PROGRESSIVE LABOR ASSOCIA­TION, BERNARDO O. CALANG, DOMINADOR RUIZ AND DELFIN N. MERCADER, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO VILLASOR, CEBU CARTAGE CORPORATION, ATLAS CONSOL…

Progressive Labor Association versus Villasor

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by the Progressive Labor Association and three of its officers against Judge Guillermo Villasor of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Cebu Cartage Corporation, the Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation, and the Mayor, the Police Chief, and the Philippine Constabulary commanders of Toledo City. The union asked the Supreme Court to dissolve a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court against its picketing, to dismiss the hauling company's civil case for injunction and damages, and to restrain the public respondents from breaking the picket line. The case matters because it shows how a labor injunction becomes moot once the strike it restrained has ended, and it marks the boundary between a court's jurisdiction over a claim for damages and the labor tribunals' jurisdiction over a labor dispute.

Procedural History

The union filed a complaint for unfair labor practices in the Court of Industrial Relations against Atlas. The Cebu Cartage Corporation then filed a complaint for injunction and damages in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the union and its officers. The trial court issued an ex parte preliminary injunction against the strikers. The union moved to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the civil case on the ground that a labor dispute connected with unfair labor practices was involved. The trial court denied both motions, and denied reconsideration. The union then came to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court gave the petition due course and issued its own preliminary injunction as prayed for. After the strike ended, the Court lifted its injunction, and the case was submitted for decision.

Facts

On March 31, 1966, the Progressive Labor Association, acting for nearly four thousand members employed at Atlas, presented a nineteen point demand for better terms of employment. The union later complained of unfair labor practices by Atlas, namely its refusal to continue negotiations, its alleged inducement of union directors to oust Attorney Delfin Mercader as counsel, and its refusal to turn over five pesos checked off from each member's salary. On June 15, 1966, the union filed a notice of strike, and on July 11, 1966, it staged a strike and picketing around the Atlas premises in Toledo City, Cebu.

On July 15, 1966, the Cebu Cartage Corporation, which had a hauling contract with Atlas, filed a complaint for injunction and damages against the union and its officers, seeking to stop the picketers from preventing its trucks and personnel from entering and leaving the Atlas premises. The next day, the trial court issued an ex parte preliminary injunction against the union and its striking members. The union moved to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied both motions and denied reconsideration.

In this Court, Cebu Cartage answered that it was not involved in the labor dispute and had sought the injunction only to fulfill its hauling contract. It also moved to dissolve or modify the Supreme Court's injunction because a return to work agreement had been signed on August 27, 1966 by newly elected union officers. The union disputed the validity of that election. On June 13, 1967, the union moved to terminate the preliminary injunction, stating that the strike and picketing had formally ceased on October 4, 1966, when the strikers offered to return to work and lifted their pickets. All respondents manifested no objection, and the Court lifted its injunction.

Issues

• Whether or not the case has become moot with the cessation of the strike and picketing, so that the trial court's preliminary injunction need no longer be declared void.
• Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the civil case for injunction and damages despite the claim that the dispute was a labor dispute connected with unfair labor practices.

Applicable Provisions

The decision refers to Republic Act 875, the Industrial Peace Act, as the statute whose procedural requirements govern injunctions in labor disputes:

No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court, to the effect that unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained.

This provision bears on the case because the union's principal attack was that the trial court issued its ex parte injunction without following these requirements.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the case had become moot. The union itself admitted that the strike, the picketing, and all concomitant acts had ceased on October 4, 1966, and the respondents interposed no objection. The injunction had lost its purpose and effectivity, and the Court saw no necessity in further declaring void and ineffective what was of itself already ineffective.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction. The alleged lack of a cause of action is not a jurisdictional defect, and the trial court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the main case insofar as the complaint sought damages. As to the claim that the labor dispute was connected with unfair labor practices, the Court ruled that such an allegation, without supporting proof, is insufficient to show that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A petition that attacks a labor injunction becomes moot once the strike and picketing it restrained have ceased, and the Supreme Court will not declare void what has already lost its purpose and effectivity. The requirements of Republic Act 875 govern the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, but a bare allegation that a labor dispute is connected with unfair labor practices, unsupported by proof, does not divest a Court of First Instance of jurisdiction over a civil case for injunction and damages. Lack of a cause of action is not a jurisdictional defect.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the Court will not declare void and ineffective what is of itself already ineffective, for mootness ends the inquiry once the strike is over. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional divide between a court hearing a claim for damages and a labor tribunal, and the rule that an unsupported allegation of unfair labor practice does not oust the regular court of jurisdiction.