor overrule an appointment made by a City Executive.
Without awaiting the resolution of his Motion for
Reconsideration, Mackay filed, on July
23, 1979, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Caloocan City, presided by respondent Judge, a
Petition for “Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages” (Civil Case No. C-7770) against Hon. Jacobo Clave, the Civil Service Commission, the Acting City
Mayor, the City Treasurer, and Medalla, praying that
said respondents be restrained from implementing the Decision of Hon. Jacobo Clave of April 24, 1979, the Resolution No. 49 of
the Merit Systems Board dated December 29, 1978, and the Decision of the Civil
Service Commission of June 27, 1979. The
Court a quo issued the Restraining Order prayed for on July 25,
1979 enjoining implementation of the afore-stated Resolution/Decisions.
On August 2, 1979, Medalla moved to
dissolve the Restraining Order and to dismiss the Petition alleging mainly
that Mackay had not exhausted his administrative remedies and that the
latter’s right to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not only dubious or
debatable but was clearly non-existent.
Hon. Jacobo Clave and the Civil Service
Commission likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss on the same ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
On August 13, 1979, Mackay moved to suspend proceedings pending
final resolution by the Civil Service Commission of his Motion for the
reconsideration of the Decision of said Commission dated June 27, 1979.
On September 24, 1979, the Trial Court denied both Motions to
Dismiss filed by Medalla, on the one hand, and Hon.
Clave and the Civil Service Commission, on the other, holding that Mackay’s failure to await resolution of his Motions for
Reconsideration pending before the Office of the President and the Civil
Service Commission did not deprive him of a cause of action besides the fact
that according to the respective Manifestations
of the said Offices; the Motions for Reconsideration had already been
resolved adversely against Mackay.
Acting on Medalla’s Motion for
Reconsideration thereof as well as his Motion to Lift Restraining Order, the
Court a quo, in its Order of July 15, 1980, denied
reconsideration but lifted the Restraining Order “there being no showing that petitioner is entitled
to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.” Respondent Judge
then set the case for hearing.
At this juncture, Medalla instituted
this Petition before us praying that the Court a quo be
restrained from proceeding with the hearing and that judgment be rendered as follows:
“1. Ordering the Honorable Marcelino
N. Sayo, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City, to dismiss respondent Mackay’s petitions, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies resulting to a lack of cause of action;
2. Declaring the decision
of the Office of the President (Annex ‘C’) and the Merit Systems Board (Annex
‘E’) as valid and enforceable.”[4]
We issued a Restraining Order on August 27, 1980 enjoining respondents from
proceeding with the case below.
On November 7, 1980, we required petitioner Medalla
to implead the Mayor of Caloocan
City as party-respondent, and the latter to comment on the Petition and to
state whether he is ready to issue an appointment to Medalla
as Hospital Administrator, Medalla’s rights thereto
having been upheld by the Civil Service
Merit Systems Board and by the Office of the President.
In his Compliance, Medalla included an
additional prayer that the City Mayor of Caloocan be
ordered to immediately appoint him as Hospital Administrator and to pay him
salary differentials.
In his Comment, the City Mayor of Caloocan
invoked the privilege of an appointing authority to determine who can best
fulfill the functions of an office citing the case of Aguilar vs. Nieva, Jr.[5] that effect. And as to the matter of his readiness to issue an appointment to Medalla, he manifested his preference to withhold action
pending Mackay’s unresolved Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of June 27, 1979 of the Civil Service Merit
Systems Board.
Petitioner Medalla submits that the
Trial ‘Court erred in not dismissing Mackay’s
Petition before it, there being a clear showing of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and that said Court was devoid of jurisdiction in
reviewing on Certiorari decisions of the Office of the President and of
the Civil Service Commission rendered in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
functions.
Private respondent Mackay takes the contrary view and prays,
instead, that the contested Decisions/ Resolution be declared null and void and
respondent Judge ordered to proceed with the hearing of the case below.
Although Mackay’s Motions for
Reconsideration were, in fact, still pending resolution by Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Commission,
respectively, at the time private respondent Mackay filed the Petition below,
dismissal of said Petition can no longer be anchored on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as Medalla
prays, considering that Manifestations dated August 17 and 23, 1979 filed by
the said parties before the Court a quo show that they had
resolved the incidents adversely against Mackay.[6]
That issue, therefore, has become moot and academic.
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by Certiorari
decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the
Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no question but
that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this
conclusion:
“The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act
arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system
of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments,
the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own
assigned powers and duties. When a
presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be
implied therefrom that the Executive is being made
subject and subordinate to the courts.
The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the
Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief
Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement
it (the law). A judicial review of the
President’s decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service
Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to
the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial
review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers.”[7]
—-o0o—–
“The courts may always examine into the exercise of power by a
ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether the particular power
has been granted to the officer, whether it is a legal power that could have
been granted to him, and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. This jurisdiction does not depend upon an
act of the legislature authorizing it, but inheres in the courts of general
jurisdiction as an essential function of the judicial department. (State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agri. Asso. 123 SW 681).”[8]
(emphasis supplied).
For the speedy determination of the controversy, however, and
considering that the position involved is infused with public interest, rather
than remand the case to the Court below for further proceedings, we hold that
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Hon. Jacobo
C. Clave and the Civil Service Merit Systems Board is absent.
To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan (RA No. 5502), it is clear that the power of
appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city
funds is subject to Civil Service
law, rules and regulations (ibid.,
section 19). The Caloocan
City General Hospital is one of the city departments provided for in the said law (ibid., sec. 17). The Hospital Administrator is appointed by
the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B).
The Hospital Administrator is the head of the City General Hospital empowered
to administer, direct, and coordinate all activities of the hospital to carry
out its objectives as to the care of the sick and the injured (ibid.).
Under section 19(3) of the Civil Service Decree (PD No. 807,
effective on October 6, 1975), the recruitment or selection of employees for
promotions is drawn from the next-in-rank.
“SEC. 19. Recruitment
and Selection of Employees. –
x x x
(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second
level of the Career Service as defined in Section 7, the employees in the government
service who occupy the next lower positions in the occupational group under
which the vacant position is classified and in, other functionally related
occupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate
civil service, eligibility shall be considered for promotion.”
Section 19(6) of the same Decree provides for the administrative
procedure by an aggrieved employee in case
of non-observance by the appointing authority of the next-in-rank rule, thus:
“Sec. 19(6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the
right to appeal initially to the department head and finally to the Office of
the President an appointment made x x x x (2) in favor of one who is
not next-in-rank, x x x x if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with
the written special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for
such appointment: x x x x x x. Before deciding a contested appointment, the
Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission. For purposes of this Section, ‘qualified
next-in-rank’ refers to an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a
position previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to
be filled and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously
determined by the appointing authority and approved by the Commission.”
The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla. He had
appealed to the department head and from thence, in view of the latter’s
unfavorable action, to the Civil Service Commission and thereafter to the
Office of the President. Resolution No.
49 of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board, its Decision of June 27, 1979, and
the Decision of the Presidential Executive Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were
all rendered in Medalla’s favor. The special reason given by the Acting City
Mayor for Mackay’s appointment, which is, that he had completed all academic
requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not tenable,
since Medalla himself was found to be in possession
of the same qualification. But while the
qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it
is clear that the position of Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to
Hospital Administrator under the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackay’s appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator
and subsequently Hospital Administrator, Medalla
outranked Mackay who was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the
next-in-rank, Medalla is entitled to appointment as
Hospital Administrator.
Respondent Mackay’s urging that he was
denied due process deserves scant consideration considering that subsequent
developments in the case establish that he was heard on his Motions for Reconsideration
by both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President.
It is true that, as respondent City Mayor alleges, a local
executive should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence; provided they
are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the
requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability,
energy and judgment.[9]
However, as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit
Systems Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious
assessment of the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla
and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a careful
study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be ignored. The revocation of Mackay’s
appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, 1) the appointment extended to private
respondent, Dr. Honorato C. Mackay, as Hospital
Administrator is hereby declared null and void; 2) respondent City Mayor of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to extend an appointment to
petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla,
as Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City
General Hospital immediately upon notice of this Decision; 3) petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, shall
receive all compensation and emoluments appertaining to said position
thenceforth, but without entitlement to salary differentials; and 4) respondent
Judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case
No. 7770.
This Decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
[1]
pp. 12-13, Rollo.
[2]
Annex “C”, p. 16, ibid.
[3]
p. 20, ibid.
[4]
p. 9, ibid.
[5]
40 SCRA 113.
[6]
see Order, September 24, 1979,
p. 41, Rollo.
[7]
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 490,
492-493 (1957).
[8]
2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law S 566 p. 379.
[9]
Claudio vs. Subido, 40 SCRA 381, (1971).